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Progress Era 
 
 
This dissertation is an examination of US-Guatemalan relations during the 1960's. 
At that time, the United States was promoting a major developmental program throughout 
Latin America: The Alliance for Progress. A "Marshall Plan for Latin America" the 
Alliance was meant to modernize the region by promoting democratic institutions, 
invigorating local economies, and expanding access to education and medical care. In 
Guatemala, however, anticommunist dogma prevailed over the lofty rhetoric of the 
Alliance for Progress. Instead of becoming the promised "showcase for democracy", 
Guatemala was transformed into a garrison-state engulfed in a long, violent civil war. This 
history will reconstruct these events and explain how even policies crafted with the best of 
intentions can end in tragedy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Shortly after taking office in 1961, John F. Kennedy announced to the world that 
the United States would invest in an ambitious new partnership with the countries of 
Latin America: The Alliance for Progress. The program, greeted with considerable 
fanfare from Latin Americans, promised to develop the region’s economic and political 
institutions as a ward against communism. Seven years later, the Deputy Chief of 
Mission to Guatemala, Viron Vaky, charged that the policies of the United States 
condoned and encouraged state terrorism. Over the course of the 1960s, the aid money 
that President Kennedy claimed would build schools and hospitals funded the people who 
burned them to the ground.  
This history reconstructs how the Guatemalan state transformed during the 
Alliance for Progress era. On the surface, it seems paradoxical that a brutal military 
regime should emerge during a period when democratization and development were 
championed as the guiding force behind US policy in Latin America. Economic 
exploitation and military intervention had created perpetual crises in Guatemala by time 
Kennedy launched the Alliance, and his administration hoped to blunt the lure of 
communism with economic development programs and political reform. Despite these 
goals, President Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon Johnson, instead facilitated the 
militarization of Guatemalan society. When challenged by revolutionary movements 
inspired by nationalism and Castro’s Cuba, the idealism of the Alliance for Progress gave 
way to anticommunist dogma and the harsh realities of Cold War Guatemala. 
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The imbalance of power between the United States and Guatemala was enormous, 
but this did not prevent Guatemalan actors from exerting their will. In fact, this study 
often reveals that Guatemalan officials outmaneuvered their American counterparts and 
retained control over their personal and national destinies. The United States certainly 
exerted considerable influence over Guatemalan affairs, but most of the major decisions 
and events turned on the actions taken by the citizens of Guatemala. Both President 
Ydigoras and Defense Minister Peralta, who proved themselves to be ardent 
anticommunists and obvious Cold War allies, routinely rebuffed Washington’s demands. 
Certainly, the United States, through the Alliance for Progress, contributed to the 
militarization of Guatemala, but it was Guatemalans, and the conflicts between them, that 
ultimately transformed the country from a democratic republic into a military dictatorship 
Specifically, officers in the Guatemalan military routinely pursued opportunities that 
advanced their personal power and the influence of the armed forces as a whole. As we 
shall see, many Guatemalans resisted the encroachments of the military, and eventually 
even some American officials attempted to halt its advances. By the end of the 1960s, 
however, the Guatemalan officer corps prevailed and dominated national political life for 
nearly a quarter-century. 
The Alliance for Progress often manifested the push and pull between US officials 
and Guatemala’s political and military elite. Initially, the aims of the vast modernization 
project were developmental and intended to act as soft-power approach to 
anticommunism. The Kennedy administration, however, failed to fully appreciate local 
factors and constraints that prevented the Guatemalan government from taking advantage 
of Alliance for Progress initiatives in the early years when its programs might have been 
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less tied to the military.1 When Guatemalan leaders attempted to comply with US 
requirements, they often faced hostility from nationalists on both the right and the left. 
The funds coming from the Alliance for Progress only began to pour into Guatemala in 
full after the military seized control of the state under the direction of Defense Minister 
and Head-of-State Enrique Peralta. We cannot know how a Guatemalan government 
ruled by civilians would have allocated the full breadth of the Alliance for Progress’ 
resources, but Peralta’s military regime ensured that the armed forces implemented these 
programs in a manner that reinforced its control over Guatemala. Instead of being the 
benevolent alternative to counterinsurgency warfare, the Alliance for Progress directly 
supplemented the Guatemalan military’s campaigns to annihilate guerrillas and their 
potential supporters. As such, the transformation of the Alliance for Progress in 
Guatemala mirrors the nation’s transition to a state consumed by counterinsurgency 
doctrine. 
The research presented here focuses on the relationship between Guatemala and 
the United States during the Alliance for Progress era, but it is also part of a much larger 
Cold War history. The global confrontation between the US and USSR drew impacted 
nearly every country on the planet, and Guatemala became one of the major battlefields 
in the contest between capitalism and communism. Both Guatemalan and American 
officials made decisions with the wider context of the Cold War. Moscow never appeared 
as a significant actor in the relations between Guatemala and the United States, but the 
                                                 
1 For example, in order to receive the bulk of loans and aid packages, the Kennedy administration required 
the Guatemalan government pass tax reforms. President Ydigoras attempted to pass minor tax reforms and 
was met with fierce opposition from conservatives, who would have been his natural political allies. As a 
result, Ydigoras became increasingly isolated and faced a proliferation of coup plots. This topic is covered 
extensively in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
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Central American republic’s support for the US prosecution of the Cold War was 
important to American officials and the presidential administrations they served. Most, if 
not all, US policymakers viewed Guatemala as a necessary ally within its sphere of 
influence. This study reveals that a major fault in US assessments of the situation in 
Guatemala often resulted from US officials ignoring crucial local factors while being 
overly preoccupied with regional, hemispheric, and even global concerns. Making use of 
US paranoia over communism, Guatemalan officials and military personnel often 
exaggerated the links between native dissidence and guerrilla activity and international 
communism. Busy looking for connections between Castro and the Guatemalan 
oppositionists, the leaders of both countries failed to address the country’s national 
problems and instead blamed the insidious influence of international communism. The 
United States would make similar miscalculations in other Cold War hotspots throughout 
the globe. 
This is not to say, however, the intricacies of Cold War international intrigue were 
not in play in Guatemala during the 1960s. Guatemalans and Americans may have 
exaggerated the magnitude of infiltration by agents of communism, but they were indeed 
present. In particular, Castro’s promise to export the Cuban Revolution to the rest of 
Latin America was put into practice in Guatemala. Cuba overtly and covertly supported 
various guerrilla movements in Guatemala, and some of the most prominent leaders of 
the insurgency trained in Cuba. The impact of the Cuban Revolution on American and 
Guatemalan perspectives cannot be overstated. Direct material support from Castro, 
however, did not match the fevered estimates of some US officials whose own 
preconceived notions regarding Cuban infiltration were often amplified by conservative 
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Guatemalan politicians and military officers seeking increased aid and influence by 
stoking anticommunist paranoia. The full complexity of the Cold War—global, regional, 
and local—all had significant bearing on US-Guatemalan relations during the Alliance 
for Progress.      
The inspiration for this research originates from a chronological and 
historiographical gap in our understanding of the Cold War and US-Guatemalan 
relations. Scholars have generally failed to explore this critical period of Guatemala’s 
history, favoring the watershed moments of the CIA’s 1954 coup and the Maya genocide 
of the 1980s.2 Some scholars have briefly covered this period as part of a broader project 
on Guatemala, Latin America, or Cold War foreign policy.3 Despite its many dramatic 
episodes and crucial events, the 1960s is essentially a lost decade. This study helps to 
bridge that gap. It endeavors to be part of the essential connective tissue between the 
coup and the genocide, while suggesting that this period was as critical to shaping the 
history of US-Guatemalan relations as those two, better-known catastrophic upheavals. 
Specifically, the evidence presented here argues that the decisions made by President 
                                                 
2 For examples of the former see: Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its 
Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999);  Richard Immerman, 
The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982); Piero 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 ( Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1991). For the latter see:  Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Terror in the Land of the 
Holy Spirit: Guatemala Under General Efrain Rios Mont, 1982-1983 (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2010); Victoria Sanford, Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala. (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004) 
3 For examples see: George Black, Garrison Guatemala. (London, Zed Books Ltd., 1984); Jim Handy, Gift 
of the Devil: A History of Guatemala. (Toronto, Between the Lines Press, 1984); Susanne Jonas, The Battle 
for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power (Boulder, Westview Press, 1991); Stephen Rabe, 
The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2012) , Stephen Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-
1961. (Athens, Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). 
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Kennedy supported the irrevocable step in the Guatemalan military’s takeover of the 
state.   
A major ambition of this research is to show that this understudied period of US-
Guatemalan relations is essential for assessing how the Cold War impacted Guatemala. 
We cannot understand the genocide committed by the military-regimes during the 1980s 
without uncovering how this state-driven killing machine was created. Guatemalan 
politics had long been fraught with violence, but these confrontations were largely 
between elites vying for power. Indiscriminate massacres, especially against indigenous 
peoples, also have a long and storied past in Guatemala. The scorched-earth tactics that 
the Guatemalan military applied across wide regions of the country during the 
counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1960s marked a significant shift in how the state 
dispensed violence, suffering, and death to achieve its goals. Moreover, this approach 
produced results; the counterinsurgency campaign broke and scattered the armed 
opposition groups by the end of the 1960s. The apparent success of exterminationist 
practices encouraged subsequent military regimes to indulge in death-squads, 
indiscriminate massacres, forced disappearance, and public mutilation when the 
insurgency regrouped and returned in the late 1970s. Familiar with the efficacy of 
wholesale slaughter, in the 1980s the Guatemalan military made the short leap to 
genocide when General-Presidents Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt attempted to annihilate 
guerrillas by wiping out any village that could offer them support. The military’s seizure 
of power and counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1960s, both supported by the United 
States, were some of the first, and most crucial steps along the path to genocide.       
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During the 1960s, political and military elites from the United States and 
Guatemala oversaw the seizure of state power by the armed forces in Central America’s 
largest country. Other options presented themselves, but Washington officials, under the 
direction of two professed progressive presidencies, routinely chose to rely on 
Guatemalan military officers to achieve US policy objectives. For their part, Guatemalan 
officers made themselves the most viable partner for the United States by labeling 
dissenters as communists and neutralizing political contenders not beholden to the 
military. As a result, the Guatemalan security forces received the lion’s share of funding 
meant for improving the standards of living. In turn, high-ranking officers used these 
programs to permeate Guatemalan civil society with the military’s presence and wage a 
war of extermination against a rebellion that had originated from within their own ranks. 
Capitalizing on their unchecked control over the state and a bounty of foreign aid, 
Guatemala’s military leaders began to acquire wealth and social standing that outstripped 
the oligarchs their institution had been created to protect. As the clique of ruling officers 
systematically eliminated all other forms of political competition, the United States found 
it had little choice but to maintain its alliance with the increasingly violent military 
dictatorship that it had helped establish. By the end of the Alliance for Progress in 1969, 
Guatemala had become a counterinsurgency state – a nation whose government 
institutions are consumed by the overriding goal of eliminating armed resistance and 
political dissidence. The importance of maintaining US dominance in the Western 
Hemisphere far outweighed the professed ambitions of the Alliance for Progress’ 
creators. This fear of potential communist subversion, and the economic and political 
consequences it could bring about, resulted in a disastrous inversion of the stated 
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intentions of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala. Simply put, when 
developmentalists’ modernization schemes did not immediately inoculate Guatemala 
from the spread of communism, Washington quickly defaulted to supporting repressive 
militarism. 
Two moments in Guatemalan politics anchor this study of the inevitable clash 
between conflicting approaches to foreign relations: the overthrow of President Miguel 
Ydigoras in 1963 and the 1966 election and presidency of Julio César Méndez 
Montenegro. President Kennedy earned the admiration of millions of Latin Americans by 
creating the Alliance for Progress, but despite the soaring rhetoric of change, his 
administration rarely delivered on its promises in Guatemala. The Kennedy 
administration undermined Alliance for Progress principles of self-determination and 
democracy by permitting the Guatemalan military, under the direction of Defense 
Minister Enrique Peralta, to overthrow the duly elected president, Miguel Ydigoras, in 
order to prevent a reformist candidate, former president Juan Jose Arévalo, from running 
for office. Threatened by the example of Castro’s Cuba, Kennedy and his administration 
equated nationalist reform with communist revolution in Guatemala. Moreover, during 
Kennedy’s tenure in office, the United States empowered leaders within the Guatemalan 
Armed Forces with foreign aid, arms, and extensive counterinsurgency training. 
Guatemalan military officers used these resources, in the name of anticommunism, to 
consolidate their stranglehold over state. While we will never know how Arévalo’s return 
to office would have affected Guatemala, the results of the coup are clear – military rule, 
mass-murder, and nearly four decades of civil war.  
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President Kennedy was assassinated nine months after Peralta’s coup, and his 
successor, Lyndon Johnson, inherited an unenviable situation in Guatemala. The 
factionalized, communist guerrilla groups that had once been a minor nuisance to the 
Guatemalan government grew dramatically after the military takeover and formed a 
united front capable of challenging security forces. When the military finally agreed to 
permit elections in 1966, President Johnson hoped to facilitate the return of democracy to 
Guatemala. Critics and scholars have charged that the Johnson administration was 
responsible for decline of the Alliance for Progress because it narrowly focused on 
commercial development instead of social and political reform. His administration’s 
record in Guatemala, however, complicates this characterization. During Johnson’s 
tenure, Guatemalans elected Julio César Méndez Montenegro, the leader of the Partido 
Revolucionario who ran on a reformist platform, to the presidency. By the end of the 
decade, the military had crippled the communist insurgency and the Guatemalan 
economy had expanded and diversified.  
Despite these nominal successes, this study shows that little could be done to 
reverse the decisive gains already made by Guatemala’s military elite during Kennedy’s 
time in office. Military leaders forced President Méndez Montenegro to grant total 
autonomy to the Guatemalan Armed Forces and used the façade of a civilian government 
to obscure their control over the state. This failure of electoral politics left many 
Guatemalans disillusioned with democracy and violently polarized political life. Under 
Johnson, the Alliance for Progress had succeeded in making Guatemala more attractive 
for private investment and the economy grew, but most Guatemalans remained 
impoverished. Many of Guatemala’s military leaders, however, formed lucrative 
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partnerships with the US government and corporations. They protected their new position 
at the top of the social hierarchy with armed forces trained and equipped by the United 
States. By the end of decade, the upper echelons of the Guatemalan military, glutted on 
US aid, emerged as a distinct socio-economic class that exercised de facto rule over the 
country.  
The Guatemalan military’s counterinsurgency tactics of terror, torture, and 
massacre stymied the guerrilla operations by 1967. The perceived success of these 
operations legitimized the use of state-terror in the eyes of the Guatemalan high-
command. The generals who ruled Guatemala following the Alliance for Progress era 
continued to make use of these nefarious practices to maintain their shaky rule, most 
notoriously during the Maya Genocide of the 1980s. Despite the ruthlessness of the 
Guatemalan military, it failed to completely eliminate the revolutionary movement or 
provide real security. Even after incurring heavy losses, guerrilla fighters assassinated 
several important US personnel including the head of the US military attaché, Ernest 
Munro, and Ambassador John Gordon Mein in 1968. It was the final year of the Alliance 
for Progress.  
 
This study reconstructs the gradual development of the Guatemalan 
counterinsurgency state during the Alliance for Progress era. As such, the events it 
depicts are predominately presented chronologically instead of thematically. This 
methodology serves two purposes. First, a chronological presentation is better suited to 
show the evolving partnership between the United States and the leaders of the 
Guatemalan officer corps. The intertwined causes and effects of US policymaking and 
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Guatemalan politics are more comprehensible when events unfold in their historical 
order. Second, because the existing literature on US-Guatemalan relations during the 
Alliance for Progress era is scant, developing a clear, detailed reconstruction of the 
sequence of events is a necessary initial exploration of this poorly understood period. 
This study pauses to provide selective analysis on many key issues, but its major focus, 
and contribution to the field, is presenting an in-depth account that relays the complexity 
of Cold War diplomacy, incorporates the diverse perspectives of dozens of historical 
actors, and fills some of the holes in the existing body of scholarship. 
Crafting a narrative that attempts to explain the relationship between two entities 
as large and complex as nation-states is a complicated task that requires significant 
curation. Thousands of government officials from both countries toiled daily in order for 
these enormous political collectives to conduct something akin to communication and 
transaction. Millions more were affected by their actions. This study regularly relies on 
accounts and documents supplied by individuals at the highest levels of power: 
ambassadors, presidents, generals, and rebel commanders. The records that they left 
behind, housed in archives and special collections, preserve only a narrow slice of the 
historical memory of these vast enterprises. Nonetheless, these individuals acted as focal 
points for the leviathan institutions they represented. Many of the primary documents 
used to stitch together this narrative come from various archives of the United States 
government, the personal papers or writings of Guatemalans, and newspapers from both 
countries. The voices this study privileges represent the organizations and individuals that 
left behind the most robust records in order to reconstruct this understudied period 
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broadly, but with sufficient detail to convey the intricacies of international relations. 
These sources, however, have their own issues of bias and reliability. 
Documents housed in numerous collections and libraries of the US National 
Archive system provide the bulk of the primary source material that this research has 
relied upon. The exchanges between Washington and the US embassy in Guatemala 
proved a particularly rich source of information. The relatively terse and dry “cable-
speak” presents the appearance of hard facts, but confusion, bias, and manipulation often 
seep into the dispatches and memos of these organizations. Basic information provided 
by these sources—dates, names, summaries of events and meetings—is typically 
corroborated by other supporting documents that can be found in the archives, but were 
not necessarily cited. Alternatively, in some instances, other scholars have used the 
source in their own works, and this has served as a basis of verification. This study 
attempts to alert the reader when the information presented in one of these archival 
sources cannot be corroborated, reflects an opinion, or is otherwise suspect. Occasionally, 
the Guatemalan and American actors reveal personal biases, manipulate facts, or outright 
lie to achieve a certain end. In these instances, the present study highlights these 
individuals’ words and actions to clarify the situation and analyze their intentions. 
Sometimes there are contradictions between individuals accounts in memoirs or 
interviews and the exchanges recorded in the documents. In other cases, false-
impressions, manipulations, and fabrications are plainly obvious, some to the point of 
being corrected by other individuals in conversation with the questionable source. As 
much as is possible, this study identifies when a document is particularly problematic, but 
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the reader should be aware that these records, and the individuals who composed them, 
are as capable of error and falsehood as any historical actor.  
The varying sources this study relies on to construct Guatemalan perspectives also 
present challenges. The present research makes use of newspaper clippings, personal 
writings, military and governmental publications, and political pamphlets, manifestos, 
and fliers. Many of these sources are politically charged and have a definite agenda. For 
example, President Ydigoras’ memoirs routinely stake claims that, with the benefit of 
decades of research and declassification of documents, are demonstrably false. In most 
cases, they are an attempt to blame Fidel Castro for the problems faced by his 
administration. Other material, like the internal circulars of the Guatemalan military 
preserved at CIRMA, display a blatant bias and enthusiastically champion the actions of 
the Guatemalan Armed Forces.4 The collection of political street-propaganda housed in 
the Benson Collection of UT Austin’s Latin America library also promote partisan 
agendas of the party that has issued them. Guatemalan newspapers, the most varied and 
journalistic material this study makes use of, also reflect the biases of the publications 
writers and editors. Despite these hurdles, which are inherent in all primary sources, the 
research presented here extracts useful information from these materials. In tandem with 
the governmental documents provided by US archives, these Guatemalan sources help 
corroborate, complicate, or contradict the accounts provided by both sides. Where there is 
consensus, the information gleaned from these sources is presented as fact. Where there 
is contradiction, this study makes note and attempts to explain the causes of the 
discrepancy. 
                                                 
4 These circulars, titled “Ejercito” even published opinion pieces written by officers that challenge negative 
press from Guatemalan newspapers. 
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Perhaps the most significant weakness of the vast majority of the data utilized in 
this study is that it largely reflects the opinions and observations of the political and 
military elites of both countries. As a study of US-Guatemalan foreign relations, this 
project has followed a traditional trajectory of relying on records of policymakers, 
military officers, and business leaders. Even the guerrilla fighters are represented by the 
movement’s leaders, who were almost entirely drawn from the urban, middle and upper 
classes, and the officer corps. This effectively omits a large segment of the population of 
both the United States and Guatemala. In the case of the former, the average American 
citizen likely did not give much thought to the plight of Guatemalans, and when they did 
it probably reflected their concerns about the broader Cold War and the potential threat of 
communism in the Western Hemisphere. For the common people of Guatemala, 
particularly indigenous groups, the impact of the decisions made by the elites featured in 
this study was much more direct. These Guatemalans certainly played important roles in 
their country’s Cold War struggle, and we will see them mobilized to support 
organizations across the political spectrum. Their own experiences and motivations, 
however, largely fall outside of the scope and capabilities of this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, the conflicts and collaborations between the diplomatic, economic, and 
military elites of the United States and Guatemala that are the core of this research 
provide a narrative that is essential to understanding  the complex relationship between 
Guatemala and the United States in the Cold War. 
 The two sprawling organizations that largely occupy the focus of this study are 
the foreign policy apparatus of the United States and the Guatemalan Armed Forces. 
Individuals who controlled or wielded considerable influence over these state organs 
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drive the narrative of this work. For the United States, the most significant contributor is 
the State Department, but the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, 
and the Executive Branch all play important roles in US policymaking. Unless 
specifically noted, this study refers to this broad coalition of foreign policy institutions 
under the simplified heading of “the United States government” and their emissaries as 
“US officials.” Similarly, the Guatemalan Armed Forces, although dominated by the 
Army service branch, incorporates the Air Force, Navy, Guardia de Honor, the Ministry 
of Defense, and intelligence agencies. The term “military” or “armed forces” is applied 
here when referring to these distinct entities as a collective. Within this general term, it is 
typically the officer class that is being discussed in this study. Enlisted men, being drawn 
largely from the indigenous population, often lacked literacy in Spanish, were subjected 
to racial bias, and were generally excluded from national political intrigue. The phrase 
“security forces” is used to describe the conjoined efforts of the military with national 
and regional police forces, which appears more frequently after 1963. These choices 
reflect the terms used in existing scholarship on the topic of US-Guatemalan relations.    
Although the struggle of the revolutionary movements occupies a good deal of 
scholarship on Cold War Guatemala, a few authors have endeavored to penetrate the 
inner-workings of Central America’s largest, most powerful military. Many of these 
publications attempt to explain the genocidal campaign against the Maya by tracing the 
history and development of the Guatemalan Armed Forces.5 Most of these scholars owe a 
                                                 
5 For an example that explores the military’s Cold War history and the rise of military officers within the 
social hierarchy see: Black, Garrison Guatemala.; For an account that incorporates all of Guatemala’s 
national history and concludes that the genocide was a modern manifestation of military massacres 
designed to prevent or crush indigenous rebellions see: Handy, Gift of the Devil.; Schirmer’s Guatemalan 
Military Project provides the most detailed and comprehensive English-language evaluation of the 
structure and tactics of the Guatemalan Armed Forces during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
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good deal to the work of Richard Adams in Crucifixion by Power. The collection of 
essays is a towering achievement in analyzing the structures of Guatemalan society from 
1944-1966.6 Crucifixion examines the breadth of Guatemalan social institutions, but its 
contribution to understanding the development of Guatemala’s military, particularly the 
officer class, remains the bedrock upon which all subsequent studies have been built.  
 Adams describes three major characteristics the Guatemalan Armed Forces have 
developed over the twentieth century: professionalization, incorporation, and a proclivity 
towards national politics. Originally a praetorian force designed to maintain the power 
and wealth of the landowning elite, the Guatemalan Army transitioned to a national, 
professional military following the introduction of the country’s preeminent military 
academy Escuela Politécnica in 1873. In addition to fostering cohesion among the 
regional garrisons under a unified training program, the instructors at Escuela Politécnica 
encouraged the professionalization of the military career.7 Adams specifies that 
“professionalization” here means that the individual has dedicated their life to the 
military vocation, and should not be confused with apolitical connotations sometimes 
associated with the term.8 Despite being considered a lifelong commitment, Adams 
remarks that as of 1966, all Guatemalan officers understood that their base salary provide 
insufficient means for respectable living. This forced most officers to seek out other 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that there has been some pushback against Adams work as being apologist for the 
Guatemalan military government and the United States relationship with it. Susanne Jonas (formerly 
Bodenheimer) published a particularly scathing critique, which she later reversed and described her 
negative review as “misconceived”. See Susanne Bodenheimer, “Crucifixion by Adams” Berkley Journal 
of Sociology. Volume 16, (1971-1972). Pp 60-74; and Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala. Page 71, 
note 1. 
7 Originally, many of the officers who ran the academy were Spanish military men. Officers from the 
United States frequently held positions, including the highest offices, during the twentieth century. 
8 Richard Adams, Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944-1966 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970) 239. 
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means of financial gain. Adams identifies two major avenues Guatemalan officers used to 
supplement their income. An officer could seek out a government or military position 
with a sobresueldo, a special stipend attached to highly coveted jobs.9 Obtaining such a 
position often relies on political affiliation and personal contacts. The other means of 
increasing an officer’s income is private enterprise—ranging from selling off commissary 
supplies to owning land. These two methods are not mutually exclusive, and officers 
often used political connections or their position in government to obtain capital and vice 
versa. That military officers needed to seek outside income would seem to work against 
the development of professionalization, but the corporatist nature of the Guatemalan 
military along with a concentrated effort towards developing internal solidarity and 
loyalty to the Armed Forces as an institution helped to mitigate the poor pay. 
 Adams portrays the Guatemalan officer corps as a corporate group that 
“encourages its members to seek their rewards almost entirely from within the 
establishment.”10 Officers enjoyed a number of benefits including reduced prices for 
food, appliances, imports, liquor, housing, and even land. They could more easily afford 
these purchases because of access to the Fondo de Previsión Militar, a credit union 
exclusively for military personnel. An active-duty officer and his extended family 
received free healthcare services. Capable young Guatemalans were lured to Escuela 
Politécnica with the promise of free tuition in exchange for six years of service. Retired 
officers had opportunities to take courses in public administration, many assuming 
regional and ministry positions after leaving the service. In addition to these material 
                                                 
9 Adams, Crucifixion by Power.240. 
10 Ibid. 244. 
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perquisites, Adams highlights that the military was extremely reluctant to ostracize or 
punish its own members for misconduct.11 The present study discusses several examples 
of the unwillingness of the high-command to rebuke disobedient officers, even in cases of 
outright rebellion.  
 Despite the martial comradery that these structures engendered, Adams admits 
that factionalism was a major internal issue that arose from these conditions. There is no 
doubt that competition for prized political positions exacerbated this further, driving 
officers to form cliques around promising aspirants. Adams identifies three major 
dividing lines within the Guatemalan Armed Forces: officers and enlisted men, line 
officers and academy officers, and the rivalry between the Army and Air Force. The gulf 
between enlisted men and the officers is the widest. The rank-and-file of the Guatemalan 
Army were overwhelmingly conscripted from indigenous populations, whereas the 
majority of the officer corps were Spanish-speaking Ladinos.12 Adams work on the 
Guatemalan military, like the research presented here, focuses predominately on the 
officer corps and, as a result, does not delve into the complexities of the cultural and 
racial dimensions of Guatemalan society. This is an understudied aspect of the 
Guatemalan military that deserves its own analysis. 
 Within the officer corps, Adams states that the older division between line 
officers and graduates of Escuela Politécnica, had become less important over time as the 
enrollment in the academy’s programs became practically mandatory for career officers 
                                                 
11 Ibid. This includes the officers that took part in the 1960 officer revolt. Those that did not flee were not 
punished. Even the rebels that became leaders of the insurgency, like Yon Sosa and Turcios Limia, 
continued to fraternize with active-duty military officers from their cohort until 1963.  
12 Adams uses a military report from 1966 to conclude that 57.13% of all members of the Guatemalan 
Armed Forces were indigenous. This figure includes the universally Ladino officer corps. Only 30.63% of 
enlisted men spoke Spanish as their first language. See Adams, 247. 
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by the 1960s. In its place, a rivalry between the Army and Air Force emerged, especially 
after the fall of the Arbenz government in 1954. Previously, army officers with flight 
training comprised the nascent Guatemalan Air Force, but it did not separate into a 
distinct branch of the military until the United States began furnishing the Guatemalan 
government with military aircraft after the CIA-backed coup against Arbenz.13 The divide 
between these branches grew as President Ydigoras lavished additional perquisites to Air 
Force members in exchange for loyalty during the 1960 officer revolt.14 This split 
narrowed after Ydigoras rescinded many of these bonuses and punished some officers 
after a faction within the Air Force unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the 
government in November, 1962.15 After Peralta seized power and instated a military 
government, internecine conflict and cliques remained within the armed forces, but the 
institution as a whole became much more cohesive and collaborative as they waged their 
US-sponsored counterinsurgency campaign. 
 Adams most crucial insight into the development of the Guatemalan military is 
that its highly competitive structure actively encouraged officers to engage in political 
and economic activities to enhance their standing within the relatively insulated 
institution. This, in turn, led the armed forces, specifically commanding officers, to what 
Adams terms an “assumption of regnancy”—a gradual process whereby the military took 
over the responsibilities of governance in Guatemala. Adams argues that the process 
began as early as the introduction of Escuela Politécnica in 1873, but officer corps made 
                                                 
13 Adams, 249 
14 For example, Ydigoras promised new uniforms, equipment, increased pay, and commercial flying 
licenses for pilots looking for extra income. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapters 1,2, and 3 of this 
study. 
15 See Chapter 3 
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incredible gains after it began to receive technical and material aid from the United States 
beginning in 1954.16 One of the major objectives of the present study is to locate and 
analyze the moment when the Guatemalan Armed Forces transitioned from regnant 
guardians to dictatorial rulers.17 
 The leaders of the Guatemalan military wielded considerable power over the 
country long before the Cold War, but the policies of the United States during it crusade 
against international communism drastically altered the potential opportunities for 
ambitious officers. At its core, this project is an examination of the causes and 
consequences of US foreign policy in Guatemala. Within the topic of the Cold War 
history of Latin America and the United States, and the wider field of diplomatic history, 
this project synthesizes a variety of perspectives in order to reconstruct and explain how 
the policies of the United States contributed to the transformation  of Guatemala into a 
counterinsurgency obsessed military regime during the Alliance for Progress era. 
 Identifying the ideological underpinning of US foreign policy is necessary for 
understanding how and why historical actors made certain choices under specific 
circumstances. Michael Hunt’s Ideology and US Foreign Policy earned considerable 
acclaim for extracting the fundamental ideological tenets from the entire diplomatic 
history of the United States. Hunt begins by defining ideology as “an interrelated set of 
convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to 
easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that 
                                                 
16 Adams, 264 
17 This topic is the focus of Chapter 3. 
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reality.”18 From this operational definition, Hunt presents three pillars of US ideology in 
foreign relations: a sense of exceptional national greatness or Manifest Destiny; a 
hierarchical view of race prejudiced against people of color; and an antipathy toward 
radical social revolution. Hunt presents these theses as a break from previous schools of 
thought that have dominated discourse on US foreign policy, embodied in the works of 
George Kennan and William Appleman Williams. For Hunt, Kennan’s zero-sum 
realpolitik put more effort into removing ideological considerations from foreign policy, 
for the benefit of technocratic diplomats, rather than explaining these impulses.19 On the 
other hand, Hunt finds Williams revisionist designation of ideology as a “tool used by the 
grandees of American capitalism to maintain their economic power and with it their 
sociopolitical control” to be “an excessively narrow conception.”20 Instead, Hunt’s three 
essential components of US foreign policy—exceptionalism, racism, and anti-
radicalism—possess greater explanatory and analytical power than those put forward by 
his predecessors. This study demonstrates how these principles manifested abundantly in 
Cold War Guatemala. 
 Although the present study incorporates Hunt’s interpretation, it does not outright 
reject economically focused theses of adherents to Williams’ revisionist interpretation 
diplomatic history. Specifically, the work of Walter LaFeber, a protégé of Williams, has 
significantly influenced this project. In his examination of US involvement in Central 
America, Inevitable Revolutions, LaFeber condemns American foreign policy in the 
                                                 
18 Michael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy. (London: Yale University Press, 1987). xi.  
19 Hunt. 7,8. 
20 Ibid. 9,11. 
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region as reckless economic imperialism that created enormous tragedies. A proponent of 
dependency theory, LaFeber argues that the exploitative economic relationship between 
the United States and Central America originated in the late nineteenth century, but the 
threat that communism posed to US market domination amplified hegemonic aggression 
in the region. LaFeber’s work covers all of the countries in Central America, but he looks 
to Guatemala as a particularly apt example to illustrate his points. Instead of recognizing 
the desperate conditions that caused many Guatemalans to sympathize with communist 
revolutionaries, the United States government regularly intervened in the country’s 
affairs, most notoriously in the 1954 coup, in order to maintain Guatemala as a peripheral 
subordinate with an economy based on resource-extraction. The Alliance for Progress, in 
LaFeber’s analysis, proved to be “the weapon to fight revolution in Latin America” 
instead of a project aimed at genuine reform and socioeconomic improvement.21 In 
Guatemala, this “weaponization” of the Alliance for Progress played a vital role in 
ongoing counterinsurgency efforts as developmental projects, and their funding, came 
under the control of Guatemalan military officers. The result was antithetical to the 
purported purpose of the Alliance for Progress, and the disparity between the wealthy and 
the poor grew during the 1960s.22 Moreover, LaFeber states that through its relationship 
with the United States, the Guatemalan Armed Forces transformed from a “rag-tag force” 
racked by internal conflict into a centralized, sophisticated institution capable of 
controlling the state.23 The research presented here supports LaFeber’s claims, but places 
                                                 
21 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. Second Edition, (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1993) 151. 
22 LaFeber, 169. 
23 Ibid. 170. 
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less emphasis on purely economic considerations and places it alongside the three factors 
presented by Hunt. 
 LaFeber’s examination of US policies in Guatemala during the Alliance for 
Progress era is insightful, but only fills a few subsections of a single chapter. Stephen 
Rabe has produced research that plunges into the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
to provide scholars a more in-depth look at how these ostensibly progressive presidents 
adhered to the longstanding traditions of US-Latin American relations instead of making 
the radical changes they professed. Rabe portrays these administrations as haunted by 
Castro’s revolution and determined to “win” the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere by 
stopping the spread of communist revolution at all cost. As a result, Rabe concludes, 
“Like Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, the president and his advisors opted 
for short term security that anti-Communist elites, especially military officers, could 
provide over the benefits of long-term political and social democracy.”24 The Alliance for 
Progress faced a variety of hurdles, but Rabe believes that it ultimately failed because of 
Kennedy and Johnson’s reliance on covert action, overt intervention, and 
counterinsurgency warfare led them to “compromise and even mutilate those grand goals 
for the Western Hemisphere.”25 
 Guatemala features regularly in Rabe’s works on US-Latin American relations. In 
his survey of US-Latin American Cold War relations, Guatemala serves as a key case 
study that exemplifies certain trends in US policy. The 1954 coup is the “Mother of 
                                                 
24 Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist 
Revolution in Latin America. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 197. 
25 Rabe, 199. 
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Interventions” that plagued Cold War Latin America.26 The impoverished country was an 
ideal candidate in need of the economic and political reform promised by the Alliance for 
Progress, but instead became a prime example of how dollars meant for development 
instead fueled repressive military regimes. Guatemala maintained its status as an 
unfortunate example US policy results through the 1970s and 1980s as the military-
government committed atrocities culminating in genocide. Nonetheless, because Rabe’s 
goal is to offer an overarching examination of US Cold War policy in Latin America, he 
is, understandably, not able to delve into the details of the period that this study covers 
for Guatemala alone. Even within Rabe’s book that focuses exclusively on the Kennedy 
and Johnson administration, fewer than thirty pages cover Guatemala specifically. The 
research presented here provides a detailed account of Guatemala’s experience during the 
Alliance for Progress era that supports Rabe’s argument that the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations embraced aggressive, interventionist strategies to preserve hemispheric 
hegemony instead of adhering to the ideals of the Alliance for Progress.   
     
   The bulk of the literature that scholars have produced on the interactions 
between Guatemala and the United States focuses on the 1954 coup against President 
Jacobo Arbenz. This is for good reason: it is a defining moment where several broad 
historical fields overlap. In the history of the United States, the intervention in Guatemala 
is one of the first covert actions designed to unseat a sitting government conducted by the 
Central Intelligence Agency. It marks a significant new direction of US foreign policy in 
Latin America—a shift from Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy to the much more 
                                                 
26 Stephen Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America.(New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). Chapter 3, page 36. 
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aggressive doctrines employed during the Cold War. For Latin American countries, 
especially those in the Caribbean and the Central American isthmus, American 
interventionism was nothing new, but the US intervention in Guatemala in 1954 was a 
turning point for politics in the region. Perhaps the most famous example of this is 
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, whose experience in Guatemala during the coup confirmed his 
worst assumption about the United States and set him on the course of revolution. For 
Guatemalan history, the 1954 coup is a paradigm shift, a nexus of the country’s history 
from which nearly all events, especially in the twentieth century, are related. The 
gravitational pull of the 1954 coup likewise locks this study within its orbit. 
 The most widely read English-language historical scholarship on the 1954 coup 
proliferated in the early 1980s, during the worst years of the Maya Genocide carried out 
under the military regime of General Efrain Rios Montt. Of those works published during 
that period, Richard Immerman’s The CIA in Guatemala alongside Stephen Kinzer and 
Stephen Schlesigner’s Bitter Fruit have become the standard texts for readers in the 
United States. Immerman is highly critical of the 1954 coup and argues that the United 
States government undermined democracy and progress in Guatemala and the region by 
removing Arbenz from power and replacing him with a series of repressive militarists 
supported only by their sycophants and USAID dollars. He blames the ideological 
rigidity and imperialistic impulses of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations for the 
coup.27 Published in the same year as Immerman’s work on the same topic, Bitter Fruit 
presents a slightly broader interpretation of the Guatemala’s brief revolution and the 
causes for its end. Whereas Immerman focuses largely on interactions between the US 
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and Guatemalan governments, Bitter Fruit emphasizes the role of private corporations, 
especially United Fruit, in bringing a close to the Guatemalan Revolution. Kinzer and 
Schlesinger, in particular highlight the numerous connections between the Eisenhower 
administration and the United Fruit company and postulate that this created a conflict of 
interest at the highest levels of government when dealing with Guatemala. 
 These two slightly varied interpretations formed the definitive narrative of the 
1954 coup until the 1990s and are still highly influential. Both accounts, however, 
focused extensively on the actions of American policymakers, and in doing so, 
exaggerated the power of that the United States had over Guatemalan affairs. This likely 
reflects the sources available to the authors at the time: recently declassified documents 
from the State Department and other US governmental bodies. Additionally, condemning 
the United States for its role in the 1954 coup was timely. The military dictatorship that 
emerged from the notorious intervention was still waging its war against communism 
nearly thirty years later and its exterminationist practices were unfolding before the entire 
world. Even as scholars produced new, more nuanced research on the 1954 coup, the 
works of Immerman, Schlesinger, and Kinzer remain highly relevant and regularly cited. 
The history presented here is an outgrowth of these two interpretations in that it agrees 
that Cold War ideological rigidity and economic hegemony motivated US policymakers, 
but the actions of Guatemalans are given more weight and consideration here than in 
these venerable, but unbalanced accounts. 
 The 1990s saw the publication of studies that deepened historical understanding 
of the 1954 coup and US-Guatemalan relations. Two groundbreaking works from this 
period demand mention: Piero Gleijeses’ Shattered Hope and Nick Cullather’s Secret 
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History. Gleijeses provides a rare commodity in his examination of the 1954 coup: an 
English-language narrative from the perspective of Central Americans. While most 
historians from the United States focus on the actions of the CIA and the State 
Department, Gleijeses delves into the inner workings of the Arévalo and Arbenz 
administrations. Gleijeses concludes that Jacobo Arbenz was not a communist, although 
he sympathized with their goals and associated with members of the Guatemalan 
Communist Party.28 He also charges that the commanding officers of the Guatemalan 
military bear significant responsibility for the overthrow of Arbenz. They refused to 
crush the bumbling “liberation” army led by the incompetent CIA-stooge, Carlos Castillo 
Armas, and then subsequently pushed Arbenz to resign for fear of a full invasion by US 
marines. Gleijeses’ account upended the notion of the United States as a hemispheric 
titan dictating its will within its proclaimed sphere of influence and duly portrayed 
Guatemalans as pivotal actors within their own history. This study attempts to emulate 
Gleijeses’ approach by incorporating Guatemalan figures and highlighting how, despite 
the enormous disparities in global power between the two countries, their actions had 
enormous influence within the international dialogue. 
 Published in 1999, at the opposite end of the decade from Gleijeses’ work, Nick 
Cullather’s Secret History continued to chip away at image of the Northern Colossus’ 
ability to dictate policy in the Western Hemisphere. As part of the CIA’s Center for the 
Study of Intelligence, Nick Cullather produced a detailed report from the Agency’s 
classified material that revealed, for the first time, an internal appraisal of the 1954 coup 
that overthrew Jacobo Arbenz. Several scholars have studied the 1954 coup, but 
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Cullather’s work is unique in that it unveils the internal communications of the CIA 
operation while it was underway. Of particular note is the revelation that Operation: 
PBSUCCESS was nearly a failure. Had the leaders of the Guatemalan military taken 
action against the CIA trained mercenaries in the invading “Liberacionista” army, the 
coup attempt would have likely failed and the Eisenhower administration would have 
been hopelessly embarrassed.29 This information, in tandem with Gleijeses’ Shattered 
Hope, provided a fuller account that demystified many aspects of the 1954 coup that still 
remained shrouded in the 1980s. This study’s examination of the 1960s continues the 
work of using newly accessible information to complicate the narrative of relations 
between the United States and Guatemala and offer some insight into the limits of US 
power.  
The other period that has yielded considerable research in the area of US-
Guatemalan relations is the Maya Genocide. The preponderance of the Guatemalan 
military government’s campaign of annihilation against the peasant population capable of 
supporting guerrillas in contested regions took place during the Rios Montt regime 
(March, 1982—August, 1983), but the practice of state-terror had been ongoing since the 
1960s. Widespread, state-induced violence continued after Rios Montt was deposed by 
his Minister of Defense—another unfortunate tradition with a precedent from the 
1960s—but his downfall signaled the impending end of the military’s control over the 
state. The generals maintained their hold over Guatemala for a brief time after Rios 
Montt, but the crimes against humanity committed by the military during more than thirty 
years of direct and indirect rule had so tarnished the institution that it could no longer 
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govern, even through extreme repression and violence. In 1986, Guatemalans elected a 
civilian president, the first in twenty years. While Guatemalan Civil War continued until 
1996, the genocidal campaigns of Rios Montt appear as the monstrous culmination of the 
partnership between the United States and the Guatemalan military that began with the 
overthrow of Arbenz.  
 Social scientists from several fields, along with journalists, have tackled the 
period surrounding the genocide with great care and a diversity of approaches.30 
Anthropologist Victoria Sanford produced one of the most critically regarded accounts of 
the genocide in Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala (2003). Many 
scholars have addressed the genocide perpetuated by the Guatemalan military-
government against highlands Maya during the early 1980s, but Sanford’s work stands 
out for its outstanding research into the experiences of victims and witnesses of atrocity. 
In addition, Sanford simultaneously uses her involvement within the Commission for 
Historical Clarification, the truth commission that investigated these crimes, to prove 
categorically that the Guatemalan government was responsible for an overwhelming 
majority of the violence that plagued the country during its long civil war and that these 
actions constituted genocide during the Rios Montt regime. Her work dismantled the 
notion that the liquidation of the Maya population was a result of protracted warfare 
between two sides—the Guatemalan military and guerrilla fighters—and that both were 
to blame for the extreme civilian casualties. Instead, Sanford mobilizes the findings of the 
international truth commission to reveal that over ninety percent of the abuses, forced-
                                                 
30 Two particularly stirring accounts that somewhat fall outside the bounds of traditional academic 
publications are: Daniel Wilkinson, Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in 
Guatemala (London: Duke University Press, 2004); Rigoberta Menchu with Elisabeth Burgos-Debray 
(ed.), I, Rigoberta Menchu. (New York: Verso, 1984). 
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disappearances, and executions were the work of the Guatemalan Armed Forces.31 The 
research presented here reveals that many of barbarous practices used by security forces 
during the genocide began during the 1960s. Moreover, many Guatemalan officers had 
learned these gruesome tactics from US counterinsurgency training. The success of 
death-squads, forced-disappearance, and other human rights abuses that debuted during 
the Alliance for Progress era led to the refinement and widespread integration of these 
tactics into Guatemalan counterinsurgency strategy. They became hallmarks of state-
terror in Cold War Latin America and were key instruments in orchestrating the Maya 
Genocide. 
 Sanford’s thorough research, compelling narrative, and her direct role in working 
for the Commission for Historical Clarification, cemented her interpretation as 
authoritative on the subject of the Guatemalan genocide, but some scholars saw room for 
debate. The anthropologist David Stoll set himself as Sanford’s foil in Rigoberta Menchu 
and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans. Perhaps the most controversial English-language 
book on modern Guatemalan history, Stoll challenges the dominant narratives of the 
field, which he deems as overly sympathetic to the guerrilla movements.32 He sets about 
this task by questioning the veracity of the survivor-story of Rigoberta Menchu, an 
indigenous Guatemalan woman who lived through the harsh repression of the 1970s and 
genocidal campaigns of the early 1980s. Menchu used her story to raise awareness for the 
crimes against humanity perpetuated by the Guatemalan regime and gained international 
recognition for her efforts in 1993 when she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Stoll’s 
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contentious claim is that the story Menchu has put forward is a quasi-fictional 
amalgamation that romanticized, and in some cases fabricated, indigenous experiences in 
order to promote the agenda of the guerrilla movement, and later her own political 
aspirations. Stoll’s iconoclastic study has created considerable debate within this field, 
and Victoria Sanford, among others, has led the charge to counter some of his more 
audacious arguments.  
While many scholars of modern Guatemala discredit Stoll’s work, he does raise 
some interesting questions on the problems of memory and identity, the value and power 
of testimonials, and the potential rise of ‘sacred’ forms of knowledge that are privileged, 
and as Stoll states, unassailable in contemporary academia.33 The research presented here, 
although closely related to the Maya Genocide, does not wade into the debates between 
these specialists. Nor does it attempt to evaluate Stoll’s controversial claims. It does, 
however, take into account the predominance of the ‘guerrilla perspective’ that exists in 
scholarly works that cover Guatemalan history during the Cold War.34 Although this 
study certainly includes various oppositionist leaders within the narrative, Guatemalans 
that sided with the military-state receive the most attention. 
 Historians have also begun to engage the Guatemalan Genocide and Terror in the 
Land of the Holy Spirit by Virginia Garrard-Burnett stands out for providing particularly 
useful insights into the methods and motivations of Rios Montt’s murderous regime. The 
majority of scholarly works on Cold War Guatemala highlight the ideological, social, 
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economic, and racial dimensions of this history. Garrard-Burnett’s work adds the lens of 
religion to this list in her study of the regime of General Rios Montt—the dictator who 
evolved longstanding practices of violence and repression against indigenous people into 
systematic extermination. She argues that the Protestant evangelism expressed by the 
Rios Montt regime imbued the scorched-earth campaigns against highland Maya with a 
religious justification of Christian salvation against godless communism. In turn, the 
death-squads and regular military units pursued atrocities with zealous fervor. 
Additionally, Garrard-Burnett shows how Rios-Montt’s Protestantism played a 
significant role in rebuilding the frayed alliance with the United States under Ronald 
Reagan after President Carter had cut economic and military aid over Guatemala’s human 
rights abuses. While Garrard-Burnett is certainly correct in identifying the religion as a 
component that shifted ongoing violence in Guatemala to genocide, the research 
presented here reveals a decades-long process of militarization and repression that served 
as the foundation of the targeted mass-murder of the 1980s.  
   Between these two thoroughly researched moments in Guatemala and the United 
States shared Cold War history, there is a dearth of information and explanation. A casual 
observer would likely conclude that, in basic terms, the 1954 coup was a cause and the 
genocide its eventual effect. Over twenty-five years separates these events, however, and 
very little scholarship exists to help explain how they connect. A handful of scholars have 
carved out smaller segments of these neglected decades, usually focusing on a specific 
topic or event and extrapolating from that point of reference.35 More often, this 
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transformative period is briefly described in studies that survey the full scope of the Cold 
War in Guatemala or Latin America. 36 These works have made considerable 
contributions to our knowledge of US-Guatemalan relations, but some crucial pieces are 
still missing. This study recovers some of these pieces and incorporates them into the 
existing body of literature to show that understanding the developments that occurred 
during the Alliance for Progress era is crucial for uncovering how the Guatemalan 
military-state came to commit genocide in the 1980s. 
Stephen Streeter fills part of the chronological gap in his examination of the 
counterrevolutionary governments that controlled Guatemala during Eisenhower’s 
remaining tenure in office in Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and 
Guatemala, 1954-1961.  Through his research, Streeter shows that the United States was 
much better at overthrowing governments than reconstituting them. Streeter argues that 
US attempts to restore its hegemony in Guatemala after the 1954 coup could not fully 
succeed because of the pervasive nationalism that the revolutionary period had instilled in 
the public consciousness.37 As a result, the counterrevolutionary government of Castillo 
Armas was difficult for the United States to directly control and his successor, President 
Miguel Ydigoras, proved even more so. The anticommunists had seized power in 
Guatemala in large part thanks to the intervention of the United States, but American 
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officials lacked leverage over their Guatemalan counterparts who still had to display their 
nationalist credentials by resisting, or even rejecting, Washington’s orders. A nearly 
identical situation would recur in Guatemala after the Kennedy administration facilitated 
another military coup in 1963, a topic covered extensively in Chapter Four of this project.  
Streeter’s book concludes with the military uprising in 1960, where nearly a third 
of the officer corps rebelled against President Ydigoras for, among other things, allowing 
the United States to use Guatemala as a staging area for the invasion of Cuba at the Bay 
of Pigs. Streeter’s study demonstrates that the United States’ meddling produced results 
antithetical to policy goals: a prolonged struggle between repressive military 
governments and the armed leftist that opposed them. Furthermore, Streeter does the 
much needed work of expanding our understanding of US-Guatemalan relations beyond 
the 1954 coup. 
Hailing from Tulane University, political scientist Roland Ebel dissects the 
highest levels of Guatemalan political history in his biography of President Miguel 
Ydigoras Fuentes (1958-1963) in Misunderstood Caudillo: Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes and 
the Failure of Democracy in Guatemala. Ebel’s presentation often runs counter to the 
prevailing characterizations of this controversial Guatemalan politician. Renowned for 
corruption and ineptitude, Ebel seeks to reframe the presidency of Ydigoras and 
highlights positive qualities that most other scholars of Guatemala rarely mention. He 
argues that while Ydigoras practiced authoritarian tactics and had many flaws, he was 
dedicated to preserving democracy in Guatemala. According to Ebel, Ydigoras’ greatest 
ambition was to oversee a legal, peaceful transition of power from his regime to the next 
 35 
 
 
through elections.38 Ebel claims that Ydigoras was overthrown by the military for a 
number of reasons, but chief among them was his refusal to bar Juan José Arévalo from 
running for office. As such, Ebel postulates that the primary cause of Ydigoras’ downfall 
was his commitment to the democratic ideal against opposition from his own military and 
the United States. The research presented by this study largely supports the contention 
that Ydigoras’ unwillingness to forgo elections and attempts to adhere to the Alliance for 
Progress were major factors that led to his overthrow, but it does not fully echo Ebel’s 
characterization of Ydigoras as a born-strongman who wanted to be remembered as a 
democratic trailblazer. 
This biography of Ydigoras is a valuable asset for scholars studying US-
Guatemalan relations during the early 1960s, but the extent of Ebel’s praise for the 
regime may be somewhat problematic. Ebel admits that he was drawn to the topic 
because President Ydigoras’ grandson was his student at Tulane University. This friendly 
relationship extended further over time, and former-president Ydigoras granted Ebel an 
audience. The two must have enjoyed each other’s company, as Ebel conducted several 
private interviews and gained access to the personal archive of the deposed Guatemalan 
president.39 The author’s potential for bias notwithstanding, Ebel’s work is one of the few 
studies that offers a detailed examination of Guatemalan national politics in the early 
1960s.  
Susanne Jonas is one of the most prolific writers on Cold War Guatemala and her 
work The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power represents a 
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distillation of her numerous publications on the topic since the 1970s. Jonas provides an 
in-depth look at political developments in Guatemala from 1954 to the end of the 36 year 
civil war in 1996. Unlike most historians, whose focus is limited to the 1954 coup or the 
genocide of the early 1980s, Jonas explores the 1960s and 1970s with considerable detail. 
Although the Guatemalan military government and the United States are necessarily 
analyzed in her work, Jonas’ focuses more on the actions and motivations of those who 
opposed the US-backed regimes. 
Jonas claims that her work does not defend any particular argument or theory, but 
her writing makes clear that she believes “the Guatemalan counterinsurgency project can 
never be stabilized” because of its inability to achieve legitimacy through violence and its 
refusal to acknowledge that the roots of the country’s social problems are widespread 
poverty resulting from exploitative economic practices and bigotry.40 Perhaps more than 
any other single author, Jonas’ decades of research is foundational to this project. She 
was among the first, and most vocal, scholars to characterize Guatemala as a 
counterinsurgency state and identifies its origins in the 1960s.41 Moreover, she argues 
that the United States played a decisive role in forming the Guatemalan 
counterinsurgency state. Jonas’ work, like this study, seeks to build an explanatory bridge 
between the 1954 intervention and the genocide of the 1980s. Jonas’ research, however, 
is much more thorough and comprehensive when discussing the 1970s, whereas the 
research presented here details developments of the preceding decade. 
                                                 
40 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala. 3, 226. 
41 Ibid. 120 
 37 
 
 
Jonas’ work examines nearly fifty years of Guatemalan political history and offers 
a narrative of the country’s experience in the Cold War. Compared to Power in the 
Isthmus, the sweeping political history of Central America written by James Dunkerly, 
Jonas’ study of Guatemala is relatively small-scale. Dunkerly’s opus spans from the 
independence movements of the 1820s to the latter years of the Cold War. Within this 
vast narrative that interweaves the distinct, yet related, body of nations that comprises 
Central America, Guatemala stands out as an example of some of the most tragic and 
deadly developments. Within the twenty pages Dunkerly dedicates to the Alliance for 
Progress era in Guatemala, he argues that the coup initiated by Defense Minister Enrique 
Peralta in 1963 as the “critical transition” that resulted in the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
control over national politics and “systematic arbitration of public affairs.”42 He, like 
Jonas, describes the military-government that developed from this transition as a 
counterinsurgency state.43 The transition that Dunkerly identifies is the core of this study, 
and the turning point of this transformation is covered in considerable detail in Chapter 
Three, and Chapters Four and Five elaborate on how the Guatemalan government became 
consumed by its counterinsurgency campaign.  
 Michael McClintock offers perhaps the most comprehensive English-language 
account of the collaboration between the United States and Guatemalan security forces in 
The American Connection. McClintock’s work focuses on the evolution of Guatemala’s 
police and military organizations through the twentieth century. He dedicates two 
chapters to the developments that occurred during the 1960s, and concludes that the 
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Alliance for Progress era saw the institutionalization of military-rule for Guatemala. 
Moreover, McClintock argues that the United States played a central role in this 
transformation of the Guatemalan state and attempted to legitimize the repressive 
dictatorship with flimsy justifications that the Guatemalan security forces were ideal for 
achieving the simultaneous goals of anticommunist counterinsurgency and economic 
development.44 McClintock provides numerous detailed examples of how various entities 
within the United States government worked in tandem with specific officers to develop 
training programs, build intelligence networks, and direct Alliance for Progress funds 
into the hands of the military, but his presentation of the 1960s is somewhat lacking in 
political analysis. This is most glaring in his treatment of the events surrounding the 1963 
coup that replaced the constitutional presidency of Miguel Ydigoras with the military 
dictatorship of Enrique Peralta. The two paragraphs McClintock dedicated to this critical 
moment are likely the result of a lack of available sources at the time of publication. This 
study has benefitted greatly from McClintock’s research, and has significantly expanded 
upon it by providing a more politically driven narrative that compliments McClintock’s 
predominately military-focused perspective. Moreover, this project makes use of recently 
declassified material to elaborate on previously unavailable information regarding the 
1963 coup in order to emphasize its importance in the history of US-Guatemalan 
relations. 
  
The research published by the aforementioned authors has been crucial for 
constructing the narrative and argument of this study. Despite the excellence of the 
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scholarship listed, much of the history of the Alliance for Progress era in Guatemala 
remains uncharted. This project aims to correct this omission in the historical record by 
providing an in-depth examination of the period from the perspective of the Guatemalan 
and American political elites who participated in policymaking and international 
exchange. This study relies heavily on archival records to provide a detailed 
reconstruction of the events that occurred during the Alliance for Progress era, but it also 
interweaves information and analysis provided by the handful of authors who have 
touched on this period. The argument that the United States contributed to Guatemala’s 
transformation into a counterinsurgency state does not originate with this project, but the 
research presented here provides answers as to how, when, and why this conversion came 
about. Furthermore, the evidence presented in this dissertations shows that Guatemalan 
politicians, rebels, and military officers had substantial agency and did not passively bend 
to the policies of the United States. It was the joint efforts of conservative military leaders 
and anticommunist American officials that dismantled Guatemalan democracy and 
replaced it with a garrison state.   
Chapter One broadly surveys the history of US-Guatemalan relations through 
1960. The first major exchanges between the United States and Guatemala laid the 
foundation for the fundamentally unbalanced relationship between the two countries. 
Corporations, most significantly United Fruit Company, served as virtual proxies for the 
United States in Guatemala and dominated the economic and political realms of their 
‘banana republics’ through the twentieth century. This chapter includes two of the most 
significant events in Guatemala’s history: the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944 and the 
Counterrevolution that began after the CIA-backed coup in 1954. The onset of the Cold 
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War caused Washington to view progressive politics in Latin America with antipathy and 
deep suspicion. As the administrations of Juan Jose Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz moved 
toward more revolutionary changes, the United States began to draft plans to depose the 
Guatemalan government. In doing so, the United States partnered with reactionary former 
officers of the Guatemalan military, an alliance that would deepen over time. The multi-
prong attack from the United States incorporated international isolation, a state-of-the-art 
propaganda campaign, and an invading “liberation army” of exiles and mercenaries, but it 
was the leaders of the Guatemalan Armed Forces that ultimately decided to push Arbenz 
from office. Threatened by the prospect of losing their station in the event of a US 
invasion, formerly loyal members of the military high-command refused to direct their 
forces to aid their besieged commander in chief. The United States certainly played an 
important role in the 1954 coup, but the events recreated for this chapter reveal that the 
Guatemalan military was the final arbiter of power, even during the revolutionary period. 
In forcing Arbenz to resign, these supposedly loyal military officers implicitly allied 
themselves with the United States, and some were rewarded during the counterrevolution 
that followed. The role of the armed forces within the Guatemalan government increased 
steadily after 1954, but their power over the state remained contested. The officer corps 
still retained a remnant of revolutionary nationalism that chafed against US interference, 
evidenced by the revolt of nearly one-third of the military in 1960—an event that 
concludes the first chapter. 
The second chapter begins the in-depth analysis of the Alliance for Progress Era. 
Its central purpose is to illustrate the initial impact of the Alliance for Progress on US-
Guatemalan relations. The evidence explored in this chapter reveals that the Kennedy 
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administration looked to the Guatemalan military as the core of the state when the 
government of Miguel Ydigoras proved corrupt, unreliable, and destabilizing. The US 
ambassador appointed by Kennedy, John Bell, actively courted influential officers and 
advocated for increased assistance for the Guatemalan military. Moreover, the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces became a major conduit for developmental projects sponsored 
by the Alliance for Progress. These programs were largely insignificant initially, but soon 
proved crucial for the militarization of Guatemalan society. When country-wide protests 
threatened to topple the government in 1962, ambitious officers took the opportunity to 
amplify their power and forced President Ydigoras to replace most of his civilian cabinet 
with colonels. Ambassador Bell, and the Kennedy administration as a whole, encouraged 
this critical step in the ascendency of the Guatemalan military. They viewed the largely 
conservative officer corps as Guatemala’s best defense against communism in the 
aftermath of the Cuban Revolution. Even in the early, heady days of the Alliance for 
Progress, fear of communism overrode the promise of bringing democracy and reform to 
Guatemala. 
The crux of this study, Chapter Three, unravels one of the most consequential, yet 
virtually unexplored, moments of the Cold War in Guatemala: the overthrow of President 
Ydigoras. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the prospect of the re-election of 
Guatemala’s first revolutionary president Juan José Arévalo, solidified the alliance 
between Washington and conservative Guatemalan officers. Ambassador John Bell, 
reflecting President Kennedy’s own views, made it his personal mission to prevent 
Arévalo from becoming president because of the belief that he might follow the same 
trajectory as Fidel Castro. Similarly, major figures within the Guatemalan military, 
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namely Defense Minister Enrique Peralta, vowed that they would never allow Arévalo to 
return to Guatemala. Publicly, they stated he would open the doors to communism, but 
the high-command feared that it would lose the considerable power it had accumulated 
since 1954 when it deposed Arévalo’s successor, Jacobo Arbenz. In pursuit of their 
shared mission to stop Arévalo, the Kennedy administration and the upper echelons of the 
Guatemalan military resolved to cancel the presidential election. When President 
Ydigoras, whose presidency continued to disintegrate even after he accepted a military 
cabinet, routinely refused to block Arévalo from entering Guatemala or cancel elections, 
segments of the military began to rise up in open rebellion. Once Arévalo finally returned 
to Guatemala at the end of March 1963, Defense Minister Peralta dealt the final blow to 
the decrepit Ydigoras administration and took control of the country.  
Ambassador Bell had long prepared his colleagues in the State Department for 
this eventuality. Despite limited protests from some members of his inner circle, 
President Kennedy took the advice of Ambassador Bell and consented to the 1963 coup. 
For the second time in less than a decade, the United States contributed to the overthrow 
of a duly-elected civilian government in Guatemala. This coup, however, resulted in a 
direct military dictatorship. From this position of unchallenged authority, Defense 
Minister Peralta and his fellow officers made the Guatemalan Armed Forces the de facto 
rulers of the country for decades to come. For his complicity in facilitating the military’s 
seizure of power, President Kennedy bears some responsibility for the atrocities that they 
would soon begin to commit in the name of anticommunism. 
The immediate consequences of the 1963 coup and the changes initiated under the 
new heads-of-state, Johnson and Peralta, occupy the narrative of Chapter Four. In 
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reaction to Peralta’s military regime, the relatively small insurrection that began at the 
end of 1960 emerged as a country-wide revolutionary movement. Moreover, many of its 
leaders ascribed to Marxism, and some fostered close relations with Castro’s Cuba. Faced 
with a communist guerrilla movement, US officials learned too late that Defense Minister 
Peralta would not blindly follow directives from Washington. Peralta’s defiant streak 
revealed that even within its sphere of influence, the power of the United States had 
serious limits; doubly so for a regime who illegal seizure of power had been condoned by 
President Kennedy himself. Initially, Peralta was slow to respond to the guerrilla threat, 
causing consternation among US policymakers who feared a repeat of the Cuban 
Revolution in Guatemala. Peralta’s military dictatorship was a far cry from the vision of 
democracy projected by the Alliance for Progress. When the Johnson administration 
inherited the presidency, its policies further distorted the stated intentions of Alliance. 
Hoping to fend of the growing insurgency while gaining favor with the obstinate Peralta 
regime, the Johnson administration increasingly directed Alliance for Progress funding 
into the hands of the military, often under the guise of Civic Action and public safety 
programs. While Peralta still did not fully embrace foreign aid initially, he eagerly 
swallowed up resources for the counterinsurgency apparatus his government was building 
with help from the United States. With a popular guerrilla movement threatening 
communist revolution, the Johnson administration continued along the path set by his 
predecessor and used the Alliance for Progress to further amplify the power of 
Guatemala’s military leaders in order to maintain US hegemony. 
Chapter Five, the final installation of this study, posits that the most significant 
outcome of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala was the transformation of the country 
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into a counterinsurgency state. Outwardly, the Johnson administration appeared to 
achieve some of the goals of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala. John Gordon Mein, 
the new ambassador to Guatemala appointed by Johnson, helped convince Defense 
Minister Peralta to allow free and fair democratic elections. The resulting civilian 
government of Julio César Méndez Montenegro, a left-leaning reformer, seemed like a 
perfect fit for the Alliance for Progress. He welcomed international aid and embraced the 
United States in combatting the insurgency. Behind the exterior of his progressive 
presidency, Méndez Montenegro was essentially held captive by the military high-
command. Forced to sign an agreement that nullified civilian control over the military, 
President Méndez Montenegro’s administration proved to be an effective cover for 
colonels committing atrocities in the renewed, US-sponsored campaign against 
insurgents, dissidents, and leftist politicians. During this period, the Guatemalan Armed 
Forces introduced horrific new tactics that would be adopted by authoritarian regimes 
throughout Cold War Latin America. Commanders employed death-squads, engaged in 
forced-disappearance, and conducted scorched-earth campaigns that turned entire 
communities into smoking ruins. The use of state-terror proved effective in dismantling 
the armed resistance, but the excessive violence meted out by security forces even 
alarmed some US policymakers. The military-machine the United States had helped build 
in Guatemala, however, could not be so easily controlled by Washington, and calls to halt 
illegal operations made no discernable impact on US policy or the behavior of 
counterinsurgency forces. When the desperate rebels began targeting and killing high-
ranking US personnel, support for the murderous counterinsurgency state only increased. 
The assassination of Ambassador Mein served as the final keystone for ensuring that the 
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leaders of the Guatemalan Armed Forces would rule the country with an iron fist for 
decades to come. For Guatemala, the Alliance for Progress, already a tattered and 
disfigured inversion of its creators’ original intentions, ended with a murdered American 
ambassador and a war-criminal colonel poised to take the Guatemalan presidency. 
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CHAPTER I: BAD BLOOD 
The Foundations of US-Guatemalan Relations 
 
In 1961, the same year that John F. Kennedy became the President of the United 
States and announced the Alliance for Progress, Juan José Arévalo published his magnum 
opus: La Fábula del Tiburón y las Sardinas (The Fable of the Shark and the Sardines). 
Arévalo had the honor of being Guatemala’s first democratically-elected president after 
the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944 ended over a century of dictatorial rule. Ten years 
after the triumph of the revolution, a covert CIA operation forced his successor, President 
Jacobo Arbenz, to resign. Over forty years of US-sponsored repression, state-terror, and 
civil war followed. When Arévalo published his work, a mesmerizing combination of 
political history and allegorical fantasy, seven years had passed since the United States 
invoked the specter of communism to bulldoze his efforts at moderate economic and 
political reform. In his winding tale, the United States plays the role of the voracious 
shark, while vulnerable Latin American countries, particularly those in Central America 
and the Caribbean, are the sardines that it devours. The 1954 coup and the 
anticommunism crusade were merely manifestations of the same impulse that saw the 
United States repeatedly occupy Nicaragua, partition Panama to build a canal, and the 
numerous interventions that characterized US-Latin American relations since the 
Mexican-American War. Arévalo lamented that the American Republic, once a collection 
of colonial possessions, had abandoned its ideals of “individual freedom, collective well-
being, and national sovereignty” and transformed into an empire driven by an insatiable 
 47 
 
 
appetite for commercial expansion.45 Willing to cause suffering on a global scale to feed 
its economic growth, Arévalo likened American politicians, government functionaries, 
and businessmen to the ancient Carthaginians who sacrificed foreign children to appease 
their bloodthirsty god, Moloch.46  
 This chapter surveys a broad stretch of US-Guatemalan relations from its 
beginnings to the year that Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress and Arévalo 
published his scathing critique. Spanning centuries of Guatemalan history, the 
information presented here relays the nature of the relationship between the Guatemalan 
Armed Forces and the country’s government. It also traces the development of US-
Guatemalan relations—from their origins through the onset of the Cold War. Establishing 
the Guatemalan military’s role within the state before, during, and in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1954 coup is necessary for understanding how the leaders of the armed 
forces advanced their institution’s influence over the civilian government. As we shall 
see in the chapters that follow, their power continued to grow until, with the assistance of 
the United States, Guatemala transformed into a counterinsurgency state.   
Many of the topics covered here—the rise of the United Fruit Company, the 
Guatemalan Revolution, and the Counterrevolution that followed the 1954 coup—enjoy a 
wealth of excellent scholarship, but their relation to subsequent developments in the 
1960s is imperative for understanding how these processes unfolded. Additionally, 
because of a relatively robust body of literature covers these topics that serve as a 
                                                 
45 Juan José Arévalo, The Shark and the Sardines (New York: Lyle Stuart Publishing, 1961) 10. 
46 Ibid. 251. 
 48 
 
 
background to the research presented here, this chapter is largely derived from these 
secondary sources.  
This chapter addresses why the United States intervened in Guatemala in 1954, 
but more importantly, it explains how. Chief among these factors is the relationship 
between the United States government and conservative Guatemalan military officers. 
The close partnership between the Guatemalan Armed Forces and the United States did 
not fully manifest until the 1960s, but the events portrayed here represent the early 
exchanges between these entities that had a major impact on the trajectory of governance 
in Guatemala and US policy. This legacy of interventionism, militarism, and 
anticommunism inspired President Kennedy’s attempt to overhaul US-Latin American 
relations through the Alliance for Progress, but it also prevented the ambitious program 
from fulfilling its idyllic aspirations. 
Perhaps most important of all, the research in this chapter suggests that high 
ranking officers advanced the power and prestige of the armed forces gradually, but 
implacably, well before the military assumed direct control over Guatemala. Ambitious 
military men had long vied for control over the presidency, but the struggle remained a 
conflict between elites. The onset of the Guatemalan Revolution in 1944 enhanced the 
abilities, and aspirations, of many commanding officers. When Guatemalan society was 
upended by the 1954 coup and the counterrevolution that followed, the officer corps 
remained largely intact and appeared as a bastion of stability and order. Conservative, 
anticommunist officers rose through the ranks as the United States influence over the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces increased. These developments were crucial steps on 
Guatemala path to militarization, war, and genocide. 
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The Backyard: Guatemala and the United States before the Revolution 
 
The tapering isthmus of Central America has been subjected to violent political 
conflict for nearly as long as humans have occupied the region. The leaders of a warrior-
class, from the ancient Mayan nacoms to the officers of the modern Guatemalan Armed 
Forces, have always held an important position in society. The Mayan Confederation, the 
first empire to lay claim to what would become Guatemala, was wracked with internecine 
wars between rival city-states and within rigid social hierarchies.47 After the Spanish 
Conquest in 1524, power and influence overwhelmingly hinged on the individual’s 
relationship to Iberia: Spanish peninsulares and their American-born progeny, criollos, 
formed the landed elite and dominated political and economic life in the colony. Spanish 
authorities imposed a racialized caste system in an attempt to create an ideal hierarchy, 
but the reality of power sharing was far more complicated. Within these castas, which 
detailed all possible permutations of racial mixing, European stock granted opportunities 
for social advancement, while African and indigenous heritage could condemn a person 
to a life of inescapable peonage. The castas were far from immutable and new identities 
emerged and coalesced over time based on regional differences. In Guatemala, the 
Ladino, a broad category that initially denoted a person of mixed Spanish heritage, would 
develop into an identity based on contrast to the majority population: los indios.48  
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 On the eve of Guatemalan independence, the division between indigenous and 
Ladino correlated along the lines of battle. Indigenous groups revolted against increased 
taxation and changes in status brought on by the Bourbon Reforms. While some Ladinos 
joined the Indian rebellions, most sided with Spain and filled the ranks of the colonial 
militia. In 1820, a massive Indian uprising attempted to form a regional government and 
crowned its leader, Atanasio Tzul, as its Indian King.49 Though Liberal Ladinos would 
join the rest of Central America in declaring independence from Spain the following year, 
they could not abide an Indian ruler and feared militant solidarity amongst the indigenous 
majority. One thousand Spanish and Ladino militiamen finally quelled the uprising, but 
the failed attempt at indigenous governance bolstered Indian claims to municipal power 
against Ladinos following independence.50 
 Post-independence conflicts between Conservatives and Liberals were waged 
between elite Ladino cliques and the largely indigenous peasants they managed to 
dragoon into their service. Landowners and urban bourgeoisie excluded the Maya from 
political participation. Liberal reforms aimed at dismantling Spanish institutions allied 
the Catholic Church and their Indian subjects in defense of former rights and privileges. 
These reforms opened the Guatemalan economy to the world market, but the lack of 
investment in infrastructure and development, the sharp disparity in wealth, and the 
incursions of foreign capital made Guatemala an export-driven backwater. The Liberal 
ideals of free-trade and nationalism were to propel Guatemala into modernity, but in 
practice, they simply maintained the status quo. Setting a pattern that would pervade 
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throughout Guatemalan history, the investments of foreign capitalists lined the pockets of 
the political elites who protected their privileges and status by co-opting the military 
through patronage.51 The resistance against these policies would spawn another common 
motif in the history of Guatemala: the rule of the caudillo. 
 In 1837, Rafael Carrera seized control of a growing insurrectionary movement 
that opposed the Liberal Guatemalan regime. A Ladino swineherd, Carrera combined the 
personal charisma, military acumen, and political cunning shared by many other Latin 
American caudillos and became the first of Guatemala’s many dictators.52 Carrera and 
his fellow Conservatives promoted limited economic protectionism, restored some of the 
colonial privileges of the Catholic Church, and centralized state power. Ironically, 
indigenous communities gained greater benefits from nineteenth century Conservative 
regimes, which recognized communal landholdings and allowed greater indigenous 
participation in local government.53 Liberals regained power in 1871 when Justo Rufino 
Barrios led a military revolt that began Guatemala’s “Liberal Revolution.”54 Barrios 
exercised considerable personal power during his twelve years as president and pushed 
Liberal reforms that increased freedom of press, attacked the Catholic Church, and, most 
significantly, reoriented Guatemala’s mono-export economy from cochineal dye to coffee 
and bananas.55 Personal rule and coup d’état became staples of Guatemalan presidential 
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politics for the next century, and regardless of the president’s political affiliation, power 
remained firmly in the hands of the landed oligarchs who best managed their relationship 
with the Army. 
 The United States began to take a more serious interest in Guatemalan affairs 
during this period of centralization under the caudillos. Until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the United States focused most of its diplomatic and economic 
energies on Europe. With the “closing of the frontier” at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the US looked to establish itself among the Great Powers and their quest for 
empire. Now capable of upholding the Monroe Doctrine that declared the Western 
Hemisphere off-limits to European empires, the United States had steadily displaced the 
European powers in Latin America at the turn of the twentieth-century. In Guatemala, 
this translated into a massive growth of  US corporate investment in the country: from $6 
million in 1897 to $47 million by 1924.56 Some countries endured occupation under the 
infamous “Big Stick” gunboat diplomacy that characterized US-Latin American relations 
in the early twentieth century. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti all faced major US military 
invasions – justified by the hemispheric policing powers claimed by the Roosevelt 
Corollary to Monroe’s venerable pledge to protect American republics from imperial 
predation. Guatemala, under the thumb of US-friendly strongmen, did not suffer the fate 
of neighboring Nicaragua. Nevertheless, many Guatemalan nationalists, including large 
segments of the army, sympathized with the legendary struggle of Augusto Sandino. 
Under the long reigns of Justo Barrios (1873-85) and Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898-
1920) US investors came to dominate the Guatemalan economy, building railways, 
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telegraphs, and infrastructure of major urban areas. Foreign corporations controlled 
nearly all modern amenities in Guatemala, and for their trouble they were granted 
century-long contracts and negligible tax responsibilities. Only Guatemalan presidents 
and their cronies could expect to benefit from these bargains and the bribes they accepted 
were a paltry sum compared to the enormous profits reaped by US corporations.   
 Militarization and corporate concessions passed for modernization in Guatemala 
at the turn of the century. During Manuel José Estrada Cabrera’s twenty-two years in 
office, the Guatemalan government began its fateful partnership with the United Fruit 
Company (UFCo). Minor Keith, the American magnate and progenitor of UFCo, had 
already monopolized the construction and administration of Guatemala’s railways and 
seaports by the time he signed an agreement with Estrada Cabrera that granted United 
Fruit massive tax exemptions, land concessions, and ninety-nine years of absolute 
commercial domination in 1904.57 United Fruit stymied nationalist sentiments by 
providing Guatemala’s political elites with bounteous gifts, exacerbating venality and 
corruption within the government. Under the caudillos, the military, long the protector of 
the oligarchy, steadily increased its power and prestige by becoming the praetorian 
gatekeepers to the office of the presidency in periods of succession. Successful 
Guatemalan leaders had literally seized the presidency since Rafael Carrera, and usually 
held an officer’s rank in the Guatemalan Army. The rule of Guatemala’s last Liberal 
dictator (1931-44), Jorge Ubico, marked a crescendo of social militarization, 
governmental corruption, and foreign economic domination. 
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The quasi-fascist dictatorship of General Jorge Ubico was the most brutal and 
repressive regime to rule Guatemala before the country’s civil war. Godson to former 
president Justo Rufino Barrios, an admirer of Mussolini, and beholden to the demands of 
U.S. corporate interests, Ubico saw Guatemala as his personal “village” and enriched 
himself and his followers to the detriment of key components of Guatemala’s ruling 
class.58 Born to a wealthy landowning family, Ubico chose military service as his vehicle 
into Guatemalan politics and rapidly rose to the rank of general. Ubico became the 
president of Guatemala in 1931 and sought authoritarian solutions for the economic and 
political crises that plagued Depression-Era Guatemala. He was the only candidate in the 
1930 election, designed to provide the pretense of legitimacy for the will of the 
Guatemalan elite. Nonetheless, he came to power through a plebiscite of forced 
consensus, not a coup, unlike many of Guatemala’s former and future military dictators.  
Like his fascist idols in Europe, Ubico identified potential threats to his power as 
enemies that needed to be exterminated. Upon taking office, Ubico “wiped the political 
slate clean” by dismissing the Supreme Court, filling the legislature with presidential 
appointees, and purging the bureaucracy of non-Ubiquistas.59 General Ubico 
simultaneously militarized all of Guatemalan society: school children drilled in combat 
exercises, army generals replaced regional governors, and even members of the national 
symphony orchestra were forced to wear military uniforms and perform pieces selected 
by the president.60 The total concentration of state power in the dictator’s hands instilled 
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an illusion of order in Guatemala that would be shattered by domestic and international 
changes that accompanied the Second World War.  
Within Guatemala, President Ubico cultivated a loyal constituency outside of the 
traditional oligarchy in order to dilute their power and enhance his own. The prominence 
of the military rose to new heights during Ubico’s years in office. The nepotism that 
characterized Ubico’s government was mirrored within the military as the two 
institutions began to merge into an indistinguishable entity. Unquestioning obedience 
trumped initiative and skill and the “mindless automata” within the officer corps received 
better pay and greater opportunity.61 Ubico’s military simultaneously reinforced racial 
divisions while providing the elusive promise of social mobility. The officer corps was 
exclusively Ladino, while most soldiers were indigenous peasants under forced 
conscription.62 Line officers, composed of lower and middle-class Ladinos, could rise 
through the ranks and improve their station in life. Similarly, the military attempted to 
imprint Ladino culture onto their indigenous conscripts. Ubico believed that military 
service could amend supposed Indian inferiority: “They arrive rude and brutish, but when 
they leave they are no longer like donkeys, they have good manners and are better 
equipped to face life.”63 Though Ubico’s policies reflected the longstanding belief in 
Ladino supremacy, the dictator was relatively popular among the Maya population. 
Unlike any previous president, Ubico travelled to indigenous communities regularly and 
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granted their leaders an audience and counsel.64 This was a deliberate political strategy. 
These public appearances had the dual effect of awing these remote communities with 
military grandeur and shifting the blame for the hardships faced by rural peasants away 
from the state and onto local landowners. Ubico reconfigured the balance of power within 
Guatemala in order to concentrate his personal authority and weaken the oligarchy, but 
his most valuable ally came down from the north in its Great White Fleet. 
The United Fruit Company, and through it the United States, served as Ubico’s 
chief patron. United Fruit had a long and sordid history in Central America, and often 
acted as a proxy for the US government. In Guatemala, UFCo possessed the majority of 
the arable land, which it used almost exclusively for the production of bananas. The 
company liked to boast that its Guatemalan workers were among the best paid 
agricultural laborers in the country, but this disguised the fact that the wages they offered 
were not significant enough to maintain the lives of their workers beyond the level of 
subsistence. United Fruit crushed any attempt at collective organization among their 
workers, and encouraged regimes that used repressive measures to control the workforce. 
While they can be credited with developing roads, rail, and electrical infrastructure in 
Guatemala and other Central American countries, these assets remained tightly controlled 
by the company and designed to move their products to port as soon as possible. The 
executives at United Fruit gave little, if any, thought to how these infrastructure projects 
could meet the domestic needs of Guatemalans. Throughout Central America, United 
Fruit Company did not hesitate to prop up violent strongmen, induce massacres on unruly 
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plantations, and even bring countries to the brink of war as long as it served their profit 
margins. The dictatorship of Jorge Ubico seemed a perfect fit for implementing United 
Fruit’s goals of dominating the market and maximizing their revenue in Guatemala. 
Ubico slashed UFCo’s already negligible taxes, reaffirmed their control over 
Guatemala’s ports, and provided the company with more privileges than any previous 
Guatemalan ruler. Historian Paul Dosal characterized “the concession as one of the most 
harmful ever imposed on Guatemala.”65 Ubico fostered close relations with the growing 
segment of wealthy German coffee growers early in his reign, and the U.S. press 
condemned his sympathy with the Axis powers. His ideological leanings, however, did 
not cloud his political judgment, and Ubico deported several hundred German citizens 
and Guatemalans of German descent and seized their considerable assets at the behest of 
the FBI.66 These maneuvers reversed American popular opinion with reporters declaring 
that Ubico “is the biggest man in Central America. Given local conditions, he has done a 
lot. Relations between the United States and Guatemala are in every way excellent, better 
than they have ever been before.”67 To further persuade the United States of Guatemala’s 
loyalty, Ubico requested a U.S. officer to head the nation’s premier military academy, the 
Escuela Politécnica.68 The Guatemalan Army would remain under the mentorship of US 
officers throughout the Cold War. In return for his fealty, UFCo gave Ubico one million 
dollars, Guatemala received increased economic aid, and the United States turned a blind 
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eye when Ubico changed the laws to preserve his presidency indefinitely.69 Through 
Ubico’s bald despotism, Guatemala became a genuine satellite of the United States. 
Ubico’s alliance with the United States did not guarantee the permanence of his 
power. Following the overthrow of El Salvador’s authoritarian president Maximiliano 
Hernandez Martinez in 1944, Ubico relied on increasingly heavy-handed tactics that 
further isolated the dictator from the traditional power-elite. The warrantless arrests and 
summary executions by Ubico’s secret police devolved into widespread state terror.70 A 
fledgling urban middle-class had been growing in size and aspirations and demanded 
greater representation within the privileged confines of Guatemalan government. 
President Ubico considered any dissidence to be dangerous leftist subversion, so labor 
organizers, intellectuals, and nationalists soon found themselves persecuted as 
communists—a slander that would be repeated ad nauseam for the rest of the twentieth 
century. The looming defeat of fascism in Europe, the overthrow of neighboring 
dictators, and the narrowing beneficiaries of Ubico’s regime inspired large segments of 
Guatemalan society to band together against their General-President. 
Though President Ubico’s brand of authoritarianism earned him many enemies, 
he still had near total control over the state. Ubico assuaged his fear of being overthrown 
with increased repression. He suspended the constitution and integrated military officials 
in the private and public sectors to act as his spies. The widespread discontent that had 
simmered for thirteen years finally boiled over on Teacher’s Day, June 30, 1944. 
Formerly a parade held in honor of Guatemala’s educators, the military took over the 
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celebration and relentlessly drilled teachers in marching and presenting colors. According 
to historian Piero Gleijeses, after hours of carrying heavy flags under a tropical sun 
without rest, the teachers began to boycott the exercises.71 Other professionals and 
students joined the boycott, which swelled into the first massive protest movement 
against Ubico in Guatemala City. Revealing his conceit and aloofness, President Ubico 
was shocked that his people did not love him. His despondency must have only increased 
when the United States, whose officials and executives he had spent his entire tenure in 
office courting, remained silent. Defending an avowedly fascist dictator had become 
relatively untenable for US policymakers as World War II drew to a close. Gleijeses 
notes that the State Department had come to view Ubico as an anachronism and that the 
new leaders of Guatemala would naturally ally with Washington.72  Only Guatemala City 
had shown resistance to the president, and the military remained loyal to his command, 
but the opposition to his rule seemed to wound Ubico on a personal level, and he resigned 
without spilling blood. According to Gleijeses account, neither Ubico or his closest 
associates offered a definitive explanation for his decision to step down. Beyond 
speculating that he may have been in poor health, and relying on the American 
ambassadors assessment that Ubico was “deeply disillusioned and hurt that the majority 
of the country was against him,” even Gleijeses formidable research could not uncover 
Ubico’s motivations.73 Upon leaving the country, he placed the government in the hands 
of a military junta, dominated by his sycophant, General Federico Ponce. What had been 
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Guatemala’s most militarized and totalitarian regime disintegrated when its dictator 
sulked away like a scorned lover. 
 Guatemala stood on the precipice of a new era. It seemed as though Jorge Ubico 
and all that he represented had been cast down by a united Guatemala. The following 
decade of reform inspired many Guatemalans to believe that they could overcome the 
forces of exploitation, repression, and poverty. Though Guatemalan society began to 
change, the old order persisted. Over a century of dictatorial rule had deeply ingrained 
Guatemalan politics with caudillo-style authoritarianism. The growing power of the 
military, both before and after the Revolution of 1944, complicated prospects for 
democratic reform even further. Moreover, the United States and its corporate entities 
retained enormous economic and political influence over Guatemala. As reformists began 
the long, hard journey towards egalitarianism, the reactionary forces of the Guatemalan 
oligarchy and US corporate interests fought to regain the power and privilege that 
appeared to be slipping through their fingers.  
 
Decade of Spring: Arévalo and the Guatemalan Revolution 
 
Guatemala presented the first challenge to the United States’ dominance over its 
declared sphere of influence. In 1944, Juan José Arévalo became Guatemala’s first 
popularly elected president after a group of young, military officers overthrew General 
Juan Federico Ponce, the last remnant of the Ubico Era. A philosophy professor of 
considerable charm, President Arévalo ushered in an era of reform known as the Diez 
Años de Primavera (Ten Years of Spring). During his term in office, Arévalo established 
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a social security system, legalized unions, set a minimum wage, rebuilt the education 
system, and reached out to indigenous communities by encouraging increased civil 
participation. His administration also crafted a new constitution that divided the power of 
the state into executive, legislative and judicial branches, and guaranteed basic human 
rights. The traditional Guatemalan oligarchy of landed elites and their allies in officer 
corps chafed at Arévalo’s reforms, but lacked the popular base to challenge a president 
who had won eighty-five percent of the vote.74 United Fruit Company, which owned a 
large percent of the arable land in Guatemala, also expressed concern about the motives 
of the reformer president. Arévalo’s enemies pointed to his nebulous personal doctrine of 
“spiritual socialism” and claimed his vaguely defined ideology was thinly disguised 
communism. As Arévalo’s term continued, conservative opposition united behind 
ambitious military men who stymied his attempts at reform and threatened his presidency 
with more than twenty failed coup attempts.75 His successor, Jacobo Arbenz, would face 
even greater threats. The first indications that the Guatemalan Armed Forces might shift 
from defending the nation to controlling it appeared during this celebrated period of 
democracy and reform. 
  Following Ubico’s abrupt departure from the Guatemalan presidency, General 
Federico Ponce quickly domineered the provisional junta and forced Congress to declare 
him president on July 4, 1944. Aware of the precarious circumstances that allowed him to 
commandeer the executive branch, Ponce presented a reformist façade. Political parties 
were allowed to form and assemble. Unions gained legal recognition. Above all, General 
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Ponce swore that Guatemala would have free and fair democratic elections in the 
immediate future. Teachers and university students, the vanguard of the protests that 
unseated Ubico, soon formed the two most powerful political parties—Frente Popular 
Libertador and Renovacion Nacional—and selected Professor Juan José Arévalo as their 
candidate.76 When it seemed likely that the academic would best the general in the 
upcoming elections, Ponce’s democratic pretenses were quickly unveiled. 
General Ponce affirmed his status as a relic of Ubico by his lack of originality 
when dealing with his potential opposition. First, he attempted to stoke the ancient fear of 
Indian Rebellion. On September 15, Guatemala’s Independence Day, thousands of 
machete-wielding peasants marched on Guatemala City, shouting their support for 
President Ponce. The government had trucked them in and praised “the magnificent 
parade…[and] the sincerity of the peasantry.”77 The opposition parties saw the display for 
what it was and condemned Ponce for his callous exploitation of campesinos in an 
attempt to manipulate the urban population with fear. Having failed at provoking racial 
tensions to his advantage, Ponce resorted to outright murder. On October 1, 1944, his 
government assassinated the editor of El Imparcial, the newspaper that most stridently 
supported opposition candidates. Ponce’s political opponents understood his message 
clearly, and scattered to the winds. Those that avoided arrest or direct deportation sought 
shelter in neighboring countries and foreign embassies. Another caudillo settled into the 
presidential palace. 
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 Eighteen days later, a group of young Army officers overthrew General Ponce 
and ushered in the Guatemalan Revolution. Nearly the entire Guatemalan Army, outside 
Ubico’s lackeys that had retained their positions of authority, resented General Ponce’s 
attempts to reincarnate the quasi-fascist dictatorship. Captain Jacobo Arbenz had resigned 
his officer post in July in protest of Ponce seizing the presidency and had been organizing 
a rebellion from El Salvador. He conspired with Major Carlos Aldana Sandoval, a leader 
within the pivotal Guardia de Honor, the elite troops of Guatemala City. On the night of 
October 19, an unlikely ensemble of officers, soldiers, students, and union members 
launched their attack on the government.78 Arbenz faced an immediate setback when his 
erstwhile ally, Major Sandoval, fled to El Salvador, but he was able to maintain the 
loyalty of the Guardia de Honor when another young, ambitious officer, Major Francisco 
Arana, joined Arbenz’s revolt. The commander of the only twelve tanks stationed in the 
capital, Arana’s contribution ensured the fight would be one-sided, and the entirety of the 
Guardia de Honor revolted against Ponce the following day. General Ponce surrendered 
promptly, and on October 20, 1944, Guatemalans rejoiced in the streets as a new 
provisional junta, headed by Captain Arbenz, Major Arana, and the attorney Jorge 
Toriello, assumed stewardship over the country. By overthrowing the Ponce government, 
military officers had saved the Guatemalan Revolution. 
 
The Guatemalan Revolution shared many characteristics with previous 
presidential successions. Although its chief actors justified their cause in the name of 
democracy, it was yet another presidential coup carried out by a group of disgruntled 
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military leaders. Far from revolutionary, the removal of General Ponce reaffirmed that 
real power in Guatemala flowed from the ability to control the Army, or at least 
significant factions within it. The Arbenz-Arana junta immediately scheduled elections 
for December, but their willingness to concede executive power belied the ambitions of 
both men and the military as a whole. Only two days after Ponce surrendered, the junta 
firmly established that the authority of the military had been in no way diminished. 
Gleijeses’ work describes an incident in Patrizia, a town fifty miles west of Guatemala 
City with a substantial indigenous majority, where over one-thousand peasants protested, 
demanding land and clamoring for the return of General Ponce.79 Things turned violent 
when the crowd began to ransack homes and attack wealthier members of the 
community—soon over twenty Ladinos lay dead. The provisional revolutionary 
government gave the traditional military response: a massacre. Foreshadowing the 
scorched-earth tactics employed by the military throughout the Cold War, the soldiers 
killed any man, woman, or child they could find in the area. The Guatemalan Army Chief 
of Staff reported the slaughter “would act as a warning throughout the Republic for any 
other disorders of this nature.”80 This early blemish on Arbenz’s record is often 
overlooked by scholars who have generally provided a positive appraisal of the leader of 
the Guatemalan Revolution. This has been compounded by the fact that, within 
Guatemala, discussing the Patrizia Revolt is considered taboo.81 Regardless of these 
potential impediments to genuine revolutionary change, Guatemalans welcomed the 
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chance to participate in their first free and fair election and expected that their interests 
would be served by a government chosen by the people. 
The October Revolution of 1944, a coup led by junior military officers against the 
short lived government of General Federico Ponce, a shell of the Ubico regime, ushered 
in the Ten Years of Spring, a decade of social, political, and economic reform aimed at 
modernizing Guatemala. Reformers, though admirable in their aspirations, attempted to 
enact change without effectively countering institutionalized authoritarianism, militarism, 
and racism or the entrenched elites that benefitted from these oppressive systems. Allying 
with these reactionary elements, the United States dragged Guatemala into its global 
struggle—as it would do with so many Latin American countries throughout the Cold 
War. Swept up in a fever of McCarthyism at home and determined to contain Soviet 
expansion abroad, the United States government, under two presidents from opposing 
parties, perceived strong assertions of sovereignty and nationalism in Guatemala as the 
harbingers of communism.  
 
* * * 
 
  Juan José Arévalo remains a near-mythical figure in Guatemala. His ascent to 
power is as captivating as it is unlikely. A teacher and an author, Arévalo’s physical and 
intellectual presence was as intimidating as any caudillo.82 Numerous authors have 
attempted to unravel Guatemala’s philosopher-president, but, as noted by the scholar 
Piero Gleijeses, a definitive account has yet to emerge as his “biographers lapse into 
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uncritical praise.”83 This tendency might have arisen from a comparison to the 
authoritarian leaders that regularly ruled Guatemala, or perhaps his biographers admired a 
fellow academic. His own memoirs provide a picture of a man who believed he was 
destined to liberate his country from the ignorance and deprivation.84 Born into 
Guatemala’s small middle class in 1904, Arévalo made his way as an educator. He taught 
at primary schools until 1927, when he set off for Argentina on scholarship to the 
University of La Plata. After six years of study, he earned his doctorate in education, 
becoming one of the few Guatemalans of his time who possessed a postgraduate degree.85 
He would soon find these credentials meant little in Ubico’s Guatemala. 
When Arévalo returned to his home country in 1934, he believed that after 
showing due deference to the dictator, he would be made Secretary of Education. Proudly 
providing his president with a copy of his dissertation, Arévalo was deeply offended 
when Ubico showed no interest in his work and only offered him a petty bureaucratic 
position in the Ministry of Education. Arévalo clearly believed he deserved much more 
and wrote: 
“Stunned…I offered my thanks. I would have only a typewriter and two 
chairs—no subordinates, not even a secretary…I felt humiliated. Ubico had dealt 
me a blow that was unexpected as it was undeserved…I was a Doctor of 
Philosophy of Education, I had studied abroad for six years, and I had been 
deemed unworthy to be the undersecretary of education.”86 
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Dissatisfied with the situation, Arévalo left Guatemala and returned to Argentina 
in 1936. Many scholars and biographers contend that Arévalo rejected the dictatorship 
and embarked on self-imposed exile to show his opposition to Ubico’s dictatorial rule. 
Richard Immerman, whose study of the 1954 coup is a foundational work on US-
Guatemalan relations, goes so far as to call Arévalo an “outspoken critic.”87 Despite this 
characterization, Arévalo never openly disparaged the Ubico regime after leaving for 
Argentina.88 Those more critical of Arévalo have suggested that he abandoned his post in 
Ubico’s government for more promising career opportunities. Both factors likely 
motivated the underappreciated academic, and he quickly settled into a position he found 
much more suitable at the University of Tucuman. There, he became a distinguished 
professor while developing his theories on political philosophy. 
Professor Arévalo had not set foot in Guatemala for nearly a decade when he 
learned that Ubico stepped down in the face of overwhelming protests. In fact, he had 
become a citizen of Argentina and was ineligible to run for public office without official 
reinstatement of his Guatemalan citizenship.89 If his ego remained bruised from the unfair 
treatment he had received from Ubico, it must have fully recuperated when the leaders of 
the various student and teacher groups who had initiated the dictator’s downfall requested 
he return to his homeland to be their presidential candidate. In fact, he had made no 
efforts to enter Guatemala’s political scene. According to Gleijeses, teachers and students 
had spearheaded the revolution, and a handful of respected educators who were familiar 
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with Arévalo’s literary scholarship believed he could be the “new man,” untainted by 
Ubico corruption, who could guide the Guatemalan Revolution.90 He obliged his 
supporters and received a hero’s welcome when he returned to Guatemala on September 
3, 1944. Formerly known only in academic circles, Arévalo became a nationally 
celebrated figure in a few days. His time as a professor had made Arévalo a practiced 
orator and the forty-year old stood six feet tall, two-hundred pounds.91 He combined his 
physique, youth, and charisma to captivate his audiences, who saw him as the 
embodiment of the Guatemalan Revolution. Attempting to explain Arévalo’s abrupt 
ascendency, Piero Gleijeses states that after getting rid of Ubico, the Guatemalan 
revolution lacked direction and was “a movement in search of a soul.” The highly-
credentialed, affable Arévalo could “be all things to all people” because his absence from 
Guatemala made him a blank canvas politically, which his supporters painted with their 
own aspirations and ideals.92 General Ponce, realizing he could not combat the political 
dynamo by legitimate means, initiated the series of repressive measures that eventually 
led to his ouster as a direct attack on Arévalo’s presidential ambitions. Notably, the 
United States did not provide General Ponce with requested assistance, implicitly 
supporting the emerging democratic movement broadly, although not extending that 
support to Arévalo specifically. The State Department likely understood that any 
candidate stained by service under Ubico could not prevail electorally in Guatemala’s 
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political climate, and decided to distance itself from presidential contenders so that the 
United States could more easily partner with whoever emerged victorious.  
The provisional government that administered Guatemala after the Ponce coup 
graciously stepped aside when Arévalo won eighty-five percent of the vote.93 Taking 
advantage of his physical appearance and practiced public speaking, Arévalo delivered 
thundering speeches to enthralled audiences as he travelled throughout Guatemala. A 
self-proclaimed “spiritual socialist”, Arévalo believed that freedom was foundational to 
human development, but that this freedom had to coincide with the democratic 
aspirations of a society.94 He sought to build a Nueva Guatemala, under this vague, 
utopian vision of spiritual socialism that transcended the “mutilating” mistakes of fascism 
and communism and would “liberate men psychologically, to return to them all of the 
psychological and spiritual integrity that was denied them by conservatism and 
liberalism.”95  
Regardless of the unfortunate name he chose for his personal philosophy, Arévalo 
was both a nationalist and a capitalist: he rejected classical Marxism, and upheld 
individual property rights “as long as they are always subordinated to the social 
necessities and interests of the nation as a whole.”96 President Arévalo’s consuming 
ambition and greatest achievement was enacting a new Guatemalan constitution that 
divided the powers of government into legislative, executive, and judicial branches; set a 
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single, six year term limit for the presidency; guaranteed individual rights and popular 
sovereignty; forbade censorship and discrimination based on race and gender; and banned 
active military personnel from occupying political positions.97 The remarkable document 
signaled something new for Guatemala—a political system aimed at widespread equality 
and representation. 
The impact of the Arévalo era reforms was undeniably revolutionary for 
Guatemala, but they could hardly be considered radical. In addition to the new 
constitution, President Arévalo legalized unions, rebuilt education and public health 
institutions, and established Guatemala’s first social security system. Despite his 
magnanimity, Arévalo could not entirely escape the legacy of his predecessors. Arévalo 
sought to build a Guatemala that dispersed authority throughout the branches of the 
government, and Gleijeses notes that he “preferred to manipulate competing parties rather 
than confront only one.”98 Key ministry positions, however, often went to unqualified 
allies: the directorship of the Fincas Nacionales (National Plantations) was given to 
Arévalo’s inexperienced brother.99 Arévalo favored waxing poetic on the vagaries of his 
spiritual socialism rather than directly confronting the exploitative land tenure system 
that held campesinos in bondage and his policies generally focused on the urban middle 
class. His administration succeeded in passing a law that forbade sharecropping and other 
exploitative labor practices that forced peasants to rent land, but it also preserved 
landowner control over rural labor by simply replacing outmoded vagrancy laws with 
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new regulations of the same effect.100 Although contemporaries and scholars have 
described Arévalo as possessing greater sympathy for the rural poor than his 
predecessors, the professor-president often offered platitudes instead concrete changes in 
the land tenure system. Arévalo announced, “The problem is that the peasants have lost 
their desire to till the soil because of the attitudes and politics of the past. My government 
will motivate them”101 Trapped within the top-down, ethnocentric traditions of Ladino 
politics, Arévalo believed that there was “no agrarian problem; rather, the peasants are 
psychologically and politically constrained from working the land.”102 
The old alliance of the military and the landed elite posed the greatest threat to the 
integrity of the revolution. Arévalo, like the majority of his supporters, hailed from a 
middle class family, and his revolution steadily replaced the old landed gentry with urban 
bourgeoisie to form a new political leadership.103 The upper class viewed the expanded 
freedoms of the Arévalo years as “intolerable excesses” and began to pine for the “social 
peace” of the Ubico years.104 The conservative segments of the military opposed Arévalo 
much more directly. They viewed the ambitious academic as a potential threat to their 
venerable position as the guardians of the established social order.  Though many viewed 
Arévalo’s lack of military experience as a welcome change, the new president quickly 
retained the military heroes of the October Revolution: Major Francisco Arana and 
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Captain Jacobo Arbenz, as the military chief of staff and defense minister respectively.105 
Major Arana, who hoped to make the most of his status as a hero of the revolution, had 
coveted the presidency since the coup. He demanded that Arévalo make him the 
military’s chief of staff after the election. Both men understood this was not a request, 
rather a concession granted in return for the loyalty of the troops under his sway. 
Historians Schlesinger and Kinzer claim that Arana, a moderate conservative, gained 
supporters from within the military and the aristocracy by using his considerable 
influence to block programs he found disagreeable.106 When some Guatemalan 
congressmen implied that Arana’s refusal to abide by the new constitution’s demand that 
political figures abdicate their military titles should be investigated, Arana responded by 
threatening to declare martial law and dissolve the legislature.107 The increasingly bold 
encroachments of Arana inspired President Arévalo to quip, “In Guatemala there are two 
presidents, and one of them has a machine gun with which he is always threatening the 
other.”108 Arévalo insisted that Captain Jacobo Arbenz, the other major military leader of 
the October Revolution, hold the position of Minister of Defense to act as a counter to 
Arana.   
As Arévalo’s term came to a close, it seemed Guatemala was destined to return to 
some form of military leadership. Arana and Arbenz were the only contenders for the 
presidency, and Arana’s aggression suggested that he was poised to overthrow Arévalo 
before the 1950 presidential elections. The precise details of the conspiracy that unfolded 
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remain a matter of debate, but the most thorough scholarly investigations generally agree 
that Arévalo and Arbenz collaborated to stop Arana. To protect the gains of the 
revolution and ensure a democratic transition, Arévalo and Arbenz plotted to arrest Arana 
and fly him out of the country. On July 18, 1949, Arana was sent on a farcical mission to 
inspect an armaments cache outside of Guatemala City, his car was stopped by armed 
men who demanded his surrender. Arana refused and was killed in the ensuing gunfight. 
Claims implicating Arbenz’s responsibility range from the direct participation of his 
personal assistants to the defense minister observing the battle from a nearby hill.109 At 
the time of the incident, Aranistas quickly blamed Arévalo and Arbenz, while the 
government and its supporters claimed that Arana had been murdered by his conservative 
allies for failing to orchestrate a coup.110 An initial uprising by Arana loyalist within the 
military was quelled when Arbenz distributed weapons to union members, students, and 
other supporters, who bolstered the ranks of government troops. Minor coup attempts 
plagued the Arévalo administration until his term ended in 1950. The return of a 
conservative military dictatorship had been averted—through assassination. Arbenz’s 
broad coalition of liberal army officers, union members, and peasant organizations won 
the election with sixty-five percent of the vote, but the illegitimate means used to secure 
the victory against Arana were a dire portent for the fate of his administration and the 
revolution. Nearly a decade later, the specter of the murdered Arana would return to 
haunt Arévalo in his attempt to return to the presidency and Guatemala. 
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 Arévalo left office warning that an “anonymous force” of international and 
domestic conservatism hovered over Guatemala and that his successor could either 
abandon the ideals of the revolution or incite their wrath by pushing it forward.111 Arbenz 
built his career in the traditionally conservative military, but he belonged to a group of 
young, leftist officers who resented Ubico’s draconian discipline and demand for 
unconditional loyalty. Arévalo’s boisterous persona bestowed the outward appearance of 
a caudillo, but he pushed his agenda primarily through political manipulation and 
consensus. Arbenz resurrected a more direct style of rule to advance the revolution by 
decree. Unlike Arévalo, Arbenz understood that Guatemala could not modernize without 
fundamentally restructuring rural society, and the only way to accomplish this would be 
to institute significant agrarian reform. Two critical presidential directives sealed 
Arbenz’s fate: the legalization of the Guatemalan communist party and the expropriation 
and redistribution of fallow land owned by large landholders. The enemies of the 
revolution warped Arbenz’s decrees to fit a narrative that would attract the attention of 
powerful allies: Guatemala was turning Red. 
 
Good Neighbors Gone Bad: The United States and the Guatemalan Revolution 
 
 It is no coincidence that the Guatemalan Revolution occurred just as the defeat of 
the Axis powers seemed inevitable.  Although the United States still supported dictators 
throughout Latin America, Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy saw the United 
States retreat from its previous tendency toward armed intervention in Latin America. As 
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the war concluded, Guatemalans became emboldened by the momentous political shifts 
that seemed to be sweeping the globe. In particular, FDR’s anti-colonialism and 
commitment to the ‘Four Freedoms’ likely inspired many members of the middle class 
who protested the fascistic government of Jorge Ubico. When threatened by a new 
adversary in the form of international communism, the United States proved it would 
sacrifice its ideals more readily than its control over its sphere of influence. 
After World War II, international competition with the Soviet Union caused 
anticommunism to feature prominently in both the domestic and foreign policy of the 
United States. The chief component of the foreign policy was containment, an approach 
formulated by respected statesman George F. Kennan during the Truman administration. 
Taking the Soviet Union as his subject, Kennan argued that peaceful coexistence between 
capitalist and communist countries was impossible because of the expansionist ideology 
of communism.112 In Kennan’s view, preventing the spread of communism might cause it 
to collapse under its inherent economic dysfunction, or cause it to soften from exposure 
to capitalist markets. Kennan’s theory found a receptive audience in the Truman 
administration, and it inspired the president to declare the Truman Doctrine in March, 
1947. Stated plainly, the doctrine promised that the United States would commit political, 
economic, and military assistance to any government threatened by the forces of 
international communism. By 1949, the detonation of the first Soviet atomic weapon and 
Mao Zedong’s victory in China seemed to prove that international communism was 
indeed an existential threat and Kennan’s call to confront and contain the global menace 
dominated the actions of the United States and its allies for the next four decades. 
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 After formulating a cornerstone of US-Cold War foreign policy, Truman’s first 
Secretary of State, George Marshall, appointed Kennan to head the State Department’s 
Policy Planning Staff. In 1950, he travelled throughout Latin American to meet with 
ambassadors and assess the United States’ southern neighbors.113 Kennan felt that the 
geographical, cultural, and racial qualities of Latin America made the region and its 
people inherently backwards. Citing Catholicism, tropical climate, and racial mixing as 
the roots of Latin America’s troubles, Kennan observed, “it seems to me unlikely that 
there could be any region on the earth in which nature and human behavior could have 
combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human 
life than in Latin America.”114 Even so, in the larger geopolitical struggle of the Cold 
War, Kennan maintained that Latin America must remain the United States’ uncontested 
sphere of influence. The Truman administration, molded by Kennan’s ethnocentric 
approach, pushed anticommunism as the preeminent feature of US policy in Latin 
America through military aid, support of dictatorial regimes, political repression, and, if 
the need arose, direct intervention. The Kennan Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, a term 
coined by historian Gaddis Smith, called for the United States to intervene in Latin 
American countries in order to save them from the communist threat that their leaders 
were incapable of handling.115 Echoing Theodore Roosevelt’s “Big Stick” policies 
toward Latin America, the United States would rely on local dictators to maintain order 
and use its military might if its political and economic interests appeared to be at risk. 
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 In Guatemala, this approach became infused with the goals of corporate interests, 
namely those of United Fruit Company, whose operations dominated the country’s 
economy. Before the Guatemalan Revolution in 1944, the United States support for a 
caudillo hinged on his relationship with United Fruit. For example, the Roosevelt 
administration overlooked Jorge Ubico’s flagrant abuses of power and admiration for 
fascist governments, in part, because of the outrageous concessions he granted the fruit 
conglomerate. Yet, when Ubico, and his successor General Ponce, sought help from the 
US embassy as their regimes disintegrated, their subservience to United Fruit did not 
translate into support from the United States. Roosevelt’s State Department, proponents 
of the Good Neighbor Policy, had tolerated the dictator, but hoped that his removal would 
usher in more palatable allies in Guatemala.116 As such, US officials did not view 
Arévalo with the scrutiny and suspicion that would characterize their later assessments, 
and his campaign and early presidential years went unopposed. These cordial relations 
would not last long.  
Conservative Guatemalans had lashed liberals with charges of communism well 
before the revolution. Jorge Ubico made his military career out of crushing supposedly 
communist rebellions in El Salvador and within Guatemala, and after he became 
president, he used the label to destroy dissidents and arrest opponents. Arévalo faced 
similar accusations from both the oligarchy and the Catholic Church when he threatened 
their power by legalizing unions and nationalizing some Church property. By 1947, some 
members of the State Department suspected the Arévalo administration might be under 
communist influence and filed a complaint, on behalf of the United Fruit Company, 
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against the enactment of a labor code that granted plantation workers the right to 
unionize.117 In May of 1948, a State Department memorandum circulated on the topic, 
concluding that while they had no “proof of communism”, Arévalo’s reforms could very 
likely have “communist inspiration behind them.”118 When the dividends of US 
corporations were threatened, many Washington officials began to condemn even 
moderate reforms in Guatemala as creeping communist infiltration.  
US-Guatemalan relations soured after the death of Francisco Arana when the US 
ambassador, Richard C. Patterson, began to threaten the Arévalo administration. Initially, 
the State Department supported Ambassador Patterson, who proclaimed that the United 
States would withhold economic assistance if the Guatemalan government persisted in its 
provocations. Described by one scholar as a “brash, dim former [businessman]…who 
couldn’t speak Spanish and was given to colorful outbursts on the menace of Soviet 
communism in Guatemala”, Ambassador Patterson recoiled at a series of perceived 
slights against the United States.119 These outrages included Arévalo’s support for the 
antifascist Caribbean Legion and encouraging Puerto Rican athletes to march with their 
own flag and music—instead of the Star-Spangled Banner—during the Central American 
and Caribbean Games inauguration ceremony in Guatemala City. Emboldened by 
Washington’s support, Patterson presented a list of seventeen officials, including several 
cabinet members, who he suspected were communists and demanded that President 
Arévalo fire them immediately. Such an audacious ultimatum, unaccompanied by 
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evidence, irked the Arévalo government. Furthermore, reports surfaced that Patterson 
was actively courting his contacts in anti-revolutionary circles to assist him in 
undermining the Guatemalan government.120 It appeared that the ambassador 
overreached, however, and was recalled back to Washington when the Arévalo 
government prepared to declare him a persona non-grata.  
When Patterson returned to the United States, he began a one-man campaign 
against the communist threat he perceived was taking over Guatemala. In his speeches 
that railed against the Guatemalan government, the expelled-ambassador developed the 
infamous “duck test” for determining if a government was communist. In painfully over-
simplified terms, Patterson explained: 
“Many times it is impossible to prove legally that a certain individual is a 
communist, but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of 
detection—the ‘duck test.’ The duck test works this way: suppose you see a bird 
walking around in a farm yard. This bird wears no label that says ‘duck.’ But the 
bird certainly looks like a duck. Also he goes to the pond and you notice he swims 
like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time 
you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he’s 
wearing a label or not.”121     
 
Patterson took his message across the United States, giving lectures throughout 
the country. His dire warnings of the Red Menace spreading into the Western 
Hemisphere resonated with Americans frightened by the incredible gains made by 
                                                 
120 This remains a point of contention that deserves further investigation. Schlesinger and Kinzer concluded 
that Patterson was actively seeking the destruction of the Arévalo government, citing his private 
correspondence with UFCo CEO Sam Zemurray, urging the executive to lobby the US Congress for harsh 
actions against the Guatemalan government. Richard Immerman’s assessment is much more restrained, 
reporting that the United States categorically denied Patterson was guilty of intervening in Guatemalan 
affairs. However, Immerman does note that Patterson had close ties to the US corporate community and 
prominent Guatemalan conservatives, namely Miguel Ydígoras. 
121 Richard C. Patterson, “Fifth draft of speech to the Rotary Club.” March 24, 1950, Patterson Papers; 
quoted in Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala. 101 and Lafeber, Inevitable Revolutions. 116. 
 80 
 
 
communists by the end of the 1940s. In Europe, the Soviets had blockaded Berlin and 
successfully tested a nuclear bomb. In Asia, communism claimed the world’s most 
populous country, China, and threatened to expand into Southeast Asia and the Korean 
Peninsula. Upon learning of the outbreak of the Korean War, President Arévalo pledged 
that Guatemala stood in “complete solidarity” with the United States. Countering 
Patterson’s claims, Arévalo stated that “Guatemala has no connections whatsoever with 
any extra-continental power, either European or Asiatic.”122 His administration was 
simply attempting to govern according to the vision of Franklin Roosevelt and that 
Guatemala “has one and only one loyalty geographically, politically, and militarily”: The 
United States.123 Events in Latin America, unfortunately, did not grab the amount of 
media attention as the Cold War hotspots flaring in Europe and Asia. Compared to 
Patterson’s “duck-test” speaking tour, few Americans noticed Arévalo’s pronouncement: 
most major press outlets ignored his message, and the few that carried the story only 
published brief accounts. Arévalo’s plea proved he had actually failed Patterson’s 
ridiculous “duck-test”, but no one seemed to notice that Guatemala’s nationalistic 
president was a follower of FDR instead of a communist quack. 
 The Good Neighbor policy hardly outlived President Franklin Roosevelt in 
Guatemala, and the incoming Truman administration quickly viewed the Guatemalan 
Revolution, and its leaders, as potential inroads for communist infiltration in the Western 
Hemisphere. As the confrontation between the capitalist West and communist East 
expanded around the globe, US officials grew more suspicious of President Arevalo, 
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despite his proclamations of loyalty and friendship with the United States. Longstanding 
beliefs of racial and cultural superiority, and the desire to maintain hegemony over the 
Western Hemisphere, became infused with anticommunism as the United States 
evaluated the fitness of its Southern neighbors for the coming conflict against 
communism. An increasing number of US policymakers viewed Guatemala as a 
weakness in the continental defenses, and any advances in the revolutionary agenda could 
cause a breach.  
 
The Successful Operation: President Arbenz and US Intervention 
 
The ignominious end of the Arbenz administration stands as the first major 
collaboration between US officials and anticommunist Guatemalan military officers. 
Most scholars who have written on the coup have emphasized the role of the United 
States, particularly the coordinated roles of the State Department and the Central 
Intelligence agency, each helmed by one of the Dulles brothers. Although the United 
States’ efforts to destroy Arbenz certainly applied enormous pressure on his government, 
the high command of the Guatemalan military ultimately decided their president’s fate. 
While the military had often played a part in determining presidential succession, their 
refusal to defend their own government against an incursion clearly sponsored by the 
United States marked a significant transition. Formerly, political contests between 
Guatemalan elites might have been decided by who had the support of the Army, but the 
coup against Arbenz saw military officers side with a foreign power, the United States, 
over their commander in chief. The 1954 coup against Arbenz established the close 
 82 
 
 
relationship between the United States and anticommunist officers of the Guatemalan 
Armed Forces that would eventually result in military rule, civil war, and genocide. 
At the close of Arévalo’s presidency, powerful individuals from United States, 
both public and private, had set in motion a campaign to discredit and even vilify the 
Guatemalan Revolution. As Guatemala prepared for presidential transitions, some hoped 
that the incoming administration, led by a respected military man, might reconcile with 
the United States and avert conflict. President Arbenz, however, leaned much further left 
than his predecessor.  
Captain Jacobo Arbenz was the commanding officer who led the 1944 revolution 
that ended Guatemala’s military dictatorship. Under Arévalo, he became Minster of 
Defense and the president’s chosen successor. After winning the 1950 election, Arbenz 
decided he would push for more radical change. Shortly after taking office, Arbenz 
unified twenty-five radical peasant unions into the National Peasant Confederation of 
Guatemala (CNCG) and, in December 1952, he legalized the Partido Guatemalteco 
Trabajadores (PGT), the formerly underground communist party.124 Historian Walter 
LaFeber remarked that Truman’s State Department, already concerned by the leftist 
revolution, quickly changed their assessment of the Arbenz administration from 
pragmatic to following an “ascending curve of Communist influence.”125 
The question of whether President Arbenz was a communist generated 
considerable debate during and after his administration, but a wide consensus of 
historical scholarship has generally agreed that the concerns of both the Truman and 
                                                 
124 Lafeber. Inevitable Revolutions. 117 
125 Ibid. 
 83 
 
 
Eisenhower administrations were unfounded at best and spurious at worst. Early reports 
on the Arbenz administration often echoed the anticommunist arguments of the 
Eisenhower administration, but every study derived from broad historical evidence has 
concluded that President Arbenz was neither a communist, nor did his government have 
ties with the Soviet Union. Richard Immerman explained that US officials fundamentally 
misunderstood, and perhaps misrepresented, the goals of the Arévalo and Arbenz 
governments. As a result, they exaggerated the threat of communist infiltration because 
of the accepted Cold War belief that Moscow had masterminded an international 
conspiracy to destroy the free world.126  
This is a view held by nearly all historians of US-Guatemalan relations with some 
variation. For example, Schlesinger and Kinzer place more emphasis on the role of the 
United Fruit Company and its connections with the Eisenhower administration as a 
crucial cause behind the myth of Arbenz the communist.127 In his detailed study of the 
Guatemalan Revolution, Piero Gleijeses interviewed several Guatemalan politicians, 
military officers, and private citizens—including the only recorded interview with 
Arbenz’s wife—to get to the heart of this question. Gleijeses concluded that the 
communists did have considerable influence with the Guatemalan president. Arbenz 
frequently consulted with members of the communist party, and considered some of them 
to be his personal friends. Moreover, his wife, Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, deeply 
sympathized with the plight of peasants and pushed the young, nationalistic captain to 
read Marx. Gleijeses contends that no one had a greater political influence on Arbenz 
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than his wife, and that the pair jointly believed in the inevitability of a worldwide 
socialist community, but also that Guatemala was currently incapable of becoming a 
communist state.128 He adds that near the end of Arbenz’s tenure, the President relied on 
a “kitchen cabinet” of close advisors, largely drawn from the PGT leadership, to help him 
govern. Ultimately, Gleijeses reveals, “Perhaps Arbenz should not formally be called a 
communist, yet fellow traveler fails to convey the intensity of his commitment.”129 This 
account, based on extensive interviews with personal associates of Arbenz, is much more 
nuanced, and somewhat contradicts, the general refutation of Arbenz’s communist 
connections that have become the standard line in studies of US-Guatemalan relations.  
 Arbenz was not an agent of the Soviet Union, but Marxist thought certainly 
influenced his political beliefs. He saw the feudalistic finca system, a plantation economy 
that shackled the Guatemalan economy to a few export crops and effectively enslaved 
much of the country’s indigenous population, as the primary cause of economic and 
political underdevelopment. In order to foster greater participation in the free market, 
Arbenz believed that peasants needed a substantial increase in personal landholdings 
where they could cultivate crops on private plots to sell at a profit. The Guatemalan 
legislature fulfilled Arbenz’s campaign promise of land reform when it passed the 
Agrarian Reform Bill in May, 1952. The new law called for the immediate expropriation 
large tracts of uncultivated land for redistribution to small Guatemalan farmers and 
peasants.130  Five weeks later, on June 17, 1952, the president issued Decree 900, which 
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established the institutional framework that would implement the new law. Unlike the 
radical land reforms under Stalin and Mao, Arbenz’s system was gradual and 
bureaucratic, with local agrarian committees having to push petitions through several 
layers of administrators before their claim to land could be considered.131 Instead of 
communal holdings, land was allotted to individual farmers who had incentive to sell 
excess crops in the open market. There were also numerous limitations on the law. For 
example, only landholdings exceeding 670 acres that left over 1/3 of the land unused 
were subject to expropriation.132 Far from the collective farms of the Soviet Union, 
Arbenz’s Decree 900 sought to replace feudalistic land practices with productive 
capitalist competition. Nevertheless, when Arbenz realized his dream, he also sealed his 
fate. 
The Agrarian Reform Law did not simply seize land for redistribution. Arbenz’s 
decree only targeted large landholders who possessed swathes of uncultivated lands. 
Naturally, the United Fruit Company’s vast tracts attracted greater attention than any 
other entity in the country. The Arbenz government offered to pay United Fruit the stated 
value the company had claimed on its tax records:$1,185,00 for the 400,000 unused 
acres.133 As such, the fruit conglomerate stood to lose an enormous investment—nearly 
one-seventh of all their landholdings in Guatemala and at an incredibly low cost. On 
behalf of United Fruit, the United States formally presented the Arbenz administration 
with a bill of over $15.8 million, a sum the company found more appropriate. Their offer 
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exceeding ten-times the declared value of the land, United Fruit had no expectation of 
receiving the enormous amount for their property and immediately mobilized their 
lobbyists in Washington. Calling upon their numerous beneficiaries within the US 
government, United Fruit demanded a direct intervention in Guatemala. They joined the 
chorus of Arbenz’s detractors within the landed oligarchy and their conservative military 
allies who had clamored for the United States to save their country from communism 
since the days of Arévalo. Arbenz’s growing list of enemies found the receptive 
champions within the incoming Eisenhower administration. 
  
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, Allen Dulles, the director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, were two of the most ardent anticommunists of the 
Eisenhower administration. The brothers were also former partners in the international 
law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell that counted United Fruit among its most important 
clients.134 John Foster Dulles had even been part of the team that negotiated UFCo’s 
contracts in Guatemala. Along with other members of the Eisenhower administration, 
including the president himself, the Dulles brothers owned considerable stock in the 
company and Allen Dulles had served on UFCo’s board of directors.135 These close 
financial ties made the Eisenhower administration especially receptive to UFCo’s 
requests, and they found the company’s line convincing: “whenever you read ‘United 
Fruit’ in communist propaganda you may readily substitute ‘United States.’136 Whether 
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their motivations were more ideological or financial has been a matter of considerable 
debate among scholars of the US intervention in Guatemala, but both factors were clearly 
in play. The Dulles brothers immediately set about the task of destroying what they 
believed to be the first communist government in the Western Hemisphere. 
The Truman administration had been making preparations to attack the Arbenz 
government before the Dulles brothers took the helm. After Arbenz issued Decree 900 in 
June, 1952 the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency regarded the 
Guatemalan president as a potential threat that would likely require direct intervention in 
the form of covert operations. Truman authorized the CIA to secretly train a band of 
mercenaries and exiles in Honduras under the command of Colonel Carlos Castillo 
Armas, a conservative militarist who had been exiled after attempting to overthrow 
Arévalo in 1949. These castaways would coordinate with neighboring Nicaraguan 
dictator, Anastasio Somoza and act as a ‘liberation force’ that would remove Arbenz. In 
preparing for the covert action, dubbed PBFORTUNE, the CIA composed a detailed 
manual on assassination, along with a list of at least 132 alleged communists in 
Guatemala that would be promptly murdered or imprisoned should the operation 
succeed.137 Just as the CIA made final preparations to launch the invasion, the coup 
attempt fell apart when arms shipments failed to materialize.  
There are different approaches to explaining why this first attempt to overthrow 
Arbenz failed to launch. Former CIA historian Nick Cullather blames Somoza for 
blowing the Agency’s cover when he bragged to other Central America leaders about his 
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role in the impending operations.138 Gleijeses contends that the State Department was 
largely unaware of the extent of the operation. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
learned that the CIA and United Fruit were shipping weapons to Somoza, who would 
then arm Castillo Armas’ war-band, he convinced President Truman that the poorly 
planned operation was doomed to failure.139 In addition, such actions flagrantly 
disregarded the non-intervention agreement set forth in the Rio Pact of 1947, and the 
Organization of American States would rightly view this treaty violation as the death of 
the Good Neighbor Policy. Operational planners at the CIA were surprised how rapidly 
their designs fell apart, but set about salvaging their work, hoping to find more 
enthusiastic support in the incoming Eisenhower administration. They were rewarded for 
their efforts with Operation PBSUCCESS. 
Scholars of the CIA coup that overthrew Arbenz in 1954 typically divide into two 
camps. Earlier treatments made a great deal out of the relationship between the 
Eisenhower administration and United Fruit, while subsequently published works tend to 
claim that Washington genuinely believed Guatemala was transforming into the first 
communist beachhead in the Western Hemisphere.140 These contesting interpretations do 
agree, however, that the preponderance of evidence shows that Arbenz’s ties to 
communism were tenuous, and that his economic policies were state-induced, capitalist 
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reforms designed to dismantle the feudalistic oligarchy. Ultimately, the Eisenhower 
administration decided to intervene in Guatemala because they believed such action 
served both their political and economic interests. In order to protect US assets and 
maintain Guatemala as a staunch anticommunist ally, the Eisenhower administration 
launched the first of many Cold War covert actions designed to overthrow a Latin 
American government.  
 Unlike the Truman administration, the Dulles brothers’ plans to depose Arbenz 
would not suffer from internal struggles within the US government. Allen Dulles, who 
had worked closely on PBFORTUNE as the deputy director of the CIA, was elevated to 
full director of the Agency. He successfully convinced President Eisenhower that a 
“communist infection” in Guatemala threatened the security of the Western 
Hemisphere.141 There would be no pushback from the State Department this time. The 
new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, ensured total cooperation between the 
Agency and State by making all matters pertaining to potential covert action in 
Guatemala the exclusive domain of his office. The Eisenhower administration formally 
committed to overthrowing Arbenz on August 12, 1953, allotting three-million dollars to 
the CIA operations already underway. To prepare the way for the CIA’s plans, the Dulles 
brothers needed a new ambassador who would help facilitate the newfound fraternity 
between the Agency and State Department. They selected John Peurifoy, who had 
acquired a reputation of being an anticommunist troubleshooter. A red-hunting rival of 
Joseph McCarthy, Peurifoy played a crucial role in the prosecution of Alger Hiss, the first 
major State Department official accused of espionage for the Soviet Union. While 
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serving as ambassador to Greece, Peurifoy meddled in governmental affairs to bolster 
anticommunist factions. Peurifoy preferred firmness and frankness over subtlety and 
sensitivity, and after a brusque initial meeting with President Arbenz, concluded; “I am 
definitely convinced that if the President is not a Communist, he will certainly do until 
one comes along.”142   
The details of Operation PBSUCCESS and the resultant coup of 1954 fill 
volumes. The words “watershed”, “cardinal”, “seminal”, and “momentous” are but a few 
ways scholars have described the significance of the event in the history of Guatemala, 
US-Latin American relations, and the Cold War. This focus of this study has its roots in 
this singular moment, but because of the impressive existing scholarship, only a brief 
account of the downfall of Jacobo Arbenz will be provided here. In broad strokes, the 
CIA launched a multi-prong attack against the Arbenz government. The small force of 
exiles and mercenaries under the command of the exiled colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, 
who had received training and supplies from the CIA during its abortive Operation 
PBFORTUNE, would serve as an invading “liberation” force. They received further 
support in the form of an experimental psychological campaign that combined 
international sanctions, relentless propaganda, and aerial bombing runs. As part of the 
“nerve war”, the CIA broadcast false reports of a triumphant conquest by the “liberation” 
force through La Voz de la Liberacion, a radio program designed and operated by the 
Agency. The reactionary Archbishop of Guatemala, Mariano Rossell y Arellano, teamed 
with CIA agents to publicly condemn the Arbenz administration for its agrarian reform 
despite the fact that Pope Pious XII had declared Decree 900 acceptable to the Catholic 
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Church.143 CIA planes airdropped thousands of copies of the Archbishop’s speech 
throughout the country. The message was clear that if the people of Guatemala continued 
to support President Arbenz, the aircraft flying overhead would soon be dropping 
explosives instead of leaflets. The effect of the CIA’s psychological warfare on the 
general public is debatable, but these efforts were clearly aimed at the segment of society 
that had long determined the fate of Guatemalan presidents: the Army. 
  Colonel Castillo Armas’ military campaign proved only that the United States 
had chosen an incompetent commander, but he was spared destruction when the 
Guatemalan Army refused to confront his mercenaries. When the invasion force first 
entered Guatemala, President Arbenz dismissed the attack. He believed that “The 
invasion is a farce. We can shoo them away with our hats. What I am afraid of…is that if 
we defeat them right on the border, the Honduran government will manufacture a border 
incident, declare war on us, and the United States will invade.”144 As such, Castillo 
Armas and his forces, numbering no more than 250 men, were allowed to advance within 
Guatemalan territory. Arbenz, however, had been losing support within the more 
conservative segments of the middle class and the military, especially after Decree 900 
and the legalization of the PGT.  
While it is unlikely that many officers believed the CIA propaganda that claimed 
Arbenz had made secret pacts with the Soviet Union and that the military would soon be 
purged and rebuilt in the image of the Red Army, their faith in their commander-in-chief 
had been shaken. Ambassador Peurifoy all but confirmed the openly-secret involvement 
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of the United States when he threatened Guatemalan officials and cut off communication 
with President Arbenz.145 The military brass, fearing a full-scale invasion and occupation 
by the US Marine Corps, refused to risk their status for a president that many of them 
viewed with growing unease. Despite numerous opportunities to eliminate the invasion 
force, commanders at the Zacapa barracks, the major military base positioned closest to 
Castillo Armas’ forces, never launched the offensive they repeatedly promised their 
president was forthcoming. When the rebels seized Chiquimula without a fight, the only 
major town between their Honduran entry point and the Zacapa base, Arbenz finally had 
to accept that his officers would not defend their country. The capture of Chiquimula 
would be the only military success the Liberacionistas could claim, but it would 
ultimately prove sufficient to topple the Guatemalan president.  
Until the loss at Chiquimula, President Arbenz had full confidence in the loyalty 
of his military officers and their ability to crush Castillo Armas at will. He had refused to 
arm civilians in the face of the invasion not only to demonstrate his faith in Guatemala’s 
armed forces, but also to ensure that the military would continue to support his 
presidency. Passing out guns to peasants and partisans would add credence to the CIA’s 
propaganda: that Red Jacobo was forming a People’s Army out of radical workers and 
communists. Following the treasonous insubordination of the forces stationed at the 
Zacapa base, Arbenz had no other choice but to turn to his civilian supporters to defend 
Guatemala. Predictably, when Arbenz attempted to arm worker and peasant militias to 
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stop Castillo Armas’ petty band, most of the remaining loyalists in the officer corps 
betrayed their president.146 
 None of Arbenz’s many foes should rightly claim the full credit for having ousted 
the besieged president from office. The fuming American ambassador, the incompetent 
renegade colonel, the crusading brothers in Washington, and the vengeful fruit company 
executives all certainly relished in Arbenz’s defeat, but none of them delivered the death 
blow to his administration. It was Arbenz’s most trusted allies within the Guatemalan 
Army that ultimately coerced the president to step down. On June 27, 1954 the five 
colonels who composed Arbenz’s senior military staff met to discuss the current crisis. 
The nominal head of the Guatemalan military, Chief of the Armed Forces Carlos Enrique 
Diaz summoned the Defense Minister, the Army Chief of Staff, the Air Force Chief, and 
the commander of the Consejo Superior de la Defensa to his home. All of the men were 
considered loyal to the president, and Colonel Diaz and Arbenz were good friends, but 
they unanimously agreed that “Jacobo must go”147 After coming to this conclusion, the 
five colonels sought out Ambassador Peurifoy in hopes of negotiating an end to the 
staged invasion. Setting a precedent that would accompany most presidential transitions 
in Cold War Guatemala, the most powerful officers of the armed forces met with US 
officials to discuss the future leadership of the country. 
 The military leaders had a single, overriding concern when they met with the 
American ambassador. With the support of his fellow colonels, Diaz told Peurifoy “that 
direct negotiations with Castillo [Armas] were out of the question; they would rather die 
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than talk with him.”148 Most Guatemalan officers, regardless of their political leanings, 
despised Castillo Armas as a renegade, a traitor, and a puppet of the United States. 
Ambassador Peurifoy promised he would arrange a truce with the Liberacionistas as soon 
as Arbenz was deposed, but he remained silent on what role Castillo Armas might play in 
Guatemala’s future.149 Diaz departed the meeting and headed for the presidential palace, 
where he presented his case before Arbenz. The offer was stark. The PGT would be 
outlawed and its leaders would be imprisoned or exiled. Worst of all, Colonel Diaz 
admitted he would have to bring an end to agrarian reform, but that he planned on 
preserving the lands already distributed under Decree 900.150 Arbenz had a single 
demand—Colonel Diaz would not negotiate with Castillo Armas. To treat with a pawn of 
foreign conspirators would be a national disgrace, undermining Guatemalan sovereignty. 
Hoping to preserve some scrap of the revolution, Arbenz agreed to announce his 
resignation that evening and ceded power to Diaz. At 9 p.m. on June 27, 1954, Jacobo 
Arbenz broadcast his parting words to his country: 
“I say goodbye to you, my friends, with bitterness and pain, but firm in my 
convictions…[with] eyes on the welfare of the people…with the hope of saving the 
democratic gains of the October revolution…[with] a government, although different 
from mine, is still inspired by our October revolution is preferable to twenty years of 
bloody tyranny under men whom Castillo Armas has brought to this country.”151 
  
None of Jacobo Arbenz’s last, desperate hopes for his country would come to 
fruition. 
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  President Arbenz capitulated to nominally loyal members of his own military in 
an effort to spare Guatemala the fate of invasion, occupation, and bloodshed. He and his 
colonels held deep nationalist sensibilities, evidenced by their fierce rejection of Castillo 
Armas. For these military officers, and many to follow, their dedication to their country 
gave way to their career ambitions and desire for self-preservation. Arbenz’s decision to 
resign was technically a matter decided internally by actors within the legitimate 
Guatemalan government, but it would be misleading to suggest that the actions of the 
United States were not significant in determining this outcome. Operation PBSUCCESS 
was a military failure, but the pressure placed on the Arbenz administration by the 
unrelenting propaganda churned out by the CIA, international sanctions imposed by the 
United States, and the presence of a hostile, albeit ineffective, military force within 
Guatemala ultimately whittled down the resolve of the revolutionary government. The 
defeat of the Guatemalan revolution sent a clear message to reformers and revolutionaries 
throughout Latin America that the United States would not tolerate any challenge to its 
rule within its sphere of influence.   
The Ten Years of Spring transformed Guatemala. In the end, these changes would 
sharply contrast with the intentions of the revolutionary Guatemalans who deposed their 
military dictator in 1944. The CIA-backed intervention had succeeded, and the 
Guatemalan military, through inaction, proved that a decade of popular, liberal reform 
had done little to change who truly ruled Guatemala. While many of the reforms were 
truly remarkable, they failed to overcome, and occasionally reinforced, the underlying 
causes of Guatemala’s problems. Land, and the wealth it provided, remained 
concentrated in the hands of a few rich families and foreign corporations. Those 
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corporations, namely United Fruit, wielded enormous political influence and used it to 
undermine Guatemalan sovereignty. The indigenous majority were still generally viewed 
with contempt: Arévalo disregarded and patronized them; Arbenz doomed the revolution 
by trying to assist them. Moreover, both Arévalo and Arbenz, despite their efforts at 
institution building, retained a resemblance to the same caudillo-style archetype that was 
emblematic of the Guatemalan presidency. Neither were genuine strongmen, however, 
evinced by the fact that both presidents remained locked in an existential struggle with 
their own military during their tenure in office. The foundational structures of 
Guatemalan society remained largely unchanged and the reforms of Arévalo and Arbenz 
dissolved as conservative elites regained power.  
The sum of the Ten Years of Spring was the legitimization of military rule in the 
face of a potential communist threat. The overthrow of Arbenz accelerated the 
Guatemalan military’s encroachments into civilian governance and the United States 
began to look to anticommunist officers to advance its agenda in Guatemala. Many left-
leaning regimes in Latin America would come to suffer a similar fate throughout the Cold 
War. Yet, despite the best efforts of the United States and its clients in Guatemala, the 
revolution of 1944 left a legacy of pervasive nationalism, defined by resistance to the 
United States, that spread from the small Central America republic throughout the 
hemisphere. 
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The Chaos of Counterrevolution: Post-Revolutionary Governance in Guatemala 
  
The United States had succeeded in its first Cold War covert operation designed 
to overthrow a Latin American government. Voicing the views of likeminded 
anticommunists in the Eisenhower administration, Vice President Richard Nixon noted, 
“This is the first instance in history where a Communist government has been replaced by 
a free one. The whole world is watching to see which does the better job.”152 Nixon, 
Secretary Dulles, and other members of the administration claimed that the United States 
would help Castillo Armas transform Guatemala into a “showcase for democracy.” 
Instead, they steadily constructed a counterrevolution designed to rollback reforms, 
destroy dissidence, and firmly secure Guatemala within the US sphere of influence. The 
United States had long wielded considerable influence over Guatemala, but it was in the 
years of the counterrevolution that Washington’s close relationship with the Guatemalan 
military’s high-command helped propel the officers corps into becoming the dominant 
political force in the country.  
The mad scramble for power that followed Arbenz’s departure hardly resembled 
“glorious victory” claimed by John Foster Dulles in the immediate aftermath of 
Operation PBSUCCESS.153 The deceit and deal-making is better represented by Diego 
Rivera’s famous mural of the same name. At the center of Rivera’s work, John Foster 
Dulles accepts a supplicating handshake from a bowing Castillo Armas. Each man is 
accompanied by his subordinates, and between the two parties sits a large, gleaming-
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white, aerial bomb with the face of Dwight Eisenhower. The Guatemalan people resist, 
weep, and die behind Castillo Armas, while those behind the American entourage load 
bananas into UFCo ships under armed guard. The details of this masterpiece reveal truths 
about the 1954 coup that cannot be adequately transcribed into words, but the greater 
message is clear—Castillo Armas’ Liberation meant Guatemala had surrendered its 
sovereignty.  
Any hopes that Guatemalans had for preserving their revolution proved very 
short-lived. Although Colonel Diaz had convinced Arbenz to resign with the stipulation 
that the Guatemalan government would not negotiate with Castillo Armas, Washington 
had no intention of abandoning its loyal lackey in the moment of triumph. Ambassador 
Peurifoy succeeded in using Diaz’s close relationship with Arbenz to force the president 
to resign with minimal conflict. With this goal achieved, the Eisenhower administration 
no longer had any use for Diaz, and anyone with ties to the Arbenz administration 
quickly became a pariah. Only hours after he permitted President Arbenz his farewell 
address to the nation, CIA agents burst into Diaz’s private quarters and informed him; 
“Colonel, you’re just not convenient for the requirements of American foreign policy.” 
When Diaz replied he had received assurances from Ambassador Peurifoy, the agent shot 
back; “Well colonel, there is reality and there is diplomacy. Our ambassador represents 
diplomacy. I represent reality. And the reality is we don’t want you.”154 The dialogue 
between the American spy and the Guatemalan colonel reflected the core dynamic of US-
Guatemalan relations. Behind the diplomatic niceties proclaiming good neighbors and 
non-intervention treaties, the reality was unvarnished imperialism.    
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Despite the colonel’s best efforts to appeal to American officials with promises of 
arresting communists and ending agrarian reform, Guatemalan officers deemed more 
pliable by the Dulles brothers forced Diaz to resign in a matter of days. No fewer than 
five provisional juntas, each staffed with a rotating carousel of military-men desirous of 
the presidency, rose and fell in the eleven days that followed Arbenz’s departure. With 
each iteration, Castillo Armas became a more central figure. Aggressive exchanges with 
US diplomats and nighttime visits from CIA agents quickly weeded out opposing officers 
in the Guatemalan military. Having received permission from Secretary Dulles to “crack 
some heads together,” Ambassador Peurifoy dominated the negotiations between Castillo 
Armas and members of the various juntas.155 The gun-toting ambassador succeeded, and 
brokered an arrangement that would allow Castillo Armas to formally become the 
president by September. On July 7, 1954, ten days after the “glorious victory” of the 
Liberation forces, Castillo paraded into Guatemala City and began the counterrevolution. 
Many leaders within the Guatemalan military still hated Castillo Armas, who they 
saw as a traitor and a stooge. The fact that the Army had lost to his band of raiders 
without putting up a fight only compounded the humiliation. Those closely associated 
with Arbenz were purged from the ranks, but as it became increasingly obvious that the 
United States was going to ensure a Castillo Armas presidency, most officers abandoned 
their scruples and pledged fealty to the new government. Nonetheless, nationalist pride 
still smoldered within the corps. On August 2, just shy of a month into Castillo Armas’ 
reign, roughly one-hundred cadets of the officer training school, Escuela Politécnica, 
attacked Liberacionistas who had taken up residence in Guatemala City to prepare for the 
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inaugural parade. Although the dispute allegedly originated from an incident between 
cadets and Liberacionistas at a local brothel, the young officers-in-training took up arms 
to reassert the primacy of Guatemala’s ‘legitimate’ military institutions. During the brief 
battle, the cadets broadcasted their intentions. They were not Arbenz loyalist, rather they 
were fighting “to vindicate the honor of the army” and to put an “end to insults” from 
Liberacionistas.156 Outnumbered seven-to-one, the cadets nonetheless prevailed and 
secured a surrender in a matter of hours. The cadets forced the Liberacionistas to rip off 
all military insignia and were “marched as prisoners of war through the city and loaded 
onto trains” that shipped them back to the Zacapa barracks.157 Feeling vindicated, the 
cadets surrendered the next day with assurances that that they would not be punished. 
The stunt resulted in a major victory for the Guatemalan Armed Forces when Castillo 
Armas, under pressure from Ambassador Peurifoy, disbanded the ‘Liberation Army.’ 
Over one hundred Guatemalans, many of them innocent civilians, were killed or 
wounded as the cadets desperately tried to salvage a scrap of dignity for the Army.158   
With the military’s injured pride temporarily bandaged by the cadet revolt, the 
Castillo Armas regime, and its backers in Washington, set about their first order of 
business: the eradication of communism from Guatemala. In practice, this meant mass-
exile, mass-arrest, and mass-murder. In late-July, President Castillo Armas, under the 
direction of the CIA, formed the Comite de Defensa Nacional Contra el Comunismo 
(Committee for National Defense against Communism/CDNCC), a tripartite board of 
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designated red-hunters. The US embassy estimated that, during the initial months of 
Castillo Armas’ regime, the CDNCC arrested an average of two-hundred people per 
week and held them without formal charges.159 An era of repression and violence in the 
name of anticommunism had begun.  
Initially, Castillo Armas proved to be as inept at hunting down his enemies as he 
was at leading his liberation force, and most prominent Arbenz officials and leaders of 
the PGT escaped Guatemala and found asylum. Frustrated by Castillo Armas’ fumbling, 
the CIA worked with the Guatemalan government to produce a blacklist of subversive 
citizens—labor leaders, peasant organizers, and anyone sympathetic to the Arbenz and 
Arévalo administrations. According to historian Stephen Streeter’s calculations, the list 
already contained 70,000 names by August 1954.160 In late September, embassy officials 
estimated that around 2,000 Guatemalans remained imprisoned.161 Scholars would later 
conclude that at least 9,000 people were arrested during Castillo Armas’ purge and that 
the vast majority had no relationship with communism.162 Jailed without charge by the 
revived Guardia Judicial, the secret political police headed by a notorious Ubico-era 
chief, many prisoners were beaten, tortured, and murdered with impunity. These arrests 
certainly didn’t bode well for showcasing democracy, but it was the violence in the 
countryside that served as an omen of things to come. 
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In tandem with incarcerating anyone with political loyalties to the revolution, the 
Castillo Armas regime, encouraged by the Eisenhower administration, quickly 
dismantled the reforms of the Ten Years of Spring. Agrarian reform and its beneficiaries 
were the primary target of “The Liberator” and his American patrons. Castillo Armas 
abolished Decree 900 and returned expropriated land United Fruit and other large 
plantation owners. Rural workers on those lands, regardless of their political 
orientation—or lack thereof—were driven off their property at gunpoint. Parallel to 
setting up the CDNCC, Castillo Armas also announced the Preventive Penal Law against 
Communism. The law essentially classified any popular peasant organization as a form of 
communist sabotage, and the penalty for violating this law was death. Massacres of 
peasants throughout rural Guatemala were the result. Casualties are difficult to calculate 
for this chaotic period, but Stephen Streeter’s research offers some insight into the scale 
of the bloodshed. In Tiquisate, a prized UFCo plantation and largest mechanical farm in 
Latin America, local campesinos had received over 55,000 acres of expropriated land.163 
At least one-thousand of those peasants that received parcels of the Tiquisate plantation 
were gunned down when the forces of the counterrevolution reclaimed the land for 
United Fruit.164 For every plantation bloodbath recorded, countless mass-killings faded 
into the din of the Counterrevolution. Massacres of peasants had occurred throughout 
Guatemalan history, but the indiscriminate and total nature of these killings, where entire 
population centers were wiped out because of their perceived links with communism, 
would become the hallmark of the Guatemalan military’s Cold War strategies. These 
                                                 
163 Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala. 73,80. 
164 Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution. 41 
 103 
 
 
kinds of mass-murders would become systematic during the Alliance for Progress era and 
evolve into full-scale genocide after decades of military rule. 
The Counterrevolutionary regime proved capable of dismantling the reforms of 
the Ten Years of Spring and persecuting its beneficiaries, but the most serious threat to 
Castillo Armas  came from fellow conservatives within the military leadership. 
Washington, by this point, was well aware that the Guatemalan Army was the final 
arbiter of state power, and that its leaders must be placated in order for any presidential 
administration to survive. After the brief cadet rebellion in August, the Eisenhower 
administration redoubled its efforts at courting commanders who controlled powerful 
cliques within the Guatemalan Armed Forces. Acting on the advice of CIA field agents in 
Guatemala, John Foster Dulles convinced Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson that a 
massive military aid package from the United States would “gain for us the friendship 
and cooperation of the Guatemalan Army and orient it toward the U.S. and its policies” 
and grant it “the ability to maintain order.”165 Moreover, by outfitting and funding the 
Guatemalan security forces, the United States could mold these armed organizations and 
cultivate future contenders for the Guatemalan presidency and other leadership positions. 
By mid-1955, the Eisenhower administration had approved a major military 
assistance grant, established a mutual defense treaty, and added numerous advisors to the 
military mission in Guatemala. Having expelled the revolutionary government, the 
Eisenhower team replaced the threat of Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere 
with a fear of internal communist insurrection as the prime threat to Guatemala. The goal, 
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however remained the same: US control over Guatemala. As such, the United States 
government would, “through military training missions, foster the concept that 
Guatemala’s primary emphasis should be given to the maintenance of internal 
security.”166 In order to achieve this aim, the United States would do more than provide 
the Guatemalan military with updated armaments and equipment; it would oversee the 
development of professionalization and specialization within the ranks.  
As part of its efforts to integrate the Guatemalan Armed Forces into its larger 
Cold War strategy, the military mission would “foster visits of important Guatemalan 
military officials to the U.S. of to the Panama Canal Zone and, when appropriate, have 
ranking U.S. officers make good will visits to Guatemala” and “encourage requests for 
training in U.S. Service Schools and academies.”167 The National Security Council 
planners believed that they would “utilize the good will normally generated by the 
training in U.S. schools to further our objectives”—namely the promotion of 
“standardization along U.S. lines of equipment, organization, training, and doctrine.”168 
At this time, the highest members of the US embassy staff rarely spoke fluent Spanish, 
but the “U.S. Military Services will assign personnel to Guatemala who are proficient in 
the Spanish language and who are the most effective personnel available for such 
assignments.”169 Several Guatemalan officers eagerly embraced the new opportunities 
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offered by the United States and, in doing so, laid the foundation of the 
counterinsurgency state that would fully emerge during the Alliance for Progress era.   
The United States bought the loyalty of the Guatemalan officers with money, 
munitions, and membership in its elite military academies, but the greater Guatemalan 
public also needed to be convinced of Castillo Armas’ counterrevolution. Even in the 
face of being blacklisted, beaten, or outright murdered, public protests staged by students 
continued sporadically in Guatemala City. Security forces retaliated with violence, which 
only added fuel to what the US embassy described as the “slowly smoldering and 
politically dangerous” protests against Castillo Armas.170 The United States Information 
Service (USIS), in coordination with the US embassy, launched a public relations blitz, 
hoping to persuade some Guatemalan citizens that their government protected them from 
Soviet slavery. Generally, these efforts followed a predictable pattern: condemning the 
Arbenz administration as a minion of Moscow and characterizing any domestic 
dissidence as being the work of communist insurgents. 
 Hoping to bolster the prestige of Castillo Armas, John Foster Dulles directed the 
State Department to sponsor press tours of Guatemala and arranged for Castillo Armas to 
visit the United States.171 Stephen Streeter argues that the attempt to improve public 
perception of Castillo Armas proved relatively ineffective. While he gained supporters 
within the US government, news publications in both countries criticized the colonel-
president. Guatemala’s most esteemed newspaper, El Imparcial, criticized the violence 
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and incompetence of the Castillo Armas regime.172 The New York Times characterized 
the Guatemalan government as authoritarian, and Time magazine correspondent Robert 
Rosenhouse faced regular threats from CIA agents and US embassy personnel for his 
coverage of the student protests. When the US government’s smear campaign against the 
American journalist failed to persuade him to desist, the Guatemalan government assured 
the US embassy that it would take care of the matter. Four unidentified assailants beat 
Rosenhouse unconscious at his Guatemalan residence nine months later.173 
 Direct economic aid to the Guatemalan government proved much more prolific 
than public relations and military support in the US policy playbook. Initially, the 
Eisenhower administration favored a “trade not aid” policy in foreign assistance, but the 
need to make Guatemalan a democratic showcase reversed the administration’s 
parsimony. Between 1954 and 1960, the United States facilitated over $130 million in 
foreign economic assistance for Guatemala.174 By injecting massive amounts of capital 
into the Guatemalan economy, the United States embarked in one of its earliest 
developmentalist projects for Latin America—a practice that would feature prominently 
in the Alliance for Progress during the 1960s. The United States financed the Castillo 
Armas regime, and insulated it from the sharp economic downturn that followed the 
overthrow of Arbenz. It also effectively placed the Guatemalan government under the 
direct control of US advisors who constructed what the political scientist Susanne Jonas 
described as a “parallel government” structure.175 Foreign aid continued to flow as long 
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as the developmental projects suited the desires of Washington and the World Bank. This 
translated into unsurprising economic policies from the Castillo Armas government. 
Negligible taxes, generous subsidies, and the promise of a docile, cheap labor force 
enticed new prospective private investors while legal disputes with corporations with an 
established presence in Guatemala, like United Fruit, were nullified and their former 
privileges largely restored. 
 The United States dispersed an unprecedented amount of foreign aid money to 
suit its own purposes in Guatemala, but this early effort at developmentalism also 
attempted to improve the mono-export agricultural economy. Large US corporations still 
had a distinct advantage in Guatemala, but the United States began to pursue greater 
diversification in the raw materials Guatemala provided for the world. Susanne Jonas 
reveals that the petroleum and nickel industries found incredible opportunities in 
counterrevolutionary Guatemala when its government granted generous forty-year 
contracts for subsoil rights. Even though no company successfully found significant oil 
reserves in Guatemala, petroleum corporations bought the mining rights to over one-half 
of the total area of Guatemala within a year.176 The very ground Guatemalans walked 
upon was all but stamped with the seal of the United States.  
Infrastructural projects and social services also received some economic 
assistance, although it was largely in the context of improving conditions for further 
foreign investment. Building better roads to facilitate the transfer of raw materials from 
the country’s interior to its major ports had been a perennial project desired by both the 
United States and Guatemalan governments. When the World Bank granted a $75 million 
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loan for the construction of new highways, however, a stipulation in the deal guaranteed 
that private US construction firms, not the Guatemalan government, would receive the 
money.177 Similarly, social services funded by foreign aid were singularly designed to 
support the US-sponsored counterrevolution. The powerful unions of the Arbenz years 
were crushed, their leaders often imprisoned, while the US supported neutered labor 
federations that, due to intentional neglect, eventually collapsed on their own. American 
educators, paid with US economic aid, replaced Guatemalan teachers thought to be pro-
Arbenz, and the threat of communism became a key feature in the education of the 
students who could afford it. Disguised as generosity, economic assistance served only to 
cement US hegemony in counterrevolutionary Guatemala. Leaders in Washington strove 
to maintain this mirage through the 1960s. 
 The years of President Carlos Castillo Armas’ counterrevolutionary government 
marked the height of the United States’ power in Guatemala. His ‘glorious revolution’ an 
accomplishment of the CIA and his ‘liberation government’ a golem of Washington’s 
design, the regime’s persistent weakness centered around its legitimacy. When an ever-
widening segment of Guatemalans called for Castillo Armas to drop his emergency 
dictatorial powers and restore some semblance of democracy to the country, the US 
embassy actually concurred.178 To disguise his dictatorship, Castillo Armas formed the 
Movimiento Democratico Nacionalista (MDN), a personalized political party comprised 
of liberacionistas he had installed in the government and military, along with 
                                                 
177 Ibid. 79-80 
178 John Calvin Hill Jr. “The New Phase in Guatemalan Political Life and Its Relation to U.S. Policy,” June 
24, 1955, DNSA, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, National Archives, 1. 
 109 
 
 
anticommunist youth organizations.179 At its conception, the MDN was little more than a 
collection of Castillo Armas cronies, but it gradually took on a quasi-fascist political 
philosophy of militant, centralized power that was reminiscent of the Ubico era. Having 
done its part to establish the counterrevolutionary government, political scientist Roland 
Ebel suggests that the Eisenhower administration new approach was to support Castillo 
Armas financially as he formed a loyal political party, while also cultivating potential 
opponents of the president: men who the US mission considered politically reliable.180  
The Dulles State Department still believed that there was a potential danger in 
adopting the electoral approach. An unfriendly, left-leaning government could return to 
power as a result of increased democratization, but that possibility did not prevent the 
Eisenhower administration from supporting the return of elections.181 After all, the 
overthrow of Arbenz had sent a clear message to revolutionaries and radicals, while the 
counterrevolution had successfully neutralized leftist political organizations. With a firm 
grip on the Guatemalan economy, government, and military, the Eisenhower 
administration began to consider the possibility of elections in its “showcase for 
democracy.” 
All attempts at normalizing the counterrevolutionary government came to an 
abrupt halt when an assassin ended Castillo Armas’s presidency. On July 26, 1957, 
Castillo Armas accompanied his wife for an evening stroll through the presidential 
palace, la Casa Crema. As they approached the dining hall, a member of the presidential 
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guard, Romeo Vasquez Sanchez, walked up to the couple, fired two rounds into Castillo 
Armas, and fled. The nearby guards pursued the assassin upstairs where they found him 
dead, reportedly a suicide. A provisional government, composed of liberacionistas under 
the banner of their newly founded political party (MDN), immediately declared a state of 
siege, condemned the assassin as a communist, and initiated mass arrests.182 Although 
their leader had been murdered by his own guard in the confines of the presidential 
palace, the MDN-led provisional government made little effort to investigate the 
assassination beyond its knee-jerk claim of a communist conspiracy. This prompted the 
US embassy to conclude that forces within the Guatemalan government, military, or both 
may have been responsible. Some US officials, later backed by scholarly investigations, 
believed that the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, ordered the assassination after he 
and Castillo Armas, once close friends and allies, had a falling out.183 Others argue that a 
power struggle within the MDN resulted in the Guatemalan president’s death.184 One of 
the more fantastic claims suggests that mobsters from the United States might have 
orchestrated the killing after being denied permission to establish casinos.185 Regardless 
of the real culprit, the United States had lost its puppet-president in Guatemala. 
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The motive behind the Castillo Armas’ assassination remains unresolved, but one 
thing is certain: the Guatemalan president had no shortage of enemies. His regime had 
weathered four major coup attempts originating from disgruntled military officers.  While 
the military was still the preeminent power in Guatemala, the Castillo Armas years 
diminished the standing of officers and cadets who had not taken part in the ‘Liberation.’ 
Additionally, while their relationship with the United States provided an increase in 
prestige, equipment, and training, the pervasive nationalist streak within the ranks often 
ruffled at American advice and directives. The masterminds behind the killing of 
President Carlos Castillo Armas may forever be shrouded in secrecy, but the officers of 
the Guatemalan Armed Forces gained the most from his demise. In the instability of the 
years that followed, military leaders capitalized on every crisis to expand their control 
over the state. 
 
The Return of Revolution: President Miguel Ydígoras and the Nationalist Army Uprising 
 
The gunfire that ended the Castillo Armas presidency rang out like a starter pistol 
for the frenzied race to fill Guatemala’s highest office. Initially, the United States favored 
continuismo, in the form of MDN leader Miguel Ortiz Passarelli, who partnered with 
Defense Minister Juan Francisco Oliva to gain support within the army. Washington did 
not want to relinquish the unprecedented control it enjoyed over the counterrevolutionary 
government of Guatemala, and believed it could maintain proxy rule if faithful MDN 
candidates obtained the legitimacy granted by an election. Regardless of the control it 
exerted over Castillo Armas’ counterrevolutionary government, the United States soon 
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discovered it could not dictate electoral outcomes in Guatemala. This reduction of US 
influence made ample room for military officers seeking to fulfill their own ambitions 
and expand the power of their institution within the Guatemalan government.    
A myriad of presidential aspirants proliferated with the announcement of 
impending elections, but the race would narrow down to three major contending parties 
and their candidates. Positioning itself as the ideological adversary to the MDN, the 
Partido Revolucionario (PR) formed from the remains of Arévalo-Arbenz era leftist 
political parties to uphold the legacy of the Guatemalan Revolution and the Ten Years of 
Spring. They selected Mario Méndez Montenegro as their leader. An attorney by training 
and a politician by practice, Mario Méndez Montenegro had taken part in the Guatemalan 
Revolution and held several significant offices during the Arévalo Presidency. He and 
President Arévalo parted ways when the confrontation between Arbenz and Arana 
appeared inevitable. Méndez Montenegro even sided with Arana supporters against 
Arévalo’s government in the short-lived rebellion that followed the colonel’s suspicious 
murder.186 The Eisenhower administration, particularly the Dulles brothers, viewed 
Méndez Montenegro as a possible communist regardless of his record. 
The Partido Revolucionario  and Méndez Montenegro opposed the Castillo 
Armas government, which they characterized as oppressive and illegitimate, but they also 
rejected major policies of the Arévalo and Arbenz administrations. They claimed the 
revolutionary governments had committed “whopping errors” in legalizing the 
communist party, aggravating foreign corporations, and implementing an “unsound 
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agrarian program.”187 The PR still embraced the populist spirit and democratic reforms of 
the Guatemalan Revolution, but condemned its more controversial aspects in order to 
appeal to a broader political base and avoid the ire of the United States. Méndez 
Montenegro welcomed assistance from the United States, but he criticized the corruption 
within the Guatemalan government that resulted from the opaque nature of international 
aid transactions. In short, Méndez Montenegro and the Partido Revolucionario were a 
political party rooted in nationalism, sovereignty, and a discerning interpretation of the 
Guatemalan Revolution.   
This was sufficient for Secretary Dulles to brand Méndez Montenegro and his 
party as part of the radical left. Dulles informed the US embassy staff to engage all of 
their Guatemalan contacts and “impress upon them the serious problem which is now 
posed for Guatemala by [the] return of certain key extreme leftist and communist leaders 
who threaten to reinstall a vulnerable, ostensibly Liberal Government which will then 
proceed through [the] same insidious cycle as turned [the] country over to communist 
during [the] Arévalo-Arbenz period.188 Dulles assured US officials that the message 
would be “crystal clear” to all “thinking Guatemalans” that they must find a candidate 
“who can solidify center political groups and [the] bulk of the Army in up-coming 
elections.”189 Concluding with a veiled threat, Dulles remarked, “This is the 
responsibility of Guatemalan people to themselves and to their country and unless 
quickly assumed, their country faces threat of utter ruin...US public and US Congress 
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simply would not tolerate supporting a government tainted with communism.”190 In the 
eyes of the Eisenhower administration, Méndez Montenegro’s association with the 
Guatemalan Revolution amounted to collusion with communism. When the Guatemalan 
provisional government, largely composed of Castillo Armas’ MDN, blocked the PR 
from legally registering as a political party, the United States remained silent. Into this 
void rushed one of Guatemala’s most complicated and contradictory politicians: General 
Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes. 
 
The fifth of seven children, José Miguel Ramon Ydígoras Fuentes was born on 
October 17, 1895. His prosperous, landowning family proudly traced its ancestry to 
Basque nobility. The young Ydígoras showed considerable academic acumen, and his 
success on examinations, along with the status and wealth of his family, afforded him the 
opportunity to join some of Guatemala’s elite schools. In 1912, the Academia Militrar 
accepted Ydígoras, who had the highest examination scores of his cohort, and he 
graduated at the top of his class three years later.191 President Manuel Estrada Cabrera 
personally bestowed the rank of second lieutenant upon Ydígoras in recognition for his 
achievements at the academy, and the young officer quickly rose through the ranks. He 
served in prestigious international posts, including the Guatemalan delegation to the 
Versailles Peace Conference. Upon his return from France, he joined the Army General 
Staff under several Guatemalan presidents and pursued an advanced degree in 
engineering. 
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 In October of 1927, Ydígoras assumed his first major political appointment when 
President Chacon requested he become the governor-general of Guatemala’s 
undeveloped frontier department, El Petén. Equally adept at administering developmental 
projects and putting down unruly mobs, Ydígoras continued to advance his career when 
he was appointed governor of Jalapa, and later, under President Ubico, the governor of 
San Marcos. In fact, his biographer Roland Ebel claims that Ubico became a mentor of 
sorts to Ydígoras, often protecting him from his rivals within the military hierarchy, and 
eventually bestowing the rank of general as a reward for his loyalty. When Ubico was 
overthrown, Ydígoras avoided complete political death, but was informally exiled as 
Guatemala’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. Tainted by his close association with 
the despised dictator, the forty-eight year old general expected that his career in the new 
revolutionary government had plateaued. When Colonel Francisco Arana began 
antagonizing Arévalo’s government, and was subsequently murdered, General Miguel 
Ydígoras found a new foothold for his political ambitions. 
 While serving in London, Ydígoras had attempted to join Arana’s inner circle 
with pledges of support and flattery. Before he could succeed, Arana was dead, leaving 
no real competitor against Jacobo Arbenz in the impending presidential election. 
Ydígoras secretly returned to Guatemala from his diplomatic-exile in London and, one 
week later, announced the formation of his new political party Reconciliacion 
Democratica Nacional (Redencion/RDN) in advertisements in the major newspapers La 
Hora and El Imparcial.192 His party held a “vague social democratic ideology” of 
respecting individual and property rights, tolerance, and freedom of the press, but it also 
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promised to defend the October Revolution by embracing nationalism and democratic 
reform.193 For one of Ubico’s old generals, no amount of ambition, creativity, or 
patriotism seemed sufficient to counter the distinctive advantages of the widely popular 
Arbenz, a government candidate with a sophisticated political machine. 
 Set against a backdrop of the assassination of Colonel Arana, the 1950 
presidential campaign brimmed with falsehoods, intimidation, bribery, and extortion on 
all sides. When Arbenz’s victory seemed inevitable, a disgruntled military officer who 
had been discharged for taking part in the Aranista rebellion, lieutenant-colonel Carlos 
Castillo Armas, launched a failed assault on a military base. Castillo Armas had 
previously sought Ydígoras’ support for the takeover, and the General promised he would 
welcome a military coup, but only if “the government refused to honor his victory. A 
coup, he stressed, should only be undertaken to secure his claim to the presidency.”194 
The treasonous lieutenant-colonel barely survived the botched operation, escaped prison, 
and fled to Colombia where he would continue to plot against Arbenz until he succeeded 
in ousting his nemesis with the help of the CIA during the 1954 coup. He also added 
Ydígoras to his list of enemies as he stewed in exile. 
 General Ydígoras, like Castillo Armas and several other conservative military 
officers, also returned to exile when Arbenz won the presidential election. Almost 
immediately, he began courting members of the Guatemalan military, the US 
government, and Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza in an effort to organize a 
                                                 
193 Ibid. 20-21. 
194 Eduardo Taracena de la Cerda quoted in: Gleijeses, Shattered Hope.  82. Taracena was involved in this 
plot. 
 117 
 
 
rebellion two weeks before the inauguration of Arbenz.195 The exiled general’s 
implausible plot failed to convince anyone, but Ydígoras continued to develop an 
intelligence network within Guatemala and remained in contact with US officials. As the 
Eisenhower administration began its search for prominent Guatemalans who might lead 
their intervention against Arbenz, Ydígoras and Castillo Armas topped the list. To 
smooth out tensions between the rightist opposition to Arbenz, the two men signed a 
secret Pacto de Caballeros that allowed Castillo Armas to control the 
counterrevolutionary military campaign and the resultant provisional government. In 
exchange, Ydígoras would become the political figurehead of the counterrevolution, and 
would run as its candidate in the first scheduled elections. Additionally, Ydígoras 
promised that Castillo Armas and his followers would be incorporated into his 
administration.196 When the Eisenhower government chose Castillo Armas to lead 
PBSUCCESS, and subsequently shoehorned him into the presidency, they disregarded 
the pact and Ydígoras remained exiled. Castillo Armas may have taken his revenge for 
Ydígoras’ previous refusal of support, but any satisfaction he may have enjoyed was 
short-lived. 
Upon learning of the assassination of Castillo Armas, Ydígoras sprang into action 
and set about reestablishing Redencion (RDN), his political party from the 1950 election 
against Arbenz. When the provisional government announced it would hold elections on 
October 20, 1957—the thirteenth anniversary of the Guatemalan Revolution—Miguel 
Ydígoras revealed he would return to his home country to run for president in the election 
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of 1957.197 The leaders of the MDN, knowing the conservative vote would now split 
between their party and the RDN, hoped to prevent Ydígoras from running. They nearly 
succeeded when a crewmember of the plane carrying Ydígoras back to Guatemala 
informed the General that a lynch mob awaited him at the airport and that the pilot would 
have to land the plane in El Salvador. The wily Ydígoras refused to believe the report and 
headed for the cockpit. After closing the door behind him, he put his pistol against the 
pilot’s head and shouted “You son of a bitch. We go to Guatemala or we all die.”198 
When they landed in Aurora Airport, a crowd had indeed gathered, but most were 
supporters of Ydígoras. The prodigal Guatemalan general had returned home. 
Having successfully blocked the registration of the center-left Partido 
Revolucionario and its candidate, Mario Méndez Montenegro, the MDN leadership now 
turned its attention to the much more significant threat to retaining the presidency: 
General Miguel Ydígoras and his Redencion party. Unable to slander the Ubico-era 
general with claims of communism, attempts to block the RDN from registering as a 
political party failed. When the MDN-led government began firing ydigorista employees, 
Ydígoras used the incident challenge the impartiality of electoral commission and called 
for all MDN party members to abdicate their government posts. On election day, 
Guatemala City and other urban centers began to run out of ballots before noon, and the 
MDN candidate, Ortiz Pasarelli, declared himself the victor when early returns showed 
he had a lead by 70,000 votes.199 Ydígoras would not be denied the presidency for a third 
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time, and he staged a massive protest that decried the 1957 presidential election as a sham 
and demanded a new, fair contest take place. 
Most Guatemalans seemed to have agreed with Ydígoras. The other legal 
opposition parties supported the protest and echoed the call for new elections. The PR, 
denied a chance to participate in the election, added their partisans to the growing ranks 
of demonstrators. Railroad workers went on strike, bringing commerce in the capital to a 
screeching halt. Desperate to salvage its “showcase of democracy” the United States 
government demanded a return to constitutional government, sending a clear message 
that a continued MDN junta would be unacceptable. After intense wrangling at a meeting 
between US officials, Pasarelli, and Ydígoras, the parties agreed that a new election 
would take place on January 19, 1958. 
The subsequent 1958 contest, although it had its share of electoral shenanigans, 
appeared much more free and fair than the previous attempt. Mario Méndez Montenegro 
joined the fray as the Partido Revolucionario gained recognition by the Guatemalan 
Electoral Tribunal, which was now under considerably greater international scrutiny. The 
contest would be close. The MDN still maintained the advantage of government funding, 
and after the disgraced Pasarelli was replaced with José Luis Cruz Salazar as their 
presidential candidate, the party received at least $97,000 from the CIA.200  
Before the annulled 1957 election, most Guatemalan officers remained aloof, 
although many found the growing militarism of the MDN appealing. Securing strong 
segments of support within the military was a necessity for any aspiring Guatemalan 
president, and although he held the rank of general under Ubico, Ydígoras lacked allies in 
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the security forces shaped by the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary governments. 
This changed abruptly when the respected colonel, Enrique Peralta, abandoned his own 
presidential ambitions and joined the RDN, bringing his considerable following into the 
Ydígoras camp.201 The alliance with Peralta tipped the scales in Ydígoras’ favor more 
than any other factor. Bringing Colonel Peralta within his inner circle would later prove 
to be Ydigoras’ most consequential decision. 
Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes won the presidential election of 1958 with a plurality of 
roughly 42% of the vote. The MDN came in a close second, and retained a majority of 
congressional deputies. After a series of backroom deals, and the Army patrolling the 
streets of Guatemala City, the Congress confirmed Ydígoras’ presidential victory with a 
vote of 40-18. The “Old Fox” of Guatemala had finally achieved the goal that had eluded 
him for seventeen years. 
The victory, however, could not be savored. President Ydígoras inherited a 
country fractured at every level. His partly lacked a legislative majority, he faced 
opposition from the political right and left, and the United States viewed him with 
suspicion and doubt. Ydígoras had campaigned on two major issues: anticommunism and 
economic development. Even before swearing into office, Ydígoras set out on an 
international trip to the other Central American republics and Washington DC to promote 
the Central American Common Market (CACM). In Ydígoras’ long-term political vision, 
regional economic integration would serve the dual purpose of fighting poverty and 
communism in Guatemala and Central America. 
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 In Washington, Ydígoras received an unenthusiastic reception. According to 
Ebel’s biographical account, Ydígoras managed to appease Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles with a pledge to build a staunchly anticommunist government that supported US 
policies in the Cold War and entertained President Eisenhower with tales of his wartime 
association with General George C. Marshall.202 They were also encouraged when 
Ydígoras promised he would protect the interest of United Fruit. Eisenhower officials 
were less impressed, however, with Ydígoras’ suggestion of creating an integrated 
political-military organization to defend Central America from communism and his 
desire to repatriate Guatemalan political exiles. In the following decade, the Johnson 
administration would embrace the idea of regional defense with the Central American 
Defense Council (CONDECA), whereas the return of exiled Guatemalans prompted the 
Kennedy administration to accept Ydígoras’ overthrow. President-elect Ydígoras left the 
United States without much to show for it, but a more pressing crisis in Latin America 
would see the Eisenhower administration change their attitude toward the eccentric 
Guatemalan general: the Cuban Revolution. 
 When Ydígoras returned from his international tour, he began to build his 
administration. His cabinet consisted of a collection of leaders from nearly every political 
party, along with a healthy amount of military officers in key positions. Internal disputes 
frequently arose in his mixed cabinet, a result of the political brokering that allowed him 
to take office, and Ydígoras spent much of his first years in office contending with his 
own government. Disputes with unions and students, a perineal thorn in the side of 
conservative Guatemalan leaders, and a lack of legislative majority made it all the more 
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difficult for his administration to implement significant policy changes. The military high 
command remained divided according to Ebel, but publicly maintained its support for the 
president who honored his campaign promise to increase officer salaries and benefits.203  
When his critics charged he was soft on communism for considering the 
repatriation of political exiles, Ydígoras reacted swiftly to maintain his anticommunist 
credentials with the military and the United States. President Ydígoras defaulted to the 
time-honored practice of labeling any opposition to his government as being communist. 
When the 1959 mayoral race for Guatemala City went to the PR candidate, Ydígoras 
threatened to annul the election with a series of specious legal maneuvers. The attempt to 
subvert the contest for mayor of Guatemala City failed, but he soon found a new 
opportunity to attack his leftist opponents after bombs detonated at the US embassy, the 
residence of the archbishop, and throughout Guatemala City. President Ydígoras blamed 
communist saboteurs for the bombings and declared a state of siege. He used the incident 
to arrest students, labor leaders, and members of the Partido Revolucionario.    
Although support from the PR had helped him nullify the 1957 election, Ydígoras 
soon turned on his former allies, declared them a communist front, and attempted to 
return the party to an illegal status. The Electoral Commission denied Ydígoras’ request, 
but his attack splintered the PR into factions along the issue of communist sympathy.204 
The president’s professed reverence for democracy seemed downright deceitful when, 
during the 1959 congressional elections, he used imprisonment, kidnapping, and 
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dragooned plantation workers to secure a legislative majority for his RDN.205 Popular 
opinion soured as the Ydígoras regime resorted to martial law and blatant 
authoritarianism, and protests and sporadic bombings continued to plague the capital. As 
public pressure increased, Ydígoras continued to blame the insidiously intangible forces 
of communism for Guatemala’s woes. In Fidel Castro, Ydígoras would find an 
indispensable enemy whose connections with communism were uncontested.   
The threat of a pro-communist seizure of power in Guatemala seemed more 
concrete after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and, few, if any, events had greater impact 
on US Cold War policies in Latin America. Fidel Castro, doctor-turned-revolutionary, 
after suffering military defeat, imprisonment, and exile, toppled the corrupt dictator and 
US ally, Fulgencio Batista. Castro led his July 26 movement, named after his failed 
assault on the Moncada barracks in 1953, into Havana after six years of building the 
small group of political dissidents into a guerilla army. The Eisenhower administration 
was suspicious of the popular revolutionary leader despite Castro’s emphatic assurances 
that he and his government were not communists.206 Initially, Moscow also had difficulty 
discerning the aims of Cuba’s new leader and worked closely with his brother Raul 
Castro to gain influence within the new regime. After Castro’s agrarian reform law of 
1959 expropriated over one thousand acres of farmland for redistribution, the already 
troubled relations between the United States and Cuba rapidly deteriorated.207 The 
Eisenhower administration made little effort to win over the Cuban government. 
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Likewise, Castro and his followers often denounced the United States for its neocolonial 
rule of Cuba. By 1961, the Cuban revolutionary government nationalized US property, 
and Fidel Castro announced: “I am a Marxist-Leninist, and I will continue to be a 
Marxist-Leninist until the last days of my life.”208 Communism had claimed its first 
country within the Western Hemisphere. 
The Cuban Revolution likely salvaged the tattered relationship between the 
Ydígoras and Eisenhower governments. Washington officials had never been keen on the 
unpredictable Guatemalan president, who was far more difficult to manage than their 
minion, Castillo Armas. Nonetheless, the Eisenhower administration tolerated Ydígoras 
because he was an avowed Cold Warrior. Stephen Streeter’s work reveals that many US 
officials, including Ambassador Lester Mallory, believed that either the Guatemalan 
military, or worse, left-leaning parties and their protestors, would remove Ydígoras from 
office before 1960.209 
Although frustrated with some of Ydígoras’ actions, the United States continued 
to pour money into Guatemalan security forces. In 1959 alone, the Guatemalan National 
Police received three US advisers and over $700,000 for training and equipment.210 
Additionally, through the Mutual Security Program, the Army and Air Missions in 
Guatemala dispersed at least $1.3 million in funds from 1957-1960.211 By becoming the 
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chief patron of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, the Eisenhower administration hoped it 
had safeguarded its alliance against communist incursion. Should Ydígoras fall, 
Washington would still have strong ties to whichever military officer emerged from the 
inevitable power struggle. President Ydígoras, however, surpassed expectations. In a 
remarkable gamble, Ydígoras struck a fateful bargain with the Eisenhower administration 
that solidified him as the preeminent foe of Castro, but simultaneously initiated one of the 
largest military insurrections in Guatemalan history. 
In his memoirs, President Ydígoras claimed that he knew that Cuban Revolution 
represented a communist invasion of the Western Hemisphere nearly two years before 
Castro declared he was a follower of Marx. Moreover, Castro was a direct threat to 
Guatemala: “Through our intelligence we learned that politicians, students, and others, 
were arriving in Cuba in ever-increasing numbers to receive military training for the 
purpose of forming guerrilla groups and making secret landings in Guatemala.”212 With 
opposition against his government growing more emboldened by the day, Ydígoras 
feared that Arévalo, Arbenz, and their supporters could return to Guatemala, backed by 
Cuban revolutionaries, and topple his unpopular regime. The grand communist 
conspiracy was confirmed in Ydígoras’ mind on May 20, 1959 when his intelligence 
contacts reported that Jacobo Arbenz arrived in Cuba, where “he was immediately 
received by Prime Minister Fidel Castro and taken to the Sierra of Escambray by Raul 
Castro, head of the Cuban Armed Forces, to visit the training camps where the legions 
were being prepared for the strike against Guatemala.”213 Welcoming a foreign 
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distraction from his domestic woes, Ydígoras mobilized the Air Force and Army to 
respond to the rumored presence of Cuban infiltrators in Panama. Believing that an 
expeditionary force of Guatemalan soldiers was incoming, the band of four-hundred 
insurgents surrendered to Panamanian authorities without a fight.214 Projecting himself as 
Castro’s chief opponent, Ydígoras basked in this early victory and touted that he was the 
first leader in the Western Hemisphere to confront the Castro-Communist menace for 
years to come. 
The Eisenhower administration soon adopted a matching hostility toward Castro’s 
Cuba, and prepared to dispose of the revolutionary leader as just as they had done to 
Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. In May 1959, the same month that Arbenz arrived in Cuba, the 
CIA armed a small contingent of anti-Castro guerrillas already inside Cuba, which failed 
to gain traction against the revolutionary regime.215 As the Eisenhower administration 
began to lay more extensive plans, Ydígoras, facing continued strikes and domestic 
unrest he claimed were Castro-inspired, pressured Washington to act against Cuba. On 
March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to initiate a major covert 
action to eliminate Castro’s government. The operation reunited many of the key 
planners who had designed Operation PBSUCCESS, and they used the overthrow of 
Arbenz as a model for removing Castro. 
 It is not entirely clear when representatives of the United States and Guatemala 
first began to discuss cooperating in the operation against Castro. As early as the late 
summer of 1959, Ydígoras sent his wealthy confidant, Roberto Alejos, to convince the 
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Dulles brothers to launch an attack on Cuba.216  Planning shifted to action by early April 
1960 when CIA station chief Robert Davis contacted Alejos, and suggested that he 
should arrange a meeting with the Guatemalan president to discuss his role in the 
impending operation. Finally appreciated for his anticommunist efforts by the United 
States, President Ydígoras struck a deal with the Central Intelligence Agency.  
In his own version of events, Ydígoras was uncharacteristically terse about his 
role in the initial plans, although he did claim credit for coming up with the idea: 
“Castro-Communist influence became stronger every day, especially in the capital…The 
attack was so dangerous that I was obliged to take the offensive. I had talks with groups 
of Cuban exiles and with nations that were friendly towards them. We drew up a plan of 
action against those who had transformed Cuba into a detention camp and a base to 
corrupt America. Representatives of the United States came to see me about training the 
Cuban anti-Castro forces and we came to a spoken agreement. My government granted 
permission for the training of Cuban contingents and for the massing of arms and planes 
on Guatemalan soil.”217    
 
The details of the “spoken agreement” remain unknown, but scholars have 
speculated that it may have been debt cancellation, a personal bribe, increased economic 
and military aid, Washington’s support for Guatemala’s claim to Belize, or a combination 
of these incentives.218 In exchange, the Guatemalan government would secretly permit 
the CIA to construct a training camp, Base Trax, on one of Roberto Alejos’ remote 
plantations in Retalhuleu. The $1.8 million compound boasted a mile-long airstrip, 
housed over five-hundred Cuban exiles, and between twenty and thirty US instructors. 
Ramping up the rhetoric against Castro, Ydígoras closed the Guatemalan embassy in 
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Havana and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba on April 28, 1960. In July, Jacobo 
Arbenz proclaimed that very soon he would be “back in Guatemala’s government palace 
speaking to his beloved people”219 The announcement seemed to confirm Ydígoras’ most 
explosive accusations against Cuba, and after allegedly receiving word of an 
assassination plot against him, the president declared a state of siege that lasted over two 
months.220 As he attempted to convince his country of curse of Castroism, President 
Ydígoras failed to anticipate that his actions would give rise to a much more immediate 
threat within his own military. 
“Guatemala, like all other countries, is receptive to rumors and the weapon of the 
whispering campaign was constantly used with success,” Ydígoras opined as he reflected 
on the obstacles he faced in his presidency.221 The details of Ydígoras’ deal with the CIA 
may still remain obscured, but word of a US training camp for a Cuban invasion force 
spread relatively quickly in Guatemala. The newspaper Prensa Libre published the first 
report of a US military base in Guatemala in early September, 1960. President Ydígoras 
attempted to counter the story by claiming that the airstrip was purely commercial, and he 
even staged a public dedication of Guatemala’s newest “airport,” although he could not 
explain where his government acquired the funds for the facility, or how it had been 
completed in a mere twenty-six days.222  
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Unable to convince the press, Ydígoras tried to whip up anti-Cuban hysteria when 
he ordered an airstrike on a Cuban schooner off the Yucatan Peninsula. He justified the 
attack by revealing that Guatemalan intelligence had uncovered a large cache of Cuban 
weapons on Guatemala’s Pacific Coast. The historian Stephen Streeter speculates that 
these weapons were planted by Ydígoras as a false-flag operation.223 This seems a likely 
explanation, especially given that the ship targeted by the Guatemalan Air Force was in 
the Atlantic Ocean, whereas the arms were discovered on the Pacific coastline. 
Regardless of this inconsistency, the American and Guatemalan media, along with the US 
government, accepted that Cubans were attempting bring violent revolution to 
Guatemala. American foreign service officers in Havana reported that Castro, sensing 
that his enemies were gathering momentum, prepped the Cuban Air Force to be “ready 
[to] annihilate attacking force as [the] element [of] surprise [is] now lacking.”224 
While Ydígoras presented a convincing case for Cuban hostility, he failed in 
squelching the story of US bases in Guatemala. Through October, an explosion of articles 
in the Guatemalan and American press revealed the full extent of the training facility and 
its purpose. Protestors gathered around the American Embassy shouting “Cuba Si, 
Yanqui No!” and threw stones through the building’s windows.225 The leading student 
organization, Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios levied the charge of high treason 
against President Ydígoras and the Army for allowing such a gross violation of 
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Guatemalan sovereignty.226 Faced with such overwhelming evidence and public vitriol, 
Ydígoras reluctantly admitted that military training bases did exist in the region. Lying to 
the public, he swore that their purpose was to prepare Guatemalan soldiers for a Cuban 
invasion of Guatemala, which the president predicted would occur in early November. 
President Ydígoras believed he had sufficiently countered the charges of treason, but he 
did not realize that the accusation greatly pained a military preoccupied with its lost 
honor. 
Several factors contributed to the decision of nearly one-third of the Guatemalan 
officer corps to revolt against the Ydígoras government. Factionalism within the 
Guatemalan military was hardly a new development. Divisions ran deep between line 
officers, typically older, conservative men who earned their rank through patronage and 
long years of service, and school officers, who had been trained in Guatemala’s military 
academy, Escuela Politecnica. The school officers tended to be younger and more left-
leaning. President Ydígoras exacerbated this divide when he promoted the aging line 
officers and bestowed military ranks on his civilian sycophants. According to Streeter’s 
research, many of the school officers attended special training courses at American bases 
in the region and the United States, and upon returning to Guatemala, resented the 
relative squalor, poor pay, and lack of medical facilities they had to endure. They blamed 
Ydígoras, whose campaign promise of better salaries and benefits for officers only found 
its way into the hands of his loyalists in the military.227 Such favoritism presented yet 
another example of the rampant corruption in the Ydígoras government that the fiery 
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young officers believed was opening the door for communist agitation and Yankee 
imperialism. 
The most flagrant sin of the Ydígoras government, however, had been the 
violation of Guatemala’s national sovereignty. The number of Arbenz and Arévalo 
supporters was relatively small in the Guatemalan Armed Forces, but a strong sense of 
nationalist pride stemming from the Guatemalan Revolution remained a core principle 
that cut across the factional divides. The severity of opposition to the presence of the 
Cuban-exile training camp in Guatemala varied, but the majority of officers, excepting 
those who owed their careers to Ydígoras, rejected the American presence as 
undermining the authority of the Guatemalan Armed Forces and the sovereignty of the 
nation. Some certainly must have chafed at the lack of consultation and not being cut in 
on the deal Ydígoras brokered with the CIA. Whatever concessions Ydígoras and Alejos 
might have secured for themselves, it was clearly not for the betterment of the 
Guatemalan state.228 Others, especially those fervent nationalists that took up arms 
against the regime, reviled the “puppet” government of Ydígoras whose greed resulted in 
yet another “shameful violation of our national sovereignty.”229 President Ydígoras 
speculated that his officers fell victim to Cuban propaganda that stated the General “was 
building up a mercenary army to replace and substitute the national army. Such a fiction 
could only convince those who had never renounced their allegiance to communism.”230 
Regardless of their individual motivations, as many as four hundred of these angry 
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officers formed a secret society, el Organización del Niño Jesús, that conspired to 
overthrow Ydígoras, install a military junta, and reorganize the military hierarchy along 
more equitable and merit-based lines.231After nearly a year of preparing for the right 
moment to launch their attack, the nationalist firebrands of the Guatemalan officer corps 
staged a revolt that fired the opening salvo of the Guatemalan Civil War. 
At 2 A.M. on Sunday November 13, 1960, a group of five officers and roughly 
one-hundred of their men seized control of the Matamoros barracks in Guatemala City, 
raided it for armaments, and retreated to the Zacapa region with several jeeps and a small 
tank.232 When fellow conspirators failed to materialize as anticipated at the nearby 
Mariscal Zavala base, the rebel group cut phone lines and fled further into the 
countryside. The last minute abandonment of the revolt became endemic, and seven of 
the nine military cliques that had pledged to join the cause broke their promise when the 
attack began. This depleted the expected ranks by at least two-thirds, although the two 
remaining rebel contingents that honored the pact had sufficient numbers to overtake the 
important military bases at Zacapa and Puerto Barrios. Any sense of victory the rebel 
forces felt would not last long. 
“We knew and we were prepared for the offensive” bragged President Ydígoras 
as he recalled one of the most triumphant episodes of his presidency.233 A conspiracy of 
such magnitude, plotted for over a year, could not stay secret for long within the bubble 
of the Guatemalan military. Eventually, word reached the Army Chief of Staff, Ricardo 
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Peralta Méndez, who reported the information to his uncle, Colonel Enrique Peralta. 
Awarded the position of Minister of Agriculture for his decisive allegiance during the 
1958 presidential election, Colonel Peralta promptly brought news of the plot to President 
Ydígoras. Government loyalist within the high command subsequently placed many of 
the suspected organizers under house arrest, disrupting the leadership of the rebellion and 
convincing the vast majority of the wayward officer corps to reconsider their 
recalcitrance.  
When the attack began, President Ydígoras was reportedly in Quetzaltenango for 
a ceremony, but renowned sociologist Richard Adams suggests that he was likely 
soliciting help from the CIA at the nearby Retalhuleu base that had been the source of 
officer malcontent.234 President Ydígoras returned to Guatemala City hours later and took 
personal command of the military operations against the rebel forces. In conjunction with 
CIA and Cuban mercenary pilots, Ydígoras launched a devastating aerial assault on the 
rebel-held Zacapa and Puerto Barrios bases. Confident that victory over the rebels was 
assured, President Ydígoras returned to the presidential palace for a “leisurely lunch with 
his family.”235  
The public, however, required an explanation for why the Guatemalan military 
appeared to be tearing itself apart. After his lunch, Ydígoras called an emergency session 
of Congress to declare martial law. He followed the session with a press conference, 
where he blamed Cuba, Mario Méndez Montenegro and the Partido Revolucionario, and 
boasted that the revolt was a good thing because it proved that his warnings of 
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widespread leftist subversion had been accurate.236 The military brass knew, and US 
officials suspected, that Ydígoras’ claims of a Cuban connection were a fabrication. 
Embassy officials worried that “this kind of situation [is] of course ideal for exploitation 
by extremist both right and left” and “that military are loath to fight brother military.”237 
Perched precariously “atop a murmuring volcano,” the US embassy worried that 
Ydígoras remained vulnerable because his military “now refuse to believe, in spite of [the 
government’s] protestations and exhortations, that rebels are really Castro agents”238 As a 
precaution, Ydígoras ordered that the airstrips at the rebel bases be destroyed 
immediately to prevent Cubans forces from supporting the revolt and requested that the 
United States assist in preventing such a possibility.239 Eisenhower’s response team, 
headed by CIA director Allen Dulles, after conferring with intelligence analysts that 
concluded that the Guatemalan communist party had been unaware of the revolt and that 
they could find “no direct evidence of Cuban participation in the uprising,” but 
nonetheless reported to President Eisenhower that “it looks as if the Cubans have a hand 
in this.”240 Such speculation appears reckless, but the Eisenhower administration dared 
not risk revolution in Guatemala. Eisenhower ordered an aircraft carrier, loaded with US 
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marines and aircraft, to head for Guatemala to assist in interdiction against the predicted 
Cuban invasion.  
Unsurprisingly, an attack from Castro or communist infiltrators within Guatemala 
never transpired. The rebels found themselves in an increasingly hopeless situation. 
Bombing runs pounded the rebels at Zacapa, and forced them to flee to the surrounding 
hills under heavy fire from strafing aircraft. Colonel Peralta personally led a massive 
force of three-thousand infantrymen to retake the Zacapa barracks, scattering the rebel 
forces nearby and isolating those that remained in Puerto Barrios.241 President Ydígoras 
then concentrated the full might of Guatemalan and CIA air assets on the lone rebel 
holdout. Bombing runs from CIA B-26 Marauders detonated gasoline storage tanks, 
partially destroying the Puerto Barrios base, and after eight hours of continuous 
bombardment, the remaining rebel officers fled for the border.242 By November 16, the 
nationalist revolt of the Guatemalan military was over and Ydígoras stood triumphant. 
President Ydígoras reveled in his good fortune: a catastrophe had turned into a 
triumph. He paraded through Guatemala City in an open car, basking in the cheers of his 
citizens. The widely-despised, old general would not enjoy such adulation ever again. 
Seeking to restore some domestic normalcy, President Ydígoras granted amnesty to most 
military personnel and refrained from prosecuting civilians like Mario Méndez 
Montenegro and other members of Partido Revolucionario.243 The surviving leaders of 
the revolt fled for Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico. Three of these officers—
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Alejandro de Leon, Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, and Luis Turcios Lima—radicalized 
during their exile. When they returned to Guatemala four months later, they began a 
guerrilla insurgency that lasted for thirty-six years. In an equally fateful decision, 
Ydígoras elevated Colonel Enrique Peralta to Minister of Defense: a just reward for the 
man who had twice saved the General’s presidency. From his position, Defense Minister 
Peralta consolidated power within the military, recently purged of its more radical 
elements, and fostered greater unity within the fractious armed forces under his 
leadership. The Eisenhower administration, with only a month left in its tenure, breathed 
a short sigh of relief. Guatemala had not gone red under their watch. Their “showcase for 
democracy” hardly lived up to its name, but the crisis-ridden country and its peculiar 
president were now the problem of the incoming Kennedy administration. 
* * * 
Once the guardians of the landed-elite, Guatemala’s military leaders steadily 
accumulated enormous political clout after the 1944 revolution. Despite the tumult of 
sixteen years of revolution and counterrevolution, the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
emerged from a wild range of governments as the backbone of the state. Although the 
dominant factions within the military changed with the political leanings of the civilian 
government, the institution as a whole steadily increased its power, especially in times of 
crisis. Military officers ushered in the Guatemalan Revolution, clashed to control the 
movement’s direction, and ultimately brought the Ten Years of Spring to an abrupt end. 
Although the CIA’s 1954 intervention greatly contributed to overthrowing Jacobo 
Arbenz, it was his most trusted colonels that convinced the besieged president to resign. 
In pre-revolutionary Guatemala, ranking officers often played a role in presidential 
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politics, but they were only one of many players who had influence over who occupied 
the Presidential Palace. After the overthrow of Arbenz, military leaders still vied with 
civilians for political power, but the real competitors increasingly came from within the 
officer corps. The Counterrevolution of Castillo Armas and the fumbling, early years of 
the Ydigoras regime only enhanced the standing of the officer corps. Persecution of the 
left and the rise of militarized political parties like the MDN contributed to the image of 
the officer corps as Guatemala’s last bastion of order. 
 Despite these advantages, the Guatemalan Armed Forces had not yet become the 
absolute masters of the Guatemalan state. While many officers loathed Colonel Castillo 
Armas and his Liberation Army, they successfully survived the chaos of the 
counterrevolution’s early years, ejected many Liberacionistas from their ranks, and began 
to make independent contacts with patrons within the United States government. 
Likewise, American officials quickly began to realize the importance of creating close 
ties to prominent members of the Guatemalan military. The bond between Washington 
and their willing supplicants within the Guatemalan officer corps solidified as the United 
States funneled aid to the armed forces and began training a new generation of military 
leaders. As mentioned above, the intrusion of the United States offended the nationalist 
impulses that many officers had inherited from the Guatemalan Revolution, and some 
revolted against their government for allowing the US to use Guatemala as the staging 
ground for the invasion of Cuba. Instead of asserting Guatemala’s national sovereignty, 
the defeat of the rebellion largely purged the ranks of left-leaning officers and set the 
stage for the military’s political ascendency.  
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 With a new US president, John F. Kennedy, arriving in office and a major 
rebellion quelled, it appeared that stability might return to Guatemala. The objectives of 
the US mission in Guatemala shifted: uncovering “the international Soviet Communist 
conspiracy” remained the order of the day, but policymakers wanted to counter 
communist influence with developmental projects and media manipulation, not the 
suspension of elections or direct military rule.244 These less bellicose methods would not 
last long, and instead supplemented the armed forces control over the state. Once the 
relatively inexperienced Kennedy administration confronted problems that required 
immediate responses, the long-term goals of development and democratization were 
undermined by defaulting to military solutions. 
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CHAPTER II: NEW ALLIANCES 
The Alliance For Progress Comes to Guatemala 
 
Two years after Castro greeted cheering crowds as he rolled into Havana atop a 
tank, John F. Kennedy became the thirty-fifth president of the United States. Ambitious, 
dynamic, and the youngest president to date, Kennedy embodied the potential and energy 
of the 1960s for his supporters. Throughout his campaign for the presidency, Kennedy 
criticized the Eisenhower administration for not waging the Cold War effectively. 
Although the most well-known accusation Kennedy made was the baseless claim of a 
growing “missile-gap” created by the rapid increase in the Soviet nuclear arsenal, 
Kennedy also blamed the Eisenhower administration for mishandling Cuba.245 Kennedy 
had his own bold, new plan for winning the Cold War in Latin America: the Alliance for 
Progress. 
 This chapter examines the early interactions between the Ydígoras and Kennedy 
administrations. The evidence presented here reveals how Kennedy’s team quickly began 
to see the Guatemalan Armed Forces as the most reliable bulwark against communist 
revolution as public protests and guerrilla groups began to assail the Ydígoras 
administration. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion exacerbated the Kennedy 
administration’s reliance on military control over civilian governance, especially after 
former Guatemalan officers-turned-rebels looked to Castro’s Cuba for inspiration and 
support as they began their own insurrection. The preference for military men only 
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increased with the arrival of Kennedy’s new ambassador to Guatemala—John Bell. 
Seeing Castro-Communists behind every public protest and dissident politician, 
Ambassador Bell helped clear the way for the Guatemalan military’s seizure of power. 
When guerrilla groups began to assail the Ydígoras regime, the “enlightened 
anticommunism” of the Alliance for Progress became another tool for the Guatemalan 
officer corps to expand their power and influence throughout the country.    
 
An Alliance Announced: The New Face of US-Guatemalan Relations  
 
The initial impact of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala was limited. 
Kennedy’s team had noble ambitions, but lacked knowledgeable specialists who could 
guide the enormous aid program through the local conditions that would impede its 
advancement. In Guatemala, conservatives rejected President Ydigoras’ attempts to 
modernize tax laws and implement a degree of land reform. The Civic Action program 
proved one of the few early successes of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala. 
Controlled by military officers, the public works project became a way for individuals to 
improve their station while promoting Guatemala’s armed forces. In time, it would 
provide the Guatemalan military with access to enormous resources and laid the 
foundations for counterinsurgency state. 
 On March 13, 1961, two-hundred fifty guests, selected from the diplomatic corps 
of the nations of Latin America and the United States Congress, gathered in the White 
House for a lavish event.246 At his inaugural address months before, the young American 
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President had vowed “to our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special 
pledge – to convert our good words into good deeds – in a new alliance for progress – to 
assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty.”247 The United 
States had rebuilt Western Europe from the ashes of World War II, and many Latin 
Americans hoped for a similar investment for the nations of the Western Hemisphere. 
Kennedy had long held that strong relations with Latin America were vital to US success 
in the Cold War, and he wasted little time unveiling his plans. Addressing the crowd of 
dignitaries and politicians, President Kennedy announced a renewed partnership between 
the United States and Latin America that would “complete the revolution of the 
Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living, 
and all can live out their lives in dignity and in freedom.”248 The speech, broadcast live in 
the major languages of the Western Hemisphere by Voice of America, resonated with 
millions of Latin Americans who hoped that the first Catholic President of the United 
States could amend the often-troubled relationship amongst the family of American 
Republics.  
The Alliance for Progress, in spirit, was a quasi-Marshall Plan for Latin America 
that promised to help fund economic and social development in the region. Kennedy 
championed education, public health, and most significantly, tax and land reform. After 
the passage of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, a new organization, the Agency for 
International Development (USAID) emerged to administer international assistance 
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programs.249 Although Kennedy invoked the revolutions that had liberated much of the 
Western Hemisphere from colonial rule in his speech, the President and his advisors 
feared that the region was vulnerable to radical social forces.250 A product of the 
modernization theory postulate that material improvement would induce social and 
political progress, the Alliance for Progress offered an alternative to the road to 
revolution. Some scholars, such as Lars Schoultz, have asserted that the Alliance for 
Progress was little more than Dollar Diplomacy with “social science window 
dressing.”251 At the time, however, many Latin American governments embraced the 
Alliance because it seemed to mark a significant shift in US policy toward the region. For 
Guatemala, the Alliance for Progress acted as a vehicle for the advance of repressive 
militarism.  
 For all the idealism and potential of the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy 
administration faced significant hurdles of implementation. No member of Kennedy’s 
cabinet or White House staff had extensive experience or expertise in Latin American 
affairs. Although some influential aides, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., provided advice 
on the region and supported the Alliance, most major policy decisions on Latin America 
fell to the president alone.252 He got little help—Secretary of State Dean Rusk had little 
interest in the region and viewed it as peripheral to concerns in Europe and Asia. One of 
Rusk’s staffers complained that the Secretary of State gave as much attention to Western 
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New Guinea as he did Latin America.253 Most officials, including Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin Martin, lacked fluency in Spanish. Kennedy’s 
appointed Ambassador to Guatemala, John Bell, was no exception to the rule and came to 
his office with little experience in Latin America beyond infrequent travel and minimal 
“classroom” Spanish.254 Without knowledgeable, skilled officials, Kennedy’s ambitious 
project lacked a crucial component necessary for a major policy shift.  
Teodoro Moscoso, the man chosen to lead the Alliance for Progress, was an 
exception to this rule. Born in Puerto Rico, Moscoso had considerable experience 
managing large-scale developmental projects directed by state bureaucracies. After a 
successful career as the Executive Director of Puerto Rico’s nationalized industrial and 
economic development agency, Compania de Fomento Industrial, Moscoso headed 
Operacion Manos a la Obra (Operation Bootstrap). Under his guidance, the program 
boosted Puerto Rico’s industrial economy and attracted considerable international 
investment. Beyond his experience, Moscoso passionately articulated his beliefs that 
massive developmental projects could produce social justice and widespread prosperity—
they had the power to reshape society. Moscoso caught the attention of the Kennedy 
administration, but he was initially tapped as the Ambassador to Venezuela in May 1961. 
His term ended abruptly: a month after he had arrived in Venezuela, he was captured by 
rioting students who burned his car and seized sensitive diplomatic documents in his 
                                                 
253 Ibid., 15. 
254 John Bell, interview by Arthur L. Lowrie,  Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, The Association for 
Diplomatic Studies and Training. June 17, 1988. 
http://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mssmisc/mfdip/2005%20txt%20files/2004bel02.txt 
 144 
 
 
possession. Kennedy recalled Moscoso to Washington in the Fall, but for a promotion 
rather than punishment.  
The Alliance for Progress needed capable leadership, and Kennedy was short on 
men with experience in Latin America. Recalling the meeting, Moscoso stated that 
Kennedy summoned him to the second-floor living room of the White House and “more 
or less, gave me no alternative. He just said that I had to take this job and that he had 
discussed it with several people and that he felt that I was the obvious choice and more or 
less implied that there was no use arguing with him.”255 On November 3, 1961, Teodoro 
Moscoso became the first Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress. An exemplar of the 
ambitions of the developmental program, Moscoso pledged that “within a decade, the 
direction and results of Latin American history is to be changed.”256 Although the new 
Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress admitted the task would be difficult, he could 
not foresee the monumental challenges ahead. 
 The United States’ legacy of militarism in both its historic relationship with Latin 
America and the prosecution of the Cold War proved to be the greatest challenge the 
Alliance for Progress needed to overcome. Kennedy wanted to avoid the mistakes of the 
recent past by cutting ties with dictators who curried the United States’ favor by 
professing their anti-communist credentials.257 At the same time, Kennedy recognized 
that military aid was necessary for maintaining influence over Latin American armed 
forces. As a result, USAID did not restrict its funding to developmental projects and often 
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contributed to police and military forces. In Guatemala, as we shall see, security forces 
not only received the bulk of US foreign aid, but also became responsible for 
implementing Alliance for Progress initiatives ranging from building schools to 
reforestation projects. The Guatemalan Army, which shouldered most of these new 
responsibilities, used the funds to indoctrinate youths, control vital resources like clean 
water and medicine, and to gain greater control over civil society. In the case of 
Guatemala, Kennedy’s high-minded rhetoric failed to match his actions, as the power of 
authoritarian military leaders swelled with the patronage of the United States in the name 
of anti-communism. 
* * * 
 Four months had passed since the November 13 rebellion threatened to topple the 
Ydígoras government when Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress would usher in 
a new era of hemispheric cooperation. Instead of unseating the Guatemalan president, the 
revolt actually had a somewhat stabilizing effect on the Ydígoras regime. President 
Ydígoras had seized the opportunity to personally lead the defense of his government, 
bolstering his public image. The fractious Guatemalan military had been purged of its 
more leftist elements, and the majority of the officers who remained in positions of 
authority greatly respected the new Minister of Defense, Colonel Enrique Peralta. The 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations shared a lack of enthusiasm for the Ydígoras 
government. The haphazard caudillo was far from the “decent democrat” that the 
Kennedy team hoped would lead Guatemala into the Alliance for Progress, but he did 
have some crucial credentials: he was an avowed anticommunist and self-proclaimed 
enemy of Fidel Castro. Although he had publicly blamed Cuba for the uprising in 
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November, Ydígoras understood that the insurrection resulted from offending the 
nationalist pride of segments of the Army that opposed the use of Guatemala as a training 
center for Cuban exiles and mercenaries. Moreover, it proved that ambitious military men 
were becoming bolder. Ydígoras needed to bolster his popular support, and the dynamic 
new project proposed by the Kennedy administration could be the lifeline that sustained 
his presidency. The Alliance for Progress presented an opportunity for the two radically 
different presidents to achieve their goals. 
 The Guatemalan military had been a relatively solid base of support that Ydígoras 
counted on since his election to the presidency in 1958.  Already dominated by 
conservative, anticommunist factions, the revolt in November 1960 had the effect of 
homogenizing the political outlook of the Army, although fissures remained between the 
cliques of aspiring officers and their loyal subordinates. Furthermore, the Guatemalan 
Armed Forces, as a whole, had generally remained aloof from the general public, 
especially in rural areas dominated by indigenous populations. Their most common form 
of contact had been the comisionado—provincial officers who rounded up conscripts and 
acted as informants to their commanding officers.258 The Alliance for Progress presented 
an opportunity for President Ydígoras to reward officers who supported him, improve 
military-civilian relations, and make headway into Kennedy’s developmental objectives 
through Civic Action programs 
 The Ydígoras government had encouraged the use of military resources for 
national development projects before Kennedy assumed the Office of the Presidency. On 
December 1, 1960, the Inter-American Defense Board had passed a resolution that 
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allowed the Guatemalan Army to engage in a number of civic duties.259 President 
Ydígoras personally supported the program, but only a few individual officers initially 
reached out to communities where they were stationed. The US Embassy in Guatemala 
quickly identified the burgeoning Civic Action programs as a conduit for Alliance for 
Progress projects. After launching an investigation, they concluded that the Guatemalan 
military, with proper organization and coordination, could administer and implement 
major public works projects and would reap major benefits.  
State Department planners had considerable goals for the Civic Action programs. 
Public outreach could greatly enhance the reputation of the military, and the government 
it represented, and as a result, military service would gain more prestige. Furthermore, 
US embassy staff noted that the Guatemalan military engaged in building “a better 
citizenship” where recruits would learn valuable skills through vocational training they 
could put to use after their enlistment.260 A testament to the aspirational tone of the 
Alliance for Progress, planners projected that even the cultural gulf between ladinos and 
indigenas could be spanned by officer-administrators who committed the men under their 
command to improving living conditions for residents, especially village leaders, in their 
region of operation. The Civic Action programs, driven by the cooperative, concerted, 
centralized efforts of the government and military could produce a profound 
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“psychological impact on local people [that] will be inescapable within one year” and, 
better still, was “easy to propagandize.”261 
 The Civic Action programs in Guatemala would be one of the most enduring 
aspects of the Alliance for Progress. The Guatemalan government and US State 
Department had a broad vision for the numerous areas where the military could intervene 
with Civic Action projects. Moreover, it seemed to offer something to all the parties 
involved. By doling out lucrative contracts for civil projects, President Ydígoras could 
curry favor with military officers and hopefully impress Washington with the results. The 
Kennedy administration could jumpstart the Alliance for Progress by piggybacking on 
the existing Civic Action program in Guatemala, while assuring themselves that the 
Guatemalan military was the most reliable vehicle for modernization in the country. 
Officers who participated in the program could expect increased earnings, prestige, and 
opportunities to advance their careers while improving the reputation of their cherished 
institution. Ostensibly, the people of Guatemala, especially the rural poor, were to be the 
greatest beneficiaries. The Guatemalan Army would march through the countryside and 
leave schools, hospitals, and housing in their wake as they built a road to the next village. 
The officers of the Guatemalan military already had a firm grip on the right to dispense 
death where they saw fit, and now, under the banner of the Alliance for Progress, they 
could now offer to improve the lives of those who proved loyal. In accumulating these 
responsibilities, Guatemala’s armed forces gained enormous power over any area 
benefitting from Civic Action.   
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Putting soldiers to work building schools, wells, and roads would not be enough 
to develop Guatemala into a robust capitalist democracy. While the Guatemalan economy 
had stabilized somewhat since the disarray that followed the 1954 coup, most 
Guatemalans were still crushed under poverty, hunger, and exploitative labor practices 
and land tenure. Taking a cue from Kennedy’s inaugural hints of sponsoring 
developmental projects in Latin America, Ydígoras announced in his New Year’s Eve 
radio address that his government would focus on economic recovery in 1961 by 
diversifying agricultural exports and industrial production while using funds previously 
granted by the Eisenhower administration to expand infrastructure and bring electricity to 
rural areas.262  
 The Guatemalan President was renowned for his bombast, but he immediately set 
out to achieve his promise to improve economic conditions with an ambitious legislative 
agenda. His administration introduced bills that would guarantee investments from 
private corporations and help Guatemala meet requirements for increased US aid. The 
two most significant, and politically dangerous, economic problems the Ydígoras 
administration sought to address were agrarian and tax reform. Debates over land rights 
and ownership had been at the core of Guatemala’s political upheavals, and President 
Ydígoras knew he had to walk a narrow path to avoid being maligned by both sides of 
this perennial issue. While he could not be described as visionary in his evaluation of 
Guatemala’s agrarian situation, Ydígoras recognized that an economy overwhelmingly 
based on a few cash crops whose prices were determined by a global market would never 
sustain stability. The 1954 coup made the possibility of expropriating land owned by 
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private individuals or corporations anathema, but Ydígoras reasoned that selling state-
owned lands to small-scale farmers and their families would improve the production of 
domestically consumed goods.  
 Since coming to office, Ydígoras strove to pass an income tax law for Guatemala. 
His efforts had met stiff resistance. In March 1960, the Ydígoras administration had 
introduced the Ley del Impuesto Sobre La Renta, a rather generous income tax law.263 It 
had languished in the Guatemalan Congress for over a year with little sign of passage. 
The Guatemalan government, however, desperately needed revenue to service 
outstanding debts, compensate an increasing backlog of unpaid government employees, 
and implement an increased salary scale for teachers in public institutions.    
 Despite the energy and ambition of Ydígoras’ legislation in 1961, it gained little 
traction in the legislative assembly. His efforts at land reform found opposition on both 
sides—conservatives saw it as state-redistribution while the left called for expanded 
expropriation and minimizing the amount campesinos would have to pay for their new 
land. By way of legislation, little was accomplished, but the Ydígoras administration did 
manage to redistribute some land. During his five years in office, the Ydígoras 
government granted over forty-five thousand campesinos land, although this was 
considerably fewer than those who received land under Arbenz, and even Castillo 
Armas.264 Resorting to executive orders, Ydígoras managed to ram through approval of a 
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salary increase for teachers, but the income tax law that would pay for it and other 
amenities remained dead in Congress. Worse still, Ydígoras’ renewed campaign to pass 
the income tax generated enormous opposition. A few years later, Ydígoras’ commitment 
to pushing the income tax law would set his downfall in motion, but in early 1961 his 
efforts spurred plots and protests that continued almost unabated throughout the 
remainder of his presidency. 
 Miguel Ydígoras earned a reputation as a skilled politician and this praise 
stemmed from his ability to divide his enemies rather than brokering compromises 
between opposing factions. Just as he was attempting to revive Guatemala’s income tax 
law, the Constitutional provision that had been passed during Castillo Armas’ presidency 
that had exiled many leftist leaders expired. Hoping to dilute the coherency of his 
opponents on the political left, Ydígoras replaced the strict provision with one that 
allowed political exiles to return. He believed that the return of former supporters of the 
Arbenz and Arévalo administrations would multiply factions on the left, rendering them 
incapable of mounting a serious political challenge. President Ydígoras undoubtedly 
expected that enacting such a law would provide more substance to his claims that he 
respected democratic values. If Kennedy wanted Latin American leaders to embody the 
principles of the Alliance for Progress, the old general would at least attempt to play the 
part.  
Repatriating political exiles and attempts at tax reform united Ydígoras’ rivals on 
the right and left in an unprecedented manner that would herald sustained protest 
movements and widespread opposition to the regime. The most vehement protestations 
came from a broad section of conservative Guatemalans. On the far-right, the Movimiento 
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Nacional Liberacion (MLN), a splinter party of the MDN that laid claim to the legacy of 
“the Liberator” Carlos Castillo Armas, led the charge against Ydígoras. They believed 
Ydígoras paved the way for the return of dangerous subversives that their slain leader, 
President Castillo Armas, had banished from the country because of their association 
with the communist party or the Arbenz and Arévalo administrations. It was opposition to 
the income tax law, however, that drew together the most powerful conservative coalition 
against the Ydígoras government.  
The Comité de Acción Económica y Social (CAES) brought together urban 
professionals, business elites, conservative students, and wealthy landowners who decried 
the income tax as a road to economic ruin and yet another way for the government to 
enrich itself at the expense of its citizens. On February 22, CAES ran advertisements in 
the major newspaper, Prensa Libre, which denounced Ydígoras as a corrupt dictator and 
lackey of foreign corporate interests. In order to save the country, CAES called for 
Guatemalans to take to the streets on February 28 in a show of united in opposition to the 
Ydígoras regime.265  
 Guatemala’s political left was generally hostile to Ydígoras and the 
counterrevolutionary conservatism that he represented. On the issue of land reform and 
taxation, however, the mainstream leftist parties did not have as severe a reaction to the 
legislative push as their conservative counterparts. Nevertheless, many wanted to 
capitalize on the chance to destabilize the Ydígoras government. When the crowd of four-
thousand angry protestors began to gather on February 28 in Parque Central in 
Guatemala City, many members of the Partido Revolucionario (PR) were among their 
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ranks. Initially, Guatemalan reporters marveled that such a gathering of extremist and 
moderates, both from the right and left, had come together to attack Ydígoras, but 
fighting soon broke out between the various factions and the rally dispersed.266  
The CAES and MLN protestors claimed that communists had subverted the rally, 
but President Ydígoras privately took credit for undermining the demonstrations. In a 
conversation with the former US ambassador, Lester Mallory, Ydígoras revealed that he 
had seeded the crowd with his own supporters who began agitating the crowd with cries 
of “Viva Castro!”267 They even managed to provoke members of the crowd into attacking 
the US embassy, who threw stones through several windows. Ydígoras was apparently 
quite pleased with himself, and reported that his furtive ploy had been successful in 
making those who opposed his tax and land reform look like Castro-sympathizers. Once 
again, Ydígoras had averted disaster by deftly turning his enemies against one another.  
Having momentarily disrupted his domestic opponents, Ydígoras quickly pivoted 
to the international stage to shore up further support for his regime abroad. Immediately 
after the demonstrations on February 28, President Ydígoras wrote to President Kennedy 
urging him to take immediate military action against Cuba. He reiterated his claims that 
Cuba was ultimately responsible for the November 13 officer uprising, but also labor 
strikes and the recent organized protests in Guatemala. “Castro has struck hard at 
Guatemala”, he informed his American counterpart, and that as “a military man” he had 
deduced that if Guatemala remained on the defensive, Castro-communists would 
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prevail.268 The time for offensive action against Cuba had arrived, but other Latin 
American countries hesitated to attack Castro “because they fear that communists will 
rise against them.”269 If Kennedy postponed the invasion of Cuba, the other countries of 
Latin America would “lose faith and hope in their liberation”, their governments would 
collapse, and Castro’s revolution would spread like a blight through the Western 
Hemisphere. Just as he had been an early anti-Castro crusader, Ydígoras boasted that by 
ending the November 13 revolt he had proven that such uprisings could be defeated. 
Ydígoras was keen to remind the young American president that he had “provided space 
in various parts of our national territory for the training of Cuban land and air forces” and 
facilitated numerous air raids from these bases to drop food, armaments, and 
propaganda.270 He concluded his missive with an assurance that his policies toward Cuba 
were in line with those Kennedy had professed on the campaign trail—on the matter of 
Castro’s Cuba there was a “necessity for prompt and conclusive action.”271 
In his memoirs, Ydígoras proudly pronounced his longstanding rivalry with 
Castro: 
“I fought Castro-communism from the outset and from the first days of 
1959 I was the victim of Fidel Castro’s aggression. I frustrated his 
invasion of Panama in March, 1959; I broke off relations with his 
government in April, 1960; I withstood two military uprisings inspired by 
his money and his agents; I operated with anti-Castro groups to train two 
thousand Cubans and launched them against the Soviet bastion in the 
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Caribbean…Perhaps no other Latin American President faced more, and 
unceasing danger.”272 
 
His animosity toward Castro notwithstanding, the Guatemalan President had other 
motivations for urgently pressing his case for immediate action against Cuba. President 
Ydígoras had paid a hefty political price for allowing Guatemala to become the staging 
ground for US operations against Castro and he hoped to reap additional rewards for the 
risks he endured for Washington’s machinations. If the new American President decided 
to scrap the operation, Ydígoras would have sacrificed a great deal with little to show for 
it. By emphasizing his role as the region’s farsighted guardian against Castro’s 
revolution, Ydígoras displayed his potential value to the Kennedy administration. He also 
needed the economic, political, and military support of the United States to endure 
domestic opposition. Although his government had survived a major military uprising, 
Ydígoras was surrounded by enemies. Kennedy clearly had a new vision for Latin 
America, and the “Old Fox” of Guatemala did not want to be swept aside. 
 The Alliance for Progress faced considerable hurdles even before its official 
implementation in Guatemala. The Kennedy administration lacked officials with 
experience with Latin America, and their broad plans for development and modernization 
did not always consider regional and local factors. In Guatemala, updated tax codes and 
agrarian reform measures met with stiff resistance from conservatives, and Ydigoras’ 
early attempt to align his policies with the Alliance for Progress generated public protests 
from the entire political spectrum. One area where developmental initiatives successfully 
gained traction was the Civic Action program. Controlled and implemented by the 
Guatemalan military, Civic Action granted ambitious officers another avenue to expand 
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their personal wealth, improve the reputation of the armed forces, and provide the 
military with another crucial access point to resources typically reserved for the civilian 
government. Within six years, the Alliance for Progress’ longest-lasting and most 
impactful program created an avenue for the militarization of Guatemalan society. 
  
Bay of Pigs: Countering Communism in Guatemala 
 
The impediments to the Alliance for Progress became magnified by the 
emergence of potential revolution in Guatemala. The Kennedy administration’s failure to 
oust Castro in the Bay of Pigs fueled anti-American sentiment in Guatemala and 
throughout Latin America. Opposition movements began to take up arms against the 
Ydigoras regime, and a fledgling guerrilla movement began to take shape. Causing 
further alarm, Juan Jose Arevalo, the first president of the Guatemalan Revolution, 
announced he would end his exile and return to Guatemalan politics.  These challenges 
encouraged the United States to look to the officer corps as their most valuable ally in 
Guatemala.  
On April 17, 1961, Kennedy granted President Ydígoras’ wish when his 
administration sent Brigade 2506, a paramilitary force of Cuban exiles, to secure the 
beachhead at Playa Giron within the Bay of Pigs. Dubbed “Operation Zapata”, it was one 
of the most embarrassing diplomatic and military blunders of the Cold War.  Kennedy 
had inherited the plan to invade Cuba from the Eisenhower administration. In fact, 
according to the research of Fursenko and Naftali, Eisenhower had cautioned Kennedy 
that the Soviets and their allies were on the offensive and that hemispheric security rested 
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on removing Castro from power.273 Hoping to win a clear victory and establish his 
credentials as a Cold Warrior, Kennedy moved ahead with Eisenhower’s operation.  
The invasion, modeled largely on the overthrow of the Arbenz government in 
Guatemala, did not enjoy the success of its predecessor. Historian Thomas Wright 
explains that Castro had anticipated an invasion, and built a two-hundred thousand man 
militia to support the regular army, and had arrested one-hundred thousand Cubans with 
questionable loyalty to prevent a potential uprising.274 On April 17, the fifteen-hundred 
strong force of CIA-trained exiles landed at the isolated bay and met heavy resistance. 
Faced with an unfolding disaster, Kennedy withheld vital air support to avoid the direct 
involvement of the United States. The invasion force became stranded along the beach as 
Cuba’s Soviet-made tanks and aircraft routed the would-be attackers and cut off their 
supply lines. Kennedy took personal responsibility for the botched mission and the 
humiliation significantly affected his administration’s work in Latin America.275 
Moreover, such an overt display of aggression by the United States against Cuba 
compounded the weaknesses and contradictions within the Kennedy administration’s 
plans for US-Latin American relations and critically undermined the goals of the Alliance 
for Progress. 
The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion dealt a serious blow to the United States. 
The small island nation defied the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere and proved that 
the power of the United States had limitations even within its sphere of influence. Fidel 
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Castro now had a unifying symbol to rally the Cuban people to his socialist revolution 
and his partnership with the Soviet Union became much stronger. Kennedy felt 
personally disgraced by the failed invasion, and the president waged a clandestine war 
against Cuba, utilizing sabotage, terrorism, and assassination, in an attempt to bring down 
Castro’s regime. The Kennedy administration became fixated on the need to prevent 
another Cuba, and this obsession shaped US policies in Guatemala for the remainder of 
the decade. 
Although Ydígoras had succeeded in turning protestors against each other in 
February, renewed demonstrations took place in response to the Bay of Pigs invasion and 
were proving more difficult to subdue. On April 18, the day after the invasion began, an 
angry mob supposedly led by communists, attacked the US chancery building, prompting 
the government to declare further demonstrations illegal. Many ignored the ban, but 
sustained protests failed to materialize after counter-demonstrators, likely organized by 
the government, fired on the crowd killing three.276 Ydígoras trucked in roughly two 
thousand pro-government peasants to support police numbers in an effort to quash further 
protests in Guatemala City. This proved to be a limited remedy and opposition to the 
Ydígoras government from the right and left continued apace. Student protests cropped 
up throughout the country, and when law students in Quetzaltenango burned Ydígoras in 
effigy, the Guatemalan president offered “to pay a one-way passage to Cuba for all who 
wanted to defend Castro” where such civil disobedience would be rewarded with a firing 
squad.277 
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While Ydígoras had obviously earned the enmity of Guatemalan leftists, 
conservatives were also growing increasingly concerned that the government failed to 
adequately protect the country from various communist threats. Some officers grumbled 
that Ydígoras needed to crack down on leftist opposition, lest Castro press his advantage. 
One concerned colonel, Antonio Batres, a commanding officer of the Air Force, 
ominously warned the US air attaché that the Guatemalan Armed Forces would use any 
means necessary to prevent communists from seizing power.278 It was neither the first, 
nor the last time officers within Ydígoras’ own military implied that they would remove 
their president if his actions could lead to communist influence over the government of 
Guatemala. 
 Indeed, before the year was over, Ydígoras foiled numerous coup plots, most of 
which incorporated one or more military officers of significant standing.  Across the 
political spectrum, retired and active officers, student leaders, union organizers, and 
police chiefs concocted schemes to rid themselves of the mutually despised president. 
Ydígoras attempted to rebuff claims he was soft on communism by ordering military 
exercises along the Guatemalan-Mexican border. Minister of Defense Enrique Peralta 
announced that the maneuvers were to dissuade the exiled Jacobo Arbenz and any of his 
supporters from attempting to enter Guatemala. Few, if any, disgruntled anticommunist 
found the show of force convincing. Even Mario Monterroso Armas, the nephew of the 
slain “liberator” President Carlos Castillo Armas, was implicated in an attempt to unseat 
Ydígoras.279 The US embassy reported that these right-wing plotters, which included two 
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army colonels, a major, the former chief of the national police, several congressional 
deputies, and a slew of enterprising civilians, intended to assassinate Ydígoras, distribute 
hidden weapons to their supporters, and seize Guatemala City.280 At least sixty people 
involved in the plot were arrested on July 11 as they arrived in the capital, and Ydígoras 
issued warrants for a further one-hundred fifty people suspected of playing a role in the 
thwarted coup.281 Although the jailed plotters plainly stated their purpose was to 
overthrow Ydígoras because of his leniency toward communists, the Guatemalan 
president returned to an old routine: he blamed Cuba. When the US embassy queried if 
the attack had originated from the extreme right or the extreme left, presidential aide 
Colonel Monzon replied, “neither, extreme ambition.”282 
 In the aftermath of this coup attempt, Ydígoras declared a state of siege and the 
Guatemalan Congress quickly ratified the decree. With expanded emergency powers and 
Guatemala’s security forces patrolling the streets, Ydígoras hoped to restore some order 
before the impending Congressional elections. For a time, this was relatively successful, 
and the conservative coalition of political parties that loosely supported Ydígoras secured 
a plurality (nearly 42%) in the Guatemalan legislature, likely through illicit means.283 
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There were large demonstrations protesting the elections as a sham, but nothing that 
seriously threatened the regime. By December, when the new American Ambassador, 
John O. Bell, arrived in Guatemala to assume his post, it seemed as though the Ydígoras 
administration might bring the country closer to meeting Alliance for Progress goals in 
1962. Yet, the Ydígoras government secured this stability through force and fraud; it 
would prove to be short-lived.   
Both the Kennedy and Ydígoras administrations feared that Guatemala was 
particularly susceptible to the lure of Castro’s revolution, especially after the Bay of Pigs 
debacle. Guatemala’s revolutionary recent-past perpetually threatened the legitimacy of 
the hardline anticommunist governments that followed the ouster of Arbenz. Guatemala’s 
major socioeconomic problems –the sharp racial, social, and economic divide between 
Ladino elites and the indigenous poor—had only become worse following the 1954 coup 
and provided fertile ground for communist propaganda. Opposition to the corrupt, 
authoritarian government was widespread across a broad section of Guatemalan society. 
Yet—with the exception of the November 13 rebellion in 1960—organized, armed, 
revolutionary opposition to the Ydígoras government had failed to materialize in any 
meaningful way. From their safehouses throughout Guatemala, several survivors of the 
ill-fated rebellion began to prepare for sustained conflict with the Guatemalan 
government and its patron, the United States. 
Two figures of renown stand out in the leadership of the emerging revolutionary 
guerrilla movements that coalesced in the aftermath of the officer revolt of 1960: Luis 
Augusto Turcios Lima and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. Both men were very young—
Turcios Lima being only nineteen at the time of the uprising, while Yon Sosa was merely 
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three years older—when they found themselves leading a revolution.284  The two 
lieutenants of the Guatemalan Army had excelled at Escuela Politécnica, the premier 
academy for military officers, and had received extensive training from US special 
forces. In the Panama Canal Zone, Yon Sosa  learned advanced counterinsurgency 
tactics, while Turcios Lima received US Army Ranger training and took courses on 
military intelligence from the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia285 
Following the collapse of the 1960 revolt, the rebel officers found refuge among the 
peasants of rural Guatemala, where they experienced a political awakening. Lieutenant 
Yon Sosa, who was particularly struck by the plight of the rural poor, believed his initial 
revolt had failed because “At the time the [MR-13 group] had no distinct ideology. That 
is why we talked with people on the right and left—anyone who was in agreement with 
toppling the Ydígoras government…[the rebellion] would not in the least have solved any 
of the urgent problems facing the Guatemalan masses, and surely the event would have 
passed into history as just another coup, very similar to one carried out later by Enrique 
Peralta Azurdia and his henchmen.”286 As they gathered their strength in hiding, the 
remaining rebel officers began to view Cuba, campesinos, and the communists who 
remained underground in Guatemala as their natural allies. 
While Lieutenant Turcios Lima favored partnership with the more traditionally-
oriented communist party, Yon Sosa gravitated toward the peasantry as the foundation of 
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revolutionary success. Nicknamed “El Chino” because his father was a Chinese 
merchant, Yon Sosa developed a decidedly more Maoist approach the revolutionary 
struggle in Guatemala. As he sought asylum in the aftermath of his failed revolt, Yon 
Sosa had been awestruck: 
“In the most difficult days for us…we felt very near the solidarity of those 
barefoot people dressed in rags who arrived in large numbers to make us presents 
of fruit, coffee, food, encouraging words, and even once in a while a five cent 
piece. This great experience that we lived through together with the attitudes of 
the Guatemalan peasants, who also provided us with food and showed us the best 
routes, guiding us to safe places, made us think seriously about that attitude and 
led us to the conclusion that these people behaved as they did because they were 
trying to win us over to their cause; they wanted leaders to lead their struggle.”287 
  
As the former officers faced mounting persecution from the military they once served, 
they became increasingly radicalized and determined to lead the Guatemalan masses into 
a protracted struggle for a more just society. 
 Lieutenants Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa had good reason to believe the rural poor 
of Guatemala would flock to their armed insurrection. Reportedly, while the rebel 
officers were in hiding after the government forces put down the revolt, over eight 
hundred campesinos came forward and pledged they would fight under their command 
against government forces. According to Adolfo Gilly, a Yon Sosa partisan and self-
appointed chronicler of his guerrilla band, at the time, the officers refused the assistance 
because they lacked the strategic, political, and economic resources to organize an 
uprising.288 Unable to find allies in Guatemala’s legal political entities, the emerging 
leaders of the insurgency turned to the Partido Guatemalteco Trabajo (PGT), the 
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Communist Party of Guatemala. Formed in 1949, the latter days of the Arévalo 
presidency, the party was legalized by Jacobo Arbenz and became a significant political 
contender during his tenure in office—a fact often touted by Eisenhower administration 
officials to justify the 1954 intervention. The US-backed Castillo Armas government 
swiftly declared the PGT illegal and it returned to its underground operations. The PGT 
championed electoral politics as its preferred method of bringing about a socialist 
revolution –focusing on strengthening unions and agrarian reform. Now locked out of 
legitimate political participation, the PGT began to shift toward a more radical 
revolutionary model. In 1960, the year of the Guatemalan officers rose in revolt, the PGT 
endorsed “all forms of struggle” at its annual Congress.289  
While Yon Sosa looked to the peasantry as a source of revolutionary strength, 
Turcios Lima worked to align the rebel forces with the more urbane politicians of the 
PGT. In July 1961, Turcios Lima met with PGT leaders and determined “they were 
different from the others…they really cared about the people,” and he began to negotiate 
an alliance between his forces and the communist party.290 Richard Gott, a prominent 
historian of Latin American guerrilla movements, argues that at this time, the PGT did 
not dominate or control the actions of what would come to be known as the MR-13 front. 
He cites the guerrilla leader, Camilo Sanchez, who claimed the initial rebels included 
“sincere revolutionaries, Catholics, Communists, and people whose only aspiration was 
to overthrow the regime in order to replace it by something more equitable.”291 Gott is 
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certainly correct that the coalition of forces that opposed the government were far from 
homogenous, a fact that would later lead to fragmentation. In the early years of the 1960s, 
however, these parties would find common ground in their mutual desire to end the 
Ydígoras presidency and they would jointly sanction revolutionary violence as the means 
to secure this end.  
Just as Turcios Lima made terms with the PGT, the national police captured 
Alejandro de Leon, an original leading member of the officers’ uprising. To this point, 
security forces had treated the rebellious officers with irritated apathy, especially because 
Guatemalan military culture discouraged outside interference with what it viewed as 
internal discipline issues and officers were reluctant to punish their former brothers-in-
arms.292 This changed abruptly when Chief of Police Ranulfo Gonzalez Ovalle 
summarily executed Alejandro de Leon shortly after his capture. Reflecting on the event, 
Adolfo Gilly remarked that “The shock produced by the death of Alejandro de 
Leon…acted as a powerful stimulus in leading the movement to put an end to its 
negotiations with the opposition parties and to decide to launch guerrilla warfare.”293 In 
August, Yon Sosa, Turcios Lima, and their subordinates officially designated their armed 
struggle the Movimiento Revolucionario de Noviembre (MR-13), wedding the initial 
officer revolt to the new revolutionary movement. They remained in alliance with the 
PGT, but largely separated from the world of “bourgeois politicians and took to the hills” 
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of the Izabal department to begin the armed struggle in earnest.294 Although there 
remained a clear distinction between the politician and the guerrilla, the PGT adopted a 
more pronounced and radical agenda in solidarity with their armed comrades. After the 
official creation of the MR-13, the Central Committee of the PGT passed a special 
resolution that defined armed struggle as the chosen path of the Guatemalan 
Revolution.295 The PGT and MR-13 guerrillas would continue to have a separate, but 
symbiotic relationship. In the following years, the guerrilla leaders became more deeply 
enmeshed in Marxist ideology and traveled to Cuba to bolster the training they had 
received from the United States. Similarly, the PGT would soon develop its own armed-
wing and join the MR-13 guerrillas in their assault on government forces. 
All three groups, the former military officers, the downtrodden peasants, and the 
communist politicians had been hesitant to embrace armed struggle, having experienced 
major defeats and setbacks in the counterrevolutionary period, but the failure of the Bay 
of Pigs invasion established that the United States and its clients in Latin America were 
not invulnerable. They could be resisted, even defeated, by dedicated revolutionaries and 
inspired leadership. Guatemala’s revolution predated Cuba’s, and Castro had learned 
valuable lessons from its defeat and dismantling by the CIA and its proxies. Castro’s 
success in repelling the Bay of Pigs invasion applied these lessons and proved 
revolutionary governments in Latin America could successfully defend themselves 
against US-backed invasions. Armed with this knowledge and a renewed faith in the 
inevitability of communist victory, many discontented Guatemalans began to believe they 
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could restore their revolutionary past. While the governments of Guatemalan and the 
United States fretted over Cuban infiltration, a native-born guerrilla movement was 
taking root. 
* * * 
For the moment, neither Ydígoras nor US officials were greatly troubled about 
rebel officers, angry peasants, or clandestine political parties. The powers-that-be 
reasoned the most likely source of communist revolution would come from without—
Cuban infiltrators sewing domestic discontent—and from within—rival contenders for 
the office of the president. Fending off political rivals from all sides was nothing new to 
Ydígoras, a man who had risen to power by pitting his many enemies against one 
another. Although these perennial plotters perturbed US officials, one particular politician 
caused increasing concern: former president Juan José Arévalo. 
 Following the coup that removed President Arbenz from office in 1954, Arévalo, 
his predecessor, had traveled throughout Latin America, but had not returned to his native 
Guatemala. The first president of the Guatemalan Revolution had resumed his academic 
career, writing scathing, albeit meandering, indictments of US foreign policy. His most 
notable work, Fabula del tiburon y las sardinas (Fable of the Shark and the Sardines) 
lambasted Yanqui economic imperialism and condemned the United Fruit Company, the 
CIA, and John Foster Dulles, among many others. Despite his loud opposition to past 
actions of the United States and its corporate entities, Arévalo also distanced himself 
from his more radical successor, the deposed Jacobo Arbenz. He widely praised John F. 
Kennedy and the Alliance for Progress. Moreover, in 1961, he condemned Fidel Castro 
and repeatedly disavowed communism and the choices made by Arbenz, his former 
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friend and chosen heir.296 Arévalo explained his shifting opinion of the United States by 
proclaiming, “There has been a changing of the guard. The dinosaurs have been defeated, 
and the Great Republic is ruled by new men—men who studied at Harvard.”297 
Regardless of the praise he heaped on Kennedy and his programs, most members of the 
administration viewed Arévalo as dangerous for US interests in Guatemala. Many agreed 
that although he might not be a communist, Arévalo’s fierce nationalism and his 
relationship with Arbenz tainted the former president. After all, at the onset of his 
struggle against Batista, several US officials had once viewed Castro as essentially a 
nationalist.  As a result of this miscalculation, the Cuban Revolution had successfully 
defeated a US-backed invasion and now stood poised to export communism throughout 
the Western Hemisphere. 
In the closing months of 1961, despite numerous challenges, the strength and 
stability of the Ydígoras government reached its peak. It had crushed a military rebellion, 
coup attempts, and protest movements while managing to cobble together a political 
alliance that, in theory, had the power to enact Ydígoras’ legislative agenda. While 
support from the US remained tepid, the Guatemalan president had reason to believe that 
he had rightly earned the grudging support from the Kennedy administration for his 
steadfast commitment to destroying Fidel Castro and his revolution. While his 
authoritarian streak and notoriety for corruption failed to mesh with the ideals of the 
Alliance for Progress, President Ydígoras fought hard to bring Guatemala in line with the 
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economic goals of the program and his regime could claim that it adhered to the norms of 
a democratic society, with some notable exceptions.298 Just before his political coalition 
took control of the Guatemalan Congress and pushed the Ydígoras administration to its 
apex, former president Juan José Arévalo definitively ended the rumors that swirled 
around his political future by announcing he would soon return to Guatemala to run in the 
1963 presidential election. Arévalo’s presidential pronouncement marked the beginning 
of the precipitous decline of the Ydígoras administration. 
 In late November 1961, major newspapers El Imparcial and La Hora published 
an interview with Arévalo conducted by the Mexican reporter, Armando Fischer.299 After 
months of suspense, Arévalo declared, “I will return to Guatemala in a political capacity 
at the insistence of the Arevalistas. I will return as a leader of the popular forces…My 
only desire is that the Presidential candidacy fall in the hands of a Guatemalan who is 
intimately a friend of the popular masses and who respects the law…I will resolve to do 
what the people of Guatemala wish.”300 Notably, Arévalo did not take the opportunity to 
mend fences with the United States. He repeatedly proclaimed he was not a communist 
and attempted to distance himself from Arbenz, yet he also noted, “I am against the 
Communists although this does not say that I am anti-Communists.”301 Further fueling 
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fears of the Kennedy administration, when asked his view on capitalism, Arévalo replied, 
“Capitalism as a monstrous accumulation of money is a sickness which can be cured 
easily in a country without the necessity of destroying democracy. The normal 
democratic system supposes the legitimacy of private property conditioned solely by its 
social utility”.302 The ex-president also maligned the US State Department, the United 
Fruit Company, and remarked that unless the Kennedy administration amended its 
policies, the Alliance for Progress should rightfully be named “El Alianza para el 
Progresso para el Estados Unidos” (The Alliance for Progress for/of the United 
States).303 For all of his issues with the United States, Arévalo also repeatedly repudiated 
Fidel Castro for aligning the Cuban Revolution with international communism, which 
had “prostituted the revolution and betrayed popular ideas.”304 If elected president, 
Arévalo would affirm Guatemala’s national sovereignty, break relations with dictators in 
Latin America, and establish “an absolute alliance with the democratic powers.”305 When 
asked his opinion on the Ydígoras administration, Arévalo showed surprise restraint for a 
man so practiced in rhetorical ornamentation. He flatly replied, “For me it is a 
constitutional government freely elected by the people of Guatemala and it has the right 
to live through its period of six years.”306 Unsurprisingly, neither the Kennedy nor the 
Ydígoras administrations found comfort in Arévalo’s sensational announcement.        
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       The Kennedy administration failed to remove Castro and it could not afford to risk 
other Latin American countries following the Cuban example. Now more than ever, the 
reformist leaders of Latin America seemed to be a potential threat. Historian Stephen 
Rabe notes that Juan Jose Arévalo, along with his Argentinian and Brazilian 
contemporaries, Arturo Frondizi and Joao Goulart, respected constitutional processes and 
supported the Alliance for Progress.307 Nonetheless, the Cuban victory at the Bay of Pigs 
solidified the United States’ hostility toward leftist reform and recast potential allies of 
the Alliance for Progress as subversive agents of the Soviet Union. 
 New challenges arose that further hampered the governments of the United States 
and Guatemala from adhering to the ideals of the Alliance for Progress. The successful 
defense of the Cuban Revolution against the Bay of Pigs invasion hardened the 
Kennedy’s outlook on Latin America and his administration would increasingly look to 
anticommunist hardliners in the Guatemalan military to maintain the status quo. While 
Ydigoras and Kennedy fretted over Castro’s growing influence, an insurgency was taking 
root within Guatemala, led by the remnants of the officer revolt of 1960. In this tense 
political atmosphere, former Guatemalan president Juan Jose Arévalo announced he 
would return from exile to run in the next presidential election. The United States would 
have viewed Arevalo suspiciously on any account due to his past, but within the context 
of the Bay of Pigs and the emergence of armed opposition within Guatemala, the former 
president appeared as a likely conduit for communist subversion. The Guatemalan Armed 
Forces used the threat of Castro, Arevalo, and the fledgling guerrilla movement to portray 
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themselves as a bastion of anticommunism that could help the United States stem the 
rising red tide.  
 
The New Ambassador: Kennedy’s Man in Guatemala 
 
John O. Bell drove down the Inter-American highway to assume his position as 
Ambassador to Guatemala in December of 1961. Becoming ambassador was his most 
prominent achievement in a rapid climb through the State Department bureaucracy. The 
problems that plagued Guatemala would prove far different from those he faced on his 
previous assignment in Copenhagen, but the ambassador embraced a broad, if not fully 
developed, Cold War policy that could be applied in Latin America as well as Western 
Europe: preventing the spread communism at all costs. In Guatemala, Bell established the 
primacy of this overriding goal in his earliest reports, and though he felt that the Red 
Menace had to be defeated in the political, social, and economic arenas, he relied on 
fostering a close ties between the United States and the Guatemalan military in building a 
strong US-Guatemalan relationship. 
John Bell began a lifelong career in government service in 1928 at the age of 
sixteen. Initially a messenger boy for the Agriculture Department, Bell became a clerk 
after two years, while attending night classes at George Washington University. Bell then 
learned that the State Department was offering an entry position that paid twenty dollars 
more a month than he was making.308 He took the job as a clerk, but quickly advanced to 
the Passport Office, where he continued to work through the decade as he finished his 
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bachelor’s and law degrees. The young Bell displayed a strong work ethic and a drive for 
professional advancement that characterized his life in government service. 
 At the outset of the Second World War in Europe, Bell spent most of his time 
preventing German and Spanish communists from entering the United States.309 Bell 
worked on a new initiative to “replace all passports in existence” with redesigned 
documents that were difficult to forge because of a growing fear that foreign agents could 
easily produce counterfeits.310 When the United States entered the war, Bell shifted to the 
Aviation Division where he continued to build his career and developed a sense of 
admiration for the nascent United States Air Force.      
After the war, Bell, now a self-declared “State Department man,” took advantage 
of the National War College’s invitation to Foreign Service personnel to attend classes at 
Fort McNair in Washington D.C.311 From 1946 to 1948, Bell acquired international 
management skills while attending lectures from General Leslie Groves, Robert 
Oppenheimer, and Dwight Eisenhower.312 His time at the National War College was a 
period of immense personal growth, and he acquired a lasting respect for the intellectual 
prowess of the top brass of the US military. Bell returned to the State Department in late 
1948, receiving his first foreign posting with the European Division. 
Stationed in Copenhagen, Bell began to climb the ladder of the State 
Department’s bureaucracy with almost annual promotions between 1948 and 1954. An 
emerging Cold Warrior, Bell believed that the United States had irresponsibly 
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demobilized in Europe at the end of World War II because “the concept of the Russians 
as enemies hadn’t really percolated thoroughly.”313  Though Bell had concerns about 
European security, he was not entirely hawkish. He disapproved of missile deployments 
in Greece and Turkey in 1953 because he believed they would be an unnecessary 
provocation of the Soviets that would not reap long-term strategic dividends.314  He also 
convinced Dean Acheson to oppose military support for Dutch efforts at reestablishing 
colonial rule in Indonesia.315 Reflecting later on the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the rapid 
expansion of America’s global power, Bell felt that his years in Europe were “the golden 
age of American foreign policy.”316 In European matters, Bell was comfortable with the 
approach favoring patient containment espoused by George Kennan over aggressive 
confrontation with the Soviets.  
After a brief assignment in Washington D.C., Bell became Deputy Chief of 
Mission to Pakistan in 1955. Although he had no experience in Middle Eastern affairs, 
his growing reputation within the State Department made him a key figure in John Foster 
Dulles’s plan to “build a wall against Sino-Soviet Imperialism.”317 Bell claimed that the 
greatest difficulty he had in Pakistan was cultural adjustment: he compared the 
“sophistication” of the Dutch with the “primitiveness” of the Pakistanis. In a country of 
“80-some million,” he stated, “there were perhaps 2,500 who were politically 
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articulate.”318 These observations smacked of ethnocentrism, or at least, extreme cultural 
insensitivity. It is clear, in any event, that the assignment was not to Bell’s liking.  
 During the two years he served in Pakistan, Bell was rarely content with the 
situation. He believed that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was attempting to 
transplant the Marshall Plan to underdeveloped countries, but that fostering economic 
recovery in Europe was not the same thing as developing a modern economy in the Third 
World.319 Bell did not, however, offer a viable alternative.  Bell’s discontent in Pakistan 
shaped his worldview as much as his time in Europe. He learned that developing nations 
required something more than piles of money to protect themselves from communism, 
and he linked this observation with a demeaning attitude toward the inhabitants of the 
Third World. These prejudices would follow him to his post in Guatemala. 
In 1957, Bell took the first opportunity to leave Pakistan and returned to 
Washington D.C. He became the International Regional Director for Near East and South 
Asia.320 Bell also cultivated political connections with an eye on the 1960 election. At 
this point, most of Bell’s work for the State Department consisted of facilitating 
international aid, and he quickly gained the confidence of Kennedy’s man in charge of 
consolidating America’s foreign-aid agencies into the Agency for International 
Development (USAID), George Ball.  After Kennedy’s election, he was asked if he was 
interested in becoming Under Secretary of Administration. Bell rejected the offer 
because, as he later put it, the Kennedy team wanted him to help “clean out the State 
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Department and get rid of all the dumb jerks.”321 Against the advice of George Ball and 
Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, Bell told Kennedy that the USAID program did 
not need reorganization. Bell suggested that all that was needed was “two good men for 
each country in Washington and two good men for each country abroad” for a total of 
over six hundred able and honest Foreign Service personnel.322 Kennedy retorted, “Hell, 
that’s more good men than I’ll get in the whole administration.”323 Despite his occasional 
sparring sessions with the president’s advisers, Bell collaborated with the Kennedy team 
in writing up a legislative proposal for the reorganization of foreign aid offices, which 
passed as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 
The passage of the Foreign Assistance Act earned Bell some powerful new allies 
in Washington. Bell caught the attention of his former law professor, Senator J. William 
Fulbright, who was impressed by Bell’s work on foreign aid and spoke highly of him, 
boosting his status in the State Department. A few months after the Foreign Assistance 
Act passed, Bell received several promising offers. John Galbraith, Ambassador to India, 
wanted Bell as Deputy Chief of Mission. Chester Bowles made a pitch for Bell in Iran.324 
Ultimately, Bell turned both offers down citing financial reasons and a desire to remain 
relatively close to his family. Instead, he chose a posting as ambassador to Guatemala. 
In thirty-three years of government service, Bell proved to be a capable, dedicated 
diplomat with respectable anticommunist credentials. Although Bell voiced his 
disagreements with various policies of three presidential administrations, he preferred to 
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follow prevailing trends in Cold War thought. Like many US officials, he believed that 
winning the Cold War necessitated a brand of anticommunism where economic and 
political strategies played a supporting role to a show of military strength. Despite his 
commitment to the State Department’s goals, Bell lacked a clear, distinctive vision of 
anticommunism beyond defeating what he had been told was a rival, destructive 
ideology. Bell was a State Department man, but within that context, a career man. His 
previous assignments did not require a nuanced approach to communism, but Guatemala 
presented an unfamiliar and volatile situation that demanded immediate, effective 
response. It was Bell’s job to prevent communists from gaining influence in Guatemala, 
and so he committed to that goal with little strategic thinking beyond the conviction that 
his course was correct. 
When John Bell chose Guatemala, he was granted the ambassadorship on the 
condition that he drive to his new office to emphasize the importance of completing the 
missing link of the Inter-American highway in Guatemala.325 After driving through forty 
miles of dusty country roads without air conditioning, the new ambassador was surprised 
when the mayor of Huehuetenango greeted him at the border with a party of local 
dignitaries. Wearing old clothes that were stained by sweat and “oozing dust”, Bell 
attended a reception where he gave his first speech in broken Spanish. He joked that he 
was probably “the dirtiest ambassador they had ever seen.”326  
  Bell arrived at the United States embassy in Guatemala City at the end of 
December, 1961. Guatemalan politics were experiencing a period of heightened tension 
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and turbulence at the time and the US diplomatic mission faced numerous challenges. 
While President Ydígoras initially proved to be a moderately effective ally for the United 
States in Guatemala due to his pragmatism, lack of ideological convictions, and singular 
devotion to his own survival, support for his regime was fading fast.327 Reminiscent of 
the dictators that ruled Guatemala before the Revolution of 1944, Ydígoras and his 
sycophants plundered public coffers and blamed ever-elusive communists for the 
country’s problems. The United States found Ydígoras’ claims of a communist threat 
credible—particularly after a large contingent of military officers and cadets rebelled 
against government in 1960—and supported the Guatemalan president despite Kennedy’s 
anti-dictatorial proclamations. As his tenure in office continued, however, the corruption 
and cronyism within his regime inspired popular protests and a revolt within his own 
military. Although the Ydígoras administration survived the attempted overthrow in 
1960, many rebel officers fled to the countryside to continue their fight against the 
government. It was the beginning of Guatemala’s thirty-six year civil war. By the time 
Ambassador Bell assumed control of his post, the Ydígoras administration was becoming 
more of a liability than an asset to the United States. 
 At a highpoint in a career marked by regular promotion, Bell came to Guatemala 
determined to succeed. The new ambassador observed that most Guatemalan institutions 
were weak, corrupt, and lacked popular support. Governmental agencies, including the 
presidency, were more practiced in graft and repression than public administration. 
President Ydígoras exemplified the dysfunctional state, and Bell predicted that the 
president would not finish his term in office—a self-fulfilling prophecy the ambassador 
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would help come to fruition.328 The unpopularity of the Ydígoras administration resulted 
in sharp political divisiveness, which led Bell to a conclusion that mirrored his 
assessment of the US efforts in the Middle East: “a developmental program is probably 
impossible.” 329 Compounding his rote dismissal of Guatemala’s capacity for 
development, Bell saw communist agitators behind every public protest and student 
demonstration, and stated that they had enjoyed a “splendid year” as anticommunists 
divided and formed opposition groups against Ydígoras throughout 1961.330 Ignoring the 
genuine social and political concerns that the opposition, both communist and 
anticommunist, may have had, Bell claimed that these groups believed Ydígoras had 
“exceeded the bounds of permissible graft” and was not sharing the spoils beyond his 
“sycophants and fellow grafters.”331 Even if Alliance for Progress initiatives were 
attempted, Bell feared that the funding would not leave the hands of Guatemalan 
administrators loyal to Ydígoras. Above all, Guatemala needed stability in order to 
overcome the challenge of communism and the perpetual plots and problems of the 
Ydígoras administration failed to impress the new ambassador from the United States. 
Bell exempted the Guatemalan military from his criticism of the country’s 
leadership. The ambassador complained that the mission he inherited lacked information 
on the aspirations and attitudes of military officers and that the embassy needed to foster 
a closer relationship with what he believed were the natural allies of the United States. 
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The Guatemalan military was vehemently anticommunist, and Bell speculated, “in all 
likelihood there are less crass motivations also present among the military, such as 
devotion to constitutional government, [and] intellectual conviction as to the merits of 
democracy.”332 Unwilling to rely on the civilian government, doubtful of the prospects 
for development, and threatened by domestic and international subversion, only the 
Guatemalan military could establish the order necessary for Bell’s anticommunist vision. 
In his earliest cables to Washington, Bell favored the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
as the most effective partner for advancing US interests in the region. He petitioned 
Washington relentlessly to support the Guatemalan military. On February 9, 1962, he 
urged the State Department to expedite shipments of F-51 Mustang fighter planes to 
reinforce the Guatemalan Air Force.333 On the following day, while asserting that there 
was no evidence that Guatemala was in immediate danger of being overthrown by force, 
he emphasized that the army had an immediate need for communications equipment and 
T-33 jet fighters.334 Though he viewed the remnants of the 1960 rebellion as little more 
than a nuisance, Bell believed there was a high probability that they would follow the 
Cuban example and begin protracted guerilla warfare in the countryside. Aiding the 
Guatemalan military in its efforts to eliminate the potential guerilla threat was an absolute 
necessity because “the US has nothing to gain and much to lose by [the] success [of ] 
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rebel elements.”335 For Bell, military aid served a dual purpose of building a relationship 
with the armed forces while safeguarding the country against the fledgling insurgency. 
Along with his advocacy of a military buildup, Bell devoted his efforts to 
preventing, at any cost, a communist seizure of power. The Cuban Revolution, and the 
subsequent failure of the US invasion at the Bay of Pigs, gave a new urgency to 
maintaining US hegemony in Latin America, and Bell was not unusual in his enthusiastic 
red-hunting. He scoured intelligence briefs and after-action reports on guerilla operations 
seeking a clear Cuban connection. Both the Guatemalan Army’s intelligence units and 
the American ambassador sought to link Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, a prominent member 
of the 1960 military uprising and guerilla leader of growing acclaim, to Castro. In the 
Zacapa department, an MR-13 raiding unit, allegedly commanded by Yon Sosa, stole a 
company payroll totaling some 18,000 quetzales (roughly $2,100) from a United Fruit 
office on the same day that Guatemalan Army units were ambushed by a second group of 
MR-13 insurgents fifty miles from Guatemala City. Bell reported that the G-2, 
Guatemala’s military intelligence division, believed that Fidel Castro had coordinated 
these attacks with Yon Sosa. The G-2 informed its US contacts to expect a massive strike 
on Guatemalan soil from Cuban MIG jets.336 Unsurprisingly, this aerial assault never 
materialized. The warning from the G-2 seems less convincing today, but Bell found the 
threat credible enough to report to the Secretary of State. The Kennedy administration 
would not tolerate another Cuba, and every US official understood that presiding over 
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such a setback would likely end their career. To both fulfill his duties and preserve his 
profession, Bell’s pursued any potential communist threat without hesitation. 
Despite their considerable efforts, neither the US embassy nor the G-2 could find 
solid evidence of an elaborate communist conspiracy in Guatemala. In fact, the purges 
and arrests of suspected communists during the Castillo Armas and Ydígoras years had 
brought the Communist Party (PGT) and affiliated organizations to a nadir point at the 
turn of the decade. This hardly hampered Bell, whose militant solutions to Guatemala’s 
communist problem found a new avenue. The persistent rumors that Juan José Arévalo, 
the former president and popular reformer, planned to return to Guatemala to campaign 
for the 1963 presidential election became a fact the month before Ambassador Bell 
arrived in Guatemala. Now the ambassador confronted a mission of significance. 
Conflating Arévalo’s reformism with Castro’s radicalism, Bell dedicated the next two 
years to doing everything within his power to ensure that Arévalo would not become the 
president of Guatemala. 
During Kennedy’s administration, Guatemala again became a harbinger of US-
policy in Latin America. Ambassador John Bell immediately decided Arévalo 
represented a threat that United States could not tolerate even though a majority of 
Guatemalans apparently wanted him to return to the presidency.337 Ignoring the former 
president’s repeated avowals of anticommunism, Bell preferred a military seizure of 
power over the risk of letting the popular reformist return to governance. Though Bell 
conceded that civilian leaders were preferable to a military regime, he doubted whether it 
would be possible to find a Guatemalan politician suitable for US interests who could 
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also defeat Arévalo in a fair election. As a result, Ambassador Bell began to direct US 
policy in Guatemala to make collaboration with the military leadership more palatable. 
His most significant contribution to US policy was to establish that the “primary and 
overriding objective of US policy in Guatemala should be to prevent it from becoming a 
Communist State.”338 He would use the Alliance for Progress and its initiatives—
particularly Civic Action programs—to see this accomplished. While this goal was not 
unusual for Cold War policy in Latin America, Bell specifically pushed for the primacy 
of anticommunism over genuine political or economic development. Moreover, he 
believed the Guatemalan military was the only organization capable of achieving these 
ends. The result was antithetical to what Kennedy had promised with the Alliance for 
Progress: a repressive military regime that rejected democracy and the rule of law.  
 
Presidency under Pressure: The Spring Protests and the Revival of the Revolution 
 
Domestic unrest proliferated in Guatemala City and exposed the weakness and 
instability of the Ydigoras government. When guerrilla movements joined the fray, 
Guatemala seemed to teeter on the edge of revolution. Unable to defend his government 
from its own people, Ydigoras’ attempts to preserve his presidency only reinforced the 
notion that his civilian government was inept and that the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
stood as the most reliable partner for the United States in the country. Fearing that 
Guatemala was about to become the next Cuba, the Kennedy administration quickly 
abandoned its pledges of nonintervention and prepared to invade Guatemala.  
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When President Ydígoras extended a warm welcome to John Bell, he had much 
larger concerns than the proclivities of the new ambassador from the United States. After 
months of tense bargaining, Ydígoras successfully aligned his Redencion (RDN) party 
with other center-right blocs and retained a legislative majority, likely through electoral 
fraud, in the 1962 congressional elections.339 Despite this win, Ydígoras still faced stiff 
resistance against desperately needed tax reform. Even more troubling was a marked 
increase in public protests.  
Protests over the December congressional elections had carried over into the new 
year and showed signs of dramatic escalation. Bombs began to explode throughout 
Guatemala City. On January 24, Ranulfo Gonzalez Ovalle, the chief of the Judicial 
Police, was assassinated, allegedly an act of revenge by Yon Sosa for the death of one of 
his fellow rebel officers, Major Alejandro de Leon.340 From their initial stronghold in the 
Sierra de las Minas, in the Izabel department, MR-13 issued its opening manifesto: 
“Democracy vanished from our country long ago. No people can live in a country 
where there is no democracy. That is why the demand for changes is mounting in 
our country. We can no longer carry on in this way. We must overthrow the 
Ydígoras government and set up a government which respects human rights, 
seeks ways and means to save our country from its hardships, and pursues a 
serious self-respecting foreign policy.”341 
 
The statement lacked any direct link with Castro, communism, or even revolution and 
seemed to align with democratic nationalism. The actions of the MR-13 would prove 
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more evocative than their rhetoric.  Less than two-weeks later, a squad of insurgents, 
once again allegedly under Yon Sosa’s command, coordinated several attacks and stole 
the payroll from United Fruit Company offices, sending Ambassador Bell and the 
Guatemalan Intelligence Services on the aforementioned frenzied and fruitless search for 
a connection between the guerrilla raids and an imagined Cuban invasion force that never 
showed up. Later that month, on February 27, a guerrilla commando unit seized control 
of Radio Mariscos and called upon the Guatemalan Army to rise up and overturn the 
government.342 While these hostile actions had little effect on the Ydígoras regime, these 
early battles heralded a prolonged insurgency that spanned four decades. The Guatemalan 
Civil War had begun in earnest.  
At first, President Ydígoras showed little concern for the emerging insurgency. A 
far cry from Ambassador Bell’s dire forecast of an impending Cuban invasion, Ydígoras 
retorted that he was more troubled by the international price of coffee than by the rebel 
attacks.343 Despite his apparent lack of caution, Ydígoras declared another state of siege, 
censored and shut down radio stations, and sent his soldiers on an unsuccessful hunt for 
the guerrillas.  From a military standpoint, Ydígoras, a retired general, was correct that 
the group of roughly one hundred insurgents posed no direct threat to the Guatemalan 
government and its powerful military. Yet, because the regime already struggled to 
manage the major social, political, and economic pressures Guatemala already faced, 
these attacks caused existing fissures to crack and threatened to shatter the Ydígoras 
presidency.  
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The opening of the new congress on March 1, 1962 should have been a 
celebratory moment for Ydígoras and the powerful coalition he had recently cobbled 
together in the Guatemalan legislature. Instead, it marked the beginning of the largest 
public protests since the triumphant days of the Guatemalan Revolution. As in 1944, it 
began with the students.  
In his memoirs, Ydigors remembered well the day that one hundred university 
students, members of the Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios (AEU), dressed in 
mourning black, marched in a procession to the doors of the National Congress where 
they laid a huge funerary wreath–symbolizing “the death of legality in Guatemala” 
resulting from the recent congressional elections.344 They demanded that Ydígoras must 
immediately disband the Congress and call for new elections. The following day the 
secondary-school counterpart of the AEU, the Frente Unida Estudiantil Guatemalteco 
(FUEGO) joined in the protest and marched on the British Embassy before convening in 
the Central Plaza of Guatemala City. Soon after, the teachers union, the Frente Unida de 
Magisterio Nacional (FUMN), joined with the student protestors and on March 6, the 
AEU and their allies called for a general strike for all academic personnel employed by 
the government. The Minister of Government, Luis Gonzalez Batres, declared the 
demonstrations illegal and that they would be put down promptly, but the majority of 
universities and secondary schools closed down for the strike.345 More importantly, the 
success of the strike emboldened workers in other sectors who began to support, and even 
join, the students in the streets.  
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Initially, the Guatemalan press reacted negatively to the student protests. As the 
demonstrations continued into March, the number of violent and dangerous incidents 
increased rapidly. Bombs continued to explode throughout the city and there were several 
exchanges of gunfire. On at least two occasions, journalists from the major newspapers 
El Imparcial and Prensa Libre were injured while trying to cover the protests. As a 
result, the papers chastised the student movement and lamented that communists and 
unscrupulous politicians had manipulated school-children into becoming their “shock 
troopers.”346 Ambassador Bell wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk claiming that the 
general public had “widespread apathy and disgust [for] student shenanigans” and that 
“unless [the] starch was taken out [of the] demonstrators by government’s action today, 
[the] situation could appreciably worsen encouraging plotters.”347   
The American ambassador proved correct and the situation spiraled out of the 
Ydígoras administration’s control as the strike grew exponentially.  The AEU, having 
gathered momentum from their success, declared a general strike for the thirteenth of 
March. The following day the most powerful union in Guatemala, el Sindicato de Accion 
y Mejoramiento Ferrocarrilero (SAMF) sent the railroad workers to join in solidarity 
with the student protests in Guatemala City. The masses of striking workers, teachers, 
and students filled the main arteries of the capital, blocked the urban workforce from the 
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central train station, and engaged in sporadic shootouts with police forces. The US 
embassy estimated that at least thirty people had been shot in the day’s events.348 
President Ydígoras hoped he could rely on his personal political acumen to 
smooth over rising tension, and against the objections of his retainers, conducted an 
audiencia publica in the midst of striking SAMF workers without personal protection.349 
He listened to the gathering of protestors and agreed to meet with their leaders, but 
concluded these talks by promising that he would use the Army, supplemented by loyal 
peasants, to end the strikes. The protesters were, unsurprisingly, displeased with 
Ydígoras’ reaction and refused to disband. In fact, the number of protesters only swelled 
as bus drivers joined the strike, effectively shutting down civilian transit in and out of 
Guatemala City. As he had promised, Ydígoras called upon the Army to put down the 
protest and began to bring in “truckloads [of] machete-armed farm workers into the city” 
to act as reserves.350 Pitched battles between security forces and the demonstrators 
erupted throughout Guatemala City. Even Ambassador Bell seemed taken aback by the 
“violent and indiscriminate bloodletting by [the Guatemalan] government”, which failed 
to end the demonstrations and aroused sympathy for the movement.351 
President Ydígoras, however, had few allies and even fewer options in dealing 
with a protest that seemed to be on the verge of a genuine revolution. The Guatemalan 
economy continued to sputter with a significant drop in coffee prices. A longtime 
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champion of import-substitution industrialization and regional economic integration in 
the form of the Central American Common Market, Ydígoras’ policies had aggravated 
existing fiscal problems by relying on international loans as Guatemala diversified 
agricultural production and invested in new industries. As a result, the Guatemalan 
government “suffered from a serious balance of payments” that necessitated the passage 
of the income tax law.352 The back pay owed to government workers, notably teachers, 
had inspired many to join the protests in March, but the prospect of an income tax law 
made the business community reluctant to support Ydígoras. While the protests of March 
have been largely characterized as far-left, conservatives were divided in their support of 
the government, with the extreme rightwing parties like the MLN remaining steadfast in 
their opposition to the current regime. Within Guatemala, Ydígoras could only tacitly 
count on the Army and dragooned peasants to do its bidding when faced with massive 
urban unrest. The United States, however, remained committed to preserving the 
Ydígoras government and began to mobilize for war. 
  The protests in Guatemala City transformed the capital into a warzone. 
Ambassador Bell initially requested that Washington send riot control equipment and 
tanker trucks armed with water cannons to help combat the masses while mitigating 
casualties.353 The day after making the request, the US embassy learned that guerrillas 
clashed with military units in the hills surrounding Guatemala City and that they were 
working in collaboration with protest leaders. For Ambassador Bell, this proved that the 
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demonstrators in the streets and the rebels in the countryside were part of a larger 
communist conspiracy.354 
 To his credit, Ambassador Bell correctly assessed the situation, although he did 
not possess a full command of the facts. Sensing that Ydígoras’ days were numbered, the 
PGT decided to join the MR-13 in waging guerrilla warfare and hastily assembled and 
armed untrained student radicals and PGT cadre.355 Under the command of Colonel 
Carlos Paz Tejada, the former Minister of Defense under both Arévalo and Arbenz, the 
new guerrilla organization dubbed themselves the “October 20th Front” seizing upon the 
similarities between the current upheaval and victory of Guatemalan Revolution over 
Ubico on that day in 1944. Echoing the demands of the protestors in Guatemalan City, 
Col. Paz Tejada issued a statement that rejected the legitimacy of the current Congress 
and the Ydígoras administration as a whole. Moreover, the colonel made his intentions 
known: 
“The only road left is the road of uprising. The only way to end the calamities 
torturing our country is to overthrow the despotic rule of Ydígoras and set up a 
government which proves by deeds that it is worthy of the people’s trust…the 
motive of our movement is that which spurred the patriotic officers of [MR-13] to 
engage in struggle. Our purposes are the same as those of these young officers. 
On our side are university students, workers, peasants, patriotic professionals, and 
upright soldiers in the army and security forces”356  
 
Revolution had returned to Guatemala. Riots flared in other cities throughout the country. 
Torn asunder by protests-turned-battles and seemingly surrounded by guerrillas in the 
hills, Guatemala City was in peril.  
                                                 
354 John O. Bell, “US Embassy Telegram 411.” March 15, 1962. National Security Files, Country Files: 
Guatemala, Box 101. JFKL  
355 Jonas and Tobis, Guatemala. 180 
356 Carlos Paz Tejada statement reprinted in: Gott, Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, 45. 
 191 
 
 
 Ambassador Bell’s quest for uncovering communist networks in Guatemala 
gained new, urgent credibility and the Kennedy administration leapt into action. A nearby 
US battle group of roughly 1,400 men went on alert, and while Washington began to 
mobilize and deploy other military assets, Under Secretary of State George Ball began 
preparing “various possible OAS and other justifications for such intervention if 
necessary.”357 At least two destroyers and six C-130 aircraft began to make their way to 
Guatemala, under the guise of “a normal training exercise.”358 The Kennedy 
administration stood ready to launch a full-scale military intervention, slated for March 
16, in order to prevent Guatemala City from sharing the same fate as Havana.  
  It was an absolute necessity for Guatemala to remain a staunch US ally. The 
United States celebrated the 1954 coup as an early Cold War victory. The reversal of the 
counterrevolution in Guatemala would deal a tremendous blow to US prestige, especially 
in the wake of Castro’s successful defense of the Cuban Revolution. For US policy 
makers, the threat of another Cuba far outweighed the potential political cost of military 
intervention. The rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress and the non-intervention compact 
of the Organization of American States mattered little when compared to the prospect of 
a Red Guatemala. The mobilization of a considerable US invasion force to counter 
civilian protestors revealed the lengths the Kennedy administration was willing to go to 
ensure communists did not gain a foothold in Guatemala.  Ambassador Bell knew that his 
steady climb through the State Department hierarchy would end abruptly if Guatemala 
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went the way of Cuba. What little faith the US ambassador had in Guatemala’s political 
leaders, especially Ydígoras, rapidly diminished as the domestic crisis deepened, leaving 
him few viable partners in the country. Just as he had dismissed such efforts toward 
‘primitives’ during his assignment in Pakistan, Bell decided development programs 
through the Alliance for Progress were too slow and risky in Guatemala’s corrupt 
political environment to effectively manage the perpetual crises that plagued the country. 
Unsurprisingly, Bell cast his lot with the most reliable, anticommunist institution: the 
Guatemalan military. 
 The Kennedy administration proved that the values it expressed through the 
Alliance for Progress mattered little in the face of potential upheaval in Guatemala. As 
protests rocked Guatemala City and guerrilla fighters surrounded the capital, it appeared 
that the Ydigoras administration was about to collapse. President Ydigoras’ efforts 
amounted to little more than fuel for the red flame of revolution. A testament to the 
enduring legacy of US militarism in Latin America, Kennedy and his team defaulted to 
direct intervention when it seemed Guatemala might join Castro’s Cuba. 
 
Army of Progress: The First Steps Toward a Military Government 
 
At ten in the morning, on the very day US intervention forces converged on 
Guatemala, Ambassador Bell phoned the White House with a brief, but impactful 
message: “Military has taken over internal security responsibilities from police but this 
action was taken with complete loyalty to the President (this action was not a coup)”359 
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Casualties mounted as Army units attacked gatherings of students, workers, and other 
civilian demonstrators. The violence diminished the protests, but they did not completely 
abate. It appeared that the Guatemalan military would inevitably retake the city, so the 
American intervention force stood down. Yet, even though the Guatemalan military 
professed its loyalty to President Ydígoras, indications of internal division within the 
security forces surfaced as the soldiers gunned down their fellow countrymen. 
Nonetheless, the military high-command used their timely assistance to extract major 
concessions from the Ydigoras government, and began the process of formally taking 
over the Guatemalan state.  
The Army had not been deployed on the streets of Guatemala City before March 
16 because Defense Minister Peralta himself had resisted President Ydígoras’ commands 
for several days until internal pressure, and whispers of a scheme to replace the reluctant 
Minister of Defense, forced him to act.360 When the Army did come to Guatemala City, 
casualties among the protesters skyrocketed as soldiers indiscriminately fired into large 
crowds. Army units also mounted an expedition in the surrounding highlands to confront 
the October 20th Front. The guerrillas under Col. Paz Tejada were full of revolutionary 
zeal and confident in their ideals, but being largely comprised of students and political 
operatives, lacked military experience. The result of the confrontation between the 
trained soldiers and untested guerrillas was a massacre, and the political scientist Louisa 
Frank concluded that the defeat of the October 20th Front demoralized the demonstrators 
                                                 
360 US Embassy Air Attache to Department of State, March 17, 1962, Record Group 59, Department of 
State, Decimal Files, 1960-1963, National Archives. pg. 1-2 
 194 
 
 
in Guatemala City.361 What had, days before, seemed like an immanent revolutionary 
takeover buckled quickly as the military mopped up pockets of sporadic protests over the 
last weeks of March and into April. The government took control of the bus lines, radio 
stations, and the electrical company in the name of restoring order. Military leaders fully 
realized they alone had saved the Ydígoras administration. Contacts within the 
Guatemalan military reported to the US embassy that “Communists are lurking on [the] 
sidelines and are awaiting the right moment to take over.” However, they reassured the 
US embassy that “If anything should happen to Ydígoras, [the] Guatemalan Armed 
Forces would continue to uphold the constitution,” while they took provisional control of 
the government.362      
Ydígoras managed to survive the wave of spring protests by suppressing the 
demonstrations with the combined strength of the Guatemalan Army and police forces. 
By the end of April, more than five-hundred Guatemalan civilians had been killed to end 
the protests.363  Indicative of the precariousness of Ydígoras’ rule, military leaders, tired 
of the president’s schemes, demanded power in exchange for loyalty. The Guatemalan 
Armed Forces continued to support Ydígoras on the condition that he share executive 
power with a military cabinet.364 It was a significant first step taken by leading officers in 
the Guatemalan military’s seizure of power. Unable to protest the demands of his vital 
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ally, Ydígoras accepted the terms and staffed his entire presidential cabinet, with the 
exception of the Foreign Minister, with military officers. The State Department, 
particularly Secretary Rusk, welcomed the idea of joint rule, believing the officers could 
bring stability and credibility to the dissolving Ydígoras regime.365 Bell predicted that the 
military would try to oust Ydígoras before his presidential term expired and began to 
prepare the way for accepting military rule in Guatemala.  
By late April 1962, three months after becoming ambassador, Bell’s 
preoccupation with the threat of a growing communist threat in Guatemala had gained 
serious credibility. The list of President Ydígoras’ allies grew shorter by the day, as the 
“Old Fox” alienated elites with his insistence on tax reform and perceived softness on ex-
president Arévalo. The Guatemalan President enraged the urban classes with violent 
repression of student demonstrators and labor organizers.366 After the unrest, Ydígoras 
still refused to bar Arévalo from running for office, which deeply troubled the State 
Department and the Guatemalan military. Guatemalan military leaders vowed that they 
would never allow Arévalo to enter the country, implying that they would remove 
President Ydígoras if such action was necessary to fulfill their promise. Ambassador Bell 
echoed the military’s position, viewing Arévalo as another potential Castro. The Spring 
protests were but a taste of what might come should Arévalo return to Guatemala and run 
for the presidency. Fearing that the conditions for a communist uprising remained ripe, 
Bell alerted Washington that Guatemala stood at the precipice of disaster. 367 
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Following the protests of March and April, the ambassador was not the only State 
Department official who viewed the Guatemalan military as the United States’ most 
important ally in the country. Secretary of State Dean Rusk approved Bell’s close 
collaboration with the Guatemalan military as an effective means to preventing another 
Cuba. In fact, during Bell’s time as ambassador to Guatemala, he seemed to have no 
greater supporter than Rusk.368 As the protest movement reached its peak in mid-march 
and the US prepared an invasion force, Rusk personally drafted the resolution for 
committing US ground forces to Guatemala that would have been presented to the 
Organization of American States. Bending the non-intervention agreement of the OAS 
charter, if the beleaguered President Ydígoras presented evidence of “international 
communist involvement” and requested assistance, the United States would urge member 
states to join it in taking action against communist aggression and subversion.369 
Regardless of the decision of OAS member states, Rusk prepared for the United States to 
act unilaterally in Guatemala if the protests and guerrillas threatened to topple the 
government.  It was, perhaps, the most attention Rusk paid to Guatemala during his eight 
years as Secretary of State.  
After the military forced Ydígoras to rule jointly with a cabinet staffed by ranking 
officers, Rusk wrote Bell that the cabinet would serve as “one of first tests whether 
energetic military action can be effective” in governance and that the military ministers 
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might generate more popular appeal by cleaning up the Ydígoras administration.370 
Moreover, Rusk suggested his openness to removing Ydígoras and advised the embassy 
that things might be better without him.371 Secretary Rusk acknowledged it was unlikely 
that President Ydígoras would remain in office until his term expired in 1964. He 
provided Bell with a list of potential parties, both allies and adversaries of US interests, 
who might unseat Ydígoras. Bell’s list noted the strengths and weaknesses of these 
groups and hypothesized what actions the United States might have to take should one of 
them overthrow the government. Unsurprisingly, conservative army officers were 
branded the most stable, US-friendly group, and Rusk requested the ambassador’s input 
in drawing up contingency plans for a military coup.372 In short, Rusk told Bell that the 
United States would recognize any usurper, civilian or military, who was committed to 
stamping out communism in Guatemala. 
Over the next few months, Bell became increasingly sympathetic to the 
Guatemalan military. In August 1962, he wrote of the virtues of military rule in 
Guatemala and Latin America in general. Bell saw the Guatemalan military as the 
bedrock of the state and believed the cooperation between the US military and the 
Guatemalan Army would develop “respect for democratic and progressive policies,” 
whereas individuals within the private and political sectors would plunder US 
                                                 
370 Dean Rusk, “[New Military Cabinet and U.S. Interests after Fall of Ydígoras],” April 28, 1962, DNSA: 
Guatemala and the US,  Record Group 59, Department of State, Decimal Files 1960-1963, National 
Archives, 1. 
371 Ibid., 2. 
372 Ibid., 3. 
 198 
 
 
developmental aid to add to their personal wealth.373 The Kennedy administration 
allocated twenty-seven million dollars in Alliance funds for Guatemala from 1961 to 
1963, despite their belief that Ydígoras’ only concern was maintaining his personal 
power by bribing the oligarchy.374 Should the military take charge, Ambassador Bell 
anticipated that those funds would finally be put to proper use.  
Unwilling to wait for this ideal military regency, Bell steered funding from the 
Alliance for Progress and USAID into programs administered by the military. After 
witnessing the Guatemalan police struggle to combat angry crowds, Ambassador Bell 
focused on rectifying the inadequacies he perceived in the non-military security forces. 
For example, Bell heaped praise upon an initiative that offered advanced riot control 
training courses for police officers—paid for by USAID.375 The Civic Action programs, 
however, presented the most visible application of the Alliance for Progress in 
Guatemala, and they were inextricably linked to the Guatemalan military. As mentioned 
previously, the Civic Action programs funded developmental projects, such as building 
rural schools and providing health services, which were directly administered, and often 
completed, by the Guatemalan Armed Forces. While this projects supplied remote 
regions with medical, educational, and economic opportunities that had been previously 
unavailable, the primary purpose of Civic Action was improving the image of the 
Guatemalan military and rural pacification. Furthermore, it placed the control of these 
vital resources squarely in the hands of the officers overseeing the various projects.  As 
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originally conceived, Civic Action would supplement, not replace, “projects which are 
the responsibility of regular civilian agencies” and “should not divert Guatemalan 
budgetary and other resources in significant amounts from other government ministries or 
civilian agencies charged with the responsibility of performing functions as might be 
performed by the Civic Action Program.”376 Under Ydígoras, the Civic Action program 
slowly gained momentum, but they expanded far beyond the confines of their intended 
scope under the governments of Colonel Enrique Peralta and Julio César Méndez 
Montenegro. 
Few officers showed interest in developmental projects when the Inter-American 
Defense Board approved President Ydígoras’ resolution to use “military personnel and 
equipment for purposes of economic development, education, and highway settlement 
work” on December 1, 1960.377 The old general-president tried to rally the troops around 
their new duties, but elevating Civic Action to a program of pride seems to be the work of 
Defense Minister Peralta, who assumed his position shortly before the resolution passed. 
Under his guidance, the Guatemalan Army created a distinct Civic Action Corps led by 
hand-picked officers who worked closely with counterparts in the US military. In 
September 1962, the military began publishing an internal circular, Boletín Ejército, 
(later simply Ejército) that covered a variety of topics deemed of interest to all those 
serving in the Guatemalan Armed Forces. Articles included laudatory historical 
biographies of past officers, social calendars, interviews with common soldiers, and 
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editorials that typically countered negative press from the major newspapers Prensa 
Libre and El Imparcial. Every issue featured a section wholly dedicated to the most 
recent initiatives of the Civic Action program. The projects on display varied –digging 
wells, inoculating peasants, laying road, and building facilities all featured heavily—but 
the common purpose was to instill a sense of pride in the military for developing and 
modeling a “better citizenship” that emphasized the nobility of sacrifice and love of 
country.378 As the Guatemalan military took over more responsibilities from the civilian 
government, the Civic Action programs expanded and absorbed the majority of Alliance 
for Progress funds.  
Combined with the already considerable military defense budget provided by the 
United States, Guatemala’s armed forces gradually funneled the vast majority of all US 
financial aid into their coffers. Ambassador Bell regularly praised the military’s efforts as 
a means to foster development through cooperation between the armed forces and the 
civilian population.379 Soon, the military used these programs to conscript peasants and 
extend its presence into village life. Bell continued to channel aid money into the military 
as it expanded its grasp through so-called developmental projects. 
* * * 
Guatemala weathered a fearsome storm in 1962 and the wily President Ydígoras 
had survived along with it. The General-turned-President greeted Kennedy’s Alliance for 
Progress with much more enthusiasm than the new US administration had shown him, 
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and Ydígoras made considerable efforts at adhering, at least in appearance, to the 
program’s spirit of modernization and reform. In fact, his attempts to achieve Alliance for 
Progress goals through tax reform and regional economic integration caused considerable 
damage to his popularity. Given the suspicious results of the 1961 congressional 
elections, it would be a stretch to consider Ydígoras a champion of democracy. 
Nonetheless, his stubborn refusal to bar Juan José Arévalo from running for the 
presidency showed that Ydígoras at least desired the legitimacy of a democratic system. 
When confronted with widespread civil unrest, isolated Ydígoras could only turn to his 
military, and they demanded a considerable toll for preserving the unpopular president. 
The United States, represented by the new ambassador, John Bell, stood ready to root out 
communists and prevent a hostile takeover of the government, but proved a lukewarm 
ally to what they perceived as a doomed administration. Instead, under Bell’s direction, 
the Kennedy administration fostered close connections with the only organization 
deemed sufficiently stable and anticommunist: the Guatemalan Armed Forces. 
The choices made by the Kennedy administration and its emissaries were hardly 
original, and certainly far from “enlightened,” when it came to confronting communism 
in Guatemala. The Alliance for Progress had promised a new era in US-Latin American 
relations. His policies, especially after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, 
more often resembled the machinations of the Dulles brothers and the long tradition of 
“big stick” diplomacy. Instead of fulfilling the professed goal of spreading freedom and 
democracy, key Alliance programs came to serve the interests of the officer corps. With 
the emergence of a leftist guerrilla threat, the leaders of the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
pressed their advantage during the Spring protests to gain a major foothold within the 
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highest levels of the civilian government. In a matter of years, the Alliance for Progress 
would largely serve as another supplement to the military aid that the United States sent 
to Guatemala. Kennedy had wooed many hopeful Latin Americans with his pledges to 
favor democracy over dictatorship, but even at the beginning of his presidency, his 
actions in Guatemala indicated that the alleged course change in US foreign policy was 
superficial. 
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CHAPTER III: CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 A Decisive Shift in US-Guatemalan Relations 
 
 
On a balmy afternoon in October 1962, Ambassador John Bell sat down to 
compose a draft of the US policy and operational guidelines in Guatemala. The 
widespread protests and strikes that threatened to derail the government throughout 1962 
had finally been tamped down under army boots and tank treads. In exchange for their 
support of the Ydígoras government, leading figures in the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
now occupied key posts in the executive branch. The creeping militarization of the 
Guatemalan government did not disturb the American ambassador—the Spring riots had 
proven that the country was ripe for widespread communist subversion. Should a leader 
emerge in the mold of Castro, the next inevitable wave of public discontent might result 
in a successful revolution. As such, the ambassador came to see Juan José Arévalo’s 
presidential bid as the primary threat to US interests, and his own career, in Guatemala. 
Arévalo had presided over the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944; the ambassador, his 
superiors in Washington, and their allies within Guatemala’s military conspired to ensure 
he would not initiate another.   
As Ambassador Bell doled out responsibilities to US agencies, he reaffirmed the 
primacy of anti-communism in his approach to US-Guatemalan relations. In this 
atmosphere, protecting US interests would require a concerted effort where all political, 
economic, and military goals, were oriented to eliminate the communist threat to 
Guatemala. USAID needed to provide financial support to the government to prevent 
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instability; USIS would intensify anti-communist propaganda and destroy communist 
influence in schools; and the US military group was to continue training its Guatemalan 
counterparts in counterinsurgency warfare and riot control.380 All three agencies would 
collaborate in order to encourage the Guatemalan military to engage in more Civic 
Action programs. Bell assigned himself, the embassy staff, and “all elements as directed” 
the task of assuring the installation of an anti-communist government that would support 
both Alliance for Progress initiatives and US foreign policy abroad.381 By two in the 
afternoon, Bell finished the task, but his superiors were far too busy to read it. That very 
morning in Washington, Kennedy was looking at black-and-white aerial photographs of 
indistinguishable clumps of trees and tiny rectangular buildings—nuclear missiles in 
Cuba. 
Soviet warheads in Cuba demonstrated that a new threat had emerged in the 
region. The Cuban Missile Crisis seemed to validate Ambassador Bell’s brand of 
uncompromising anti-communism. The collaboration between Soviets and the Cubans all 
but proved that communist expansion in Latin America posed an immediate, existential 
danger to the United States. Although the US-Soviet confrontation in the Caribbean 
ended without a nuclear exchange, Cold War fears ran high.  The crisis disturbed 
President Kennedy and his administration’s obsession with destroying Castro deepened. 
Washington’s worst projections of revolutionary Cuba had been affirmed. During this 
apex of Castro’s revolutionary appeal, the United States perceived charismatic, left-
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leaning reformers like former-president Arévalo as harbingers of communist revolution. 
In this anxiety-ridden environment, the only thing that remained certain was the staunch 
anticommunism of the Guatemalan military leadership. With the approval of the 
President of the United States, Ambassador Bell continued to foster close relations with 
the Guatemalan military and empowered its leaders, enabling their takeover of the state. 
The Kennedy administration preferred stability through force over the uncertainties of 
democracy. Instead of embracing the spirit of the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy 
administration returned to the interventionist rationale of his predecessors in the 
aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Once again, Guatemala would be a litmus test for 
US policy toward Latin America. 
 The political ascension of the Guatemalan military leadership unfolded gradually 
since the revolution in 1944, but there are several key moments when the officer corps 
seized the opportunity to amplify their power within the government. The most widely 
known occurred during and after the 1954 coup, when the high command forced Arbenz 
to resign and subsequently launched the counterrevolution. In the aftermath of the Spring 
protests of 1962, covered in the previous chapter, military officers took another crucial 
step toward establishing a military government when they took over President Ydígoras’ 
cabinet and elevated Colonel Enrique Peralta to Minister of Defense. The turning point, 
however, came in March 1963 when Defense Minister Peralta ousted President Ydígoras, 
setting the stage for decades of direct military rule. This chapter uncovers the details of 
the precise moment when Guatemala transitioned from a constitutional republic to a 
military dictatorship. The overthrow of President Ydígoras was as consequential to 
Guatemalan history as the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944 and the CIA-backed coup of 
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1954, but it has never been subjected to close historical examination. In unravelling the 
events that unfolded in the months surrounding the 1963 coup, this chapter reveals that, 
despite alternatives, the Kennedy administration encouraged the military takeover of 
Guatemala because they believed it was the best way to counter communist influence in 
the country. As a result, the partnership between Washington and the Guatemalan Armed 
Forces deepened dramatically as Defense Minister Enrique Peralta and the officer corps 
formally helmed the state.  
 
Portentous Plots: The Air Force Attacks the Presidency 
 
 Guatemala’s military leaders had greatly advanced their control over the state 
when they forced President Ydigoras to replace his cabinet members with military 
officers, but they did not yet have total control. As unpopular as Ydigoras was, he 
remained head of state and continued to resist some of the demands made by his armed 
forces chiefs and the United States. When Ydigoras attempted to pass an unpopular 
taxation bill that would make Guatemala eligible for a massive increase in Alliance for 
Progress funding, some eager officers and their civilian allies saw an opportunity to strike 
down the ailing administration and install a military junta. The dramatic aerial attack on 
the Presidential Palace failed when vital military assets did not lend their promised 
support. When the dust settled, Ydigoras celebrated a victory, but it was Defense Minister 
Enrique Peralta who had, for the moment, decided Ydigoras’ fate.   
In the days that followed the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Miguel Ydígoras 
was quick to pledge his full support for immediate retaliation against Cuba while heaping 
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encomiums on President Kennedy.  The Guatemalan president thanked Kennedy for 
addressing the “danger [to the] American continent of [the] Communist, de facto 
government of Fidel Castro.”382 Ydígoras had viewed Castro as a threat since the 
beginning of the Cuban Revolution, and he touted the fact that his longstanding demands 
for intervention against Cuba no longer seemed overzealous. In a sense, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis partially redeemed Ydígoras for allowing the United States to train Cuban 
exiles on Guatemalan soil. In 1960, this decision cost him nearly a third of his officer 
corps in the nationalist uprising, but now Ydígoras could claim his leadership made 
Guatemala a cornerstone of hemispheric defense against communist incursion. While 
Ydígoras’ anti-Castro credentials cannot be doubted, the insecurity produced by the 
Cuban Revolution, exacerbated by the Missile Crisis, made the old general vulnerable to 
a new foe: hardline anticommunists within Guatemalan military and their patrons from 
the United States.   
By the end of November 1962, Ydígoras’ indifference toward Juan José Arévalo’s 
pending presidential campaign and return from exile provoked another open revolt within 
officer corps. The ongoing domestic crisis and general opposition to the Ydígoras regime 
continued even after the military put down major public protests in the Spring of 1962. 
Despite the crackdown, several nascent guerrilla bands began to organize against the 
government in earnest. The Communist Party of Guatemala, El Partido Guatemalteco del 
Trabajo (PGT), broke with its institutionalist traditions and, on October 20, established 
its ill-fated guerrilla front in the mountains that surrounded Guatemala City. Although 
this hastily formed band of Arbenzistas, students, and PGT cadre were largely untrained 
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and poorly equipped, the audacity of launching attacks so close to the capital represented 
a direct challenge to Ydígoras.383 While tensions remained between military factions and 
La Casa Crema over Arévalo’s repatriation, the army upheld its commitment to being 
Guatemala’s bulwark against communism by massacring the PGT insurgents. The 
operation was successful in its primary objective, but the very fact that guerrillas were 
attempting to establish bases of operations outside of Guatemala City must have seemed 
like yet another failing of the Ydígoras regime to disgruntled, ambitious officers. 
The Guatemalan Air Force, the most prestigious branch of the military, 
transformed its discontent with the Ydígoras government into action on November 25, 
1962 when a significant contingent of its personnel attempted to remove their unpopular 
president. For the second time, Ydígoras faced a rebellion from within his own military. 
Compared to the previous revolt of junior officers in 1960, this uprising had fewer 
participants and a fundamentally conservative agenda. Whereas the uprising in 1960 was 
a nationalistic reaction against Ydígoras allowing the US to train Cuban exiles in 
Guatemala, the Air Force plotters maintained they were defending Guatemala from 
potential communist subversion in the form of an Arévalo presidency. In both cases, 
friction between branches of the Guatemalan military and personal rivalries between 
individual officers prevented a successful coup. Unlike the revolt of 1960, however, this 
insurrection signaled the beginning of the end for the Ydígoras presidency. It would be, 
in the words of political scientist Roland Ebel, “a dress rehearsal for the overthrow.”384 
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Both the US embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency had long been aware of 
persistent rumors of a “preventative coup.” Two weeks before the attack, Francis 
McNeal, a secretary of the embassy, informed the ambassador that Guatemalan contacts 
were abuzz with talk of Ydígoras’ imminent overthrow. It was now common knowledge 
that the typically fractious Guatemalan military stood united behind its pledge to prevent 
Arévalo from entering the country and participating in the elections even if it meant 
removing Ydígoras from office and establishing a junta. The embassy was apprehensive 
about these dire warnings: “Guatemala is a land of rumors, and plotting—for the most 
part more froth than substance.”385 The CIA reported a day before the attempted coup 
that a small faction of air force officers planned an imminent assault on the loyalist 
command center at the Ciprisales military base in Guatemala City and would proceed to 
assume control of the government.386 To aid in their takeover of the capital, the rebelling 
officers secured an alliance with an army brigade stationed at a key military base, 
Mariscal Zavala, on the outskirts of Guatemala City and twenty-two members of the 
Guardia de Honor, the praetorian force that guarded President Ydígoras and his 
ministers. Central Intelligence Agency memos described the rebel officers as non-leftist, 
anti-Arévalo, and friendly to the United States.387 While the coup attempt received no 
endorsement by the US government, the CIA did not inform Ydígoras. This inaction 
suggests that the Kennedy administration was more than willing to see Ydígoras removed 
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from office. Fully aware of the situation, the United States government watched and 
waited. 
  Early in the morning of November 25, renegade aircraft blasted the presidential 
palace with a barrage of missiles and machine gun fire. Ydígoras’ own grandchildren 
were nearly killed as .50 caliber rounds tore through the bedrooms of the presidential 
residence.388 Nonetheless, most of the military remained loyal to the “Old Fox” of 
Guatemala and thwarted the attack on the Ciprisales base and the presidential palace.389 
The uprising faltered quickly when plotters in the Army failed to fulfill their promise to 
storm La Casa Crema with ground forces. In fact, Ydígoras seized the initiative and 
personally led the defense against the air attack by directing anti-aircraft fire from the 
barracks of his honor guard. A barrage from Ydígoras loyalists downed one of the P-51 
fighters, and the insurrectionist airmen attempted to fly their planes out of the country 
when they realized their co-conspirators on the ground had abandoned them.390 The 
attack dissipated around noon, mere hours after it had begun. A few dozen people were 
wounded, including the wife of a US embassy attaché, and three Guatemalan civilians 
were killed.391 President Ydígoras, however, remained standing and addressed the public 
that very afternoon. Apparently, Ydígoras’ informants had fortuitously forewarned the 
president of impending threat and his regime staggered on.392  
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President Ydígoras likened the event to a boil bursting to relieve a festering 
sore.393  In his public address, he promised that he would “root out the defectors” in the 
military, but he attributed the uprising to Cuban subversion, not the military’s widely 
known opposition to Arévalo. According to Paul Kennedy, a reporter for the New York 
Times, neither the Guatemalan people nor the US embassy, put stock in Ydígoras’s 
claims of a Cuban connection.394 That the oftentimes rabidly anti-Arévalo, Castro-fearing 
US embassy staff did not join Ydígoras in blaming Cuba in their internal communications 
or dispatches to Washington suggests that this explanation was utterly untenable. 
Nonetheless, President Ydígoras hoped to obscure the growing rift between his office and 
the military, and claimed that his intelligence agents had revealed that Cuban communists 
paid several air force officers $30,000 to launch the attack.395 The reality behind the 
insurrection was far more complicated. 
 In Guatemala, talk of land reform is the only thing more politically dangerous 
than proposing tax legislation. The agri-export businessmen who dominated the 
Guatemalan economy protected their privileges, always at the cost of the majority of their 
fellow citizens. Since 1959, President Ydígoras sought to pass an income tax, the first of 
its kind in Guatemala, hoping to generate desperately needed revenue for the state. 
Unpaid government workers played a major role in the protests of 1962, with teachers, 
contractors, and even hospital workers staging walkouts and demonstrations.396 
                                                 
393  Robert F. Corrigan, “[President Ydígoras Cracks Down on Air Force following Unsuccessful Coup],” 
November 28, 1962, National Security Files, Country Files: Guatemala, Box 101, John F. Kennedy 
Library. 3. 
394 Paul P. Kennedy. “Hundreds Seized by Guatemalans”. The New York Times, November 27, 1962 
395Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes.  My War with Communism. (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1963). 242. 
396 Ebel, 261 
 212 
 
 
Moreover, the United States used preconditions for increased Alliance for Progress aid to 
convince Ydígoras that “passage by Congress of income tax and land tax modernization 
is essential to enable Guatemala to be included in [a] list of approved aid clients.”397 At 
the behest of US officials, Ydígoras even sought out OAS experts to help his 
administration draft the law.398 In an effort to gain support from the private sector, 
Ydígoras had submitted the law for review to the Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones 
Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF), the league of Guatemala’s 
major industry moguls. Unsurprisingly, they repeatedly rejected the law and its numerous 
revisions. In an apology letter to unpaid hospital workers, Ydígoras blamed these 
economic elites and their unwillingness to pay taxes for most of fiscal Guatemala’s 
problems: “In all the countries of the world the citizens pay taxes. In Guatemala they do 
not do that and when the rich see that the state may obligate them to do so, they unite 
with the communists to overthrow the government as occurred in March and April of this 
year.”399 The likelihood of collaboration between communists and the major capitalist 
leaders of Guatemala was as far-fetched as any of Ydígoras’ more fanciful declarations, 
but it did show that the entrenched president was facing growing opposition from all 
segments of society. Condemning communists, who would never be satisfied with 
Ydígoras’ government, carried no risks. Losing the support of CACIF and the economic 
and political power its members’ wielded, however, was a dangerous move even for one 
so experienced in Guatemalan politics. 
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 After years of revision, negotiation, and compromise, the Guatemalan Congress 
passed Ydígoras’ income tax law on November 24, 1962. The Air Force insurrection 
occurred the very next day. Many of the conspirators had been plotting Ydígoras’ 
overthrow since he first proposed an income tax in 1959 and had been carefully 
cultivating a network of supporters among political, business, and military leaders. The 
US embassy questioned his credibility because of his status as a “perennial plotter 
and…person who may become involved in plots and intrigue for the sheer pleasure”, but 
the account Eduardo Taracena de la Cerda provided a rare glimpse into the cloak and 
dagger of Guatemalan presidential politics.  
Taracena was a leader of the remnant of Carlos Castillo Armas’ crypto-fascist 
political party, Movimiento Liberacion Nacional (MLN), and considered himself the 
chief civilian architect of the failed Air Force insurrection. On November 5, twenty days 
before the attack, Taracena contacted a political officer of the US embassy to present the 
case for the impending coup. He claimed the loyalty of “over 100 military officers in 
strategic posts throughout the armed forces, [who have] decided that a coup is now 
necessary if the country is to be kept from falling into the arms of the extreme left.”400 
Arévalo, not taxation, was the focus of Taracena’s stated rationale for the overthrow of 
Ydígoras, but this contradicted his boast that he and his allies had been plotting since 
1959; years before Arévalo announced his presidential bid. The coup, Taracena claimed, 
was an immediate necessity because his men had infiltrated Arevalista organizations and 
uncovered a letter from Arévalo calling on his supporters “to begin the development of a 
subversive organization that would work toward a coup” that would presumably lead to a 
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leftist, Castro-friendly government.401 The US embassy, usually quick to tarnish Arévalo, 
noted that this was a dubious claim because he had consistently dissuaded his followers 
from such tactics.402 Taracena confidently projected “that his group does not need ‘one 
cent or cartridge’ since everything is prepared and planned” because of the political and 
business interests that allegedly supported the overthrow.403 
The failure of the Air Force insurrection proved that Taracena and his co-
conspirators were less unified than he suggested. Although most of the Guatemalan 
military fervently opposed the return of Juan José Arévalo, the longstanding rivalry 
between the Air Force and Army, and divisions within the Army itself, factored 
significantly in the coup’s failure. Ex-major and aspiring presidential contender, Abundio 
Maldonado, told the US embassy that at least fourteen Army officers at the Mariscal 
Zavala base and within the Guardia de Honor received substantial bribes in exchange for 
promises to begin a ground assault on the capital in coordination with the air strikes on 
the presidential palace.404 When the time came to strike, the compromised Army units 
remained loyal and defended the regime. Infighting between the key military plotters 
over the composition of the junta that would assume control over the government caused 
key army officers to withhold their forces at the last moment.405 Also, having learned 
from the fall of Arbenz in the 1954 CIA coup, Ydígoras had implemented “Operation: 
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Whip” and installed anti-aircraft guns near the presidential palace that were instrumental 
in repelling the air force attack.406 The most important factor, however, was the refusal of 
Defense Minister Enrique Peralta to participate in the attack.    
Enrique Peralta Azurdia entered into the elite army officer training school, 
Escuela Politecnica, in 1926 at the age of eighteen. In his steady climb through the ranks 
of the military, he earned a reputation for honesty and loyalty. During the 1944 
revolution, a group of leading military officers and business elites approached Peralta 
with the possibility of becoming the new president of Guatemala.407 He refused. As the 
civilian and military posts within the Guatemalan government became increasingly 
indistinguishable following the overthrow of Arbenz, Peralta held numerous positions. 
He served several ambassadorships, headed the Escuela Politecnica, and became 
Minister of Agriculture by 1959. When nearly a third of the army rose up in rebellion 
against Ydígoras in 1960, it was Peralta who convinced the majority of the officers to 
remain loyal to the President.408  He was rewarded with a promotion to Minister of 
Defense. 
When the conspiring officers launched their attack in 1962, they did so without 
the support of Defense Minister Peralta. The military, as a whole, was unified behind 
blocking Arévalo’s presidency, and the Defense Minister had publicly announced on 
several occasions the Army would fulfill this promise. Factions within the ranks differed 
on how this would be achieved. Although Peralta had secured his cabinet position by the 
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consent of the leaders of the Guatemalan military, contention between the branches and 
factions remained an issue. According to US embassy reports, Peralta had visited the 
commanding officers of the “big three” military institutions involved in the 1962 
uprising—the Air Force and the Mariscal Zavala and Guardia Honor Brigades—to 
reaffirm his commitment to preventing the return of Arévalo, but some, particularly Air 
Force officers, were suspicious of the decorated Army colonel.409 These concerns were 
likely rooted in the professional rivalry between the Army and the Air Force. Despite 
their agreement to jointly storm the presidential palace, the Army remained loyal to the 
Defense Minister, while the Air Force proceeded with the attack. Officials in the US 
embassy believed that several officers involved in the plot also had presidential 
ambitions, and saw Peralta as a strong contender for the office, and a potential obstacle 
for their own aspirations.410 By attacking Ydígoras without Peralta’s support, these 
officers were likely trying to circumvent the presumed presidential succession should the 
Defense Minister be forced to make good on his promise of barring Arévalo from 
country. By this point in time, talk of Ydígoras’ overthrow had become so widespread 
within the military, that many assumed Peralta would soon become the de facto president 
of Guatemala. With Peralta as the head of state, these presidential hopefuls, particularly 
those in the Air Force, felt that their political potential would be greatly diminished. 
Although Peralta left no record indicating his reasoning for not participating in the 
brief 1962 uprising, there are several calculations that probably contributed to his 
decision. Foremost, the Defense Minister was already in a position of formidable power. 
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During his tenure as chief representative of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, most 
presidential cabinet positions became filled with his allies in the military. This solidified 
his popularity across most of the factions within the various security forces. By 1963, the 
Ydígoras administration had been battered by near-constant civil protest, two military 
uprisings, and a growing guerrilla insurgency. To endure these crises, President Ydígoras 
relied on the loyal elements of the military to maintain some degree of order. In exchange 
for personal and political survival, Ydígoras whittled away his own power while 
enhancing the role of the military in civilian affairs. Defense Minister Peralta, though his 
brother Arturo, had also been developing strong relationship with the US Embassy, and 
enjoyed a rather favorable assessment from Ambassador Bell and his staff. Participating 
in a risky coup attempt would likely have damaged his good standing with US officials, 
especially if that coup would have ended in failure. Likewise, the botched uprising 
eliminated several contentious officers, each a potential rival of the Defense Minister. 
Peralta was keen to preserve his outstanding reputation. As a member of a government 
notorious for its corruption, Peralta stood out as a relative paragon. Both American and 
Guatemalan officials believed that Peralta did not engage in graft and only took on 
positions of power with reluctance. Some, like anthropologist Richard Adams, have 
pointed to his rejection of the presidency in 1944 and subsequent refusal of the title of 
president in 1963 as evidence for this characterization.411 Whatever calculus Peralta used 
to guide his ascent to power, he concluded that November 1962 was not the right time to 
dispose of President Ydígoras. 
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The Air Force attack of 1962 demonstrated that while the Guatemalan military 
had developed a unified front against an Arévalo presidency, the organization, as a 
whole, remained factionalized and mutinous. Despite the failure of the coup attempt, the 
armed forces, and particularly Defense Minister Peralta, increased their leverage over 
President Ydígoras. The deeply unpopular president had nowhere to turn except his 
steadfast Minister of Defense. For its part, the United States appeared unable to act 
against the coup attempt. Even had it been able to do so, the ties that Ambassador Bell 
and others had established with Guatemalan military officers likely encouraged 
Washington to withhold its’ intelligence and wait for the conflict to play out. The Air 
Force attack proved that the last vestiges of a civilian regime were extremely vulnerable, 
but only if the commanding officers could set aside their squabbles and act in concert 
under a single leader.   
   
Narrowed Possibilities: New Approaches Following the Failed Coup 
 
The failure of the Air Force coup attempt momentarily halted the momentum of 
the Guatemalan officer corps steady accumulation of control over the state. The United 
States was prepared to accept military rule in Guatemala: Washington’s silence before 
and during the Air Force attack suggested that Ambassador Bell’s campaign to ally with 
the Guatemalan officer corps was an acceptable approach for the Kennedy 
administration. President Ydigoras was surrounded by people, even within his own 
cabinet, who wanted to destroy him, yet he survived nonetheless. Military rule was not a 
forgone conclusion, although many Guatemalans and US officials still believed it was an 
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inevitability. For the moment, however, new options appeared in the realm of political 
possibility that might preserve Guatemalan democracy. 
President Ydígoras, used to being backed into a corner, tried to make the most of 
the attempt on his life. He took advantage of the situation and purged the armed forces, 
particularly the Air Force, of disloyal elements, arresting hundreds of military personnel. 
The chief plotters, along with many of the Air Force pilots who participated in the attack, 
had already fled to El Salvador to escape retribution.412 Having lavished special 
privileges on the Air Force since the 1960 uprising, predominately an Army affair, 
Ydígoras felt betrayed and was determined to reorganize the entire branch of the military. 
He complained that special treatment had led these “Hollywood Glamour Boys” to 
develop a “disdain for ordinary army personnel” and the government at large.413 With the 
exception of a handful of dismissals of the most offensive plotters, nearly all of the 
arrested military men did not stay imprisoned for very long. The Guatemalan Armed 
Forces may have suffered from petty internecine struggles between cliques and 
personalities, but they universally resolved to discipline personnel internally. 
Punishments might result in checked ambitions through diplomatic exile or demotion, but 
infractions committed by military officers rarely resulted in formal charges, much less an 
arrest.414 His reprisals largely ineffective, the Ydígoras presidency exposed just how little 
control the civilian government had over the military.  In fact, when Ydígoras diminished 
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some of the perquisites enjoyed by Air Force, it placed them on a more equal footing 
with their Army counterparts and likely reduced the adversarial tension between these 
branches.415 This would be a small, but significant step in developing a stronger sense of 
shared identity among the military branches and security forces.   
Not one to miss an opportunity for political gain, Ydígoras also ordered the arrest 
of numerous political opponents following the abortive coup. Determined to serve his full 
term in office and preside over the first genuinely democratic transition of power since 
1950, President Ydígoras hoped to press every political advantage he could muster. 
Jailings only delayed political adversaries for a brief time, as they were released shortly 
after being apprehended, and soon Ydígoras found himself facing an insurmountable 
quandary. After four years of alleged corruption, intermittent martial law, and economic 
malfeasance, the Guatemalan president had earned the enmity of nearly every political 
constituency. Only the unenthusiastic support of the military kept his regime afloat, and 
their chief demand was preventing Arévalo from running for the presidency. Ydígoras 
faced a stark choice: survive the remaining year of his presidential term or allow a 
genuinely open election. If he chose the latter, military leaders, including Defense 
Minister Peralta, had made it clear there would be no election. The failed Air Force attack 
on the presidential palace confirmed the willingness of officers to act on their words. 
However, to the dismay of his loyal commanders and US officials, Ydígoras still refused 
to bar Arévalo from the country. In an odd turn of events, general-turned-president—who 
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was at one time a protégé of the fascist dictator Jorge Ubico—stood as one of the final 
defenders of the democratic legacy of the Guatemalan Revolution. 
While the archconservative Ydigoras tried to preserve the last vestiges of 
Guatemalan democracy, the Kennedy administration and its representatives continued to 
develop their relationship with the officer corps. Having spent considerable time and 
energy over the past year procuring military hardware for Guatemala, especially aircraft, 
Ambassador John Bell was concerned about Ydígoras’ crackdown on the Air Force. A 
few days after the revolt, the ambassador and President Ydígoras met, and Bell expressed 
his worries. At the Air Force’s request, Bell had secured T-33 fighter jets for Guatemala, 
which were slated for imminent arrival. Ydígoras promised Bell that the Air Force would 
experience some reorganization, but it would remain intact and that the jets were still a 
modernizing necessity.416 Despite the president’s assurances and the brevity of 
internment, Bell believed that the arrests and expulsions of treasonous officers were too 
harsh because the ailing Ydígoras government needed to maintain a close alliance with 
the military in order to manage the impending election crisis. In an attempt to bandage 
the fissures appearing between the armed forces and the government, Bell approved the 
delivery of jet fighters, claiming they were a symbol of the United States’ commitment to 
the Guatemalan military.417  This action would have clearly signaled to the Guatemalan 
officers, even those in the Air Force, that they remained in the good graces of the United 
States despite recent difficulties. For Bell, the most significant threat to US interests, and 
his own career, was the return of Arévalo. Seeing the former Guatemalan president as 
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another Castro in the making, Ambassador Bell believed that the United States could not 
afford to lose ground within its sphere of influence because of squabbling within the 
Guatemalan elite. Ydígoras had weathered waves of civilian protests and military 
uprisings so far, but Ambassador Bell would not risk the possibility that the unpopular 
president would become another Fulgencio Batista.  
 While Bell strategized how to save Guatemala from communism, his superiors in 
the United States seemed content to let the ambassador control the situation as he saw fit. 
The upper echelons of the State Department had several priorities outside of Guatemala 
in the early 1960s. The standoff in Europe had cooled after the Berlin Crisis in 1961, but 
the Old World still loomed large in Cold War geopolitics. In Vietnam, escalation 
continued unchecked and the recalcitrant Ngo Dinh Diem frustrated the Kennedy 
administration. In Latin America, the State Department devoted the preponderance of 
their attention on the issue of Cuba. President Kennedy’s personal grudge against Castro 
bordered on obsession. The Cuban Missile Crisis dramatically demonstrated that 
communist infiltration of Latin America posed an immediate and existential threat to the 
United States. As such, Guatemala clearly mattered, and Bell, as ambassador, wielded 
considerable influence over US policy in Guatemala. There is no indication that Secretary 
Rusk or other State Department officials questioned Bell’s initiatives and approach. One 
of the only member of JFK’s administration who actively voiced a more nuanced 
interpretation was Arthur Schlesinger Jr, Camelot’s court historian. 
 Schlesinger occupied a unique position as Special Assistant to the President. 
While not a major maker of policy, Schlesinger did have influence within Kennedy’s 
inner circle.  Unlike Bell, Schlesinger did not see Arévalo as a nascent communist threat, 
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and in January 1963, Schlesinger circulated a telegram through the State Department that 
challenged the accepted thinking on the popular Guatemalan reformer. Schlesinger 
conceded that open association with Arévalo should be avoided, but he postulated that the 
United States might be “missing a bet if we do not assign some non-official people to 
cultivate Arévalo quietly, explore his views, and see whether he can be steered in sensible 
directions.”418 Furthermore, he felt that Arévalo’s professions of anti-communism and his 
expressed desire to work with the United States should be taken more seriously; he found 
no reason for the former president to have any ties to Castro or the communist world. 
Schlesinger concluded with a warning: “The present line is one of those self-fulfilling 
prophesies: if we persist in acting as if Arévalo were beyond all hope of salvation, he will 
certainly end up that way.”419  
Schlesinger’s appraisal of Arévalo developed from his optimistic view of how the 
United States could bring positive change to Latin America through democracy and 
building up the middle class. An avid proponent of Alliance for Progress reforms, 
Schlesinger’s opinion was rooted in modernization theory. Prominent academics in the 
social sciences held that education, social welfare, and competitive political parties could 
uplift traditional societies out of the hierarchical, economically stagnant systems, while 
undermining radical political movements in the process.420 The military and 
socioeconomic elite often rejected forms of modernization as a challenge to their 
privileged position, which encouraged radicalization among marginalized groups. This 
                                                 
418 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, “State Department Circular Telegram on Arévalo,” January 8, 1963, National 
Security Files, Country Files: Guatemala, Box 394, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library. 
419 Ibid. 
420 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Place in the World, 26. 
 224 
 
 
approach toward Third World countries led Schlesinger to favor economic development 
and democracy as cornerstones of successful anticommunist doctrine. To Schlesinger, 
Arévalo’s politics aligned more closely with the ideals of the Alliance for Progress than 
those of the reactionaries, militarists, and radicals that competed for power in Guatemala. 
 Unlike other members of the Kennedy administration, Schlesinger seemed 
receptive to Arévalo’s public praise for the Alliance for Progress and his denunciations of 
Castro. A fellow academic with democratic credentials and a history of moderate reform, 
Arévalo fit Schlesinger’s ideal for a Latin American leader. Considering the 
alternatives—a  pseudo-civilian kleptocracy or a military dictatorship--Arévalo had more 
potential. The current breed of political and military elites in Guatemala would only use 
Alliance funding to preserve their own narrow interests under the guise of modernization. 
If properly cultivated and controlled, Schlesinger believed that an Arévalo presidency 
could advance Alliance for Progress programs while sapping the momentum of leftist 
radicals.  Schlesinger’s telegram received no formal response. Most likely, the officials 
who received the telegram, including President Kennedy, had decided that Arévalo was, 
at best, a “menace” and that his links to Arbenz were evidence enough that he would 
encourage communism in Guatemala.421 This decision reflects the enduring antipathy 
toward revolution in US foreign relations. As identified by historian Michael Hunt, 
opposition to radical movements is a cornerstone of the United States’ diplomatic 
ideology.422 Kennedy’s determination to “win” Cold War conflicts against any 
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communist challenge pushed the likelihood of working with someone who had criticized 
US actions in Guatemala even further away from the realm of possibility. In the wake of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, the fear that an avowed reformist could quickly transition to a 
radical revolutionary remained too great a risk for Kennedy and Ambassador Bell to even 
consider the prospect of Arévalo’s return to presidency. 
Furthermore, Schlesinger’s assessment glazed over an important fact: Defense 
Minister Peralta had repeatedly and publicly stated that Arévalo would never be allowed 
to run, and the Guatemalan Armed Forces stood united behind this pledge. The 
conservative leaders of Guatemala’s military proclaimed that their opposition to Arévalo 
stemmed from their stalwart determination to protect the country from communist 
influence, but most officers likely assumed that Arevalo would halt the steady 
accumulation of power and prestige that the armed forces had experienced since the 
counterrevolution. Many remembered the conflict between the Arévalo government and 
the conservative elements of the military that resulted in the assassination of their 
champion, Major Francisco Arana. Political scientist Roland Ebel reveals that many anti-
Arevalo officers demanded criminal prosecution of the former president for the murder of 
Arana.423 Even in the event of Arévalo’s successful election to the presidency, he would 
face constant internal threats from both his own military and the majority of Guatemala’s 
economic and political elite. As it would do in 1966 to President Mendez Montenegro, 
the armed forces would have, at best, made Arévalo a hostage-president, while military 
leaders controlled the real mechanisms of power. Schlesinger’s idealistic proposal was 
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incompatible with the reality of the increasingly pervasive presence of the Guatemalan 
military in all levels of the government. The United States would not disrupt its 
longstanding relationship with the leaders of Guatemala’s armed forces for the wishful-
thinking of an academic. 
In January 1963, with the Air Force coup attempt behind him, Ambassador Bell 
could once again focus on Arévalo and the upcoming elections. Though he admitted that 
Ydígoras had considerable political skill, evidenced by his survival, Bell reported, “there 
is widespread feeling in Guatemala favoring a military coup to oust Ydígoras and [to] 
arrange for elections which would exclude the participation of Arévalo.”424 The accuracy 
of this statement is highly suspect, given that both Washington and the Guatemalan 
Armed Forces acted as though they anticipated Arévalo’s electoral victory. Furthermore, 
despite the alleged “widespread” opposition to Arévalo, Bell claimed that the other 
political parties lacked the unity necessary to produce a significant challenger for the 
presidency. Contradicting his earlier characterizations of Arévalo, Bell admitted that the 
former president was not a communist, but that “his confused, ill-balanced, political 
philosophy of ‘spiritual socialism,’ fed by deep prejudice against the United States, 
served the Communist purpose well during his administration” and was a precursor to the 
“Communist dominated Arbenz administration.”425 Bell also suggested that Ydígoras 
might be conspiring with Arévalo: a rumor that had long circulated in Guatemalan 
political circles. He noted that Ydígoras continued to withhold his endorsement of any 
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presidential candidate and speculated that the president might be in contact with Arévalo 
in order to secure a life of comfort in Guatemala after the election.426  
Bell maintained his belief that forging strong ties with the military remained the 
best way to create a stable, anticommunist Guatemala. When US interests and 
international prestige appeared to be at risk, the high-minded rhetoric of the Alliance for 
Progress meant little, and the Kennedy administration opted for what it believed was its 
safest bet: the Guatemalan Armed Forces. High-ranking officers had already declared that 
they would not allow Arévalo into the country, and the Air Force coup attempt in 
November 1962 proved that they planned on keeping their word. Although Bell deemed 
it improbable, he maintained that finding an acceptable candidate who could beat Arévalo 
remained his priority.427 Failing that, he urged a concerted effort to assess Arévalo’s 
popularity outside of the capital, covertly reduce the former president’s prestige, and 
dissuade him from running in the election. That option, however, seemed unlikely to 
succeed. In the event that Ydígoras was displaced before the election, Bell suggested 
grooming military men suitable for governance.428 The ambassador promised another 
interagency appraisal of Guatemala in March, but given Bell’s growing preference for the 
military, the likelihood of a change in approach seemed minimal. 
Although it appeared that Bell had already cast his lot with the military, the 
ambassador scheduled a meeting with the intractable Guatemalan president. The 
discussion focused almost entirely on Arévalo’s return. Ydígoras waited patiently as Bell 
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expressed his concern that Arévalo would win the election if he were allowed to run for 
president. When the ambassador finished, President Ydígoras presented a convincing 
defense of his actions. He explained that Guatemala’s borders made it practically 
impossible to prevent a determined individual from entering the country. If Arévalo were 
arrested after entry, Guatemalans would view him as a hero, or martyr, and the 
Americans’ worst fears of a Castro-figure emerging in Central America would become a 
reality.429 An arrest would lead to court appeals, public disorder, and a spectacle that 
would only increase his stature and renown. If killed by overzealous military-men, the 
ranks of radicals and guerrillas would swell. Moreover, there was no legal basis for 
keeping Arévalo out of the country and Ydígoras, “like his friends in the United States,” 
respected the rule of law.430 The wisest course of action, the president explained, would 
be to allow Arévalo to run for office, which Ydígoras believed would divide and weaken 
all of the leftist parties.  
 The meeting between Ydígoras and Bell presented new possibilities and 
challenged the assumptions of the Kennedy administration. Not only did Ydígoras assure 
Bell that Arévalo’s popularity was overrated, he also revealed that his own relationship 
with the former president was misunderstood. Ydígoras admitted that among the “rich 
people” of Guatemala, rumors had circulated that he had “sold out” to Arévalo.431 In fact, 
Ydígoras opposed Arévalo. He simply believed that the defeat of the former president 
required “cold and clear planning and not letting hate drive one into ill-considered and 
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hasty actions.”432 The president’s argument apparently impressed Bell. In a report to the 
State Department summarizing the meeting, he stated that he was “inclined to agree with 
Ydígoras” that it would be a mistake for the Guatemalan government to keep Arévalo out 
of the country.433 Bell’s suddenly more favorable assessment of Ydígoras suggested that 
the ambassador might have been open to more subtle and creative solutions for 
safeguarding Guatemala against communist threats.  
Despite the new possibilities that emerged from the failure of the Air Force coup 
attempt, the Kennedy administration continued to operate on the assumption of an 
eventual military takeover of the Guatemalan state. Arévalo’s impending arrival, the 
unrest within the armed forces, and the ambassador’s two years of cultivating a close 
relationship between the embassy and Guatemalan officers, however, all prevented Bell 
from changing the course of US policy at so late an hour. Even had he done so, the 
influence of the US embassy, while significant in Guatemala, had limits. The leaders of 
the Guatemalan military, including the powerful Defense Minister Peralta, had 
universally declared they would cancel elections if Arevalo entered the country. While 
the United States had few qualms of intervening against perceived communist infiltration, 
it would not directly confront its allies within the conservative officer corps to defend the 
Guatemala against anticommunist authoritarianism. As the ambassador’s options 
narrowed, the likelihood of a coup increased.  
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The Pitfalls of Presidential Politics: Guatemalan Democracy’s Last Gasp 
As the presidential campaign season neared, President Ydigoras faced political 
decisions that would determine his fate and could change the course of Guatemalan 
history. The single most important choice he needed to make as his term came to a 
natural close was choosing a candidate to endorse. If successful, his successor would 
rally the anticommunist vote and crush the factionalize left. As Ydigoras routinely 
opined, such a presidential contender could even defeat Juan Jose Arevalo in an open 
election and preserve Guatemalan democracy in the process. Although Ydigoras had 
proved himself a master of Guatemalan politics, he stumbled in one of the last and most 
significant decisions of his presidential tenure. This misstep was all that his opponents 
needed to recover from the disastrous Air Force attack. The military and its 
anticommunist civilian supporters, bolstered by the Kennedy administration’s lack of 
enthusiasm for Ydigoras, made the final preparations for their seizure of the Guatemalan 
state. 
President Ydígoras had much more to contend with than the concerns of the 
American Embassy. The already dire political situation was becoming increasingly 
untenable as Ydígoras tried to secure a legacy of democratic succession. Like sharks 
drawn to the bleeding regime, a proliferation of parties and candidates seeking 
presidential power began to encircle the President as the election year began. Leftist 
parties remained divided over the prospect of Arévalo’s return. The great fear of the 
Guatemalan military and the United States was that Arévalo could unite the fragmented 
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groups that ranged from guerrilla fighters to moderate urban bureaucrats and 
businessmen, but this was an unlikely scenario.  
Arevalo’s reluctance to provide political guidance compounded the confusion on 
the left. After announcing his candidacy in November 1961, Arevalo had remained 
relatively quiet. His major work, Fábula del Tiburón y las Sardinas (Fable of the Shark 
and the Sardines), published the same year, had thoroughly condemned US foreign policy 
in Latin America, but his criticism ended with the Eisenhower administration. As noted 
in the previous chapter, Arévalo expressed cautious admiration for Kennedy’s Alliance 
for Progress and hoped to foster good ties with the new president’s administration. 
Arévalo’s lack of public pronouncements likely reflected the difficult task that lay before 
him: he needed to maintain political support within the Guatemalan left and 
simultaneously not appear too radical to the Kennedy administration. In fact, Arevalo did 
not publicize his political platform until late January 1963, and only did so because two 
major Arévalista parties threatened to support a rival candidate, Francisco Villagrán 
Kramer, if he continued to withhold the formal announcement.434 Roland Ebel reports 
that Arevalo’s supporters were disappointed by his “Carta personal al Guatemaltecos” 
because it failed to address specific political issues.435 Instead, Arevalo defaulted to 
repeating his nebulous personal philosophy of “spiritual socialism” and reiterated that he 
was neither a communist nor did he play a role in the murder of Major Francisco 
Arana.436 Of greater significance was Arevalo’s insistence that he would embrace the 
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Alliance for Progress and ally with the United States in international affairs.437 The 
announcement failed to made no discernable impact on US officials and did little to help 
Arevalo build a broader political coalition.   
The Partido Revolucionario, which had long associated itself with the 
Guatemalan Revolution over which Arévalo had presided, had already selected a 
candidate, Mario Méndez Montenegro, a centrist who had wrested control of the party by 
expelling Arévalistas.438 Arévalo’s rejected supporters, in turn, splintered into several 
political parties: Partido de Unificación Revolucionaria (PUR), Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (PNR), and the Partido Revolucionario Auténtico (PRA). The highly 
factionalized nature of the political left formed the basis of Ydígoras’ continued advocacy 
for allowing Arévalo to run for office. As he related to Ambassador Bell, Ydígoras 
believed that Arévalo would not be able to unite his own political base, much less the 
entire electorate, and would lose the presidency to whichever candidate emerged from the 
coalition of conservative, anticommunist parties on the right.439 
Guatemala’s political right, a loose confederation of major business interests, 
military officers, traditionalist peasants, and the anticommunist segments of the middle 
class should have been Ydígoras’ natural ally. Instead, they were the greatest threat to the 
President and his hopes of overseeing the exchange of power from his regime to the next. 
CACIF, the league of Guatemala’s most prominent businessmen, still begrudged 
Ydígoras for passing an income tax law. Many members were suspected to have been 
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involved in the abortive Air Force attack that had occurred the morning after the law had 
passed. Following the failed coup attempt, CACIF purchased political ads in newspapers 
that announced the Ydígoras regime lacked the capacity, sincerity, and organization to 
govern and that “additional taxation would destroy productive capital, raise the cost of 
living, increase unemployment, and provide the government with more money to 
waste.”440 Instead of taxation, CACIF offered an alternative to generating much needed 
revenue for the state: reduce the salaries of top bureaucrats by twenty percent;  a seventy-
five percent cut to the presidential salary; bar and rescind all appointments of family 
members to government offices; and the elimination of los confidenciales—the private, 
discretionary funds the President used to grease the wheels of government.441 When 
Ydígoras’ finance minister called a special meeting of Congress to come up with 
solutions to Guatemala’s financial woes, the members of CACIF undercut the 
proceedings by stating they would not pay taxes or invest in new businesses if any of the 
measures passed.442 In the face of financial crisis, the impasse between the government 
and business leaders only created stagnation at a time where action was desperately 
needed to help stabilize an increasingly turbulent political atmosphere. 
Unable to pay most of his own government’s workers and incapable of extracting 
funds from the wealthy, Ydígoras had become politically isolated and, for most 
candidates on the right, a liability to be avoided. Hoping to secure a candidate among the 
anti-communist right that could challenge Arévalo, Ydígoras called for a convention for 
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the conservative parties. Four major parties, along with the conservative wing of the 
Partido Revolucionario bridged the spectrum of the Guatemalan political right. The 
Christian Democrats and PR conservatives formed the center right.  The MDN and MLN, 
remnants from the counterrevolutionary coalition government of Castillo Armas, 
comprised the far right-wing.443 Additionally, President Ydígoras had formed his own 
party, Redención (RDN), following his narrow electoral victory in 1958. When he called 
for a conference among the right-wing parties that would determine a single candidate to 
run against Arévalo, only the candidates of his own party and the leader of the MDN 
bothered to attend. There would be no unified anti-Arévalo coalition. 
Instead, a new conservative organization emerged, the Frente Unido Nacional 
Anticomunista (FUNA), which condemned Ydígoras as a co-conspirator of Arévalo’s. 
FUNA’s leader, Luis Arenas, declared that the group was willing to resort to violence and 
coordinate with the Army in order to stop Arévalo. Defense Minister Peralta quickly 
rejected the notion of an alliance between the Army and FUNA. Desperate to create some 
unity within the political-right, Ydígoras tried to appeal to anti-arevalistas by permitting 
a FUNA rally on March 4, 1963. To rebut FUNA’s Arévalo-Ydígoras conspiracy rumors, 
the President hardened his stance and announced that Arévalo would have to prove he 
was not a communist before he returned to Guatemala. This was not an outright ban, but 
it was certainly an indication that Ydígoras was beginning to feel intense pressure from 
every direction. Even the Central Intelligence Agency now entertained the possibility of 
an Arévalo-Ydígoras conspiracy, and generated its own list of speculative connections 
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between the two Guatemalan leaders. The fact that “Ydígoras and Arévalo together have 
attacked Liberationists and the Partido Revolutionario” and a handful of overlapping 
political associates was all the CIA could muster in its case for collusion between the 
Guatemalan leaders.444 While evidence of Ydígoras and Arévalo working together was 
sparse, the unpopularity of the Guatemalan president was undeniable. 
Having failed to forge a conservative coalition that could present a feasible 
challenger to Arévalo, Ydígoras turned to his own diminished political party in his search 
for a successor. Yet even within Redención , there were factions competing for the 
nomination. Colonel Guillermo Flores Avendaño led the pack. He had served as interim 
president following the assassination of Carlos Castillo Armas and had proven vital to 
Ydígoras’ 1958 presidential victory by securing the support of the military.445  The US 
embassy also picked Avendaño as Ydígoras’ likely choice, although the President denied 
he had made up his mind when he discussed the issue with Ambassador Bell.446 
Likewise, many of the chiefs of the Guatemalan government believed Ydígoras would 
pick Avendaño. Foreign Minister Unda Murillo told the US embassy that he was 
confident that Ydígoras would declare his support for Avendaño because the President 
“owed [him a] debt of gratitude from [the] past” alluding to military support Colonel 
Avendaño was able to drum up during Ydígoras’ 1958 campaign.447 Two pre-
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revolutionary relics of the Guatemalan military, it seemed likely that the Old General of 
Guatemala would select an old colonel to replace him as head of state. 
The other major contender for the RDN nomination was longtime political crony, 
Roberto Alejos. The wealthy landowner and businessman, who had never held a major 
political office, had a sordid past that intertwined with Ydígoras’ political career—neither 
man benefitted from their shared reputation of being the nexus of corruption within the 
Guatemalan government. Furthermore, military leaders despised Alejos.  When Cuban 
exiles trained in Guatemala for the Bay of Pigs invasion, they had done so on Alejos’ 
land. In furtively providing the United States with a base of operations, the military 
believed Alejos had undermined their command structure for his own personal gain. They 
blamed Alejos for the uprising that followed when nationalistic officers learned that 
Guatemala was being used as a staging area for the invasion of Cuba. Nonetheless, Alejos 
had some success in building political support and he used his ample means to campaign 
throughout the country and, allegedly, purchase political loyalty.448 
In a move that seemed to defy logic, President Miguel Ydígoras endorsed Roberto 
Alejos as the official candidate of Redención. Even before Ydígoras made the official 
announcement on March 10, his party was in rebellion. Avendaño and other important 
RDN members refused to attend the convention and claimed that Alejos had subverted 
the selection process and had been stealing party funds. The RDN congressional deputy, 
Mario Sarmiento Castillo, resigned and claimed that support for Alejos was continuismo 
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of Ydígoras’ failing regime.449 In naming Alejos his heir-apparent, Ydígoras sundered his 
own party and doomed his chances for political survival. 
It is difficult to determine exactly why President Ydígoras took such an enormous 
risk. He had skillfully navigated the rocky shoals of Guatemalan national politics for his 
entire adult life. Ydígoras had been characterized as eccentric and erratic by both allies 
and detractors, but a blunder of this magnitude when his administration was at a critical 
juncture remains baffling. Alejos was one of Ydígoras’ first and foremost financial 
backers in 1958. When Ydígoras won the election, Alejos became the President’s primary 
liaison to Washington, where the wealthy plantation owner and businessman cultivated 
close ties with the US government, particularly within the Central Intelligence Agency. 
His brother, Carlos Alejos, was made Ambassador to the United States. After the 1960 
military revolt, Alejos was a persona non grata among the Guatemalan elite. Most 
believed the millionaire reaped enormous financial and political rewards for allowing the 
CIA to train Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion—violating Guatemalan 
sovereignty and national dignity in the process.  
Instead of distancing himself from the hated Alejos, Ydígoras kept him close and 
he remained one of the President’s most trusted allies. It was not unswerving loyalty to an 
old friend, however, that caused the wily President to select Alejos. In an interview, 
‘Miguelito’ Ydígoras Lappara, the son of the Guatemalan president, claimed that the two 
political allies had a complicated relationship. Apparently, Roberto Alejos had dealt 
Ydígoras a “stab in the back” when he threatened to publicize a letter criticizing the 
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President and his administration for corruption.450 These charges were ironic, considering 
Alejos was a renowned source of graft. Ydígoras told his son, “Roberto [Alejos] has the 
worm of ambition eating at him. If he wins he will someday receive a letter like that and 
that will be my revenge”.451 Personal loyalty, then, cannot fully explain why Ydígoras 
chose Alejos. Yet, taking Ydígoras at his word and assuming that some sort of long-
harbored revenge motivated the nomination is unsatisfactory considering the Guatemalan 
president had many other means at his disposal that would have been more effective.  
Most of Ydígoras’ opponents saw the nomination of Alejos as being rooted in 
some form of corruption. Many on the right believed that Ydígoras had nominated Alejos 
to ensure Arévalo would win, feeding the existing rumors of collusion between these 
parties. FUNA and angered RDN members circulated fliers calling on Guatemalans to 
think carefully of the suspicious connections between Arévalo and Ydígoras, claiming 
that the latter had sheltered and assisted the former while simultaneously destroying the 
unity of the anticommunist parties.452 They alleged that the only logical conclusion was 
that Ydígoras, Arévalo, and Alejos were going to deliver the country to Castro and 
communism.453 Others, like Ambassador Bell, maintained a less conspiratorial view, but 
believed that Ydígoras was trying to secure a life of comfort, preferably in Guatemala, 
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after his term expired.454 To this end, Ydígoras had made arrangements with Alejos, and 
possibly Arévalo in the event of his electoral victory, that ensured he would retire in 
dignity—and wealth. Ultimately, it is sensible to conclude that Ydígoras was making 
arrangements for his post-presidential life, but these machination took place in secret.  In 
truth, Ydígoras’ motivations for nominating Alejos remain obscured. Regardless, the 
decision ensured his downfall. 
* * * 
The Guatemalan military remained unconvinced by Ydígoras’ political schemes. 
The endorsement of Alejos as the official government candidate pushed Defense Minister 
Enrique Peralta, who had avoided intrigue and averted plots to overthrow the president, 
to reconsider his position. Days before Ydígoras made his announcement, the US 
embassy reported that Peralta and other military chiefs met with their president to 
reiterate their opposition to Arévalo. In a thinly-veiled threat, Peralta told Ydígoras “that 
a united Army would never permit Arévalo or other extreme leftist…to take office even if 
prevention necessitated use [of] illegal force.”455 Banning Arévalo from entering the 
country was the only acceptable way to achieve this goal. The military leadership also 
opposed the candidacy of Roberto Alejos. Although the military had not forgiven Alejos 
for his role in hosting the Bay of Pigs invasion force, they were more concerned that his 
candidacy would ensure an Arévalo victory by dividing anticommunist voters. Peralta 
and his fellow officers suggested that Ydígoras abandon Alejos and support any of the 
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other conservative candidates.456 In response, the President delivered the same lecture 
that he had given Ambassador Bell previously—barring Arévalo would “martyrize” him, 
whereas allowing him to compete against fellow leftist in the election would neutralize 
him.457 Yet the President recognized that he had been backed into a corner by the 
military’s ultimatum and agreed that he would impede Arévalo’s return. When the 
meeting concluded, Defense Minister Peralta believed that they had finally come to 
agreement. When Ydígoras nominated Alejos the following week, what little confidence 
Peralta had in Ydígoras withered. He could no longer hold back the mounting pressure 
from the military and business community to end the Ydígoras Presidency. 
 On March 12, four days after Ydígoras declared Alejos the official RDN 
candidate, the US Deputy Chief of Mission, Robert Corrigan, met secretly with Arturo 
Peralta, the brother and confidant of the Minister of Defense. Peralta’s brother told 
Corrigan that Ydígoras’ selection of Alejos, whose venality earned him enemies in all 
sectors of Guatemalan society, guaranteed that Arévalo would win the election.458 
Furthermore, Arturo Peralta repeated the claim that Ydígoras was working with Arévalo 
and could not be trusted. While this notion at one time seemed ridiculous, the perplexing 
nomination of Alejos gave the rumor of Ydígoras-Arévalo collusion more merit. 
Guatemala was, once more, on the brink.  
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 According to Corrigan, Arturo Peralta also explained the benefits of a military 
government headed by his brother, the Minister of Defense. The new military regime 
would immediately enact economic reforms, place capable men in the ministries, and 
bring much needed integrity and efficiency to the Guatemalan government.459 Peralta had 
considerable support within the armed forces, however the Army would not act until it 
was certain that the coup would succeed and that the United States would recognize the 
new government as legitimate. Corrigan gathered that the Defense Minister’s brother 
sought some indication of how the United States would respond positively to Ydígoras’ 
expulsion, but the diplomat refused to speculate on how the US might react to a coup. 
The silence in Corrigan’s report was telling. The United States would give no open 
endorsement, but neither would it prevent Peralta from seizing control. In a later report to 
the ambassador, Corrigan revealed “that [the] Army, supported and impelled by various 
non-communist, anti-government political groups, is indeed disposed to find [a] bold, 
forceful solution. In our opinion, there is no doubt [the] President’s blatant espousal of 
Roberto Alejos has catalyzed and almost electrified opposition to continuation in office 
of Ydígoras.”460 Corrigan concluded that uncertainty over how the US would react 
seemed to be the only thing preventing military action against Ydígoras.461 The gathering 
momentum behind a coup seemed unstoppable. 
 Guatemala’s high-ranking military officers had long developed a close 
relationships with American officials through direct contact with the US diplomatic and 
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military missions. Peralta was neither the first nor the last military leader to engage with 
American officials outside the auspices of the Guatemalan state. For nearly a year, the 
Defense Minister had been signaling that the military found an Arévalo candidacy 
unacceptable and was prepared to take action in order to prevent it. He had several 
discussions with President Ydígoras, Ambassador Bell, and had even given public press 
conferences where he declared that under his command, the Guatemalan Armed Forces 
would block Arévalo from returning to the country. Since the counterrevolution of 1954, 
the military defined itself as the bulwark against communism, and the return of Arévalo, 
the “spiritual-socialist”, presented an existential threat. If Peralta failed to deliver on his 
promise, not only would he lose all credibility within the armed forces, but both the 
purpose and the capabilities of the Guatemalan military would be called into question. To 
preserve the institution and its role in Guatemalan society, the Defense Minister was 
willing to sacrifice constitutional governance and the rule of law. All he needed was the 
tacit support of the Kennedy administration to legitimize the overthrow and resulting 
military-government. Backed by the United States, no political party or civil institution 
would be able to challenge the authority of the Guatemalan Armed Forces over the state.    
President Ydígoras was not a fool. He calculated that the military would move 
against him with the quiet consent of the United States. To make matters worse for his 
administration, demonstrators across entire political spectrum took to the streets of 
Guatemala City to protest Ydígoras, Alejos, and the United States. With shouts of “Viva 
Arévalo”, “Viva Castro” and “Down with the US” demonstrators assailed the US 
embassy and the National Congress, breaking windows and damaging property.462 
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Although united in their opposition of the Ydígoras government, the politically polarized 
participants also turned on each other when “several indignant anti-communist women 
hurled buckets of urine at heckling Arevalists”.463 After the police began arresting 
demonstrators, the protests turned into a full-scale riot. “Roving bands of youths” 
disrupted traffic and hurled rocks in minor skirmishes with police.464 The police 
responded by trapping roughly one-hundred students and some professors in a 
commercial night school and bombarding them with tear gas. Although the clashes 
claimed no lives, the capital was a scene of anarchy.  
Seeking self-preservation above all, Ydígoras finally acceded to Peralta’s 
demands. The President had previously proclaimed that in order for Arévalo to enter the 
country, he must prove that he was not a communist. Now, Ydígoras claimed to have 
evidence that Arévalo was a communist and, therefore, ineligible for office. He also 
forbade the commercial airlines on the Mexico-Guatemala route from transporting 
Arévalo to Guatemala.465 Ydígoras reversed his previous stance on dividing the political 
left and now claimed that if Arévalo participated in the election, he would win by a 
substantial majority.466 Ydígoras also expressed his frustrations with the United States. 
He complained that President Kennedy and the US government had failed to deal with 
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him responsibly when his vigilance alone had warded off communism in Guatemala.467 
President Ydígoras’ sudden reversals and denunciations read like the last acts of a 
desperate man.  
Most military leaders were skeptical of Ydígoras’ about-face and continued to 
believe that the steps he had taken were simply political feints and they prepared for the 
coup they determined was inevitable. Ydígoras had long professed that Arévalo’s 
participation in the election was necessary for Guatemalan democracy. Having sacrificed 
his goal of presiding over a fair and fully-democratic election, Ydígoras believed he had 
sufficiently placated the military and bought himself more room to maneuver. Roland 
Ebel’s interviews with the president’s son suggest that all that mattered to Ydígoras now 
was staying in office for the remainder of his term, and he hoped that his final meeting 
with President Kennedy would solidify his position.468 
In San Jose, Costa Rica the presidents of Central America and the United States 
gathered together to discuss the most pressing issues of the turbulent region.469 Ydígoras 
would have the ear of President Kennedy for two days, and the cunning politician had 
crafted a plan to safeguard his office from the growing threat of a military coup. 
Guatemala had long laid claim to British Honduras (Belize), and Guatemalan leaders, 
including Ydígoras, had often rallied nationalist support, particularly in the military, with 
renewed demands that Britain return the territory. Roland Ebel maintains that Ydígoras 
thought that if he could secure US support for annexation, “it would be a great nationalist 
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triumph that would neutralize the Army and most of his detractors.”470  To this end, 
Ydígoras had previously sent Ambassador Carlos Alejos to Washington D.C. to present 
the Kennedy administration with formative plans for Guatemala’s annexation of Belize. 
When the two presidents met in San Jose, Ydígoras presented Kennedy with favorable 
terms in exchange for helping Guatemala and Great Britain come to an agreement. If 
Kennedy promised to work with Ydígoras to secure Belize, he would grant US 
companies a monopoly on natural resource extraction in the region for up to ninety-nine 
years. To Ydígoras’ surprise, President Kennedy readily accepted the proposal without 
much discussion. Kennedy stated he would contact the British Foreign Office and arrange 
for a conference that would examine the issue of the sovereignty of Belize.471 By the time 
Ydígoras returned to Guatemala, his Foreign Minister, Unda Murillo informed the 
president that the British had already contacted his office to request a delegation. Full of 
newfound confidence, Ydígoras told a reporter that he was “going to kick the British out 
of our lost Province of Belize” with the help of the United States, who he paradoxically 
dubbed “the Royal Knights of Liberty.”472 For the moment, it appeared the wily Ydígoras 
had scored a major victory that would bring expansionist business interests and 
nationalistic military men back into the fold.  
While Ydígoras focused on stitching a political parachute from promises of 
Guatemalan territorial growth, a different problem captured the attention of his American 
counterpart: the impending arrival of Juan José Arévalo. Kennedy grilled Ydígoras over 
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“what measures might be taken [to] make it more difficult for Arévalo to win.”473 He 
lectured the Guatemalan president, warning him that “Arévalo would undoubtedly 
campaign as [an] anti-communist moderate but he would be dangerous if he won [the] 
election.”474 President Ydígoras tried to reassure Kennedy and admitted that Arévalo’s 
initial return would be disruptive, but that the former president’s popularity would 
evaporate quickly. Additionally, Ydígoras revealed his newest plot—he would publicly 
proclaim the “need for Arévaloism without Arévalo and for having [a] new man as 
candidate to carry [it] out.”475 If the plan worked, it would create further divisions within 
the leftist camp and prevent his presidency. If that failed, Ydígoras agreed with Kennedy 
that communist would be able to steer the Arévalo administration, and that a “preventive 
coup might be called for” in the unlikely event of an Arévalo victory.476  
Although it remained unapparent to Ydígoras, these answers did not soothe 
Kennedy’s Castro-induced anxieties. Notably missing from Ydígoras’ reply was his 
recent promise that Arévalo would not be allowed back into Guatemala. When he 
recounted his conversation with Kennedy in a meeting with Ambassador Bell, Ydígoras 
presented an overwhelmingly positive outlook on the future of US-Guatemalan relations, 
although he did note that the American president firmly opposed Arévalo. To the surprise 
of the ambassador, Ydígoras resurrected his previous position, “that to attempt illegal 
barring from [the] country was not sure of success and might make him (Arévalo) [a] 
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martyr or lead to intolerable agitation.”477 He repeated that the best way to defeat Arévalo 
was through honest elections. Ambassador Bell agreed that free and fair elections would 
be ideal, but that “there was great danger that Arévalo might win [the] election.”478 When 
they had met the month before, Ydígoras’ argument for Arévalo’s political participation 
had briefly convinced Ambassador Bell, but now the diplomat stuck to the Kennedy 
administration’s position. President Ydígoras likely knew of, and certainly suspected, 
Bell’s close ties with Defense Minister Peralta, and warned the ambassador that “the 
extent and dependability of Army opposition to Arévalo” was suspect and could not 
guarantee a desirable political outcome for either the United States of Guatemala.479 In 
returning to his previous stance on Arévalo, Ydígoras did not inspire confidence in the 
ambassador. Bell was certainly not persuaded to disregard the military or its threat to take 
serious action should Arévalo enter the country. A final showdown between the President 
and his Minister of Defense loomed inevitable. 
President Ydigoras’ questionable political choices following the botched Air 
Force attack revitalized his opponents within the conservative political parties and the 
military. Although Ydigoras perceived his meeting with Kennedy as a success, his efforts 
to mend fences through international deal-making with the Kennedy administration failed 
to secure the United States’ support because the Guatemalan president persisted in his 
refusal to bar Arevalo from the country. The Guatemalan Armed Forces stood united 
behind Defense Minister Peralta’s promise to prevent Arevalo from campaigning for the 
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presidency even if it meant discarding democracy. Even if the United States had not 
actively pursued close ties with the Guatemalan high command, there is little doubt that it 
would have supported the anticommunist military over the besieged and friendless 
President Ydigoras. When the time came for Kennedy to make that decision, it was a 
hardly a choice at all.   
 
A Cornered Fox: The Overthrow of Ydígoras 
 
 A conservative general from the Ubico era was an unlikely final thread to hold 
together the tatters of Guatemalan democracy, but his own military determined that 
President Ydigoras must be cut from the government in order to preserve their 
accumulated power. These military leaders had backing from conservative civilian 
politicians and had reason to believe that the United States would support their coup. 
President Ydigoras remained defiant until he could no longer maneuver and manipulate 
his way out of his perpetually precarious situation. Guatemalan democracy died as US-
made tanks breached the doors of the la Casa Crema.  
Violence and chaos erupted across Guatemala as speculation increased that 
Arévalo was about to return. Throughout late March, bombs exploded across Guatemala 
City. In his report sent on March 20, DCM Corrigan wrote that he believed the army had 
staged these bombings to justify an imposition of a state of siege.480 Five days later, 
Corrigan’s suspicions of an army plot were confirmed when the government declared a 
state of siege because of a “vast plan [of] agitation and violence” by armed communist 
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groups.481 Ambassador Bell noted that the government suspended Article 46, among 
other constitutional provisions, which guaranteed Guatemalans the right to enter or leave 
the country.482 The military had initiated the process of blocking Juan Jose Arévalo from 
exercising his legal right to run for president. 
Two days before the state of siege, on March 23, the Guatemalan Supreme Court 
declared that Arévalo had the right to enter the country and run for president. 
Anticommunists took to the streets in huge numbers, and roughly thirty-thousand flooded 
Guatemala City to protest Arévalo, Ydígoras, and the decision of the Supreme Court. In 
response, leftists mobilized their own forces and added to the anarchic situation. Students 
vandalized the homes of right-wing politicians, guerrillas attacked Army installations, 
and armed raiders freed one of Arbenz’s militant supporters, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, 
from prison.483It was doubtful that the Arévalo question would be solved peacefully. 
Defense Minister Peralta used the widespread civil unrest to set the stage for a 
coup. After the nomination of Alejos, the Minister of Defense had likely resolved to 
remove Ydígoras and was biding his time. While Kennedy and Ydígoras discussed Belize 
and Arévalo in Costa Rica, the chief of the presidential military staff, Colonel Catalino 
Chavez, told President Ydígoras’ son that Peralta had requested his assistance in the 
impending overthrow of Ydígoras. In his interview with Roland Ebel, Miguel Ydígoras 
Jr. admitted he did not take the accusation seriously because he believed that the Minister 
of Defense would never make such a move, especially while Ydígoras was meeting with 
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the other heads of state.484 In addition to restricting travel, the state of siege, essentially a 
declaration of martial law, enhanced Peralta’s legal authority. He issued orders that 
prohibited gatherings with more than four people and forbade any political party 
activities. The police were placed under direct military control and all security forces 
were permitted to conduct searches and arrests of anyone they deemed suspect. Weapons 
permits for civilians were cancelled. Escalating his silent takeover of the state, Peralta 
consolidated all public relations functions of the government under the Ministry of 
Defense and took control of all radio and television broadcasts.485 For the moment, 
Peralta was satisfied and justified his actions to the US embassy as being sufficient to 
prevent Arévalo from returning. When asked what would happen should Arévalo return 
anyway the Defense Minster replied ominously: “We have other methods [for] handling 
him.”486 
 When he had been president of Guatemala, Arévalo had refused to be intimidated 
by threats from the military, and he had not changed in the thirteen years since he had left 
office. He had survived dozens of coup attempts during his presidency and many of them 
originated from within his own military. To back down now would have been not only 
out of character for the charismatic politician, but it would have been viewed as 
cowardice and betrayal by his supporters. Ambassador Bell received word from “high 
Arevalist sources” that Arévalo was undeterred by the state of siege and would return on 
                                                 
484 Interview with Miguel Ydígoras Laparra, February 20, 1993: Found in Ebel, Misunderstood Caudillo. 
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485 John O. Bell,  “Telegram 583”, March 26, 1963, National Security Files, Country Files: Guatemala, Box 
101a, John F. Kennedy Library, 1. 
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March 31 at eleven in the morning.487 According to the source, Mexican president Adolfo 
Lopez Mateos had provided Arévalo with a private plane, and several important Mexican 
officials agreed to accompany him, as did twenty-four foreign journalists from the US, 
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic.488 Meanwhile, Defense Minister Peralta reassured 
the embassy that he remained determined to prevent Arévalo’s return to Guatemala.489 
The moment that the American ambassador and Guatemala’s Minister of Defense had 
prepared for was seemingly at hand. 
In fact, Arévalo had already arrived in Guatemala alone on March 27 at a 
secluded farm airstrip. He drove to the outskirts of Guatemala City where he stayed with 
friends, changing his location at night.490 On March 29, Arévalo met with his principal 
followers to determine a course of action. The CIA learned of Arévalo’s presence in 
Guatemala on March 29 and speculated that he might lead his followers in an uprising, 
but the former president managed to hold only a few quiet, clandestine meetings with 
peasants and supporters.491 Arévalo knew that with the state of siege, he had be wary of 
major urban areas, so parading into Guatemala City and rallying partisans was out of the 
question. Instead, Arévalo held a private conference with journalists from major 
American news outlets—among them were Paul Kennedy of the New York Times and 
Dan Rather of CBS news. The gathered journalists heard Arévalo’s final appeal to the 
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people of Guatemala and the government of the United States. First and foremost, he 
tried to reach out to the Guatemalan Army by telling his followers to obey the restrictions 
set out by the state of siege. He wanted to avoid any potential “disagreeable” situations 
that might occur from public demonstrations.492 He also promised he would not punish 
political opponents and that he sought a friendly relationship with the Kennedy 
administration. To facilitate a peaceful campaign and show respect for the military’s 
decrees, Arévalo announced he would spend time among the campesinos in the southern 
coast and avoid Guatemala City until the state of siege was lifted. The interview with 
Arévalo was published the following day, March 30, in Prensa Libre. The interview was 
only the third publicly announced political statement that Arévalo released regarding his 
1963 presidential bid.493 That night, Defense Minister Peralta made his move against 
President Ydígoras. 
At 11:00pm on March 30, 1963, a mass of troops and armor surrounded la Casa 
Crema under the cover of darkness.494 Nine-hundred soldiers, many of them from the 
President’s own Guardia de Honor, blocked the streets as Sherman tanks rumbled into 
position around the Presidential Palace. Such a show of overwhelming force was sure to 
deter the unpredictable Guatemalan president from resisting the inescapable. His six 
remaining loyal bodyguards conceded that come the morning, they could no longer 
                                                 
492 Prensa Libre, 30 Marzo, 1963, CIRMA 
493 The first was his announcement that he would run for office. The second, his ill-received “Carta política 
al pueblo de Guatemala” began its circulation in Guatemala in late January, 1963. 
494 This account has been reconstructed from the following sources: Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, My War with 
Communism. (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1963), 1-7 ; Chicago Tribune April 1, 1963 ; Roland Ebel, 
Misunderstood Cauldillo, 288-291. 
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protect President Ydígoras. The Old General of Guatemala was to make his final stand 
against his own military. 
The long anticipated coup did not come as a complete shock. Arévalo’s covert 
entry into Guatemala, despite Peralta’s proclamations and precautions, humiliated the 
Defense Minister and made the competency of the Guatemalan Armed Forces seem 
highly questionable: an aging academic had confounded and circumvented the best 
efforts of the most powerful military in Central America. When Arévalo revealed himself 
through his press conference, the surprised President and the Defense Minister sprang 
into action. The following morning, March 30, Ydígoras caught wind that officers were 
planning to remove him from office that evening. He immediately contacted Peralta, who 
feigned ignorance and reported that all military bases remained loyal. Despite his 
assurances, Peralta was in the midst of making final preparations for usurping the 
President later that night. In a last-ditch effort to rally support for the constitutional 
government, Ydígoras called together his cabinet and the leaders of the major 
conservative parties.495 During the meeting, Ydígoras received word that Peralta was 
making rounds with his subordinates to discuss a solution to the Arévalo problem, and 
the Guatemalan president made one final plea to his political colleagues. If they publicly 
announced a united anti-Arévalo front, presumably by endorsing Roberto Alejos as their 
joint-candidate, Ydígoras hoped military action might still be forestalled. Ydígoras, 
however, had long spent his political capital and had alienated his potential allies in the 
room. The MDN and the MLN would not join with Ydígoras’ rapidly crumbling 
government. President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes was on his own. 
                                                 
495 This included Roberto Alejos of RDN, Cruz Salazar of MDN, Luis Urrutia of MLN, Congressional 
president Miguel Angel Ortega Merida.  
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 Late that night, after their forces had surrounded the presidential residence, three 
officers called upon Ydígoras to surrender. He refused and spat a challenge to his 
rebellious soldiers: “Lead me to the wall first.”496 He turned to his wife and announced, 
“Maria Teresa, this night you will become a widow” before returning inside the residence 
to play for more time.497 Scrambling for a miracle, Ydígoras contacted the Air Force 
chief, hoping the adversarial relationship between the branches might provide him with 
some room to maneuver. Although Ydígoras had punished the Air Force for their failed 
coup attempt months before, they professed loyalty and pledged they would do what they 
could to protect the president. With this glimmer of hope, the President immediately tried 
to contact the leaders of Congress and the Supreme Court. His efforts were in vain—the 
men that surrounded la Casa Crema had grown tired of Ydígoras’ stalling and cut all 
telephone cables to prevent the President from plotting. The situation was now hopeless. 
His bodyguards were growing nervous, and he knew further resistance would mean not 
only the end of his life, but the lives of his wife and the handful of men who remained 
with him to the end. Recalling the events that prematurely ended his presidency with his 
signature hyperbole, Ydígoras claimed, “I did not surrender until a tank crushed the weak 
doors of my home and aimed the canon at my very face. It was impossible to resist with 
six loyal officers armed with submachine guns; I would have died in defense of the 
Constitution but too much innocent blood would have been shed.”498 
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 Ydígoras, still the constitutional president of Guatemala, boarded a transport 
provided by the Air Force at 9:00 AM the morning of March 31 and began his exile. He 
would never return to Guatemala. In contrast to his defiance in facing down his mutinous 
troops, Ydígoras told reporters, “What is going on in Guatemala is for her own good and 
for the good of the rest of Central America.”499 In the days that immediately followed his 
removal, Ydígoras decided to place the blame for the coup on unnamed communist 
agitators. The perpetual crises that surrounded his presidency were, according to 
Ydígoras, a concerted effort by Castro’s minions in Guatemala, and the coup was the 
culmination of their efforts. While he had requested that other governments recognize 
Peralta’s government as legitimate to impede communist gains in Guatemala, he also 
lamented that the military takeover could backfire “because every setback suffered by 
democratic representative government is a victory for communism.”500 His conciliatory 
tone, however, soon became embittered by the disloyalty of his former allies. Ydígoras 
later opined, “The mere fact that Arévalo was able to enter Guatemala and evade the 
security measure set up by Defense Minister [Peralta] Azurdia, and brazenly hold a press 
conference in a secret place, imperiled [his] prestige and political future.”501 A week after 
being removed from office, Ydígoras reasoned that Peralta had needed “to find a 
scapegoat to cover up his inertia and weakness. Treason was the path he chose and I was 
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his victim”502 While Ydígoras reflected on his downfall in exile, he came to believe that 
he had been betrayed by not only Defense Minister Peralta, but also by the United States. 
A reformer and despot, modernizer and regressive, foreign puppet and 
ultranationalist—the contradictory, nebulous, and unpredictable nature of Miguel 
Ydígoras’ politics makes succinct and accurate descriptions of the Guatemalan president 
impossible. The period of his presidency, however, can be more definitively described. 
Guatemala briefly emerged from the chaos of the counterrevolution, only to be plunged 
back into internal strife as opposition to government policies mounted and eventually 
developed into armed insurrection. During the Ydígoras Presidency, the Guatemalan 
Civil War—one of the longest, bloodiest conflicts in the Western Hemisphere—began.  
Miguel Ydígoras and Juan José Arévalo are both larger-than-life figures in 
Guatemalan political history, but whereas Arévalo received overwhelmingly positive 
coverage from biographers and scholars, Ydígoras’ reputation is much more mixed. 
Authors writing during or soon after his presidency often suggested Ydígoras was a 
democratic reformer who “lifted most of the repressive features of the Liberation 
(Castillo Armas) regime.”503 The most well-known works on US-Guatemalan relations 
often portray Ydígoras in a negative light.504 Cruel, despotic, manipulative, and 
avaricious are but a few of the unflattering descriptors scholars attribute to the man. They 
charge that Ydígoras ineptly ran a corrupt, heavy-handed quasi-dictatorship that paved 
                                                 
502 Ibid., 6. 
503 Jerry Weaver, “Political Style of the Guatemalan Military Elite.” Studies in Comparative International 
Development,  Vol 5, No. 4, 1969-1970, p. 72; see also Franklin D. Parker, The Central American 
Republics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 107 
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the way for future military governments. Others focus on his fervent anticommunism, 
labelling him a reactionary, an archconservative, or even a fascist relic of the Ubico 
era.505 Paradoxically, some of Ydígoras’ adversaries alleged he was secretly a communist 
supporter.506 Edelberto Torres-Rivas, the renowned Guatemalan sociologist, tempers 
these more severe characterizations, calling the Ydígoras period a “pseudo-democratic 
interregnum”507 
Yet, still other scholars, particularly those who have focused extensively on 
Ydígoras and his time, present a more complicated picture. Stephen Streeter portrays 
Ydígoras as an embattled nationalist and savvy politician with a militarist streak who had 
to placate contradicting interests in Guatemala and abroad. In Ydígoras’ only English-
language biography, political scientist Roland Ebel provides the General with his most 
flattering portrayal, although the many faults and problems of his government are 
adequately covered. Here, Ydígoras appears as a tragic hero with mighty ambitions beset 
by implacable forces that eventually overwhelmed his best efforts.  Ebel ultimately 
concludes that Ydígoras’ removal from office resulted from his steadfast defense of 
modernization and Guatemalan democracy. His work addresses issues of violent 
repression and corruption, but these aspects fade behind Ebel’s creation of Ydígoras the 
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Political Dynamo. Certainly, General Ydígoras preferred Ebel’s portrayal.508 Miguel 
Ydígoras’ own extensive writings on his life most closely align with Ebel’s: “I swore 
fealty to the Constitution and in my heart vowed that nothing would stand in the way of 
my earnest desire to see democracy a reality in Guatemala.”509  
 After five years of skillfully maneuvering through the turbulent political situation 
in Guatemala and withstanding uncounted plots against his presidency, Miguel Ydigoras 
lost the battle against his many adversaries. Moreover, he had failed to secure a legacy of 
democracy for Guatemala, which only further tarnished his historical reputation. With his 
removal from office, Guatemala’s fragile democracy shattered. Almost the entirety of 
Guatemala’s political spectrum had reason to celebrate Ydigoras’ downfall, but the 
commanding officers of the Guatemalan Armed Forces were the real victors. Defense 
Minister Peralta, now the head-of-state, began to dismantle the constitutional republic 
and replaced it with a military dictatorship. In the nine years since the 1954 coup against 
Arbenz, the Guatemalan officer corps had steadily accumulated power, but the ouster of 
Ydigoras was the singular moment where the country transitioned from civilian to 
military rule. 
 
 
 
                                                 
508 It is worth reiterating here that Roland Ebel had personal contacts with the Ydígoras family. He wrote 
his the political biography of President Ydígoras, Misunderstood Caudillo, with the blessing of the family 
and access to the president’s personal archives. Ebel was introduced to President Ydígoras’ grandson at 
Tulane University, where Ebel taught and Mike Ydígoras attended college. President Ydígoras even 
granted Ebel the opportunity to record his oral history of his political life. Ebel preserved many of these 
documents, as well as some retrieved from the Ydígoras private collection, at Tulane University. This is 
also discussed in the introduction of this study. 
509 Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, My War With Communism. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963)74 
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Kennedy’s Culpability: The United States’ Role in the 1963 Coup 
 
  The overthrow of Ydigoras was executed by Guatemalans, but the United States 
played a significant role in the coup, and the subsequent development of a military 
dictatorship. When Peralta announced the military had overthrown Ydígoras, there was 
no sense of surprise or disapproval at the US embassy. In the year since Arévalo had 
announced his candidacy, Ambassador Bell and his staff had encouraged the idea that the 
rule of a military government was not only a likely outcome, but potentially a positive 
good for Guatemala. While the CIA knew of the plot before it was initiated, the US 
embassy did not confirm the coup until the following day, after receiving word from 
Peralta’s brother, Arturo, that the defense minister had become the head of state and that 
all commanding officers of the various security forces supported the Colonel-
President.510 The American ambassador was relieved and proud of his accomplishment. 
Guided by Ambassador Bell, the Kennedy administration had successfully influenced 
regime-change in Guatemala without resorting to an overt display of aggression like the 
1954 coup that toppled Arbenz. Nonetheless, for the second time in less than a decade, 
the United States had played a significant role in deposing a democratically elected 
president in Guatemala.   
Scholars have agreed that Kennedy knew of the coup and must have given his 
approval because the Guatemalan military would not so easily sacrifice the close 
relationship it enjoyed with the United States. There has been scant evidence, however, to 
support this claim. The authors who have addressed this issue have relied primarily on a 
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single article from the Chicago Daily News, printed over three years after the events 
transpired.511  Georgie Anne Geyer  reported that “top sources from the Kennedy 
administration” informed her that President Kennedy met with top advisors to discuss 
Guatemala’s presidential election two weeks before he met with President Ydígoras in 
Costa Rica.512 Kennedy chose four men to help him decide how to handle the problem of 
Arévalo – Teodoro Moscoso, coordinator for the Alliance for Progress; Edwin Martin, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, CIA chief Richard Helms, and 
Ambassador John Bell. Geyer asserted that Bell and Moscoso opposed each other at the 
meeting. “Ambassador Bell argued vehemently that Arévalo, who had been president 
from 1944 to 1950, was a Communist and that his election must be prevented at all 
costs”513 Moscoso defended Arévalo and argued that the former president had “showed 
how, once in office, men of the non-Communist left developed [a] reform-minded, 
progressive administration”.514 Kennedy was unsure how to proceed, and called upon his 
advisors to vote on what action to take. According to Geyer’s sources, only Moscoso 
opposed the coup against Ydígoras to prevent Arévalo’s candidacy. Geyer lamented the 
decision and provided an unflattering and accurate evaluation of the trajectory of 
Kennedy’s policies in Latin America. 
                                                 
511 Some notable works that have utilized Geyer’s article: George Black, Garrison Guatemala; Roland 
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“The Ydígoras coup came at a time when the brilliance of the 
Kennedy administration’s early concern over pushing democracy 
in Latin America was dimming. The failure of the Bay of Pigs 
invasion, and the concomitant new reliance on military regimes 
against communism, ignited the change. The new policy was being 
formed that came to be known as a more pragmatic approach”.515 
 
After Geyer’s story broke, two participants denied that the meeting had ever taken 
place. Edwin Martin and Ambassador Bell both refuted the claim, and wrote personal 
letters to the exiled Ydígoras professing their innocence.516 Bell’s denial was categorical. 
The ambassador announced that “This coup was not suggested by the US, it was not 
arranged, managed or supported by the US” although he did admit that he “did not find 
the military’s attitude surprising or illogical.”517 Bell even went as far as to blame a 
disgruntled Moscoso, who he described as “not a bad fellow but very Latin,” for leaking 
the fabricated story to the Geyer.518 Martin’s response was more telling: “I would guess 
that we may have decided not to try to stop the military if they moved to overthrow 
Ydígoras, a quite different thing than in initiating a coup”.519 Kennedy’s advisors 
maintained a degree of secrecy, but their refutations hinted that something had indeed 
taken place. 
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516 Bell and Martin composed letters to Ydígoras dated Feb. 9, 1967 and May 11, 1967 respectively. They 
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Recently declassified documents support the contention that President Kennedy 
assented to the military coup. In an oral history recorded in 1964, Teodoro Moscoso 
elaborated on the meeting he had with Kennedy the day the President decided to support 
the military coup. Moscoso’s account roughly parallels the story reported by Geyer two 
years later, but there are some crucial differences that affect how Kennedy’s decision 
should be evaluated.  
According to Moscoso’s interview, on March 25, five days before Ydígoras’s 
ouster, President Kennedy called some of his most trusted advisors on Latin America into 
the Oval Office to discuss the problem of the Guatemalan elections. Present were Edwin 
Martin, Ambassador John Bell, CIA agent Cord Meyer, and Moscoso.  Kennedy asked 
the men he had gathered a simple question about the complicated situation in Guatemala: 
“What do you think – what shall we do about this?”520 Moscoso told the president that a 
military coup was a bad idea, and that he did not believe that Arévalo was genuinely a 
communist. To add credence to his claim, he directly asked Agent Meyer if, as a 
representative of the CIA, he believed Arévalo was a communist. Meyer bluntly said, 
“No, I don’t think so.”521 Emboldened by Meyer’s support, Moscoso pushed further and 
told Kennedy “we should not condemn [Arévalo] this way” and, echoing Schlesinger’s 
memo from a few months earlier, suggested that Arévalo was “impressionable” and that 
the United States could harness his popularity among Guatemalans while molding him 
with “aid and assistance, [to] try to conduct him to the right way.”522 Clearly frustrated 
                                                 
520 Teodoro Moscoso, Oral History Interview #2, May 25, 1964, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. 
Page 127. 
521 Ibid. 
522 Ibid. 128 
 263 
 
 
with Kennedy’s willingness to accept military rule in Guatemala, Moscoso concluded his 
remarks to the president saying, “And, for heaven’s sake, let’s be careful how we treat 
democracy in these countries. Unless we nourish it, unless we promote it, unless we 
educate the people in ways of democracy, these people will never learn how to govern 
themselves.”523 
That Schlesinger and Moscoso shared this unique perspective on Arévalo within 
the Kennedy administration is no surprise. Both men were architects of the Alliance for 
Progress and major proponents of modernization theory. Together, they represented the 
idealistic ambitions of the Alliance. Likewise, both seem divorced from the political 
realities of small, underdeveloped nations and the impact of the Cold War on their 
deeply-rooted socioeconomic structures. Similarly, Moscoso and Schlesinger shared a 
conviction in the ability of the United States government to wield its influence and power 
to create positive change abroad. In his interview, Moscoso emphasized, “in a country 
such as Guatemala, in Central America, I assure you, that the influence of the United 
States is so preponderant that we could have democracy there.”524 Ultimately, by his own 
admission, Moscoso, along with many other supporters of US developmentalist 
modernization theory, believed that Guatemalans were incapable of governing 
themselves in a democracy, and only the United States could bring light to this darkness. 
Within the Kennedy administration, even those most receptive to democratic, civilian 
rule in Guatemala clung to patronizing notions of the cultural and political inferiority of 
Latin America. 
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  After Moscoso had finished laying out his opposition, President Kennedy turned 
to Ambassador Bell and asked for his assessment. The ambassador flatly rejected 
Moscoso’s plea stating, “Well, I think rather not to have an election than have Arévalo 
elected.”525 In this moment, Moscoso claimed that “the decision was taken right then and 
there.” President Kennedy “looked at the carpet, thought for a minute, and said, ‘O.K. 
This is it,” confirming that the United States would not stop the military coup.526 
Reflecting on the meeting, Moscoso blamed Ambassador Bell, stating that he had gone 
too far and was actively encouraging the coup. He also reluctantly shared his 
disappointment in President Kennedy: “I had, perhaps foolishly, held the President on 
such a high pedestal that he came down at least a step or two when he made that 
decision.”527 Moscoso regretfully concluded, “Now, were we willing to undertake the 
very, very difficult task of trying to hold on to someone who might be an ultranationalist, 
who might be leftwinger, who is not a Communist, in the right path? Apparently that 
takes a little more doing and we were not willing to do it. That is what I resented.”528  
The two most significant differences in these accounts revolve around who 
supported the coup and when the meeting took place. In Moscoso’s account, CIA chief 
Richard Helms, who was soon after promoted to Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, was not present. Instead, Agent Meyer represented the CIA and, contrary to the 
Geyer article, supported Moscoso in denying the links between Arévalo and communism. 
Geyer did note, “there is also some evidence that lower level CIA officials, who 
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appreciated Ydígoras’ help in the Cuban invasion, were not in agreement with the 
decision.”529 This could be a reference to Cord Meyer, although the nature of his 
opposition differs from Moscoso’s recounting. Moscoso’s version also presents a much 
more contentious debate—with Kennedy’s advisors split down the middle, the choice still 
fell to the president. Alternatively, Geyer’s story portrays a president who accepted the 
majority vote of his most knowledgeable officials. Moscoso’s retelling places the full 
weight of the decision, and its consequences, on Kennedy. 
The two sources also differ on the fixed date for this meeting. Geyer’s sources 
claimed that the meeting had taken place early in 1963, at least two weeks before 
Ydígoras and Kennedy met in Costa Rica. Moscoso placed the meeting on March 25, five 
days after Kennedy and Ydígoras returned to their respective countries. It was also the 
same day that the Guatemalan government declared a state of siege to block Arévalo’s 
impending arrival. Two separate meetings may have taken place, but this is unlikely 
given the parallels in purpose of the meeting, the people who attended it, and the general 
narrative of the events that transpired.  
White House records reference a meeting between the President and Edwin 
Martin on the subject of Arévalo that took place on January 22, but it is unclear if anyone 
else attended.530 No minutes of the meeting or memoranda summaries record what was 
discussed exists for public viewing. Moreover, it is unlikely that the decision was made 
as early as January. In mid-February, Bell had met with Ydígoras to discuss the situation, 
and the Guatemalan president had impressed the ambassador with his strategy to defeat 
                                                 
529 Geyer, “Twists and Turns of Our Guatemala Policy” 
530 McGeorge Bundy to Ralph Dungan, January 24, 1963. National Security Files, Country Files: 
Guatemala, Box 101a, John F. Kennedy Library. 
 266 
 
 
Arévalo in an open election. Moreover, if Geyer’s estimated date is correct, Kennedy’s 
meetings with Ydígoras in Costa Rica were a deceptive and callous maneuver. Drowning 
in a tide of popular discontent, Kennedy had provided the beleaguered Ydígoras a 
potential life-preserver by agreeing to work with Guatemala on negotiating the 
annexation of Belize. Also, Kennedy had harangued Ydígoras on the issue of Arévalo 
and tried to convince him that the former president was too dangerous a threat to allow 
him back into Guatemala. If Kennedy and his advisors had already sealed Ydígoras’ fate 
weeks earlier, this encounter served little purpose other than to deceive Ydígoras and to 
undermine any efforts he would have otherwise made to preserve his presidency.  
If Moscoso’s date of March 25 is accurate, then Kennedy had used the meeting in 
Costa Rica to give Ydígoras a final chance to redeem himself. Unconvinced by Ydígoras’ 
presentation and alarmed by the escalating chaos in Guatemala City, President Kennedy 
sided with Ambassador Bell. Yet, this date is also problematic. On the same day he was 
supposedly meeting with Kennedy, Moscoso, and the other advisors, Bell drafted at least 
two memos, ostensibly sent from the US embassy in Guatemala.531 Although these could 
have been dictated or fabricated, the truth is likely much more mundane, although not any 
simpler.  
It is possible that neither Geyer nor Moscoso were correct, rather the meeting took 
place somewhere in between the dates each proposed. In the days preceding Kennedy’s 
trip to Costa Rica, DCM Corrigan composed the majority of daily communications 
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Files: Guatemala, Box 101a. John F. Kennedy Library. Both sources are cited previously. Telegram 579 
informs the State Department that the Guatemalan government has declared a state of siege. Telegram 580 
summarizes a meeting held with President Ydígoras on March 22, where the president and ambassador 
discussed Ydígoras’ recent trip to Costa Rica and conversations with President Kennedy. 
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coming out of the embassy.532 During this time, Arturo Peralta, brother of the Defense 
Minister, tried to sound out the US position on the coup that he warned was imminent. 
This also followed Ydígoras’ much maligned decision to endorse the candidacy of 
Roberto Alejos. That the vocal Ambassador Bell had nothing to say on these matters of 
importance is surprising, and might suggest that he was away in Washington at some 
point during this period. If true, Kennedy went to Costa Rica knowing that Ydígoras’ 
days were numbered. This could explain why Kennedy so readily accepted Ydígoras’ 
proposal for the annexation of Belize. On the other hand, why would President Kennedy 
bother contacting the British Foreign Ministry over the issue if he knew Ydígoras would 
be ousted in a matter of days? Ultimately, the precise details of the meeting, if they exist, 
remain under the shroud of classification. What is certain is that the United States wanted 
pliable and predictable anticommunist allies in the Western Hemisphere. Guatemala 
would join the growing family of Latin American military-dictatorships.  
*         *         * 
A series of crises encouraged the United States to take a hardline approach to anti-
communism in Guatemala that resulted in the second overthrow of a democratically 
elected government in less than a decade. The idealism and promise of the Alliance for 
Progress’s renewed relationship with Latin America crumbled as the Kennedy 
administration confronted Castro’s Cuba. Under these circumstances, Bell’s fixation on 
blocking Arévalo from running for president seemed rational and necessary for stymieing 
communist influence in Guatemala. Constitutionality and a commitment to democracy 
                                                 
532 From March 12-19, Robert Corrigan drafted nearly all correspondence from the US embassy in 
Guatemala to the White House. Memos from Bell dated March 16 and March 19, 1963 are in the existing 
open records. President Kennedy met with President Ydígoras in Costa Rica from March 18-20. 
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were placed on the backburner because the Kennedy administration had come to believe 
that only the military could produce stability and defend against communism in 
Guatemala. The American ambassador held that development programs and modernizing 
initiatives were too slow and uncertain for the immediate problems he faced in 
Guatemala. Notably, this did not prevent the Kennedy administration from continuing its 
Civic Action programs that funneled Alliance dollars directly into the hands of the 
military. In fact, Ydígoras’ efforts at genuine tax reform, a pre-condition for increased aid 
through the Alliance for Progress, severed the Guatemalan president from the upper class, 
induced a rebellion within the Air Force, and set the stage for a successful military coup.   
Although alternative solutions arose, Ambassador Bell and his superiors never 
seriously considered anything but Arévalo’s exclusion from Guatemalan politics as an 
option. Instead, Bell continued to advocate for the Guatemalan military. Although 
Ydígoras may have briefly convinced the ambassador that the best way to defeat Arévalo 
was through open elections, Bell quickly reverted to the stance shared by his superiors in 
Washington and his contacts in the Guatemalan military hierarchy.  The elaborate fantasy 
of Arévalo’s communist subversion and a dearth of acceptable political candidates 
ensured that the only plausible partner for the United States in Guatemala was its armed 
forces.  
 The Kennedy administration was complicit in the coup, but the role of American 
officials was secondary. The overthrow of Ydígoras was planned and executed by 
Guatemalans acting in ways they believed best served personal and national interests. 
After five years of perpetual crisis, Ydígoras and his government had become bywords 
for political turmoil, economic stagnation, and governmental malfeasance. Most 
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Guatemalans wanted Ydígoras gone, but the military coup prevented them from being 
able to express who they wanted to replace him as their president. As the Peralta’s regime 
attempted to consolidate its position, the situation in Guatemala rapidly deteriorated as 
popular discontent transformed into widespread civil war. 
 The forced abdication of President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes marked a definitive 
moment in the transformation of Guatemala’s security forces. The relationship between 
the military and the government had always been symbiotic, and the trend of officers 
serving in civilian posts pre-dated the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944. Despite the 
radical shifts in political culture, military leaders steadily improved their position in 
Guatemalan society and eroded distinctions in martial and civil authority throughout the 
“Ten Years of Spring” and the subsequent counterrevolution. When the Ydígoras regime 
was beset by various crises, the military offered its tepid allegiance in exchange for 
positions in the government. The capstone of this gradual assumption of regency over the 
Guatemalan state slid into place when Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, the Minister of 
Defense, supplanted his commander-in-chief on March 31, 1963. The military and 
government of Guatemala had coalesced into a single, indistinguishable entity. Peralta 
assumed executive authority without firing a shot, but a bloody toll would be paid in 
decades of internecine warfare. The Guatemalan Armed Forces were now ascendant. 
Their long reign of terror would usher in an era unprecedented carnage and horror.  
 
     
 270 
 
 
CHAPTER IV: CHANGED REGIMES 
US-Guatemalan Relations under Johnson and Peralta 
 
Although it receives considerably less attention than the coup that toppled Arbenz 
in 1954, Colonel Enrique Peralta’s seizure of power rivals the infamous CIA operation in 
its impact on the development of the Guatemalan state.  Elections returned to Guatemala 
by 1966, but the military’s refusal to permit Juan Jose Arévalo from running for the 
presidency reduced democracy to a fiction in the country for decades. Military leaders 
had long wielded considerable influence over national politics, but after 1963, the officers 
of the Guatemalan Armed Forces began to transform into a distinct socio-economic group 
that ruled over the country, regardless of who held the civilian offices of government. 
Heaps of Alliance for Progress dollars fueled the evolution of the officer corps into the de 
facto power in Guatemala. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations, however, quickly 
learned that their investment in Defense Minister Enrique Peralta would not make him 
compliant.  
Instead, the colonel proved he had his own convictions.533 Exhibiting the 
pervasive nationalism of his military’s culture, the Guatemalan head-of-state often 
resisted Washington’s demands, even as the ranks of the guerrilla fronts swelled with 
outraged citizens. In tandem with Peralta’s partial rejection of American influence, the 
Johnson administration recalibrated the Alliance for Progress in a manner that benefitted 
private investment and military assistance at the expense of national civilian institutions. 
                                                 
533 As noted previously, Colonel Enrique Peralta never officially took the title of president. From 1963-66 
he served as the head-of-state and retained his position of Minister of Defense. Most government 
publications refer to him as “El Jefe del Gobierno y Ministro de la Defensa Nacional.” 
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When the Peralta regime finally relented and permitted severely constrained elections, it 
mattered little. The military government either prevented political parties from 
participating in elections or coopted them into its newly formed institutional party. 
Blocking Arévalo’s candidacy had already proven that there would be no second chances 
for revolution and reform in Guatemala. The Alliance for Progress provided the political 
and economic means to develop the forces that sustained military rule in Guatemala for 
generations. 
 The aftermath of Peralta’s coup is the focus of this chapter. The research 
presented here shows how the new Guatemalan head-of-state rapidly consolidated control 
and used his dictatorial powers to reconfigure the political landscape in a manner that 
ensured military domination over the state. The Kennedy administration had played a 
significant role in abrogating the democratic process in Guatemala and installing the 
military government, and the resulting confused and ineffectual attempts to mold Peralta 
and his regime by American policymakers is presented here as evidence of the limits of 
US power within its sphere of influence. Complicating US-Guatemalan relations further, 
Peralta’s seizure of power infused the various oppositionist and revolutionary groups 
with newfound purpose, and bands of guerrilla fighters, communist politicians, and leftist 
student activists forged a united insurgency that posed a serious challenge to the military 
regime. In response to the unrest and desperate to exercise influence over Peralta, the 
United States all but abandoned the ideals of the Alliance for Progress and began to 
reconfigure its programs to support counterinsurgency efforts. Defense Minister Peralta’s 
coup in March 1963 stands as the definitive moment that the military seized control over 
the state, but the actions taken by US officials and Peralta’s high command in its 
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aftermath guaranteed that the officer corps of the Guatemalan Armed Forces would rule 
the country for decades to come. 
 
Peralta in Power: The New Guatemalan Regime and the United States 
 
Colonel Enrique Peralta’s overthrow of President Ydigoras presented a decisive 
moment in Guatemalan history. The Guatemalan military had been steadily acquiring a 
greater role in governance since the revolution, but Peralta’s actions following the 1963 
coup established the country as a military dictatorship. Many American officials began to 
express anxiety over Peralta’s consolidation of power into his position, but found 
themselves utterly unable to influence Guatemalan head-of-state to change course. 
Instead, Peralta began the process of solidifying the Guatemalan Armed Forces’ hold 
over the state for the foreseeable future.  
Arévalo acted bravely when he entered Guatemala, but after Peralta seized power, 
he had no choice but to leave his home country. The day after the coup, Arévalo fled to 
Mexico as Guatemalan security forces arrested scores of Arévalista leaders.534 
Ambassador Bell reported, undoubtedly with some satisfaction, that the army would 
make use of the disorganization and lack of resources of Arévalo supporters to “make 
effective counteraction most unlikely.”535 Whether the result of genuine optimism or self-
interest, within the month Bell’s glowing appraisal of the situation in Guatemala proved 
as rooted in reality as his association of communism with Arévalo. 
                                                 
534 John O. Bell, “Presidential Aspirant Arévalo  Flees to Mexico,” April 1, 1963,  National Security Files, 
Country Files: Guatemala, Box 101, John F. Kennedy Library. 
535 Ibid. 
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 The ambassador wasted no time in praising Peralta. Two days after the coup, Bell 
defended the Peralta regime as having, through “honest convictions,” saved the country 
from communist control.536 Moreover, the new leadership pledged to restore honor and 
efficiency in governance. Should “leftist opponents of the new regime” threaten the 
military-government, it would be able to organize an effective response without 
requesting US assistance.537 The Peralta regime solidified its control over the Guatemalan 
state by immediately dissolving the constitution and cancelling the presidential elections. 
Once the State Department produced its “minimal requirements” for what it would 
consider a legitimate regime, Bell promised he would ask Peralta to commit to a 
timetable for elections.538 The ambassador suggested that the United States recognize the 
Peralta government within the week to maintain a friendly relationship with the new 
regime. 
 Four days after deposing Ydigoras, in an interview with the Miami Herald, 
Colonel Peralta announced that elections could probably be held “in more or less than 
two years.”539 Caught off-guard by the disconcerting interview, Ambassador Bell 
nonetheless defended the long delay of democracy in his communications with 
Washington. The American ambassador proposed that Peralta needed time to build up the 
private sector and develop a reputation for decency and honesty before plunging 
Guatemala into what would undoubtedly be another turbulent election. Sensing that 
                                                 
536 John O. Bell, “Recognition of Guatemalan Military Government,” April 1, 1963, National Security 
Files, Country Files: Guatemala, Box 101, John F. Kennedy Library, 1. 
537 Ibid., 1-2. 
538 Ibid., 1. 
539 John O. Bell, “[U.S. Posture toward Colonel Peralta’s Government],” April 3, 1963, , National Security 
Files, Country Files: Guatemala,  Box 101, John F. Kennedy Library, 1. 
 274 
 
 
Peralta’s indeterminate plans for elections might trouble both Guatemalan and US 
officials, Bell suggested that perhaps the comments were simply “off the cuff.”540 The 
following three years of direct military rule indicated that they were not.  
Despite Peralta’s anti-democratic leanings, Bell maintained that the coup and the 
military government actually advanced the cause of freedom and democracy in 
Guatemala and the hemisphere. Had the elections gone forward, the ambassador argued, 
Arévalo would have taken advantage of the “naiveté and innocence of the Guatemalan 
people” and opened Guatemala to “communist infiltration and control.”541 Furthermore, 
Bell contended that the “responsible elements” of Guatemalan society showed courage, 
foresight, and had prevented civil war by overthrowing the government.542 Suspending 
the constitution and the democratic process were the only viable courses of actions, and 
the ambassador believed it would be a mistake for Guatemalans to hold elections in the 
near future. “Right thinking Latin Americans,” Bell declared, would agree with his 
assessment.543 If the United States fully supported the Peralta regime, his government 
would bring order and progress to the perpetually backward nation. Bell’s patronizing 
rhetoric rarely, if ever, surpassed this early defense of the Peralta regime. His analysis 
would prove to be fatally wrong. 
 Not all members of the State Department shared Ambassador Bell’s favorable 
assessment of Guatemala’s military government. On April 4, Under-Secretary of State 
George Ball composed a partial response to the ambassador’s vigorous defense of 
                                                 
540 Ibid., 1,2. 
541 Ibid., 2.  
542 Ibid., 1. 
543 Ibid., 2. 
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Peralta. Ball directed Ambassador Bell to approach Peralta with a proposal of forming a 
Council of State, led by Peralta and comprised of distinguished citizens, who would hold 
executive and legislative powers until the promised election. He further proposed that the 
council include mostly civilians who represented the leading political sectors of the 
country.544 With a broader political base provided by the council, the new government 
could fix a time for elections, carry out essential programs, encourage cooperation within 
the region, and obtain more widespread acceptance. Under-Secretary Ball stressed the 
importance of holding elections within a year and allowing all democratic parties to 
participate, especially considering that current acceptable presidential contenders were 
more likely to continue to work with the Peralta regime if it looked less like a 
dictatorship.  
George Ball went on to lecture the ambassador on the inherent problems of 
military regimes. Ball’s foremost concern was the vague, two-year projection of military 
rule. In his view, the Peralta regime would be able to deal with opposition, now sure to 
have communist support, only by infringing on civil liberties. This, in turn, would foster 
further resistance.  Under-Secretary Ball observed that military regimes were not 
sensitive to popular reactions to authoritarianism and warned that opposition elements 
might be strengthened, “in will if not number,” should Peralta prolong his rule.545 Often 
inflexible and deeply conservative, military governments were likely to find persuasive 
reasons to maintain their position of power and forgo needed reforms at the expense of 
the electorate. Military regimes, Ball added, had a “greater ability to remove a bad 
                                                 
544 George Ball, “[Provisional Rule of Military Government in Guatemala],” April 4, 1963, National 
Security Files, Country Files: Guatemala, Box 101, John F. Kennedy Library.  
545 Ibid., 2. 
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government than create a good one.”546 He concluded by stating that an early return to 
democratic practices and the restoration of constitutionality would better protect 
Guatemala from revolutionaries returning to power by reducing the development of 
dangerous political intrigue common in closed political systems.547 This mild 
chastisement by his superior had little apparent effect on the ambassador as he continued 
to support Peralta’s personal rule. George Ball’s caution had come too late for 
Guatemala. 
 The Under-Secretary of State’s criticism of Ambassador Bell’s approach in 
Guatemala  likely reflected his own concerns about a concurrent foreign policy quagmire: 
Vietnam. George Ball had long advocated the adage of avoiding a land war in Asia and 
felt that the Kennedy team’s uncompromising commitment to “win” in Vietnam had 
obstructed alternative, more diplomatically oriented strategies in Southeast Asia.548 
Nevertheless, in the final months of the Kennedy administration, George Ball found 
himself ensnared in troubling developments within the South Vietnamese leadership. 
Although the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem was not the military dictatorship 
Ball described to Ambassador Bell, Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu personally controlled 
South Vietnam’s security forces and used them to brutalize opponents and rivals.549 Ball 
lamented that the callousness of Diem’s leadership required the United States to distance 
itself from “Nhu’s noxious activities” even though the US “had in effect created him in 
                                                 
546 Ibid., 3. 
547 Ibid. 
548 George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1982), 361, 368. 
549 James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University 
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the first place.”550 In Peralta’s Guatemala, Ball saw a close enough parallel to caution the 
ambassador against following a similar path. Ironically, four months after challenging 
Ambassador Bell’s work in Guatemala, Under-Secretary Ball became one of the chief 
architects in the conspiracy that toppled the Diem government, installed a military 
regime, and resulted in the assassination of both President Diem and his brother, Nhu. In 
both Vietnam and Guatemala, the United States’ interference in the name of anti-
communism intensified ongoing conflicts and brought disaster to the respective regions. 
As guerrilla warfare raged across the Southeast Asian peninsula and the Central 
American isthmus, the two countries became the United States’ testing-grounds for 
counterinsurgency strategy. 
With Arévalo out of Guatemala and Ydigoras replaced by a military regime under 
Colonel Peralta, Ambassador Bell believed that that the most pressing communist threat 
to the Guatemalan government had ended. The Peralta regime laid out its agenda, 
proclaiming the eradication of extremist threats to the existing government as its main 
objective.551  Promising a restoration of governmental honesty, the Peralta government 
vowed that it would implement Alliance for Progress initiatives, honor international 
commitments, and promote a democratic climate. The military would turn over power to 
an elected government after it had fulfilled these goals. Excepting George Ball’s warning 
to the ambassador, the harshest criticism US officials initially mustered against Peralta 
was that he might have been too “honest and upright” for Guatemalan politics.552 His 
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reputation, however, did not prevent the new Guatemalan head-of-state from appointing 
several family members and friends to key ministries in the government. Peralta rejected 
the internal political machinations that Ydigoras used to remain in power, and relied on 
family and trusted allies to maintain his rule. This new administration would be 
disciplined, persistent, and ruthless in the pursuit of its mission.  
 Although he expressed his misgivings, Ambassador Bell obeyed the order of 
Under-Secretary George Ball and approached Colonel Peralta with the prospect of 
forming the Council of State. The Guatemalan head-of-state, flanked by his brother 
Arturo Peralta and his loyal secretary and confidant, Colonel Jose Luis Aguilar, humored 
the American ambassador, but dismissed his proposal outright. Colonel Peralta claimed 
that his handpicked “Council of Ministers” already fulfilled this role.553 Beaming with 
confidence, Colonel Peralta reported that he had visited “the major outlying areas and 
military zone headquarters where he found absolute tranquility and determination on 
[the] part [of the] army and civilian elements [to] support his government.”554 If his 
government needed to broaden its base of support, Peralta suggested he might add 
members who would represent agriculture, labor, and education—those sectors most 
likely to oppose his rule—to the council.555 The existing council, however, was strictly 
advisory, and Colonel Peralta maintained his power to rule by decree.  
This did not seem to trouble Ambassador Bell, who reported, “we foresee no 
difficulty in getting GOG [to] make satisfactory declaration concerning holding of 
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elections within possibly 18-month period and no later than two years.”556 Furthermore, 
Ambassador Bell now unequivocally endorsed Peralta’s long electoral delay, claiming 
that “early elections [are] not desirable –a view shared by all sectors [of] Guatemalan 
political opinion except Arevalists.”557 Striking a defiant tone toward his Washington 
superiors, Bell warned, “it is obvious that our capacity to negotiate “conditions” 
diminishes,” as a result of the State Department pushing for legislative councils and 
prompt elections.558 Although it appeared that Ambassador Bell had already detected a 
resistant streak in the Peralta government, he was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to admit 
that the crowning achievement of his diplomatic career might create serious problems for 
US-Guatemalan relations. State Department heads, however, were already growing 
concerned about the direction of the Peralta regime and its relationship with Ambassador 
Bell. 
 Edwin Martin, Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, soon joined George 
Ball in cautioning the Ambassador. He wrote directly to Bell that he wanted “to 
emphasize [the] importance [of] not being misled by current euphoria in Guatemala” and 
that he believed ‘it will be [a] miracle for this attitude to last any length of time.”559 In 
Washington, American businessmen with investments in Guatemala were beginning to 
express their alarm to government officials that two years of military rule might harm 
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their interests.560 If corporate executives had their doubts about the Peralta regime, Bell’s 
assertion that all Guatemalans, excepting communists and Arévalo supporters, favored 
the regime and a protracted moratorium on elections was patently absurd. When Peralta 
issued the decree establishing his Charter of Government, instead of restoring 
constitutional liberties or fixing a date for elections, the regime instated a military court 
system empowered by the new “law for defense of democracy” that doled out “very harsh 
penalties” for a “wide range of offenses.”561 Additionally, the charter “stated that public 
power would reside in the Army and [would] be exercised by the Minister of Defense 
(i.e. Peralta) as the Chief of Government. It provided that the Chief of Government would 
exercise all executive and legislative functions.”562 There would be no effort to disguise 
this military-dictatorship with a façade of civil government.  
Following Peralta’s defiant declaration, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who had 
previously endorsed Guatemalan officer’s growing power in the government, wrote to 
Bell requesting that the ambassador “make clear to Peralta our extreme disappointment in 
[the] final wording of [the] charter of government and harsh decree law.”563 Ultimately, 
even the extreme disappointment of the Secretary of State held little sway over a military 
government whose illegal seizure of power had been condoned by President Kennedy. 
Two days after Rusk conveyed his qualms, the United States officially recognized the 
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government of Colonel Enrique Peralta. That powerful members of the State Department 
voiced their concerns so soon after Peralta’s takeover only compounds the tragedy of 
Kennedy’s decision to accept military rule in Guatemala.      
   Despite mounting apprehension of the major figures of the Kennedy State 
Department, Ambassador Bell remained optimistic about the prospects of the Peralta 
regime. The government he had helped install, in his view, was proud, dedicated, and 
willing to take forceful action to eliminate potential threats. In his messages to his 
superiors, Bell suggested that a vast majority of Guatemalans supported the 
unconstitutional regime because it promised a modicum of social and economic progress; 
and if the regime made improvements, the population would tolerate an autocratic 
political system.564 Bell downplayed the ongoing guerilla activities and declared that 
Peralta’s government faced no serious threat to its stability. The ambassador believed he 
had achieved his objective of preventing a communist seizure of power in Guatemala.  
* * * 
With the regime change in Guatemala, US policymakers began to reassess 
priorities and goals. The AID program remained unchanged as American officials hoped 
that Peralta would make good use of the existing thirty million dollars in unexpended 
funds that the Ydigoras government had failed to utilize.565 Both the State Department 
and the Department of Defense agreed that the interests of the United States would be 
served best by maintaining a close relationship with the Guatemalan Armed Forces and 
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increasing military aid to Peralta’s government. In its Military Assistance Program, the 
Department of Defense focused on the objective of establishing the Guatemalan military 
as the institution that would not only safeguard the government from communist 
penetration, but also act as the chief contributor to social and economic development 
through Civic Action programs. The Military Assistance Program allotted one million 
dollars to the Guatemalan Army for constructing roads, bridges, public buildings and 
schools, creating public water utilities, and initiating reforestation projects.566 This figure 
was dwarfed by the estimated twelve million dollars to fulfill standing Defense 
Department obligations to the Guatemalan military.567 Military Assistance Program 
planners projected that, by the end of the decade, Guatemalan security forces would have 
suitable hardware and funding to meet US goals, but that a potential shortfall existed in 
the number of adequately trained personnel. 
The State Department’s Internal Defense Plan echoed the position and goals of 
the Department of Defense. Referring to the prevention of Arévalo’s candidacy, the 
report boasted that the “immediate primary objective of our IDP was effectively 
implemented.”568 The plan reiterated Ambassador Bell’s assertion that the Peralta regime 
faced no serious threat and that Guatemalans had apparently accepted military rule as a 
welcome change from Ydigoras. Nonetheless, the Guatemalan government needed to 
confront serious issues.   
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The chief concern was the lack of proper training in security personnel, which 
was further complicated by the fact that Peralta’s appointments to high-ranking positions 
in the police and military were based on patronage instead of merit. When selecting new 
heads of Guatemala’s police forces, Peralta chose loyal military subordinates instead of 
police officers who had received extensive US training through the AID sponsored Public 
Safety Program. The rejection of US-trained security personnel marked the initial divide 
between the actions of the Peralta regime and the demands of the United States that 
would confound American officials for much of the colonel’s time in office. Even 
Ambassador Bell, who had facilitated Peralta’s seizure of power and acted as the 
regime’s most vocal advocate within the State Department, began to feel a hint of doubt 
toward the new Guatemalan government. 
On September 7, 1963, Bell compiled his progress report for the Internal Defense 
Plan. In the five months since the establishment of Peralta’s military government, Bell’s 
enthusiasm about the regime had shifted toward disappointment. The ambassador found 
that the Peralta government had become difficult to work with because of “its sensitivity 
and over developed sense of dignity with respect to ‘sovereignty’”569 While Peralta’s 
regime dealt with subversives severely, it had been slow, even unwilling, to implement 
measures and programs that addressed social and economic problems. More troubling 
were indications that the Peralta government was refining its strategies for shrugging off 
US influence. Whenever Peralta and his representatives were questioned about setting a 
timetable for elections, they became irritated and claimed that the country’s “social 
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problems” required a solution before a presidential election was feasible.570 Colonel 
Peralta successfully resurrected the perpetual ‘Belize Question’ as an effective riposte 
against the demands of the United States. Countering US proposals with his own requests 
for Washington to mediate the longstanding territorial dispute between Guatemalan and 
Great Britain, Peralta used the issue to bolster his nationalist credentials while occupying 
US officials with this intractable problem. Many Guatemalans viewed the previous 
colonel to come to power through a coup, Carlos Castillo Armas, as a puppet of 
Washington. Defense Minister Peralta did not want to share the reputation, or the fate, of 
the assassinated Castillo Armas. Throughout his tenure as Guatemala’s ruler, Peralta 
would routinely challenge, dismiss, and even rebuke the United States.    
The American ambassador attempted to dismiss Peralta’s defiance as traditional 
military nationalism, although Bell admitted some apprehension. His frustration obvious, 
Bell vented that Peralta was “more stubborn, not as intelligent, nor possessor of as quick 
and facile mind and imagination as Ydigoras; he will not be easy to persuade of influence 
– primarily because he is slow of thought and stubborn of opinion.”571 Despite the Peralta 
government’s continued resistance to US advice, Bell maintained that replacing Ydigoras 
with a military regime had achieved the United States’ immediate goals by blocking 
Arévalo’s return. Unwilling to accept that the military regime might prove as problematic 
as George Ball had cautioned, Ambassador Bell concluded that the United States should 
stay its course in Guatemala and continue to keep on good terms with influential figures 
in Peralta’s administration. 
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Other American policymakers were not as kind as Ambassador Bell towards the 
increasingly dictatorial and disobedient Peralta. Officials with the Agency for 
International Development met to determine whether a reduction in Public Safety 
Program funding might effectively chastise Peralta for ignoring needed reforms and 
appointing his own men to head Guatemalan police agencies over US recommendations 
for the posts.572 Writing directly to Ambassador Bell, George Ball emphasized that his 
“central purpose” as the ambassador should be to cultivate greater influence over Peralta 
and to steer him away from personal dictatorship.573  George Ball cautioned that there 
was a growing alarm in Washington regarding Peralta’s refusal to address political and 
economic issues while rejecting help and advice from emissaries of the United States. 
Advocating the “slow and careful” courting of Peralta and his advisors, Under-Secretary 
Ball stressed that the ambassador deliver the message that continued political repression 
would drive the opposition underground and invite insurrection.574 Ambassador Bell had 
played a role in Peralta’s ascent, but the new head-of-state had secured his position and 
would prove difficult to persuade. For all of its supposed military and economic might, 
the United States found itself relatively powerless to control an allied government within 
its sphere of influence because it had committed itself to the regime by endorsing its 
subversion of democracy.   
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In Washington, George Ball was not alone in his unease with Peralta’s 
uncooperative streak. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, after reviewing the AID proposal to 
reduce funding from the Public Safety Program, instructed the ambassador to present 
Peralta with an ultimatum. Peralta had already appointed loyal army officers to lead 
Guatemalan police forces against the advice of the United States, but now the regime was 
refusing to meet the minimum financial and staffing requirements set by the bilateral 
Public Safety Program.575 If the Guatemalan government failed to honor its 
commitments, Rusk warned, AID would reduce its contributions, including military 
equipment.576 Rusk believed that Peralta needed to a reminder that maintaining law and 
order through well-trained security forces was in the interest of both the United States 
and Guatemala. When the Guatemalan government remained unresponsive, Secretary 
Rusk followed through with his threat and roughly halved USAID assistance funds 
during Peralta’s years in power.577 A spike in guerilla attacks would test Guatemalan 
security forces, the military government, and the US ambassador who had helped bring it 
to power. 
From the onset of his reign over Guatemala, Colonel Peralta proved he was no 
creature of the United States. The Kennedy administration had played a role in Peralta’s 
seizure of power, but unlike Castillo Armas, the Defense Minister and head-of-state had 
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not completely relied on the United States to secure his position. Guatemalans, 
particularly anticommunist officers in the military, had brought Peralta to power—he did 
not require the air support, international pressure, or propaganda machine of the United 
States that had helped Colonel Castillo Armas topple Arbenz in 1954. American officials 
attempted to influence and direct Colonel Peralta, but they found they had little impact. 
Peralta rapidly consolidated power into his nebulous position and began dismantling the 
constitutional republic of Guatemala. With unchecked and unlimited power and the 
strong support of the Guatemalan Armed Forces and their civilian backers, Peralta 
reconfigured the Guatemalan state into a military dictatorship.  
  
Resurgence of Revolution: Guatemalan Opposition to the Peralta Regime 
 
While US officials wrangled with the surprisingly rigid regime in Guatemala, the 
assorted rebel and clandestine groups that opposed Peralta’s rule began to gain 
momentum. Those who plotted the overthrow of the Guatemalan government ranged all 
along the political spectrum, but the most significant threat to the regime now came from 
the armed leftist groups and their supporters. Many of these organizations, especially the 
various guerrilla fronts, could be labeled as communist because their leaders and some 
members believed in Marxist principles and theory. Their connections to international 
communism and Moscow, however, were either weak or nonexistent. While some groups 
did receive some support from Havana, most of the insurgents were highly nationalistic 
in their outlook and fought primarily to bring sweeping change to Guatemala. 
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Nonetheless, the presence of a Marxist-inspired insurgency presented the perfect 
justification for the continued rule of Peralta’s military dictatorship. 
The caution expressed by some US officials in the aftermath of Peralta’s coup 
diminished as the guerrilla threat revealed itself.  As pressure from Washington 
decreased, Peralta’s regime found it had plenty of space to expand the power of the 
military and its hold over the state. Instead of focusing on the local and regional 
conditions that created these movements, both the US embassy and the CIA devoted 
considerable attention to uncovering a Cuban connection to guerrilla activities in 
Guatemala. This critical error only exacerbated Guatemala’s fundamental socioeconomic 
problems as USAID dollars meant for development filled armories instead of empty 
stomachs.   
The miscalculation was not without purpose. Evidence of communist collusion on 
an international scale warranted an international response. Greater involvement and 
intervention by the United States in Guatemala seemed more palatable and prudent if 
hostile governments were attempting to subvert and destroy its allies. When a bomb 
prematurely exploded in Guatemala City, killing alleged PGT member Jose Ibarra 
Escobar, the embassy accepted the rumor that the deceased had been a “Cuban-trained 
technical expert in explosives” as fact.578 No investigation confirmed Escobar’s Cuban 
connection. His supposed membership in Guatemala’s communist party was sufficient 
for proving his ties to Castro. Similarly, the embassy suggested Cuban involvement when 
an unnamed fifteen-year-old student was killed in an attack on a police station because he 
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was a member of a leftist youth organization.579 Though the relationship between 
Castro’s Cuba and leftist opposition to the Peralta regime was often minimal at best, US 
officials exaggerated collaboration between these groups to fulfill the Cold War canon of 
international communist conspiracy. Paradoxically, Ambassador Bell, while hunting for 
Cuban influence in Guatemalan dissidence, initially dismissed the threat posed by the 
native insurgency. The delusion evaporated when an armed resistance reasserted its 
opposition to Peralta’s regime.  
With the uptick in guerrilla activity in 1963, the CIA began to take a more direct 
role in assisting the Guatemalan government with interrogation of captured guerillas and 
touted the effectiveness of its techniques after its agents recruited a former member of 
Yon Sosa’s MR-13 group.580 The information they extracted from the turncoat guerrilla 
alarmed the Agency. As April 1963 came to a close, the CIA learned that several guerilla 
groups were preparing to wage war against the Peralta government.  The Partido 
Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT)—the Communist Party of Guatemala—claimed to 
speak for the various opposition groups now under its political guidance.581 The assorted 
guerrilla fronts that had formed from the 1960 officer revolt and the 1962 Spring protests 
coalesced under a single banner of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) and began 
coordinating their operations against the government’s security forces. The expulsion of 
Arévalo and subsequent seizure of power by the military provided the disparate 
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opposition groups of student activists, political dissidents, and guerilla fighters with a 
common cause.  Clashes between insurgents and army units increased over the following 
months, and it soon became undeniable that Guatemala was in the midst of a civil war.  
The CIA was unimpressed with the Peralta government’s tepid response to the 
growing insurgency. Its analysts believed that, in their current disorganized state, 
oppositionist forces did not yet have the ability to overthrow Peralta, but worried that 
they could develop into a serious problem in time if ignored. The major opposition 
groups within the FAR—Arévalistas, the PGT, and the MR-13 guerilla fighters— had 
apparently held meetings with representatives from leftist student groups to discuss the 
overthrow of Defense Minister Peralta. The factions remained divided on strategy. 
Arévalistas and moderates within the PGT favored the suspension of subversive activity 
so that the government would lift the state of siege, allowing more room for political 
organization and protest. The radical wing of the PGT, its armed cadre, and the MR-13 
guerillas favored robberies, bombings, and the assassination of key government 
leaders.582 The CIA concluded that although these groups could not currently challenge 
the government, a unified insurgent movement could unleash another Cuban-style 
revolution in Guatemala. The CIA’s evaluation may have been alarmist, but the FAR, 
still in its nascent phase, represented a much greater threat than an aging academic like 
Arévalo. Now, instead of compromising with the ‘spiritual-socialist’ former president, 
US officials and the leaders of the Guatemalan Armed Forces faced the very Marxist 
revolutionary movement they had sought to circumvent.  
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The Cuban Revolution had demonstrated the potential of a dedicated, rural 
insurgent group under the command of a charismatic leader. The Movimiento 
Revolucionario 13 Noviembre (MR-13) hoped to replicate Castro’s success by mirroring 
aspects of his 26th of July Movement. The leadership of MR-13 boasted two figures of 
growing renown: Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Augusto Turcios Lima. Both men 
were former Guatemalan Army officers who had previously received training at the 
School of the Americas, and had survived the rebellion of the junior-officers against 
Ydigoras in 1960.583 In the aftermath of the failed officer uprising, they found refuge 
among indigenous peasants and came to believe that change would come to Guatemala 
only through popular armed struggle. The two guerilla leaders subsequently travelled to 
Cuba where they received further training and funding, and attracted the attention of the 
CIA. The Agency noted that Yon Sosa, in particular, was highly regarded within Castro’s 
regime, which had provided him with fifty-thousand dollars to continue his guerilla 
campaign against the Guatemalan government.584 This relatively small sum was likely 
Cuba’s single most significant material contribution to the Guatemalan guerrilla 
movements.  
After returning from Cuba in November 1962, Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima 
worked closely with other oppositionist groups, namely Guatemala’s communist party, 
the PGT. The PGT had formed its own armed wing, which merged with MR-13 in 
December 1962 to form a nominally united armed opposition, the Fuerzas Armadas 
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Rebeldes (FAR).585 The guerrilla fighters of the FAR organized into three fronts, each of 
which contained smaller cells organized along the foco model pioneered by Che Guevara 
and the Cuban Revolution. Groups within FAR retained considerable autonomy, and 
members remained loyal primarily to their commanders rather than to the organization. 
Still, increased collaboration between these groups marked a significant period of 
rejuvenation for the leftist opposition. Washington had used the specter of communist 
infiltration to intervene in Guatemalan affairs for nearly two decades, and now it had 
arrived. A reaction against the military regime the Kennedy administration had helped to 
install, the long-feared, Cuban-backed, communist insurgency had emerged as a 
significant threat to US interests in Guatemala. 
 The guerrilla groups and their political allies had largely withdrawn to recuperate 
after taking heavy losses against the military offensives that ended the Spring protests of 
1962. Sporadic raids and bombings occurred throughout 1962, but armed insurrectionary 
groups remained relatively quiet even as the military blocked Arévalo and deposed 
Ydigoras. Entire guerrilla fronts had been massacred by the Army, but a much more 
cohesive and collaborative revolutionary movement, united under the FAR, returned to 
the fray only a year after facing near-total annihilation.  
The resurgence of the revolution began in April 1963. Just days after the US 
extended official recognition to Peralta’s government, guerrillas attacked Army patrols in 
Northeast Guatemala and inflicted a greater number of casualties than they received in 
return.586 The Central Committee of the PGT, acting as the core political leadership of the 
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FAR, announced that on April 25, the three major guerrilla fronts of the FAR would 
jointly issue a declaration of war against the Peralta government. Copies of the 
declaration bearing the signature of Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima flooded the streets of 
Guatemala City. It “called on the people to be alert for the overflight of a rose-colored 
airplane which would be the signal for the beginning of anti-government action in 
Guatemala City.”587 Blaring sirens in the night “would be the call to battle” as saboteurs 
destroyed dams, cut powerlines, blocked transportation, and kidnapped government 
leaders.588 Portraying themselves as “patriots and the people’s forces…[the FAR] are 
ready to lay down their lives for the noble and just cause of turning the fatherland into a 
land free from tyranny, poverty, capitulationism and corruption.”589 All Guatemalans, 
regardless of their political beliefs, needed to unite against “the criminals who are now 
enslaving the people” who would “certainly be punished” come the FAR’s inevitable 
victory.590 The clarion call to revolution never signaled the proposed mass-sabotage, but 
the announcement put security forces on alert and the population on edge. 
 The FAR’s battle-cry bulletins did not correspond with a major guerrilla 
offensive, rather, they suggest the opposition group was attempting to rally the public and 
draw in new recruits. Notably, the declaration specifically called upon military men to 
join in the movement. With Peralta in power and the military purged of oppositional 
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elements following two failed revolts and a successful coup, it seems unlikely that any 
remaining officers would defect to the decidedly disadvantaged guerrillas. This wishful-
thinking likely reflects the influence of the officers-turned-rebels of the 1960 revolt, 
namely Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima, who still maintained a strong nationalist orientation 
and personal ties to some members of their former cohort that remained loyal to the 
Guatemalan government. It also reveals that insurgent leaders recognized that significant 
segments of the military had to be coopted if the revolutionary movement were to take 
control of the state.  
The FAR propaganda swayed few, if any, members of the security forces. Instead, 
the ascendant Guatemalan Armed Forces retaliated. In July, Army units killed every 
member of a foco group operating in the Izabal department during a nighttime raid.591 
The bloody defeat exposed the naïve optimism and inexperience of the patchwork 
revolutionary movement. The members of the Guatemalan Armed Forces seemed 
unmoved by the professed patriotism of their former brothers-in-arms. Although cliques 
remained, the Guatemalan security forces showed a greater unity of purpose than ever 
before in opposing the FAR. Unable to win over any significant military factions, the 
groups within the FAR became more radical and began to embrace a variety of 
communist doctrines.    
 The forces under Marco Antonio Yon Sosa developed the most distinctive 
divergence, as the former Guatemalan officer grew frustrated with the lack of influence 
he exercised over the ideology of the FAR. In forming the rebel alliance, all parties had 
agreed that the Frente Unido de Resistencia (FUR)—the governing council dominated by 
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PGT leaders—would direct and determine the political and military strategy of the groups 
within the FAR. Radicalized by his first-hand experience with indigenous peasants who 
had sheltered him after the failed officer revolt of 1960, Yon Sosa believed that the 
revolution could succeed only by mobilizing the exploited masses for armed struggle. 
The planners within the FUR, almost entirely drawn from the urban, middle-class PGT 
leadership, “kept open the possibility and the hope of eventual negotiations leading to a 
shift form armed to electoral struggle.”592 Adolfo Gilly, the Yon Sosa partisan and self-
appointed historian of the MR-13 guerrilla front, explained, “The guerrilla actions which 
MR13 planned to carry out were considered by FUR to be, not a means of toppling the 
system, but an instrument of pressure which could force the government to negotiate and 
yield on the electoral, democratic level…While the political leadership of FUR 
committed to democratic negotiations, moved in the direction of conciliation, the 
leadership of the armed struggle moved in a revolutionary direction.”593 This discrepancy 
in the fundamental outlook of these two major factions portended future disunity within 
the opposition group that would lead to disaster and defeat. 
 Over the course of 1963-64, Yon Sosa gradually redefined the ideology of his 
MR-13 front. Anti-imperialism and nationalism once dominated the former officer’s 
thinking, but his experiences in rural Central America and Cuba led him to adopt a 
Trotskyist interpretation of socialist revolution. He rejected the Soviet bureaucracy of 
Stalinism, and set his movement upon “the path of the Socialist revolutions of China and 
Cuba, of a government of workers and peasants as the goal of the revolutionary 
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struggle.”594 The historian Richard Gott concludes that this ideological shift resulted 
when The Fourth International’s Latin America bureau sent Trotskyist doctrinaires to 
“fill the political vacuum” that signified the growing divide between Yon Sosa’s MR-13 
and the rest of the FAR.595  
Under the influence of the Trotskyists, Yon Sosa’s movement became the first 
guerrilla movement in Latin America to adopt an overt socialist programme.596 The 
groups under his command began to embrace armed propaganda—entering a village with 
guns in-hand to educate peasants and inspire them to join the struggle. The MR-13 
movement began to build training camps and assembled peasant committees in friendly 
villages to help supply the guerrilla fighters and dispense ‘revolutionary justice’. By all 
accounts, this strategy was initially successful in generating a popular response, but its 
indiscreet nature drew the attention of the military. When the MR-13 left the village, 
Army units would simply kill any peasant suspected of collaborating with the insurgents. 
These vulnerable civilians, under pain of torture, occasionally revealed the whereabouts 
of nearby guerrilla cells. The aforementioned liquidation of an entire MR-13 foco in July 
1963 by the Army resulted from the confession of a peasant-sentry who had been savaged 
by military interrogators. In addition to these setbacks, Yon Sosa’s radical shift also 
began to alienate some of his allies. The remnants of the initial 1960 officer revolt and 
other Army rebels—steeped in a nationalist, anti-imperialist tradition—split over the 
issue of communist influence. Some embraced Yon Sosa’s leftist swing, but many others 
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remained highly suspicious and firmly declared themselves anticommunist. Even in the 
early, heady days of the FAR, fault lines appeared that would grievously fracture the 
movement in the coming years. 
As Yon Sosa’s movement developed idiosyncrasies that set it apart from the FAR, 
his comrade Luis Turcios Lima drew closer to the umbrella organization and its PGT 
dominated leadership. Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa shared a formative experience; the 
young men arose as the surviving leadership of the failed junior-officer revolt of 1960 
and found refuge among poor, indigenous villages while fleeing the Guatemalan Army’s 
retribution. Both men were products of the School of the Americas, through which they 
received counterinsurgency training during their time in the Guatemalan Army. The two 
rebel officers subsequently travelled together to Cuba where they added guerrilla warfare 
and political indoctrination to their repertoire. Turcios Lima, however, did not radicalize 
to the same extent as Yon Sosa.  
In an interview with the New York Times, Turcios Lima declared, “I am not a 
Communist party member” although he admitted he agreed with most Marxist 
philosophy. Moreover, he established his movement was “supported neither by Moscow 
nor Peking, nor Havana” and that the FAR was “a nationalist movement.”597 The political 
scientist Louisa Frank observed that although he professed his nationalist ideology and 
political independence, Turcios Lima collaborated closely with the PGT and relied on the 
communist party to help organize his front and select an area of operations.598 The 
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guerrilla front under his command, named the Frente Guerrilla Edgar Ibarra (FGEI) 
consisted almost entirely of PGT cadre from the party’s Communist Youth Organization 
along with an array of students, workers, and peasants.599 Within his guerrilla front, 
Turcios Lima was the only member of the original MR-13 uprising of 1960. While these 
attributes would appear to be major disadvantages in the military sphere, the FGEI was 
actually the most successful of the FAR guerrilla fronts. Whereas Yon Sosa advocated for 
immediate, persistent action aimed at destroying the Peralta government as quickly as 
possible, Turcios Lima prepared for a protracted struggle based on the strategies of North 
Vietnam. Turcios Lima lacked the personal charisma of Yon Sosa, but due to superior 
organization provided by the PGT and a more cautious, clandestine implementation of 
operations, the FGEI steadily expanded its territory and gained popularity. 
Regardless of these early variations within its member groups, the FAR was 
united in its decision to wage war on the Peralta regime. Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima 
disagreed on some finer points of revolutionary theory, both men still saw the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces as the crucial institution capable of enacting change in 
Guatemala. The FAR had called on soldiers to join their cause when it issued its joint 
declaration of war against the government in April, and MR-13 propaganda continued to 
target members of the military for recruitment. One particularly stirring leaflet called 
upon the soldier to “Refuse to fire against your peasant brothers. Refuse to burn down 
villages, refuse to torture. Soldier: Turn your guns on those who plunder and persecute 
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the peasantry. Our struggle is yours.”600 They also implored conscientious enlisted men to 
bring their commanding officers to trial for murder and torture.  
These appeals not only reveal the barbarous tactics already being employed by the 
military, but they also indicate that the FAR hoped to exploit existing weaknesses within 
the structure of the Guatemalan Armed Forces. With the vast majority of its enlisted men 
hailing from an impoverished, indigenous background, this kind of propaganda played on 
the guilt and resentment many soldiers likely felt when they obeyed the sordid orders of 
their bourgeois, Ladino officers. The idea of bringing these officers to trial for their 
actions was preposterous, especially in the military tribunals that served as Peralta’s 
judicial branch. This very realization, however, might have further incensed soldiers, 
causing them to defect or, perhaps enact their own brand of justice upon their superiors.  
It is unclear how many military men joined the ranks of the rebels, but their 
number would have been relatively small. By 1964, Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa both 
committed to the peasantry as a primary source for recruits and openly advocated a 
socialist ideology that would have offended the staunchly nationalist and increasingly 
anticommunist officer corps. The harsh discipline and firsthand experience with the 
brutal methods of the Guatemalan Army likely discouraged most of the common soldiery 
from turning against the chain of command. The FAR never convinced significant 
segments of the military to join their cause. There would be no repeat of the 1960 junior 
officer revolt. Rather, the emergence of a multi-front insurgency, led by communists and 
rebel officers who had received money from Castro himself, solidified the formerly 
fractious security forces against what they perceived to be an existential threat. 
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The members of the FAR had several reasons to believe that their movement 
would succeed during the organization’s formative years. Revolutionary movements, 
inspired by Cuba’s continued geopolitical success, spread throughout Latin America 
during the early 1960s and Guatemala led the pack in many respects. The renowned 
socialist theorist and academic Regis Debray reported that in 1963-1964 the FAR 
garnered more popular support than any other guerrilla movement in Latin America.601 It 
faced an illegitimate military dictatorship that had usurped a democratically elected 
president, suspended the constitution, and cancelled elections. Moreover, the alliance 
between the Peralta regime and the United States began to fray as the colonel ignored 
advice from Washington and US officials subsequently reduced economic and military 
aid. Even the red-hunting American ambassador, John Bell, initially dismissed the FAR 
and steered US resources elsewhere. The leaders of the FAR conceived themselves as the 
vanguard of an expansive, nationalist movement that would establish a popular 
government built on the legacy of Jacobo Arbenz and the Guatemalan Revolution. Yet, 
even as momentum and circumstance propelled the FAR to early victories, internal 
divisions and strategic disunity prevented the movement of realizing its ultimate goal of 
toppling the Peralta government. Moreover, the growing threat of a widespread, 
communist-led insurgency provided a rationale for the creation and preservation of a 
military regime in Guatemala. Peralta’s officers now had a mission of great import, and 
American officials would prove reluctant to oppose the militarization of the Guatemalan 
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state as it faced off against Castro-inspired guerrilla movements. The FAR, like the 
Arbenz administration, would end in failure.           
 
An Alliance Adjusted: Changes and Continuities in US-Guatemalan Relations 
 
 Colonel Enrique Peralta had his own plans for the nation he now headed. 
Preventing communist infiltration in the guise of Arévalo had been the chief justification 
for military rule, but Peralta’s pledge to rid the government of rampant corruption and 
restore public faith was a mission most Guatemalans agreed was badly needed after the 
Ydigoras administration. Ambassador Bell frequently praised the honesty and integrity of 
Peralta and his followers, and his astonishment that an individual of such character had 
succeeded in Guatemala’s political environment bordered on ethnocentrism. The quest to 
purge corruption from government, however, served as a convenient excuse for 
repression and an expansion of the military’s control over Guatemalan society. With 
Operación Honestidad, Colonel Peralta extended military influence, annulled civil 
liberties, and reconfigured the Guatemalan political landscape. 
 Operación Honestidad functioned more as a sprawling governmental recalibration 
than the precision program that its name implies. Some of its most publicly promoted 
manifestations included halving the presidential salary, re-staffing government 
bureaucracies, and punishing officials who engaged in bribery, extortion, and nepotism. 
Peralta’s government billed these measures as necessary to eradicate communist 
influence, but also as a means to rid Guatemala of malcontents and parasites, motivated 
by greed and personal power, who had wielded influence in the past. When implemented, 
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this aspect of Operación Honestidad often served as little more than a convenient excuse 
to remove individuals from the government bureaucracy and replace them with Peralta 
loyalists. Furthermore, the purification of Guatemala’s body politic—the professed 
mission of Operación Honestidad—became the Peralta regime’s primary excuse for 
delaying national elections. The regime regularly claimed that a presidential contest could 
not be held until pervasive corruption had been eliminated. The Peralta regime also used 
the aims of Operación Honestidad as a justification for suspending the constitution, 
dissolving the “corrupt” legislative and judicial bodies, and declaring a near-permanent 
state of siege.  By 1965, Peralta’s government used Operación Honestidad to severely 
restrict political participation and secured the military’s dominance over the Guatemalan 
state for decades to come. 
 In the closing months of 1963, however, Operación Honestidad helped bridge the 
growing divide between the governments of Guatemala and the United States. Peralta had 
incorporated Alliance for Progress initiatives into the social outreach aspects of 
Operación Honestidad. At the same time that leading State Department officials 
complained that Colonel Peralta ignored their advice on security and fiscal policies, other 
US officials, namely embassy staff, countered Washington’s concerns with effusive 
praise of Peralta’s embrace of Civic Action as a pillar of Operación Honestidad. The 
“establishment of community relations councils, literacy training support, school lunch 
program…road and bridge construction (especially in the Petén), and medical missions, 
the latter in cooperation with the University of San Carlos Medical School” were just the 
opening act of the combined Alliance for Progress and Operación Honestidad.602 The US 
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embassy proudly noted: “In fact, while certain leftist but non-Communist sectors do 
criticize the U.S. for conventional military assistance, the Embassy has heard favorable 
comments from these same sectors regarding the utility of Civic Action as a means of 
having the Military do something “useful” and perhaps of giving the military 
establishment a more democratic orientation and integrating it more into the life stream 
of the nation.”603  Indeed, the Civic Action programs would succeed in enmeshing the 
military into nearly every facet of civil society, but failed to democratize the authoritarian 
institution. The implementation of Civic Action into Operación Honestidad shows that 
despite the rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress, its programs were compatible with 
military dictatorship. 
 The Peralta government joined the US embassy in promoting and praising the 
Civic Action programs. In addition to becoming head-of-state, Peralta retained his 
position as Minister of Defense, and stridently promoted Civic Action within the Defense 
Ministry’s internal circular Ejército. Editorials and articles heaped praise upon a military 
that had supposedly been cleansed of corruption by Operación Honestidad and now stood 
ready to help the people and build a better Guatemala. One laudatory article proclaimed 
that the soldier and the villager would now work together to improve the country. 
Soldiers would not remain isolated in their barracks. They would take to the street, not 
with guns slung over their shoulders, but instead engaging in their patriotic duty of 
developing the nation alongside fellow citizens.604 Other articles sang similar praises, 
highlighting the contributions of the military’s Civic Action programs to road-building, 
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domestic development, and public works projects. One author assured his presumably all-
military audience that, far from abusing the power now at their disposal, the Guatemalan 
Army would use its forces to gain the respect and love of their citizens and the free 
nations of the Western Hemisphere.605 In this vision of Guatemala’s future, the armed 
forces, inspired and funded by the Alliance for Progress, would lead the country to 
prosperity and order. It was the inexorable march of progress, and anyone who opposed 
its advance became an enemy of civilization itself. 
Peralta’s regime seemed to understand that construction projects alone would not 
win hearts and minds. Not only would the military help to provide the material needs of 
Guatemalan citizens, but it would benevolently cooperate in the “cultural and spiritual 
development of the Guatemalan people” as well.606 In practice, this amounted to the 
military controlling the curriculum of academic institutions, especially those schools 
supported or established through Civic Action programs. The military chain of command 
tightly controlled materials provided to schools and its broader literacy program. Only 
those “national authors” whose work the commanding officers regarded as dignified 
would be fit for Civic Action education initiatives. Unsurprisingly, these authorized 
publications tended to feature uncritical examinations of national heroes and triumphant 
portrayals of military endeavors.607 Additionally, the military signaled that it planned on 
using Civic Action programs to “cooperate” with institutions of higher learning by 
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inserting itself into a diverse “diffusion of works of instructive, academic, and scientific 
nature” including scholarly publications, periodicals, and even graduate theses.608 The 
abundant references to the honesty and integrity of the Guatemalan Armed Forces and 
their commitment to public works served as a thin veneer to cover their early attempts at 
social control. 
 Fulsome advocacy for Civic Action did not stop at Guatemalan borders. Colonel 
Peralta personally promoted the program in his interactions with other Central American 
heads-of-state. At the first annual conference for Civic Action of Central America, 
Peralta made his case for integrated regional adoption of Civic Action programs.609 
According to Peralta, only national armies had the organizational capacity to defeat 
communism. These militaries, Peralta posited, possessed the power to crush subversive 
movements outright by killing off insurgents and their supporters, but this came at a steep 
political and human cost. Civic Action, however, was more effective than warfare 
because it robbed revolutionaries of their appeal by providing the services promised by 
communism. Peralta added that publicizing the projects completed by the military 
through Civic Action stimulated the public sector and encouraged citizens to cooperate 
with the government. Civic Action had so much potential that Peralta argued that it 
should be the foundation for the proposed integration of Central America’s armed forces, 
El Consejo Nacional de Defensa Centroamericano (CONDECA). Peralta’s impassioned 
speech can be considered a success. On December 14, 1963, in Guatemala City, the 
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militaries of Central America signed a treaty forming CONDECA, and began to 
coordinate their efforts against leftist insurgencies in the region.   
 Paired with the public outreach projects of Civic Action, Peralta practiced another 
method of extending the military’s control over the Guatemalan countryside through the 
comisionados militares. Traditionally a position granted to retired, non-commissioned 
officers, the comisionados had long served as a village-level military representative 
whose chief duty was to conscript peasants into the army. Under Peralta, the 
comisionados transformed into a pervasive spy network that actively rooted out local 
subversive elements. In his landmark study of the national social structure of Guatemala, 
Richard Adams reported that the Civic Action and counterinsurgency programs “were 
closely coupled activities.”610 The conversion of the comisionados militares from a 
conscription service to a domestic espionage ring is an example of this intertwined 
response to revolutionary insurgency.  
Comisionados often collaborated with officers conducting Civic Action programs 
in their regions, occasionally taking a leading role, and used the public outreach as a 
means of infiltration into the community. Guerrillas soon realized the threat posed by 
these domestic spies, pejoratively referred to as orejas (ears), and attempted to persuade 
allied villagers to eliminate their local comisionado.611 Failing that, the rebels would 
assassinate the orejas themselves and announce the killing as an act in “service to the 
campesinos.”612 Yet, in cases where the comisionado had effectively associated himself 
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with popular Civic Action initiatives or otherwise proved sympathetic to local concerns, 
rural Guatemalans cautiously approved of the new role of the military. Adams goes as far 
as to suggest that in some instances, the relationship between some comisionados and 
their assigned population outweighed their duty, and they presumably protected some 
individuals from persecution.613 These postulated exceptions aside, the evolution of the 
comisionados militares and their partnership with Civic Action tainted one of the most 
successful, popular, and outwardly benign programs of the Alliance for Progress in 
Guatemala by transforming it into a mechanism for domestic surveillance and control.   
As much as Operación Honestidad and Peralta’s embrace of the Civic Action 
programs seemed to bode well for the popularity of the military government, it could not 
disguise the fact that a repressive, authoritarian regime had seized the Guatemalan state 
and sought to extend the power of the armed forces over civil society. Although these 
efforts served as a point of agreement between American and Guatemalan officials, the 
relationship between the two countries remained strained as Peralta continued to ignore 
Washington’s directives on security and economic matters. The United States, despite its 
frustrations with Guatemala’s head-of-state, was willing to accept some resistance from 
the military regime as long as it maintained order and remained firmly dedicated to 
destroying communists and other subversives. All of the rhetorical niceties of the 
Alliance for Progress would be set aside when brute force appeared to be a quicker 
solution for countering communism. Here then, the real priorities of the United States 
were laid bare: whether by modernization, militarization, or some combination of the 
two, Guatemala must remain bound within the Northern Colossus’ sphere of influence. 
                                                 
613 Ibid. 
 308 
 
 
Peralta proved he could use the Alliance for Progress to further his own ends, namely 
establishing the primacy of the military in all state affairs. The stubborn nationalist 
welcomed US dollars, but rejected foreign military advisors as the insurgency began its 
war against his government in earnest. As long as Peralta continued to serve its Cold War 
security interests, the United States would endure the Guatemalan leader’s limited 
displays of defiance. 
* * * 
The notion that Alliance for Progress died with President Kennedy prevailed 
among many of the program’s most ardent supporters. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. claimed, 
“The Alliance was never really tried. It lasted about a thousand days, not a sufficient test, 
and thereafter only the name remained.”614 As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Schlesinger was champion of the Alliance for Progress and was one of the few members 
of the Kennedy administration who advocated for allowing Juan José Arévalo to run for 
the Guatemalan presidency. Schlesinger and other progressive policymakers in Latin 
American affairs soon found themselves relocated, or outright removed, from circles of 
influence and power in the Johnson administration. In their place stepped Thomas C. 
Mann, a longtime foreign-service official who had worked under the Eisenhower 
administration on Latin American policy. Mann occupied the two highest State 
Department positions concerning Latin America: the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Latin America and the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. His appointment 
displaced two of Kennedy’s most stalwart defenders of the social and political mission of 
the Alliance: Richard Goodwin and Teodoro Moscoso. It may be recalled that Moscoso, 
                                                 
614 Schlesinger quoted in Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 174. 
 309 
 
 
like Schlesinger, lent his support to an Arévalo candidacy and failed to convince 
President Kennedy to avert Peralta’s coup.  
A tough-talking, business-minded, anticommunist from Texas, Mann’s relatively 
brief service in the Johnson administration reoriented the Alliance for Progress to focus 
on economic development through private investment rather than emphasizing social 
justice and political reform. His approach to Latin America’s political problems was 
blunt—counterinsurgency efforts would be bolstered and the United States would openly 
accept dictatorial regimes, provided they were sufficiently committed to combatting 
communism. Protecting US financial interests in the region was paramount. 
Subsequently, his infamous acceptance of anticommunist authoritarianism in Latin 
America would be dubbed the Mann Doctrine, but its tenets were already at work in 
Kennedy’s policies toward Guatemala. 
Many scholars have widely criticized President Johnson and Thomas Mann for 
their handling of the Alliance for Progress. Even before Mann assumed his posts, Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. lamented in his journal “that Mann was an able man, but he would be a 
“disaster”—that he was a free enterprise ideologist, that he did not really believe in the 
Alliance for Progress and that his appointment would mean a reversion to the days of 
John Foster Dulles.”615 Schlesinger’s prolific writings shaped much of the literature 
surrounding the Alliance for Progress, and his antipathy toward Mann permeates many 
critical evaluations of the program. Records of Mann’s ethnocentric outburst and 
remarks, public and private, suitably justify criticism of the policymaker’s attitude toward 
Latin America. On matters of policy, however, Thomas Mann and the Johnson 
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administration followed along the course set by Kennedy more often than they deviated 
from their predecessor’s practices.  
Some scholars, such as historian Stephen Rabe, have drawn attention to the 
continuities between the Kennedy and Johnson administration, and have provided much-
needed nuance to the discussion of these presidents’ relations with Latin America. The 
case of Guatemala during the Alliance for Progress era confirms much of Rabe’s 
thinking. In Guatemala, the transition from Kennedy to Johnson appeared to have little 
impact initially. The most noticeable difference between the two presidents was that 
Kennedy directly involved himself in important Guatemalan issues, whereas Johnson 
preferred to leave the country, along with most Central American issues, to the State 
Department. In fact, over the course Johnson’s years in office the Alliance for Progress 
looked to be working as intended in Guatemala: democracy returned, economic 
conditions improved, and the revolutionary movement was effectively tamped down. 
Behind the appearance of success, the military machine Kennedy set in motion gained 
extraordinary power, committed heinous atrocities, and acted with increased autonomy 
from Guatemalan civil authorities and its patrons in the United States. 
For Ambassador John Bell, 1964 was a difficult year. Bell owed his 
ambassadorial appointment to his close connections with the Kennedy team, and the 
assassination of the American president in November 1963 dealt him a heavy blow. The 
new year with a new president began with problems that continued for the rest of the 
ambassador’s term. Guerilla forces went on the offensive throughout Guatemala and 
established themselves as a persistent threat to the military regime. In responding to the 
insurgency, Bell was no longer the aggressive Cold Warrior who averted potential 
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communist threats. The ambassador went on the defensive and showed signs of being 
overwhelmed by the prospect of a genuine communist revolution. 
 The recent union of guerilla groups into the FAR revealed its potential through a 
series of coordinated attacks in January 1964. In the countryside, guerillas now regularly 
clashed with the army units in the Izabal and Alta Verapaz departments of eastern 
Guatemala. The influence of the guerrilla fronts in the predominantly rural region was 
growing and disrupted access to Guatemala’s most important port, Puerto Barrios.616 
More troubling to the ambassador, insurgents began assaulting urban targets frequently, 
extending their reach from their rural strongholds. Mortar shells rained down on the 
Guatemala City airport on three occasions and then targeted a nearby Honor Guard 
compound. Bell observed that FAR pamphlets signed by Commandant Yon Sosa had 
been distributed in nearby neighborhoods warning people to stay away from the airport to 
avoid future attacks made “in retaliation for [the] military dictatorship’s action against 
guerillas” in Izabal.617 At the end of the month, the FAR assassinated Colonel Jose Oliva 
Valdez, an intelligence officer of the Puerto Barrios garrison, in a drive-by machine gun 
attack in Guatemala City.618 In his monthly assessment, Bell admitted that the insurgency 
had escalated its attacks, but that the military, as a result of US training, was gradually 
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becoming a more efficient counterinsurgency force.619 Despite mounting evidence to the 
contrary, Bell continued to claim that the guerilla forces could not seriously threaten the 
Peralta government. 
Responding to the State Department’s alarm and the increasing problems on the 
ground, Bell suggested a reorientation of US policy in Guatemala. The new policy 
objective emphasized greater cooperation with the Peralta regime to advance the 
economic and social goals of the Alliance for Progress and the reinstatement of a 
democratic, constitutional government.620 The ambassador also stated that long-term 
social and economic programs would undermine the insurgency over time, but that 
increased support for security forces was immediately necessary to maintain the current 
counterinsurgency efforts and exert influence over the military regime. The organization 
of these security forces, however, remained a contentious issue between Peralta’s 
government and US officials.  
 State Department officials, CIA analysts, and US military advisors all agreed that 
the National Police and Guatemalan intelligence agencies needed to be professionalized 
and restructured in order to counter the growing insurgency effectively. Secretary Rusk’s 
previous reduction in the funding of the Public Safety Program in an attempt to push 
Peralta into reforming the police and appointing US-trained officers to leadership 
positions failed to persuade the regime. With guerillas targeting urban areas with more 
frequency, Ambassador Bell reported that the need for an effective police force was now 
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Guatemala’s most significant national security problem.621 A collaborative effort between 
USAID and Guatemalan police officers produced a plan for reorganization that the US 
embassy would present to the Minister of Government, but Bell feared that the Peralta 
regime would once again reject these suggestions. Robert Corrigan, the Deputy Chief of 
Mission, presented the police reorganization plan to the Minister of Government, who 
agreed that the reforms were necessary, but the Peralta regime still refused to integrate 
more US advisers into the structure of his security forces.622  
Despite Peralta’s unwillingness to listen to its US allies on internal security 
matters, his regime inched toward a return to constitutionality. As part of his initial purge, 
Peralta had dissolved the Guatemalan Constitution. The government needed to articulate 
its foundational principles, and the military regime would gain increased legitimacy--and 
would likely reap benefits--if it oversaw the drafting of the new constitution. Following 
the American ambassador’s failed attempts to prod Peralta into setting a definite 
timetable for the presidential election or forming a council of state, his superiors in 
Washington conceded Bell’s original assessment had been correct: making overt 
demands on the Guatemalan government would not work. Instead, the careful courting of 
influential members of the regime had proven most effective. By building his relationship 
with Peralta’s brother Arturo and other Guatemalan power brokers, Bell quietly 
encouraged elections for a constituent assembly. These representatives would, in theory, 
help Peralta’s regime draft a new constitution to replace the one that had been nullified 
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following the coup. His efforts met with some qualified success and, nearly a year after 
taking power, Colonel Peralta announced that elections for the constituent assembly 
would be held May or June.623  
 The election, however, came with several caveats. Since coming to office, Peralta 
had formed his own political party, Partido Institucional Democrático (PID), largely 
from his supporters in the upper echelons of the military, and the constituent assembly 
election would be its debut.  According to historian Jim Handy, the PID looked to the 
Mexican PRI as its model and planned to control Guatemalan politics through its 
command over the state bureaucracy and by coopting moderate reform movements into 
the party.624 Unlike the PRI, the PID was essentially a military-political organization and 
ranking officers intended to maintain power over their party indefinitely. The formation 
of the PID institutionalized the military’s decisive presence in Guatemalan politics and 
served as their vehicle for domination over the state for decades.  
In order to ensure the PID would meet with success, Peralta’s regime barred 
opposition parties from participating in the election. Only the extreme rightist MLN and 
center-left Partido Revolucionario registered for the election. Their candidates 
understood well that they served at the pleasure of the PID and joined in a coalition with 
Peralta’s party for the election. This subservience to the PID became most apparent when 
the two parties presented nearly identical, government-selected, platforms; a bizarre 
phenomenon considering the stark political differences between the PR and the MLN.625 
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The conservative political positions of the PID and MLN naturally converged on several 
issues, but the unlikely alliance between the Partido Revolucionario and Peralta’s party 
defied logic. The most sensible explanation for the alliance, put forth by Jim Handy, 
argues that the leader of the PR, Mario Méndez Montenegro, saw an opportunity to 
legitimize his party and secure its position in future elections. His gambit succeeded. 
Although Mario Méndez Montenegro did not live to participate in the 1966 presidential 
election, the PR survived and won the contest.  
The Guatemalan government announced that the vote for constituent assembly 
would take place on May 24, but Colonel Peralta’s political tricks could not mask the 
electoral farce. State Department intelligence analysts considered the election a 
plebiscite, and estimated that “the failure of the military government to allow an 
opposition party to participate in the election has created a political issue that will be 
prominent in Guatemalan for months to come.”626 After enduring over a year of pressure 
from Washington to broaden his political base and move toward elections, Colonel 
Peralta responded with a deeply undemocratic maneuver. The constituent assembly vote 
was merely the beginning: a test case for rigging future elections through procedural 
maneuvers, blocking party registrations, and dictating policies to the political parties that 
the military elite found acceptable. The brief prospect of political stability and progress in 
Guatemala rapidly dissolved. 
A proliferation of coup plots against Defense Minister Peralta marked the 
immediate popular response to the announcement of the election. Opportunistic military 
leaders, political opponents, journalists, and students of all political identities conspired 
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to overthrow the government, but these self-interested splinter groups lacked the 
resources and political unity to make a serious attempt to topple the regime. Susanne 
Jonas’ examination of the revolutionary movement reveals that ideological fissures 
within the FAR’s tenuous alliance erupted between the PGT, which favored political 
participation, and the MR-13, which rejected the elections and demanded a continuation 
of armed struggle.627 Although the divisions within the FAR were not yet irreconcilable, 
they prevented the most formidable opposition group in Guatemala from taking definitive 
action during the constituent assembly elections. Participation in the elections was low, 
but May 24 came and went without a serious disruption. Facing no real resistance, a 
toothless, conservative constituent assembly formed and granted the pretense of some 
democratic progress to the Peralta regime. The divide within the left over the issue of 
elections, however, would prove fatefully enduring.   
 The Guatemalan military effectively swallowed the Alliance for Progress as 
Peralta advanced the armed forces control over the state. Although the lofty 
developmental program had been designed as a method for countering communism in 
Latin America, it’s initiatives increasingly funded projects that enhanced security forces 
control over the civilian population. The Johnson administration largely followed the 
trajectory set by the Kennedy administration and maintained the idealistic rhetoric of the 
Alliance for Progress, but dispensed with much of the humanitarian principles expressed 
by the project’s creators. Under the Mann doctrine, the US would offer little pushback 
against allied anticommunist dictators in Latin America and empty gestures toward 
democracy, like Peralta’s constituent assembly election, passed as political progress. 
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Constraints on Peralta’s militarization of politics and the state would not come from the 
United States. As the insurgency established itself as a genuine threat, Peralta needed 
little justification for sharply increasing repression, violence, and requests for US security 
assistance.  
Through the summer of 1964, the US embassy continued to lament the inaction of 
the Peralta regime against the FAR, yet still discounted the danger posed by opposition 
forces. Bell recommended that the Public Safety Program officials delay their assessment 
of Guatemalan police forces because the government continued to rely on the army as 
both an urban and rural counterinsurgency force.628 Major guerilla engagements had 
subsided. They averaged, Bell noted, “one murder a month for the past five months,” 
targeting plantation owners and a few army officers.629 Peralta’s neglect of public 
security might be overlooked if the momentum of the insurgency continued to diminish. 
If it did not, perhaps it could finally push the colonel to cooperate with US security 
advisors. The optimistic assessments of the embassy and the arrogance of Peralta’s 
government dissipated in the face of a sustained assault that began in the provincial 
village of Panzós. The attack on Panzós signaled that Guatemala’s long, bloody civil war 
had only just begun as the country plunged into a decades-long descent into terror and 
violence. 
 
 
                                                 
628 John O. Bell, “The Threat of Violence in Guatemala,” May 22, 1964, DNSA, Records of the Agency for 
International Development, Records of the Office of Public Safety, Record Group 286, Box 66, National 
Archives, 3. 
629 Ibid. 1. 
 318 
 
 
The Gathering Storm: The Insurgency Tests the Peralta Regime 
 
Dusk ushered in the heavy, cool evening air, mixing the humidity of the Polochic 
River valley with the refreshing currents that crept down from the highlands surrounding 
the village of Panzós, where nine soldiers manned the local Army outposts. Suddenly, at 
around 7:30pm, shots and shouts pierced the rising drone of crepuscular creatures in the 
jungle. A large group of ragged men, roughly twenty in number, burst from the shadowed 
tree-line and stormed the fortification. Surprised and outnumbered, the sentries stood 
little chance. By the end of the firefight, the Army squad surrendered—three had been 
killed, two wounded. The guerrillas sustained zero casualties and took three of the 
survivors captive. A single member of the Panzós outpost escaped and reported that the 
guerrillas had seized all of the arms and ammunition from his detachment. On October 
16, 1964, after months of relative quiet, the FAR’s raid at Panzós initiated a prolonged 
period of escalating attacks against the Guatemalan military government. 
 A commercial center along the railroad that connected the plantations of central-
eastern Guatemala to the Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios, Panzós sat near the border of the 
Alta Verapaz and Izabal departments: the two regions where guerrillas had established 
strongholds and expanded their influence. Panzós was a microcosm of the broad power 
relationship that characterized traditional Guatemalan society. The vast majority of the 
region’s inhabitants were Maya peasants who worked on land owned by Ladinos. The 
bounty reaped from peasant labor made its way through Panzós, where many wealthy 
local landowners resided, before being loaded onto ships owned by foreign corporations. 
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It was a fitting symbol for the disparities of wealth and power generated by extractive 
relationship Guatemala had with other countries, namely the United States.  
Colonel Peralta reacted to the attack immediately by sending a swell of 
government troops into the region to hunt down the guerrilla band. Two platoons of 
paratroopers landed in nearby Puerto Barrios to secure the port city.630 Naval forces plied 
Lago Izabal while air assets surveilled the heavily forested regions for any sign of the 
insurgents. A full six infantry platoons, over two-hundred men, swept the area on foot.631 
Two days after the raid, an Army unit stopped a group of men driving a pickup truck and 
detained them, claiming that they were guerrilla fighters. After what can only be assumed 
was an intense and unpleasant interrogation, the accused told their captors that the group 
that carried out the attack on the Panzós outpost “had numerous guerrillas in the band up 
in the mountains” who were armed with high-quality machine guns and carbines 
manufactured in the United States.632 The US Army attaché stationed at the embassy 
reported an “all-out effort was being made to locate and capture the culprits” and that the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces were “reacting vigorously to this attack.”633 Beyond arresting 
a handful of suspects, however, government forces failed to locate and eliminate the 
group that assaulted Panzós. 
 The US embassy deployed an investigative team to Puerto Barrios to survey the 
guerrilla-friendly regions, but before these officials even arrived in the town, Ambassador 
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John Bell tried to downplay the Panzós raid. Repeating the mantra he had developed 
since Peralta came to power, the ambassador insisted that the guerrillas were not a threat 
to the government and that there were “no indications that the subversive groups are 
gaining in strength.”634 Bell assured his superiors that the US military mission “received 
reports that over the past several months the Government has quietly but with apparently 
increasing efficiency kept pressure on guerrilla bands…Guatemalan military units have, 
without fanfare, “eliminated” some 30 guerrillas and police in the capital have arrested 
several terrorist leaders, serving to disrupt guerrilla and terrorist plans.”635 Despite the 
efforts of security forces, the ambassador admitted, “it will be difficult to eliminate the 
guerrillas and terrorist entirely.” While insurgents lacked the capacity to unseat the 
military-government, “perhaps the biggest threat,” Bell cautioned, “is the possibility of 
the assassination of Chief of Government Peralta by communist-backed guerrillas.”636 
Such an event would spell disaster for Guatemala and the United States.  
The headstrong Guatemalan leader had caused consternation among high-ranking 
State Department officials, but Ambassador Bell believed he remained the only 
individual capable of producing stability in Guatemala. Reaffirming this point, Bell 
reported that the Peralta regime showed promise in several areas. Civic Action continued 
to receive “strong support” and the government had extended its outreach initiatives by 
introducing sponsorship and training programs “to identify and support promising labor 
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leaders.”637 Select youth organizations enjoyed exchange programs and leadership grants. 
Alliance for Progress dollars, directed through Peralta’s government, continued to create 
roads, schools, and rural clinics. Operación Honestidad gained recognition for creating 
the first government budgetary surplus since the 1954 coup. Above all, Peralta had made 
moves toward constitutionality and the return of democracy with the constituent 
assembly elections, and in the process, forged ties with both the PR and the MLN. The 
ambassador’s tale, however, contrasted with reports coming from the embassy team 
investigating Puerto Barrios.  
After two days in Guatemala’s primary port, the reporting officer’s alarm over 
conditions in “the incredibly ugly city of Puerto Barrios” revealed why the region was a 
hotbed of anti-government sentiment.638 It seemed that Alliance for Progress promises 
had not affected the “bar and bordello seaport economy,” and a “general atmosphere of 
decay and dissatisfaction” presented an opportunity for the FAR. Unemployment was the 
norm and those who could find work saw their earnings decrease as much as sixty 
percent over the course of the year. Hoping to catch guerrillas, the local garrison 
regularly performed mass-arrests, which only increased local sympathy toward the 
insurgency. The report revealed that even the garrison commander feared for his life: “the 
threat of violence is always present…Col. Manuel Arturo Giron never ventures from his 
military compound except in an unmarked car, changing his license plates frequently, and 
with two body guards armed with submachine guns, an armed driver, and with a .45 
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caliber pistol tucked in his belt.”639 Writing on behalf of Ambassador Bell, embassy 
secretary Edward Hef, echoed his boss’ standard line: “there is little question that the 
military are in control of the guerrilla situation. However, given the elusiveness of the 
guerrilla groups and the difficult terrain in the area, it is unlikely that the guerrillas can be 
entirely eliminated.”640 Regardless of the single qualifying statement, the dire situation 
presented in the report appeared at odds with Ambassador Bell’s conclusion that the 
insurgency was merely a nuisance to an otherwise robust government. 
Major figures in the State Department already doubted the ambassador’s rosy 
outlook on Peralta’s regime. The Panzós raid damaged John Bell’s credibility far more 
than it harmed the Guatemalan military government. Secretary of State Rusk demanded 
immediate clarification on the attacks and additional information on the Izabal and Alta 
Verapaz departments. Furthermore, he ordered Bell to urge Guatemalan authorities “to 
conduct thorough interrogation of captured guerrillas…with [a] view [of] obtaining 
intelligence on possible Cuban involvement.”641 When the confessions of presumably 
tortured prisoners failed to yield actionable intelligence, Secretary Rusk called for an 
assessment of the “apparent expansion of [the] area of guerrilla operations.”642 
Ambassador Bell, displaying the stubbornness often attributed to Colonel Peralta, gave 
Secretary Rusk his boilerplate response: the guerrillas were not a threat and the 
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Guatemalan government was steadily increasing “pressure against subversive 
activity…to contain and reduce it.”643 Instead of the guerrillas in the hills, Bell argued 
that the real emerging threat in Guatemala was the impending breakdown of the odd 
political coalition Peralta had bolted together for the constituent assembly elections over 
the issue of selecting a mutually agreeable candidate for the still unscheduled presidential 
election. Unwilling to recognize the danger posed by the FAR’s growing popularity, 
Ambassador Bell became an impediment to counterinsurgency doctrine and its many 
adherents within the Johnson administration. 
If State Department chiefs had any remaining faith in Ambassador Bell, his 
dismissive response to the Panzós raid and the subsequent spate of guerrilla attacks so 
reduced his standing that the formerly vocal anticommunist crusader became relatively 
despondent. The Guatemalan Army patrolled the “guerrilla habitat” and reportedly, “kept 
the subversive groups off balance [by] killing and capturing small numbers of guerrillas 
in minor clashes.”644 The US Army Mission, however, concluded that the Guatemalan 
counterinsurgency program “began to deteriorate” as early as January 1964 because 
Peralta had refused to allow proper supervision and inspection by US military advisors.645 
The Guatemalan Army Chief of Staff had only recently accepted a curriculum suggested 
by the US Army Mission and it would not be fully integrated until well into 1965. This 
cast further suspicion on Ambassador Bell’s assurances that the Guatemalan Armed 
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Forces had the rebels trapped in their highland hideouts. Increased military presence did 
temporarily reduce guerrilla actions in rural Izabal and Alta Verapaz, but this was offset 
by audacious urban attacks that confirmed Ambassador Bell no longer had a firm grasp 
on the situation in Guatemala. 
 As fireworks exploded across the sky on New Year’s Eve 1964, FAR cells 
attacked Guatemala City. They torched a USAID hangar, destroying 23 vehicles, and 
planted a bomb within the US Army Mission headquarters. It failed to detonate, as did a 
second explosive device found at a gasoline storage depot, but it was clear that the FAR 
had escalated its operations and could attack major urban targets, including US facilities. 
Two weeks later, an assassination squad attempted to kill Colonel Hector Medina, one of 
Peralta’s loyal subordinates, in a drive-by shooting.646 Then on February 9, two men on a 
motorcycle sped up to a car containing Colonel Harold Houser, Chief of the US Army 
Mission in Guatemala, and fired at him point blank—narrowly missing the highest-
ranking US military officer in the country.647 In the weeks that followed, the FAR 
continued operations in Guatemala City, hurling bombs into a crowd during a military 
ceremony and dropping a grenade from a bridge into a truckload of soldiers. Jolted from 
complacency by repeated attacks in the capital, Peralta declared a state of siege and 
suspended many of the rights provided by Charter of Government that had temporarily 
replaced a working constitution. 
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 The crackdown only emboldened the FAR agents, who interpreted the 
government’s state of siege as an indication that their actions were successfully 
pressuring Peralta and exposing the weakness of his regime. On March 20, insurgents 
assassinated the notorious secret-police chief Napoleon Arturo Cordova, who was 
commonly knowns as “The Torturer.”648 Killing the infamously cruel officer gave many 
FAR members a taste of revolutionary justice. When President Johnson ordered US 
forces to invade the Dominican Republic in an effort to halt the return of overthrown 
former president, Juan Bosch, many Guatemalan rebels saw their own tragic history 
repeating in another small, Latin American country. Bosch, elected president after the 
assassination of the widely hated dictator Rafael Trujillo, was an intellectual and a 
dedicated reformer. He was overthrown by his own military after serving only seven 
months in office, but disapproval with the resulting military regime generated a civil war. 
The Johnson administration’s decision to send roughly 42,000 troops to back the 
unpopular military government incensed many Latin Americans and provided ample 
propaganda material for guerrilla movements throughout the region. The FAR used their 
successful assassination of the hated Cordova and the US intervention of the Dominican 
Republic to amplify their message and attract more adherents to their movement. 
By May, despite the ongoing state of siege, the FAR expanded its operations well 
beyond what the governments of the United States and Guatemala thought was possible. 
Guerrillas resumed activities in rural areas, this time with a focus along the Honduran 
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border.649 CIA informants reported that the leadership of the PGT sent out a startling 
directive to its active cells: 
“The group agreed it was urgent to initiate immediate terrorist activities against 
the United States Embassy and other U.S. government installations in Guatemala, 
and against personnel of the embassy and of the U.S. government in Guatemala. 
The terrorist activity will consist of bombing of U.S. installations and private 
homes of embassy personnel, and of armed action against individuals. The 
communists will machine gun automobiles and residences of embassy and 
consular and other United States government personnel…The PGT will urge all 
other groups to collaborate with it in this terrorist action.”650 
 
Attacks on US targets manifested immediately. On May 2, while bombs detonated 
throughout Guatemalan City, FAR saboteurs peppered the United States’ consulate 
building with machine gun fire.651 The CIA noted that the PGT ordered the attacks in 
response to the invasion of the Dominican Republic. The sound of explosions filled the 
night air of Guatemala City through the summer of 1965, and American corporations, 
government buildings, and individual citizens found themselves the primary target of 
urban FAR attacks.   
The Agency was also concerned about the opinion of the American public. On 
May 4, NBC aired a scathing hour-long program, The Science of Spying, which 
lambasted the CIA and the United States government for its global interventions.652 
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Editorial bias against US policy in Guatemala went undisguised. The program featured 
interviews with major figures such as Allen Dulles, former CIA chief Richard Bissell, 
and even exiled former president Miguel Ydigoras. The longest portion of the 
Guatemalan segment, however, was reserved for an extensive interview with Marco 
Antonio Yon Sosa, the rebel officer leading the MR-13 guerrilla front. On American 
national television, Yon Sosa pleaded his case for revolution. He condemned the US-
backed military-government and declared that the Alliance for Progress “was inspired by 
good intentions, but it was too late”. When his interviewer confronted Yon Sosa with 
accusations of terrorism, the rebel commander responded that such actions were 
necessary retaliation against soldiers who were committing atrocities in the countryside, 
including torture, rape, and massacres. Likewise, Yon Sosa claimed that his forces must 
also attack US officials because they enforced interventionist policy in Guatemala and 
acted as an occupying force. Moreover, he denied any Cuban involvement with his 
movement. Clean-shaven and considerate, Yon Sosa’s performance in the interview gave 
the impression of a reasonable man put in unreasonable circumstances. He was not the 
bearded, vagabond guerrilla fighter that the Cuban Revolution had impressed upon the 
American consciousness. Instead, it was the United States and its endorsement of 
dictatorship that appeared as the real villain of the piece.   
The unabated guerrilla attacks and unflattering prime-time television program 
reflected poorly on Ambassador John Bell’s judgement and ability to perform his duties. 
Bell’s name appeared on fewer diplomatic cables as other embassy members took on 
correspondence with Washington that the ambassador formerly monopolized. The First 
Secretary of the Embassy, John Dreyfuss, began composing the monthly guerrilla reports, 
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among other important communiques. When Colonel Peralta gave an impromptu press 
conference on the issue of subversion, First Secretary Dreyfuss reported that the 
Guatemalan head-of-state dismissed the guerrillas as mere bandits and attempted to 
blame recent unrest on a plot concocted by the exiled-president Miguel Ydigoras and his 
nationally despised crony, Roberto Alejos.653 When the State Department responded to 
Peralta’s flippant disregard of the guerrilla threat by demanding the embassy put more 
pressure on the Guatemalan government to accept US counterinsurgency support and 
public safety recommendations, Ambassador Bell only managed to muster an unhelpful 
reply: he would continue put forth these arguments, “but without expectation [of] much 
success.654 It seemed the American ambassador, who had just years before upended 
Guatemalan democracy in the name of anticommunism, gave up once a genuine 
communist movement gained a foothold.  
A few weeks after Peralta’s press event and Bell’s unenthusiastic response, the 
FAR assassinated the Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel Ernesto Molina Arreaga.655 
Four days later, on May 29, FAR hitmen nearly succeeded in assassinating Colonel 
Peralta himself at the inauguration ceremony of the Central American Industrial Fair, but 
the CIA and G-2 (Guatemala’s intelligence service) narrowly managed to uncover the 
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plot the day before the event took place.656 Seven bombs detonated throughout 
Guatemala City on June 7, with two blasting the residences of the Brazilian and 
Nicaraguan ambassadors. The FAR targeted these diplomats after their home countries 
sent troops to support the United States invasion in the Dominican Republic, allowing the 
intervention to operate within the parameters set by the Organization of American 
States.657 These attacks, and the accompanying social instability, forced the Peralta 
government to act and on June 9, the Constituent Assembly finally scheduled the 
Guatemala’s return to constitutional rule. The Assembly announced that by September 
15, it would enact the new constitution. Moreover, the Peralta regime would finally allow 
a convocation for congressional and presidential elections on October 1, with elections to 
follow within six months of ceremony. From these elections, a new Congress would 
assemble on June 1, followed by the inauguration of a new president and vice president 
on July 1, 1966. For nearly two years, Washington urged Peralta to set an itinerary for the 
return to constitutionality, but it was domestic pressure created by relentless FAR attacks 
within Guatemala City that forced the colonel finally to commit to definitive dates. 
Democracy, in some form or fashion, would return to Guatemala. 
The announcement by the Constituent Assembly pleased the Johnson 
administration, and US officials believed it would help reduce opposition to the Peralta 
regime, but Guatemala’s problems were far from solved. The sharp escalation of guerrilla 
activity in Guatemala required the attention of multiple US military, diplomatic, and 
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intelligence organs that coalesced into the Latin American Ad Hoc Interagency Group on 
Counterinsurgency. This diverse body compiled a report detailing the challenges the 
Guatemalan government faced along with recommendations on how they might be 
addressed. The Interagency Group concluded that the “Guatemalan military forces have 
sufficient training and equipment to counter isolated hit-and-run raids by guerrillas in 
rural areas” and the ongoing insurgent “activities will not in themselves cause the 
overthrow of the Peralta government if there is no major deterioration of the political and 
economic situation.”658 Economic and political stability, however, could not be found in 
Peralta’s Guatemala. 
The root of the Guatemalan government’s problems, according to the Interagency 
Group, was the inability of its leadership to take decisive action. “Indecision in the 
political field has been matched by indecision in the business of government,” the report 
concluded.659 Peralta’s government had stalled Guatemala’s return to constitutionality 
until terror gripped the capital. All major USAID loans for developmental projects, 
excepting Civic Action, went unused as US representatives found themselves “unable to 
penetrate the suspicion and apathy of Guatemalan officials [to] complete negotiations on 
these loans.”660 Colonel Peralta undoubtedly desired to project the image of a nationalist 
dedicated to Guatemalan sovereignty and wanted to avoid being viewed as a Yankee 
puppet, but his government’s resistance to international financial institutions such as the 
Export-Import Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank caused US policymakers 
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to conclude that the “lack of action in the economic field fundamentally results from the 
unwillingness or inability on the part of some members of the government to make 
effective decisions.”661  
The military regime displayed similar lethargy in its internal defense. The Army 
had initially proved reluctant to crush an insurgency led by men from their own ranks, 
and as a result, their former comrades had built a powerful revolutionary movement. 
Police forces, a crucial component of counterinsurgency strategy, remained underutilized, 
outdated, and managed by Peralta loyalists instead of professionals with experience and 
training. Bafflingly unmovable, Peralta’s military government would not even respond to 
Washington’s offers to increase assistance to Guatemala’s police. That a country helmed 
by its Minister of Defense and his subordinate ranking-officers failed to deliver political 
and economic stability is unsurprising, but the military government’s reluctance to accept 
the United States’ help in combating communist insurgents perplexed policymakers in 
Washington. The Johnson administration soon determined that US interests would be best 
served if Kennedy’s colonel-president relinquished his hold over Guatemala. 
Following the unflattering report by the Interagency Group, the CIA uncovered 
that the MR-13 had transferred its headquarters to Guatemala City. Peralta’s government 
had failed to combat the wave of urban terror, and the insurgent group planned to press 
the attack with increased assassinations, kidnappings, hit-and-run shootouts, and 
bombings. The American Embassy reported a series of anonymous threatening phone 
calls to US personnel, and the CIA revealed, “the guerrillas have a complete list of 
United States citizens currently residing in Guatemala. The guerrillas will take action 
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against these persons as soon as the 13 November Movement gives the signal for the 
initiation of hostilities.662 By encouraging military rule as a ward against communism in 
Guatemala, the United States gave life to a leftist insurgency that targeted American 
citizens.  
When Colonel Peralta seized power to prevent Juan Jose Arévalo from 
campaigning for the Guatemalan presidency, John Bell basked in a mission 
accomplished. In the wake of the military takeover, his superiors in the State Department 
charged Ambassador Bell with a new mission: persuading Peralta to avoid personal 
dictatorship and restore a constitutional, representative government. For nearly two years, 
he failed to achieve his directive while excusing the authoritarian government he had 
helped to bring to power. When Peralta relented at last, in the face of domestic unrest and 
urban terrorism, it was hardly a victory for the American ambassador. No official 
reprimand of Bell has surfaced in the available archival records, but it seems clear that 
the ambassador understood he was no longer trusted in the Johnson administration. His 
dwindling correspondence with Washington officials lacked the strength of conviction 
that formerly characterized his assessments of the situation in Guatemala. He had played 
a major role in convincing President Kennedy to allow Peralta to seize power, but his 
incessant promotion of the regime and his refusal to take the insurgency seriously became 
a liability for the Johnson administration’s approach in Guatemala. 
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 The reasons why John Bell relinquished his ambassadorship are not explicit in 
official documentation, but several factors likely contributed to his decision to leave what 
he described in later interviews as “a small, not particularly important country.”663 From 
his own account, Bell claimed he “could have stayed in Guatemala longer, but I declined” 
for personal reasons. Chief of these unstated reasons must have been a degree of fear for 
his personal safety, as the US Embassy seemed like a prime target in the warzone of 
Guatemala City.664 After a lifetime of government service, Bell’s career also must have 
been an important component of this decision. Clearly, his achievements as ambassador 
were rapidly being overshadowed by the crises that characterized the majority of his time 
in office. His greatest accomplishment as ambassador—blocking the return of Arévalo by 
facilitating the military’s seizure of power—appeared to have backfired, and now 
Guatemala faced the threat of Red Revolution. As a result, the Kennedy-appointed, self-
declared “State Department man” butted heads with his superiors whose influence over 
foreign policy increased under Johnson. Seeking self-preservation, Bell likely left his 
ambassadorial post before an injunction, or a bullet, terminated his tenure. 
 John Bell departed for his new position in Florida as a political advisor to United 
States Strike Command (STRIKECOM/STRICOM), the integrated command structure of 
the strategic assets and doctrines of the Army, Navy and Air Force. His replacement at 
the US embassy, John Gordon Mein, swore his oath of office on September 3, 1965 and 
came to a country in chaos. A lifelong foreign-service officer whose career mirrored his 
predecessor in many ways, Mein proved to be as dogmatically anticommunist as Bell, but 
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more shrewd. Moreover, he had no personal attachment to the Peralta regime, making 
him a much more flexible diplomat. Ambassador Mein oversaw a turning of the tide in 
Guatemala during his service, but the problems that arose from the United States’ 
devotion to the country’s military officer class overrode the appearance of progress. 
Whereas Bell managed to escape Guatemala with his life intact, John Gordon Mein 
would not be so fortunate. 
* * * 
    Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia’s government demonstrated that the United 
States could empower strongmen, but not necessarily control them. The small, 
impoverished country had displayed the United States capacity to wage the Cold War in 
1954 by toppling Arbenz, but Guatemala had not transformed into the “showcase for 
democracy” promised by American coup-plotters. The United States enjoyed a brief 
window of overwhelming influence over the Guatemalan government for a time, but this 
eroded quickly as nationalists across the political spectrum resisted Yankee intervention. 
His seizure of power having received the blessing of the Kennedy administration, 
Colonel Peralta exposed the limits of US power, even as his intransigence threatened the 
economic, political, and social stability of the state he commanded. Washington’s 
attempts to influence, persuade, or coerce Peralta usually failed. American officials, 
especially Ambassador Bell, discovered they had little leverage over the unconstitutional, 
dictatorial regime because of their complicity in its rise to power. Alliance for Progress 
programs, to the degree they were permitted, became a tool Peralta wielded to reward 
loyal subordinates and amplify the control the military had over civil society. 
Infrastructure, education, public health, and national culture all came into the purview of 
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the Guatemalan security forces. Expanding its dominance into the political realm, Peralta 
successfully created the PID, lending legitimacy to the military’s role as arbiter in 
elections. Colonel Peralta eventually agreed to give up his personal powers and permitted 
elections, but the rule of the Guatemalan Armed Forces remained unassailable. Peralta 
completed Guatemala’s transition from a constitutional, democratic republic to an 
authoritarian military dictatorship, and the armed forces stood ready to exterminate its 
enemies with impunity. 
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CHAPTER V: COUNTERINSURGENCY STATE 
The Culmination of the Partnership between the United States and Guatemalan Armed 
Forces 
 
By 1965, the Guatemalan military and its patron, the United States, faced an 
armed communist-inspired opposition that challenged the legitimacy of both the 
government and the Pan-American system. After sending waves of advisors, trainers, and 
millions of dollars into the country, the United States and Guatemala jointly launched 
Operación Limpieza in 1966, which turned the tide against guerrilla forces and completed 
Guatemala’s transformation into a counterinsurgency state.665 The first half of the 1960s 
had seen little improvement to the Guatemalan economy and although economic 
production marginally increased as the decade continued, Alliance for Progress programs 
fell short of improving the lives of most Guatemalans. The Guatemalan economy 
expanded during the latter years of the Alliance for Progress, but industrial diversification 
and the influx of private investment benefitted a narrow few. Moreover, enormous sums 
of foreign aid funneled into Guatemalan military and the pockets of its highest officers.666 
The uneven economic circumstances, paired with the evaporation of civil liberties, 
inspired many Guatemalans to sympathize, and even join, the growing insurgent groups.  
By the end of 1963, the insurgency began to pose a serious threat to the regime 
due to Peralta’s initial inaction. The revolutionary movement, however, lacked the unity, 
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armaments, and organization to match Central America’s most powerful military backed 
by training, intelligence, and hardware provided by the United States. The unlikely 
election of Julio César Méndez Montenegro, the progressive leader of the Partido 
Revolucionario, promised to usher in the “Third Government of the Guatemalan 
Revolution.” Instead, it led to the division and conquest of the oppositionist left by the 
United States, the Guatemalan military, and the right-wing death-squads created through 
their collaboration. Abiding by their U.S. counterinsurgency training, these death-squads 
publicly sewed terror by disappearing activists, intellectuals, and political leaders whose 
names they publicly posted “kill lists”. The physical and psychological toll of these terror 
tactics isolated the various insurgent groups and dried up recruitment. Once fully 
unleashed, the blood-fueled counterinsurgency forces could not be contained. Even the 
US State Department grew concerned. In 1967, the US embassy warned Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk that the Guatemalan counterinsurgency program was “running wild,” 
and that their excessively violent actions were beyond the control of the United States 
and the civilians nominally in charge of the Guatemalan government.667 Although the 
military still held the reins of the state during Méndez Montenegro’s presidency, chaos 
ruled in Guatemala. 
 Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, “the Butcher of Zacapa,” marshaled the anarchic 
bloodletting that consumed Guatemala into a coherent counterinsurgency strategy of 
unprecedented, organized brutality. Colonel Arana received considerable U.S. assistance 
in his campaign that incorporated death-squads into the formal military apparatus; 
systematically terrorized civilians through rape, torture, and forced disappearance; and 
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razed entire communities to the ground.668 The colonel’s savage stewardship over the 
province of Zacapa, the center of the rebellion, dealt a mortal wound to the insurgency, 
and fellow commanders emulated his methods across the nation. By 1968, the rebels 
were no longer a threat to the Guatemalan counterinsurgency state. Two years later, the 
Butcher became the President.      
 The first decade of Guatemala’s long civil conflict introduced new, frightening 
elements to waging the Cold War in Latin America. Under the banner of anticommunism, 
the Guatemalan military used their hold on the power of the state to pursue a relentless 
witch-hunt for subversive threats. Given a massive technological and financial edge over 
the insurgents by the United States, the Guatemalan military forwent the responsibilities 
of governance and pursued an unbridled, nationwide massacre of its own population. To 
make matters worse, the defeat of the insurgency through mass-murder and state-terror 
legitimized the tactics in the eyes of the military and the oligarchy. The Guatemalan 
experience during the Alliance for Progress debuted several nefarious practices that 
would become common in Cold War Latin America: paramilitary death-squads, 
reciprocal terror, and forced disappearance originated from the US-Guatemalan 
counterinsurgency efforts. The Eisenhower administration had promised to transform 
Guatemalan into a “showcase for democracy,” but under the Alliance for Progress of 
Kennedy and Johnson, the country instead became a “laboratory for 
counterinsurgency.”669  
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 This chapter posits that the most significant accomplishment of the Alliance for 
Progress era in Guatemala was transforming the country into a counterinsurgency state. 
The evidence presented here reveals that the military high command successfully retained 
power over the state even after Peralta’s regime permitted the left-leaning reformer, Julio 
César Méndez Montenegro, to take the office of the presidency after his electoral victory. 
The preservation of the Guatemalan military’s authority over matters of state directly 
resulted from the policies of the Kennedy administration.  The new US ambassador, John 
Gordon Mein, helped the Johnson administration fulfill some of the promises of the 
Alliance for Progress: the Guatemalan economy expanded, constitutionality and 
democracy returned, and the threat from the communist-led insurgency disintegrated.  
The legacy of Kennedy’s decision to accept military rule after the 1963 coup, however, 
overshadowed these nominal accomplishments. Removed from civilian oversight, the 
leaders of the Guatemalan security forces more readily embraced assistance from the 
United States in their efforts to destroy the revolutionary movement. The revitalized 
partnership between the US and the Guatemalan military resulted in a counterinsurgency 
campaign of unprecedented barbarity, as highly-trained specialist fought alongside 
partisan death-squads to sow terror and execute anyone who might aid the guerrilla 
fighters. These methods succeeded in tamping down the revolutionary movement, but at 
an enormous cost. By the end of the Alliance for Progress era, assassins targeted 
American officials, commanding officers employed terrorism to control the ballot box, 
and the military had killed ten-thousand Guatemalans.  The exterminationist tactics used 
in the counterinsurgency campaign in the final years of the Alliance for Progress served 
as a blueprint for the Guatemalan Armed Forces genocide against the Maya in the 1980s.   
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Preserving the Military Dictatorship: The US and Guatemalan Military Prepare for 
Elections 
 
 As the guerrilla movements gained more recruits and continued to challenge 
security forces, Peralta’s dictatorship began to appear unsustainable. American officials, 
including the new ambassador John Gordon Mein, grew tired of Peralta’s resistance and 
strongly advocated for the return of an elected government. Sensing his reign neared its 
end, Peralta altered election rules and increased collaboration with US security advisers 
in order to maintain the military’s grip on power after he left office. If a candidate not 
endorsed by the military should take control of the presidency, Peralta’s efforts ensured 
that the Guatemalan Armed Forces would remain the real power in Guatemala. 
John Bell’s departure from the American embassy offered an opportunity for a 
change in diplomatic discourse, but the legacy of Kennedy and his ambassador helped 
ensure that the Guatemalan military retained their control over the state. Though their 
approaches as ambassador to Guatemala somewhat differed, John Gordon Mein’s career 
shared more similarities with that of his predecessor than differences. Born on September 
10, 1913 in Cadiz Kentucky, Mein remained in his home state until he completed his 
bachelor’s degree from Georgetown College.670 Mein left Kentucky to attend George 
Washington University where, like Bell, he earned a law degree. The careers of both men 
within the State Department began with service during the Second World War. While 
Bell remained in the United States for the duration of the war and his experience abroad 
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was predominantly in Europe, Mein’s assignments were more geographically diverse. 
After being appointed to the Foreign Service in 1942, Mein served in Rome, Oslo, 
Jakarta, and Manila. In 1953, Mein attended the National War College—five years after 
John Bell left the same institution—and gained considerable experience in international 
crisis management.671 
 Mein continued to build on his career in the State Department in Washington D.C. 
After leaving the National War College, he served as the Director of the Office of 
Southwest Pacific Affairs from 1957 to 1963 because of his experience in Indonesia and 
the Philippines. During this period, the State Department awarded Mein the Meritorious 
Service Award for his diplomatic work in Indonesia.672 Seeking greater opportunity and 
prestige abroad, John Mein returned to the international scene an accepted a position as 
Deputy Chief of Mission of the US embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Mein’s entry 
position into Latin American foreign policy lasted for five years, and his efforts in Brazil 
afforded him the opportunity to advance his career to the ambassadorship of Guatemala.  
 By mid-1965, Ambassador John Bell was ready to leave Guatemala. He had been 
an integral part of instating an unelected military regime in the hopes that it would quell 
the potential for communist revolution. Instead, the forfeiture of elections, the exile of 
both a sitting constitutional president and a former president attempting to return to 
office, and the military seizure of power transformed an isolated group of fewer than two 
hundred rebellious officers into a widespread insurgency. The deteriorating situation in 
Guatemala was proving to be an unmanageable mess, and Bell shared considerable 
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responsibility for partnering US interests with the leaders of the Guatemalan military. 
When John Bell became ambassador in 1962, his first evaluation stated that there was no 
credible threat to the security of the Guatemalan government; when he left his post three 
years later, a civil war waged through terror tactics embroiled the country.673    
 Sworn in September 3, 1965, Ambassador Mein inherited an unenviable situation. 
The Peralta regime was losing its few, key civilian supporters within the Guatemalan 
business community as the Guatemalan state and military became increasingly 
indistinguishable. President Peralta original promise to restore constitutionality through 
free elections by March of 1965 had passed, which cast considerable uncertainty on the 
true intentions of regime. While the Peralta government proved less prone to corruption 
than previous administrations, it failed to take advantage of large loans offered by 
USAID and the Export-Import bank designated for social programs and economic 
diversification.674 The stagnation in government investment exacerbated Guatemala’s 
perpetual poverty problems and the sprawling slums that surrounded Guatemala City and 
Puerto Barrios became a rich recruiting ground for antigovernment conspirators of all 
political stripes. Peralta, like his predecessor Ydigoras, had become increasingly isolated 
from both Guatemalan elites and the common people as his administration became more 
concerned with preservation than governance. 
  Ambassador Mein quickly grasped that the worsening conditions in Guatemala 
required a response that the military alone could not provide. He postulated that the FAR 
                                                 
673 John O. Bell. “[Military Assitance Program Delivery for Guatemala].” February 10, 1962. DNSA: 
Guatemala and the US, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. page 1. 
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used terror tactics to provoke an overreaction on the part of the military government and 
that state-terrorism, the suspension of constitutional guarantees, and the instatement of a 
permanent military dictatorship would arouse popular resistance and discredit the 
democratic process.675 Convinced that the Guatemalan government balanced on a razor’s 
edge between military dictatorship and communist revolution, Mein believed that the 
coming election was not only necessary, but would determine the fate of the Central 
American republic. 
 Colonel Peralta’s regime also seemed to realize it could no longer remain indolent 
in combatting the insurgency. In August 1964, Peralta created a special Presidential 
Intelligence Agency that served as a coordinated communications hub that shared 
intelligence between the National Police, the military-command, the National Palace 
staff, and a variety of security forces throughout the country.676 He also allowed US 
advisers to oversee aspects of the new intelligence apparatus and accepted financial 
support for the project. Formerly unwilling to make use of the police personnel trained 
under the USAID Public Safety Program, Peralta began to modify and expand domestic 
security forces. Overhauling the rural military police, the Policía Militar Ambulante 
(PMA) reorganized into a thousand-man regiment tasked with protecting “owners or 
administrators of estates, haciendas, agricultural lands, forests and all rural properties” by 
eliminating “all activity that tends to inflame passions among the peasant masses or in the 
rural communities and, when necessary, repress through legitimate means any disorder 
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that should occur.”677 Additionally, in June 1965, Peralta formed an elite, urban 
counterinsurgency unit, Comando Seis, to hunt down subversives within the capital. A 
precursor to the death-squads that would soon appear throughout Guatemala, foreign 
policy expert Michael McClintock notes that Comando Seis employed reprehensible 
methods such as torture, summary execution, and forced-disappearance in their mission 
to eliminate subversives.678 This black-ops squad received its training, armaments, and 
funding from USAID’s Public Safety Program. The formation of these units and the 
increased cooperation with the United States foreshadowed the major counterinsurgency 
offensive soon to come: Operación  Limpieza (Operation Cleanup). 
The military regime also bolstered its public image by finally issuing the new 
Constitution on September 15, 1965. Although the document restored many of the basic 
civil liberties, it had little practical effect during the sixteen-month state of siege that 
Peralta had decreed in February. Strict provisions outlawing communism effectively 
nullified the ability of the radical left to participate in national politics, but this was not 
enough to ensure that the military’s political party, Partido Institucional Democrático 
(PID), could easily usher its chosen candidate into La Casa Crema. McClintock’s 
research reveals that the PID attempted to control the number of participants in future 
elections through constitutional means. The Constitution of 1965, drafted by the Peralta 
regime, stipulated that political parties must provide the electoral tribunal with a list of a 
minimum of fifty-thousand supporters in order to register for elections.679 This had the 
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dual-effect of blocking smaller, moderate and left-leaning parties like the Christian 
Democrats while coercing the remnants of the moribund MDN and Redencion parties of 
the right to consolidate into the PID. Moreover, the membership lists submitted by 
political parties in order to register provided the military-government with ample 
information should the need arise to discredit or dismantle any opposition movement.  
With these new constitutional stipulations, only the three major parties that had 
previously participated in the constituent assembly election qualified to run a candidate 
for the Guatemalan presidency. The PID and MLN remained uneasy allies as factions 
within the political right vied for the government’s endorsement of their candidate. The 
Partido Revolucionario (PR) had detached from its unnatural coupling with the PID, and 
clearly intended to run its longtime leader, Mario Méndez Montenegro in the presidential 
race. Méndez Montenegro had been a fixture in Guatemalan politics since the Arévalo 
administration, and had narrowly survived the counterrevolution because he had resigned 
from the revolutionary government in 1949 to protest its involvement with the 
assassination of Defense Minister Francisco Arana. Having secured the legitimacy of the 
PR by obeying Peralta’s directives during the constituent assembly elections, Mario 
Méndez Montenegro prepared to ride the wave of domestic discontent into the 
presidential palace. 680 
On October 31, 1965, Mario Méndez Montenegro was found dead in his home 
with a gunshot wound to the head. The government ruled the death a suicide, but his 
family refused the official explanation. His brother, Julio César Méndez Montenegro 
declared the death a “political murder” carried out by a “rightist militarist cabal” seeking 
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control over the Guatemalan government.681 Within a few days, Julio replaced his brother 
as the leader of the Partido Revolucionario, and he called for a “united national front of 
all reformist/leftist groupings under PR leadership.”682 If Julio’s claim that his brother’s 
death resulted from a rightist conspiracy—the now widely accepted explanation—was 
true, the assassins had made a major miscalculation. The martyrdom of Mario Méndez 
Montenegro brought together moderate and leftist Guatemalans while the political right 
divided into warring camps over selecting a presidential candidate. 
Two colonels competed for conservative voters and the official endorsement of 
the military government. Peralta personally favored Colonel Juan de Dios Aguilar, a loyal 
subordinate who, unfortunately for the PID, was a relative unknown in the country and 
had few supporters outside of Peralta’s clique within the military.683 The far-right MLN 
selected Miguel Angel Ponciano, the former Armed Forces Chief of Staff who served 
under both Colonel Peralta and the party’s progenitor, President Carlos Castillo Armas—
the “Liberator” of the 1954 coup. The ambitions and rivalries of MLN and PID leaders 
made compromise on a single presidential candidate appear impossible. The CIA and 
State Department believed that Ponciano and his acolytes in the MLN plotted to 
overthrow Peralta if he could not secure their electoral victory.684 
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 The Johnson administration faced a similar problem of indecision when it came to 
determining which presidential candidate would best serve US interests. Each 
presidential contender came with their share of potential pitfalls. Due to his lack of 
popular support, if Colonel Aguilar could secure a PID victory, it would likely be through 
illegitimate means. Both the MLN and all of the political left would oppose his 
presidency, creating further instability. If the MLN returned liberacionistas to power 
through Colonel Miguel Ponciano’s presidency, political polarization would almost 
certainly increase under an extreme right-wing government and Alliance for Progress 
developmental initiatives would likely fall by the wayside. Surprisingly, Washington did 
not outright oppose Julio César Méndez Montenegro and the Partido Revolucionario. 
Initially, some US officials feared that Méndez Montenegro would take a sharp turn to 
the left and “in [the] spirit [of] anguish and revenge he may be inclined” to reach out to 
the FAR and other “leftist extremists.”685 Subsequent reports, however, described 
Méndez Montenegro as “brilliant,” “popular,” and a “safe” candidate for the interests of 
the United States.686 The State Department and its emissaries did not view Méndez 
Montenegro with the degree of suspicion and hostility that they had displayed toward 
Arévalo. In order to survive, US officials probably surmised that Méndez Montenegro 
would have to rely on his relationship with Washington. Desperate for protection against 
his own army, the civilian president of Guatemala could not rebuff the encroachments of 
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the United States and its emissaries as General Ydigoras and Colonel Peralta had done for 
years. 
Whereas Ambassador Bell’s tireless advocacy for the Guatemalan military made 
him complicit in elimination of elections, the US embassy under the direction of John 
Gordon Mein defended democracy in Guatemala. The Johnson administration and its new 
ambassador, however, did not push for presidential elections in Guatemala purely from a 
position of altruism. This softened approach can be partially explained by the somewhat 
diminished threat from the Cuban Revolution. The Johnson administration still feared the 
establishment of another communist beachhead in Latin America and believed that 
Cuban infiltrators lurked behind every antigovernment action in Guatemala. In 1965, Che 
Guevara continued to make good on his promise to export revolution with appearances in 
Africa and Latin America. The call for communist revolution remained pervasive, but the 
United States feverous obsession with Cuban infiltration had marginally abated. Castro’s 
reputation among some Latin American revolutionaries, including Commander Yon 
Sosa, had become slightly tarnished because of his relationship with the Soviet Union 
following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Moreover, Johnson’s invasion of the Dominican 
Republic reaffirmed that the United States would not hesitate to stage massive military 
interventions to prevent potentially adverse leftist governments from coming to power. 
Such actions would not be necessary in Guatemala if the United States could count on a 
powerful military to crush communists and other opposition movements. With Colonel 
Peralta’s compliance, US officials and Guatemalan officers could jointly build the 
counterinsurgency apparatus; a pliant civilian president could provide these actions with 
the cover of democratic legitimacy.  
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 Despite Peralta’s sudden, enthusiastic embrace of US security assistance, 
Guatemalan counterinsurgency forces remained in a nascent state. Military engagements 
in the eastern countryside had reached a stalemate, but Guatemala City remained under 
constant threat as the insurgency shifted to urban terrorism. FAR agents kidnapping 
wealthy Guatemalan citizens for ransom became an endemic problem, and the Peralta 
regime clamped down on the media to prevent the public from learning of the extent of 
the guerrillas’ urban operations.687 Ambassador Mein remarked, “Recently there has been 
[a] great acceleration [of] dissatisfaction [as a] result of terrorist kidnapping tactics which 
has sown remarkably deep fear in business and wealthy sectors.”688 Obeying the maxim 
of guerrilla warfare of attacking where the enemy is weak, the FAR’s targeted assault on 
Guatemala’s economic elites threatened to unravel the military’s alliance with its most 
important civilian supporters. 
 Describing the symbiotic relationship between the economic and military elites of 
1960s Guatemala, political scientist Jerry Weaver argues that, “by associating and 
dealing with the military government, the [economic] notables brought legitimacy to the 
de facto regime. At the same time, they provided the government much needed expertise: 
managerial skills, professional training, technical competence, and perhaps most 
importantly, experience in dealing with civilians.”689 When the military-state failed to 
reciprocate by providing these economic elites with protection, they began to look for 
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alternatives. Sensing an opportunity, the MLN provided a solution that would attract 
more adherents to their far-right party. With the Peralta government appearing incapable 
of protecting its most valued citizens, the MLN decided to reply to the FAR’s political 
violence in kind. Reports from Ambassador Mein mentioned that the Peralta government 
might be quietly encouraging the “formation of vigilante-type ‘security committees’ 
composed of armed private citizens united for their own protection against terrorist 
threats” as early as November 1965.690 Guided by the practice of “counter-terror,” 
paramilitary death-squads entered into Guatemala’s political conflagration.691 
 Seeking counterinsurgency expertise, Ambassador Mein requested the assistance 
of John Longan from USAID’s Office of Public Safety. A veteran security adviser, 
Longan had helped set up the Guatemalan National Police in 1957 during the end of 
Castillo Armas’ presidency. His return eight years later launched an era of atrocity in 
Guatemala. Focused particularly on Guatemalan police agencies, Longan became the 
architect of the nerve center of counterinsurgency operations, dubbed “The Box” that 
coordinated the intelligence agencies of the various security forces and the military high-
command. He also orchestrated Operación Limpieza (Operation Cleanup), a concerted 
campaign conducted against the insurgents by special police units and the Army.692 
Additionally, Longan hand-picked Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque to command 
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Operación  Limpieza. Colonel Arriaga subsequently used his success in Operación  
Limpieza as a springboard into the position of Minister of Defense, where he oversaw the 
formal implementation of paramilitary death-squads as an integral part of US-
Guatemalan counterinsurgency strategy. 
 In his landmark study of the Guatemalan Civil War, Greg Grandin compared 
Longan with the notorious Nazi war criminal, Adolf Eichmann, because both men 
refused to acknowledge the horrors wrought by their policies and justified their actions as 
part of their job as a “technician” within a vast bureaucracy.693 That Longan later 
concluded that Guatemalans experienced such terrible violence during the 1960s because 
“it was inbred in them, and they hate pretty deeply,” suggests that Grandin’s comparison 
was apt. Before Longan and Colonel Arriaga could launch their offensive against the 
guerrillas, the Peralta regime and the State Department confronted a conspiracy within 
the MLN to unseat the Guatemalan head-of-state.      
The US embassy, gravely concerned that the situation in Guatemala spiraled 
toward a coup, once again weighed the possibility of another abrogated electoral contest. 
The Johnson administration, unlike its predecessors, concluded any non-democratic 
transfer of power would unduly risk a revolutionary takeover by potentially uniting 
moderate and leftist Guatemalans with the insurgency. Under-Secretary of State George 
Ball pressed Ambassador Mein to warn the candidates and the military that Guatemala 
needed an elected government. While the United States still viewed the armed forces as 
their most valuable ally in Guatemala, it had not proven especially adept at governance, 
especially in the economic arena. Under the Johnson administration and the Mann 
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Doctrine, the United States welcomed anticommunist military dictatorships in Latin 
America as useful allies in the Cold War. In Guatemala, however, Peralta’s resistance to 
economic reform and refusal to make use of international loans concerned corporate 
interests. Furthermore, prolonging direct military rule would likewise prolong the 
insurgency—and the political and economic instability that came along with it. In order 
to improve the investment climate of Guatemala, the Johnson administration believed that 
a degree of civilian rule had to be restored.    
The task of convincing these right-wing rivals initially fell to the ambassador’s 
second-in-command, Viron Vaky. Well-versed in the politics and culture of Latin 
America, Vaky became Deputy Chief of Mission to Guatemala in 1964 after tours as a 
Foreign Service officer in Ecuador, Argentina, and Colombia. Meeting first with the 
MLN presidential candidate, Miguel Ponciano, Vaky stressed that the United States 
would not accept a coup.  Ponciano pleaded ignorance of any plots, but complained that 
the elections would be a sham; Vaky suggested that he make OAS observation of the 
elections a campaign issue.694 After reading Vaky’s report of the meeting, Under-
Secretary Ball demanded that Ambassador Mein reiterate Vaky’s points in his own 
meetings with Ponciano and Peralta, but above all, the ambassador needed to make it 
clear that the United States “would not find it easy to cooperate with a Guatemalan 
government that was the result of the coup.”695  
When Ambassador Mein met with Peralta to convey Ball’s terms and warn him 
against a potential coup, the colonel dismissed the allegations of electoral fraud and a 
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military overthrow as fabrications of the Guatemalan press.  Mein avoided advocating 
observed elections, feeling that it would offend the nationalist sensibilities of Colonel 
Peralta, but Vaky continued to lobby other candidates, especially Ponciano, to demand 
OAS monitors to ensure a fair election.696 The presidential contenders knew that 
advocating the presence of the Organization of American States would be seized upon by 
their rivals as subservience to US interests. Instead, Peralta and the MLN came to an 
understanding and the threat of a coup subsided. The terms of this compact remain 
unknown, but the subsequent appointment of scores of MLN leaders to key positions is 
likely a result of the agreement. Many military leaders who belonged to the MLN, such 
as the aforementioned Colonel Arriaga and the infamous Colonel Arana, received major 
promotions, while other MLN partisans joined the ranks of the comisionados militares. 
As covered in the previous chapter, Colonel Peralta had reorganized the comisionados 
into a pervasive intelligence network throughout the country. When the MLN came to 
dominate the comisionados, they used the position to organize, and sometimes personally 
lead, paramilitary campaigns of genocidal violence in the countryside. The overwhelming 
majority of these efforts, from the ‘counter-terror’ plans of John Longan, to the formation 
of MLN death-squads, received some support through Alliance for Progress programs of 
the United States Agency for International Development.697        
While the embassy officials maneuvered to prevent presidential rivals from forgoing 
elections, the Guatemalan military clashed with guerrillas along the Honduran border. 
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For months, guerrillas had been aggressively prodding the Guatemalan military, picking 
off soldiers and stealing supplies and armaments. In response, the military deployed more 
units to the Izabal department, which borders Honduras, and ordered extensive sweeps of 
the area. In a bold strike on Los Amates, insurgents assaulted an Army headquarters at 
the center of town in broad daylight. The guerrillas killed six before withdrawing, but US 
officials were far more concerned about the ability of FAR units to carry out such an 
audacious attack despite the deployment of a significant contingent of government 
troops.698 The insurgency still lacked the ability to meet the Guatemalan military head on, 
but no one could deny it was gathering strength at an alarming pace. The security forces 
could not outright eliminate the guerrillas, but a moderate, left-leaning reformer in the 
presidential palace presented a democratic political alternative that undermined the 
revolutionary movement. 
As Peralta’s prolonged military rule became untenable, the Defense Minister and his 
subordinates made preparations to preserve the armed forces’ power over the Guatemalan 
state. Although his regime produced a new constitution to replace the one he had 
dissolved in his takeover and finally agreed to permit elections, Colonel Peralta 
reoriented Guatemalan politics to give major advantages to the PID-MLN. His regime 
altered electoral laws to prevent most political parties from running a candidate. 
Moreover, Peralta began to permit increased security assistance from the United States. 
Together, the two countries started to build a potent counterinsurgency machine that 
introduced terror-tactics as a new weapon against the guerrilla fighters. The new 
                                                 
698 John Mein, “Embassy Telegram 321.” November 26, 1965. DNSA: Guatemala and the US. Record 
Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966. Box 2253. 
National Archives.  
 355 
 
 
American ambassador, John Gordon Mein, appeared less hawkish than his predecessor, 
but his desire to return Guatemala to a democratic, constitutional republic resulted more 
from the Johnson administration’s concern about investment opportunities than any moral 
compunction. Now working closely with US security advisers, Guatemalan officers and 
police chiefs acquired more resources for their fight against the insurgency, and in turn 
positioned themselves to remain the de facto rulers of the country regardless of election 
results.  
 
A Revolution Divided: The Sundering of Guatemalan Revolutionary Movement 
 
The forces that opposed Colonel Peralta’s regime gained considerable ground as 
Guatemala prepared for elections. At this decisive moment when revolutionary victory 
seemed possible, the conglomerate of guerrillas, politicians, and activists began to 
fracture along ideological and strategic lines. These divisions allowed counterinsurgency 
forces, which were steadily building momentum , the chance to deal punishing blows to 
the armed opposition and sap their growing strength. Just as Julio Cesar Mendez 
Montenegro and the Partido Revolucionario won the presidency, the Guatemalan 
military stuck out hard against the insurgency and secured their power over the civilian 
government. 
At the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, the FAR commander Luis 
Turcios Lima rejected the legitimacy of the impending Guatemalan presidential contest. 
Speaking to the assembly of leftist fellow-travelers from around the world, the rebel 
leader proclaimed, “If we revolutionaries were to participate in these elections, or if we 
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called upon the people to participate in them by voting for the Revolutionary Party or any 
of the other opposition parties, we would be giving our backing, our principled support, 
our revolutionary approval and the support of the masses who believed in us, to people 
who we know have no scruples, who we know are the accomplices of reaction and  
imperialism.”699 The guerrilla fighters challenged security forces in the countryside and 
even won some conventional battles. Operations in Guatemala City terrified the urban 
elite, whose loyalty to the military regime waned as kidnappings, explosions, and murder 
went unchecked. Revolutionary leaders transformed into mythical figures: “They said of 
Yon Sosa that he slept in the belly of an alligator.”700 Targeted by FAR propaganda, 
morale among the lower ranks of the security forces dropped as guerrillas scored 
victories and sowed terror. Yet, even as the insurgency appeared ascendant, ideological 
differences within the revolutionary forces weakened the movement just as the 
Guatemalan military-state renewed its counterinsurgency efforts. 
A composite of various opposition groups, political division existed within the 
FAR since the coalition’s inception. Yon Sosa’s MR-13 branch embraced Trotskyism, 
setting it apart from the FAR early on, and his organization formally broke from the rebel 
alliance with the First Declaration of the Sierra de Las Minas, published in Revolucion 
Socialista, in February 1965. The rupture occurred because Yon Sosa rejected the 
practices of the PGT leaders who controlled the political direction of the FAR. The MR-
13 commander demanded immediate socialist revolution and armed struggle was the only 
                                                 
699 Turcios Lima, quoted in César Montes, “Una Ruptura lógica y  necessaria”, translated in Richard Gott, 
Guerrilla Movements in Latin America. 68 
700 Louisa Frank, “Resistance and Revolution: The Development of Armed Struggle in Guatemala.” 
Susanne Jonas and David Tobis, eds. Guatemala. (Berkely, CA:NACLA, 1974). 184 
 357 
 
 
viable path to achieve it. Moreover, the Declaration claimed that, in addition to the 
struggle against capitalist imperialism, the MR-13 “has had to fight a political battle 
against conciliatory, vacillating and reformist tendencies which seek to confine the 
workers and peasants of the country to the false perspective of the so called ‘democratic-
national revolution.’ Those tendencies are embodied especially in the leadership of the 
PGT.”701  
Although the MR-13 remained allied in spirit to the FAR, it no longer took orders 
from its leadership committee and stopped coordinating its campaigns with the other 
guerrilla fronts. Freed from the strictures of the PGT’s leadership, the MR-13 rejected the 
revolutionary potential of the bourgeoisie and began to focus on the peasantry as the base 
of its organization. Following the Declaration of the Sierra de las Minas, Commander 
Turcios Lima hoped to repair the relationship between the revolutionary factions and 
called upon Yon Sosa, his longtime comrade and former classmate, to come to a unity 
conference for the FAR. Yon Sosa refused to attend, and Turcios Lima resigned from the 
MR-13, an organization named after the very revolt he had led just four years earlier. 
With this seismic break, the first incarnation of the FAR technically dissolved. 
Nearly a year later, Turcios Lima waged his own battle with the PGT over the 
prospect of political compromise. He railed against participating in the Guatemalan 
presidential elections at the Tricontinental Conference, but his views did not align with 
the PGT leadership. In the year since Yon Sosa’s break with the FAR, the front under 
Turcios Lima’s command, Frente Guerrillero Edgar Ibarra (FGEI) had also developed 
its own political outlook and began to exert its influence as it became the largest and most 
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successful of the guerrilla organizations. Like the MR-13, Turcios Lima’s band criticized 
the PGT’s categorization of the national bourgeoisie as a revolutionary class and refused 
to foster alliances with potentially sympathetic segments of the Guatemalan middle-class. 
The FAR forces under Turcios Lima also began to look to the peasantry as the core of 
their movement, but unlike the MR-13, the FGEI prepared for prolonged conflict over 
immediate revolution.702 Despite these differences, the FGEI continued to partner with 
the PGT and served as the primary armed force of the FAR. 
While Turcios Lima condemned the Guatemalan presidential elections from 
Havana, PGT leaders seized the moment and pushed the governing council of the FAR to 
support the Partido Revolucionario and its presidential candidate, Julio César Méndez 
Montenegro. Even though he had publicly rejected such a compromise, and his FGEI had 
voted against the resolution, Turcios Lima accepted their decision upon returning to 
Guatemala. He later explained his reasoning: “voting for Julio César Méndez Montenegro 
represents a form of struggle against the arbitrary behavior of the government and also a 
demonstration to public opinion – in this case, particularly international public opinion – 
of the total repudiation of the dictatorial regime. Therefore the victory of the candidate of 
the Revolutionary Party signifies a political victory of the FAR, for the Guatemalan 
people have through voting expressed their irrepressible desire for changing the system.” 
The guerrilla commander also warned, “however, it is necessary to repeat and stress the 
point that the guerrillas do not have the slightest doubt about what road to take, for there 
is only one road. This is by no means the road of elections but the road of armed 
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struggle.”703 Regardless of his lukewarm endorsement of elections, the FAR remained 
deeply divided over candidacy of Méndez Montenegro. 
The PGT had good reason to hope that electing Méndez Montenegro could bring 
positive change and reform to Guatemala. Composed primarily of labor leaders, urban 
intellectuals and professional politicians, many influential members of the PGT balked at 
the urban terror tactics employed by the guerrillas. During his campaign, Méndez 
Montenegro promised to bring an end to the conflict by negotiating with the guerrillas 
and argued that he was the only candidate who could broker a deal. Favoring a policy of 
total liquidation, the colonel-candidates of the MLN and PID would not convince the 
guerrillas to lay down their arms. Before the 1966 election, many of the old-guard 
communists, respected leaders from the Arévalo-Arbenz decade, returned from exile in 
an effort to curb the growing violence and militancy of the revolutionary movement and 
encourage participation in the election. It was a fatal mistake that revealed the military-
state had no interest in peace and reconciliation. 
* * * 
The infighting within the revolutionary movement did not go unnoticed by the 
diplomatic and security organs of the United States. Already preparing for a major 
offensive against the guerrillas, US officials saw the rifts in the revolution as a significant 
opportunity for counterinsurgency efforts. Embassy officials honed in on the 
vulnerability of Yon Sosa and the MR-13, and believed he could be isolated and 
destroyed more easily than the FAR. Fidel Castro had only extended an invitation to 
attend the Tricontinental Conference to Turcios Lima. During the event, Castro 
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commended Yon Sosa’s bravery and patriotism, but lamented that the commander had 
fallen under Trotskyist influence. “Fortunately,” added Castro, “…the revolutionary 
movement is being saved...by Major Turcios.”704 Yon Sosa shot back immediately and 
publicly by issuing a press release that castigated Castro for “betraying the socialist 
revolution” through his “total subservience to the Soviet Union” and “has forever lost all 
authority as a revolutionary leader.”705 Thereafter, Turcios Lima stated that he believed 
that the reunification of FAR and MR-13 was impossible.  
The US embassy was also aware that segments of the PGT debated whether to 
continue armed struggle or to reorient to political organization before the elections, 
although they had not yet learned that the leaders of Guatemala’s communist party had 
already decided to support Méndez Montenegro. If properly handled, the combined 
efforts of the Guatemalan and United States governments could force a wedge into the 
existing fractures of the revolutionary movement. Most of the US diplomatic team 
agreed, however, that prolonging military rule “could drive the FAR and MR-13 together 
again to continue the armed struggle as one, unified guerrilla organization.”706 
Overburdened by its commitments in Vietnam, the Johnson administration could not 
afford to repeat the military coups of Eisenhower and Kennedy. Guatemala needed an 
authentic election, or revolution could consume the country. 
The State Department predicted that Méndez Montenegro would be the next 
Guatemalan president if the election proceeded under normal, legitimate conditions. The 
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only way the two military officer candidates could win the election was through fraud, a 
political deal, or both. Individually, they lacked a popular backing, and together they 
divided the political right. Moreover, Secretary of State Dean Rusk doubted that “either 
has [the] ability to rally [the] country behind effective program of political, economic, 
and social reform under [the] Alliance for Progress which Guatemala so desperately 
needs.”707 Peralta’s hand-picked successor, Colonel Aguilar dismissed the prospect of 
Méndez Montenegro’s electoral victory, leading US officials to worry that the military 
either planned to control the election, or was dangerously out of touch with the electorate 
and political climate of the country. 
Peralta had lost a valuable ally when John Bell left the ambassadorship. With the 
arrival of Ambassador Mein, the United States embassy seemed more distant and 
unfamiliar now that the longstanding and relatively close relationship between John Bell 
and Colonel Peralta’s inner circle had been severed. Peralta and Bell met frequently, but 
the Guatemalan head-of-state was reluctant to approach the new ambassador. Perhaps 
Peralta’s nationalist pride prevented him from appearing as a supplicant before the US 
embassy, and Ambassador Mein certainly did not have as much incentive for cultivating 
close ties with the outgoing head-of-state. As the March elections neared, Peralta sent 
emissaries to request a meeting, an occurrence Ambassador Mein found odd considering 
they could have easily spoken directly in person or over the phone. While the contents of 
their meeting went unrecorded, Mein came to Peralta with a clear understanding of the 
situation. Large segments of the population would refuse to accept the election results if 
the MLN or PID candidates won. These dissatisfied voters would revolt, and likely join 
                                                 
707 Dean Rusk to US Embassy in Guatemala, February 14, 1966. National Security Files, Country Files: 
Guatemala. Volume 2, Box 54. LBJL. Page 1. 
 362 
 
 
with the guerrillas. Although the American ambassador believed that the Guatemalan 
security forces would unite in support of the government against any such movement, 
they were not yet prepared for “an all-out offensive by the guerrillas” combined with 
popular mass resistance.708  
In order to prevent the further spread of the insurgency and risk revolution, Mein 
was determined to convince Peralta to allow free and fair elections. The Johnson 
administration, consumed by the Vietnam War, hoped that a political opening in 
Guatemala could prevent a conflict that would require a greater US presence in the 
country. Ambassador Mein decided he needed to have a “frank discussion” with Peralta 
to enlighten him to the danger of interfering with the election, but he would also extend 
an offer of increased assistance. “It seems to me,” Mein mused, “that this is the 
opportunity we have been waiting [for] and that we should be responsive.”709 Faced with 
a likely electoral defeat and an unrelenting insurgency, Peralta was at his most pliable. If 
the military could be persuaded to accept a civilian president from the moderate left, then 
the fragmenting revolution might shatter. 
 Boosting the confidence of security forces was crucial to persuading their leaders 
that the presidential election, regardless of the outcome, had to go forward. John Longan, 
the Public Safety program expert summoned by Ambassador Mein, completed his work 
in training police and coordinating intelligence by January, 1966. Colonel Arriaga 
assumed command of the newly formed counterinsurgency police units and began to 
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implement Longan’s teachings immediately, launching Operación  Limpieza.  Grandin’s 
research reveals that over eighty raids—replete with torture, forced-disappearance, and 
summary execution—took place before the end of February.710 The specialist units 
conducted their operations with support from American advisers from the Office of 
Public Safety, and likely incorporated CIA agents.711 During these raids, security forces 
captured several opposition leaders, many of whom were never seen again. At the behest 
of Colonel Arriaga, the embassy requested that US South Command send additional 
experts who could further train his police forces in counterinsurgency and riot control.712 
While their exact identity remains concealed, many scholars have suggested that these 
“experts” were US Special Forces operatives.713 Upon entering Guatemala, these 
specialists came under the employ of the Public Safety program and received funding 
through USAID. Like the Civic Action programs, the rhetoric of the Alliance for 
Progress concealed repressive militarization under the guise of keeping the public safe. 
  On March 5, the day before the presidential election, Operación  Limpieza 
effectively decapitated the PGT. Many of the leaders had returned from exile to join their 
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comrades in organizing support for Méndez Montenegro and bringing the PR to power in 
Guatemala. Although they had their differences, as many as thirty representatives of the 
various oppositionist groups gathered together to celebrate the anticipated electoral 
victory of a candidate who promised to usher in a third incarnation of the Guatemalan 
Revolution. Crowding into single-story stucco house in Guatemala City, exiled veterans 
of the Arévalo era conversed with the new generation of hot-blooded guerrilla fighters. 
Just before noon, one of the occupants of the house noticed a Judicial Police car, but it 
was too late. The building was surrounded. Some of the scrambling revolutionaries took 
to the roof and riddled a police car with machine gun fire while the others fled. The elite 
police units anticipated this, and tracked the escaping rebels to their safehouses. In a 
single day, the budding Guatemalan counterinsurgency state swallowed up twenty-eight 
“communists or communist sympathizers.” Among their number were several prominent 
leaders: Leonardo Castillo Folores, the secretary general of the National Peasants 
Federation; “Paco” Amando Granados, commander of a MR-13 foco; Victor Manuel 
Gutierrez Garbin, the head of the PGT; and Carlos Barrillas Sosa, the half-brother of 
Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. The CIA soon learned that, after three days of undoubtedly 
painful interrogation sessions, all of the captured dissidents were executed. The 
Guatemalan government planned to deny any involvement. It would be as if they had 
simply disappeared.714  
 The security services struck a decisive blow against the insurgency, but the spirit 
of the Guatemalan Revolution prevailed in the 1966 presidential election. Julio César 
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Méndez Montenegro became the first civilian President of Guatemala since Arévalo. His 
victory, a plurality of 44.4% of the vote, resulted from the divided political right.715 
Peralta, and most other military leaders, were shocked by the outcome and delayed 
congressional ratification until they had assurances that they retained their power over the 
Guatemalan state. By March 12, Peralta’s government informed the State Department 
that an agreement had been reached. Méndez Montenegro would become president, but 
there would be no real transfer of power. 
   During his time in office, President Arévalo remarked that Guatemala effectively 
had two presidents, and that one held a machine gun against the other. Julio César 
Méndez Montenegro, claimant to the legacy of the 1944 revolution, embodied his 
forebear’s characterization of a Hostage-President. In order to assume the office he had 
fairly won in the election, Méndez Montenegro handed over most matters of state to the 
high-command of the Guatemalan military. The military would be autonomous from the 
civilian government. It would internally select both the Minister of Defense and the Army 
Chief of Staff. The interlocked intelligence services created with US support would 
transfer from the Office of the President to the Army Chief of Staff. Military leadership 
would assume full command of all counterinsurgency efforts and related programs 
without interference from the civil government. Furthermore, the government would 
grant amnesty to all security forces for acts committed in the pursuit of the war against 
the guerrillas. Ambassador Mein observed that “the provisions seemed to be of doubtful 
constitutionality since they would in effect limit powers of president as commander in 
chief of armed forces,” but concluded “there must have been a meeting of minds” since 
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the agreement was signed by both parties.716 Whether or not the ambassador realized it, 
Méndez Montenegro had no choice but to accept. To reject the military’s demands would 
have certainly cost him the presidency, and likely his life.  Four months before his 
official inauguration ceremony, Méndez Montenegro had already ceded the power of his 
office to the military command.  
 The Johnson administration accomplished what Kennedy had refused to consider. 
The United States had encouraged, even facilitated, the election of a moderate-leftist 
reformer to the presidency of Guatemala. It seemed the Alliance for Progress’s promise 
to foster democracy might be achievable, and the new administration in Guatemala would 
be more receptive to other social and economic reforms. Ambassador Mein predicted the 
unconstitutional deal brokered between the military and the PR would assure a peaceful 
transition period. Despite the appearance of democratic progress, Méndez Montenegro’s 
electoral triumph came too late for Guatemala. The Guatemalan Armed Forces had 
always enjoyed a position of power and influence, especially after the 1954 coup, but 
Colonel Peralta had used his time as head-of-state to ensure that supremacy of the 
military was virtually unassailable. 
 The headline on the cover of the military’s circular, Ejército, read “Mission 
Complete” as Guatemala returned to a democratically elected government. 
Accompanying the self-congratulations, a loving biographical article hailed Colonel 
Peralta as a profoundly democratic officer and citizen who led by setting an example for 
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honesty, integrity, and austerity.717 After “political passions are pacified,” future 
generations would revere Colonel Peralta as a monumental figure of Guatemalan history 
for his achievements.718 Moreover, under Peralta’s guidance, the military-government 
had laid the foundations for a constitutional democracy through the enormous sacrifice of 
the Guatemalan Armed Forces.719 Although they had their share of difficulties with 
Colonel Peralta’s regime, the State Department concluded, “The conservative, lackluster, 
avowedly caretaker regime of…the stolid colonel, left Guatemalan in better shape—on 
balance—than when it took over.”720 The Johnson administration hoped that his 
successor, “the newest Latin American president of the democratic left,” would be “of 
critical significance to the Alliance for Progress.”721 
 Notwithstanding their general enthusiasm, some US officials observed that 
Méndez Montenegro was “sure to spend more time walking a tightrope” between his 
leftist supporters and “the traditional Guatemalan oligarchy…civilian plutocrats and 
military conservatives.”722 Worse still, “he might turn out to be another President 
Arévalo, leading Guatemala back along the tragic path of communist infiltration, anti-
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communist reaction, coup d’état, and dictatorship.”723 There were several indications, 
however, that conservative anticommunists were marshalling their forces to ensure that 
such an event would never occur. In June, a month before the election, a mysterious 
group calling itself Movimiento de Acción Nacionalista Organizada  or MANO 
BLANCA, (White Hand) littered the streets of Guatemala City with fliers that proclaimed 
the paramilitary group would be “the hand that will eradicate national renegades and 
traitors to the fatherland…with the same violence used by the communists.”724 This 
amounted to an announcement of the creation of Guatemala’s first, and perhaps most 
notorious, death-squad.  The same week that Méndez Montenegro swore his oath of 
office, Ejército warned its readers that the military would not grow complacent in the 
fight against communists.725 Another ominous sign of impending violence, an aircraft 
flying over Guatemala City dropped thousands of MANO leaflets demanding that all 
Guatemalans support the counterinsurgency and praising the military as the most 
important institution in the country. An early indication of the overlap between the 
military and death-squads, Michael McClintock reports that the airplane that delivered 
the MANO propaganda took off, and landed, in the restricted Air Force section of La 
Aurora airport.726  Promising reform, a surge of popular support had carried Méndez 
Montenegro into the Presidential Palace, but the real power in Guatemala remained in the 
hands of the colonels. They would be watching the new president carefully and would not 
hesitate to remove him for the slightest infraction.  
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 The guerrillas did not celebrate the electoral victory of the Partido 
Revolucionario. “In the final analysis nothing will change. The army won’t stop its 
repressions. So we won’t stop either,” Turcios Lima announced in a New York Times 
interview just after the election. 727 Instead, the FAR continued its attacks and mounted a 
massive propaganda campaign to stoke public outrage over the twenty-eight activists the 
government had disappeared on the eve of the election. Peralta’s government continued 
to stonewall public demands for the whereabouts of the missing dissidents.  Unable to 
obtain answers, the FAR decided to take hostages that they could exchange for 
information. On May 4, a FAR cell in Guatemala City seized the Minister of Information, 
Baltassar Morales Cruz, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Romeo Augusto de 
Leon, after a withering firefight in the streets. Peralta deployed an unsurprising response 
and decreed a state of siege. To assuage fears that the military was attempting to nullify 
the electoral victory of the PR, Peralta simultaneously issued a statement that he would 
abide by the will of the Guatemalan people and “install the new constitutional 
government as scheduled on July 1.”728 The FAR escalated the confrontation and 
kidnapped the Congressional Vice President, Hector Méndez de la Riva, on May 26. 
Even in the last weeks of his rule, Peralta remained intractable and refused to 
acknowledge his government’s role in the disappearance. The truth only came to light 
after the colonel relinquished his position as head-of-state. 
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    One of the most observable initial differences between the Peralta and Méndez 
Montenegro government’s was how tightly the flow of information was controlled. 
President Méndez Montenegro lifted the heavy censorship the Peralta regime had placed 
on the press, and publications immediately produced blistering exposés on the current 
and previous governments. Members of his own administration were also eager and 
willing to speak their mind to the public. The source of many of the leaks, according to 
McClintock’s research, was the Vice President, Clemente Marroquin Rojas, the peculiar 
editor of the newspaper La Hora.729 In an attempt to score political points, and sell 
papers, Rojas published the compact that the military high-command forced upon the 
Méndez Montenegro. Instead of shaming the officers into submission, public knowledge 
of the agreement transformed many leftists’ reluctant support into suspicious disapproval 
before Méndez Montenegro could even take office. Three weeks into his presidency, two 
former police officers involved in the arrest told student activists that the twenty-eight 
dissidents had been captured, tortured, and shot. The Air Force dumped their bodies into 
the sea. Each attempting to blame the other, both Peralta’s and Méndez Montenegro’s 
Ministers of Government verified the account to the press. The deaths of their comrades 
confirmed, the FAR released their high profile hostages in exchange for the return of a 
captured student-guerilla.730 Sensing an opportunity for dialogue, Méndez Montenegro 
attempted to negotiate with the insurgents. 
 President Méndez Montenegro had successfully campaigned on the notion that he 
was in a unique position to broker a peace between the guerrillas and the government. In 
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his inaugural address, he extended the guerrillas “the hand of friendship if they ceased 
their operations—and the mailed fist if they refused.”731 The destruction of much of the 
PGT leadership in the pre-election raid, the escalating use of reciprocal terror, and the 
electoral victory of the PR tested the revolutionaries’ commitment to the primacy of 
armed struggle. Many within the rebel forces, especially among the PGT, desperately 
hoped to reach a settlement to end the violence. In fact, political scientist Louisa Frank 
notes that the new Central Committee of the PGT had effectively implemented a 
ceasefire on July 16, hoping to improve the terms of the peace.732 In its first show of 
power over the civilian government, the military-command attached onerous addendums 
to any amnesty agreement. In order to receive a pardon, the rebels would have to 
surrender and hand over their weapons. Having witnessed the cruelty of the military 
firsthand, the revolutionary factions rejected the offer. The FAR and PGT issued a joint 
statement that declared the Méndez Montenegro government was “under the tutelage of 
North American imperialism.”733 Yon Sosa, speaking for his MR-13 front, exclaimed, 
“we have committed no crimes, therefore we do not ask for pardon.”734 He and his men 
would fight “to the death with capitalism.”735 With the revolutionaries’ rejection of the 
terms of the peace, the military now had a free hand to make Yon Sosa’s oath a reality. 
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 The guerrillas outright dismissal of amnesty reflected the recent successes of the 
revolutionary movement. The insurgency and its supporters grew precipitously in the last 
year of Peralta’s regime. In May 1966, the FAR’s combat potential peaked when Turcios 
Lima launched a blitz attack against a motorized infantry patrol at the Battle of 
Zunzapote.736 His FGEI front believed that this marked a new phase in the struggle where 
conventional battles would be more common. Instead, Guatemalan security forces 
abandoned their defensive posture and began a countrywide assault on the guerrillas and 
their supporters. For Comandante Turcios Lima, the victory at Zunzapote would be his 
final triumph. 
On the morning of October 2, Turcios Lima enjoyed a brief respite as he cruised 
along the Roosevelt Highway just outside of Guatemala City with a girlfriend, Silvia 
Yvonne Flores Letona, and another unnamed female companion. Suddenly, the car was a 
flaming wreck and the famed rebel leader was dead. Accounts of the incident vary. The 
New York Times reported that his car hit an obstruction in the road that caused it to flip 
over and catch fire. Radio Havana broadcasted that an “explosion of unknown character” 
had occurred within the car before the wreck. Another version of the story, published 
nearly a year later, alleged that Turcios Lima had stolen the car to take his girlfriend out, 
and had crashed into a wall during their joy-ride.737 Whether by design or accident, the 
revolutionary movement in Guatemala had lost its most effective guerrilla commander. 
The onslaught unleashed by the Guatemalan Armed Forces shortly after his death only 
compounded the loss. 
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 It is a dark irony that the Partido Revolucionario and its champion, President 
Méndez Montenegro presided over the division and destruction of the revolutionary 
movement. During his hobbled presidency, the United States and the Guatemalan Armed 
Forces joined together in a manner not seen since the aftermath of the Arbenz coup in 
1954 in order to extinguish the revolutionary movement. Right-wing politicians and 
conservative officers had no love for their president, but the election of Méndez 
Montenegro hindered the insurgency far more than the direct efforts of Colonel Peralta 
and his military regime. Although Peralta took the guerrilla threat more seriously toward 
the end of his rule, his unconstitutional dictatorship drove many Guatemalans to 
sympathize with, or even support, the oppositional left. Drawing from a diverse pool of 
recruits—ranging from student activists to former soldiers—the FAR and its constituent 
organizations incorporated a variety of opinions within its ranks, and thereby lacked 
ideological cohesion and organizational discipline. As the guerrillas and the military 
escalated the scope and scale of violence and retribution, many Guatemalans who put 
their hopes in the revolutionary cause saw a chance for peace in a Méndez Montenegro 
presidency. Instead, the upper echelons of the Guatemalan Armed Forces used the duly 
elected civilian administration as a cover for the final stages of Guatemala’s 
transformation into a counterinsurgency state—a government totally consumed by its 
exterminationist war against guerrillas and anyone who might lend them aid. The 
Johnson administration, for all its outward support of elections and the moderate-leftist 
Guatemalan president, could not, and would not, reverse the decisions of Eisenhower and 
Kennedy that had empowered the military high-command. Julio César Méndez 
Montenegro, a hollow figurehead whose presidency only served to shield the Guatemalan 
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military during the wanton slaughter of its counterinsurgency campaign, proved a fitting 
personification of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala.  
 
The Butcher’s Block: The Ascendency of the Counterinsurgency Forces  
  
Guatemala’s gradual transformation into a military-dominated counterinsurgency 
state completed as the Guatemalan Armed Forces and their death squad axillaries 
launched their campaign against the guerrillas in 1966. Led by two officers who worked 
closesly with US security advisers, Colonels Rafael Arriaga and Carlos Arana, the 
military utilized strategies designed to completely annihilate the guerrillas and any 
civilians who might lend them aid. Reeling from this new wave of incredible violence, 
the few surviving guerrillas scattered and effectively ended their war against the 
Guatemalan government. The apparent success of these murderous methods enshrined 
their legitimacy to the officer corps, and directly contributed the military government’s 
genocide against the Maya in the 1980s.   
Nearly two-thousand Guatemalans attended the funeral of Luis Augusto Turcios 
Lima. All of the major guerrilla leaders came together in Guatemala City to bury their 
comrade.738 To mourn their loss publicly in the capital openly defied the security forces 
that were determined to destroy the guerrillas. The gesture was a show of strength and 
resilience—the guerrillas had recently won several battles and were resolved to continue 
their fallen leader’s fight. Even though many insurgents remained hostile toward the new 
government of Julio Méndez Montenegro, the electoral success of a politician who 
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identified with the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944 clearly emboldened the left. Those 
that placed a modicum of hope in the president and his Partido Revolucionario soon 
learned their faith had been misplaced. 
President Méndez Montenegro understood the precarious nature of his position, 
yet he still, on occasion, tested the constraints the military placed on his office. At each 
attempt, his colonels and the death-squads under their command countered any hint of 
reform with targeted violence. On his first day in office, Méndez Montenegro publicly 
announced he would reform the various police agencies and that “neither torture nor 
abuse of authority will take place, these things are finished.”739 The prospect of civilian 
interference with security forces, along with the relaxation of press censorship and the 
president’s call for negotiations with the guerrillas, drove MLN partisans into a frenzy. 
As the FAR halted operations to consider a peace settlement, right-wing paramilitary 
groups began an urban terror campaign of their own. Bombs detonated almost daily in 
Guatemala City during the first few months of Méndez Montenegro’s presidency. A 
faction within the MLN aimed to create an atmosphere of instability that would allow 
ambitious officers to stage a second “liberation” in the tradition of their founder, Colonel 
Carlos Castillo Armas. Conspirators within the MLN even offered generous bounties to 
any officers willing to support a coup, but only managed to ensnare a few potential 
usurpers. The government’s response to the plot was swift, but merciful. The three chief 
Army officers involved, including Vice Minister of Defense Colonel Adolfo Callejas, 
were quietly exiled to diplomatic posts.740 Connecting the coup attempt to the MLN’s 
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urban rampage, the Méndez Montenegro administration declared a state of siege, 
amplifying the power of the military and reducing an already fettered presidency to 
obsolescence. Although many party members were briefly arrested during the state of 
siege, and a few avaricious officers had been sent abroad, the MLN had successfully 
infiltrated the real power structure of Guatemala. 
The coup attempt failed because of Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque. An avowed 
anticommunist with close ties to the US military, Colonel Arriaga had previously 
partnered with John Longan in reforming the National Police and intelligence agencies 
while coordinating their efforts during Operación  Limpieza. As Peralta left office, he 
hand-selected Arriaga to be the next Minister of Defense. The decision was likely a 
political compromise: Arriaga was a long-time friend and supporter of the MLN 
presidential candidate, Colonel Miguel Ponciano.741 Arriaga had also assisted in Colonel 
Peralta rise to power when he joined in the overthrow of President Ydigoras in 1963. 
Colonel Arriaga also had many admirers from the United States who described him as 
“intelligent, energetic, ambitious, and professionally well qualified, he is one of the most 
competent senior Army officers and is a good military administrator. 742 Granted total 
autonomy from the civilian government by the pact the military had forced upon Méndez 
Montenegro, Colonel Arriaga was the most powerful man in Guatemala. 
 With an MLN supporter in a position that essentially surpassed the presidency, 
their plot to destabilize the government appears counterintuitive on the surface. Certainly, 
many MLN members feared that Méndez Montenegro would attempt reforms and open 
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 377 
 
 
the door to communism. It is also likely that a faction within the party did not value the 
potential cover the Méndez Montenegro administration could provide for the 
counterinsurgency state, and hoped to place their own aspirants at the helm of the party. 
Urban terror and a half-hearted coup plot, however, may have been a trial run for the 
false-flag operations attempted by the MLN throughout the rest of the decade. Moreover, 
the discovery of the coup led to the exile of a potential rival to Colonel Arriaga’s 
position, Vice Minister of Defense Callejas. Moreover, the violence perpetuated by the 
MLN in Guatemala City forced President Méndez Montenegro to declare a state of siege, 
enhancing Defense Minister Arriaga’s already considerable authority while dispensing 
with constitutional protections. Essentially, MLN actions restored a military dictatorship 
in Guatemala within months of Méndez Montenegro’s inauguration.  
 Defense Minister Arriaga had consolidated his control over the Guatemalan state 
by November 1966, but his fierce prosecution of the war against the guerrillas began 
before he took office. His time working with John Longan and other USAID personnel 
made Arriaga particularly receptive to Washington, and past visits to various US Army 
installations allowed him to develop relationships with American military commanders. 
The Minister of Defense displayed none of the nationalistic reluctance that constrained 
Colonel Peralta, and he embraced the United States as a welcome collaborator in the 
counterinsurgency. Relieved to have finally found a willing partner, Washington 
rewarded Arriaga with a surge of financial assistance and military hardware. In addition 
to shipments of guns, grenades, and ammunition, US Southern Command sent attack 
helicopters, napalm-armed jets, and teams of elite specialists who would operate these 
more complex weapon systems until their Guatemalan counterparts received sufficient 
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training.743 Additionally, the United States committed an unknown number of Mobile 
Training Teams (MTT) to assist with the coming counterinsurgency offensive. The MTT 
occupied a nebulous realm of military assistance—billed as “advisers,” many, if not all 
MTT units were composed of US Special Forces and CIA agents. An indication of the 
newfound goodwill between the US and Guatemalan military command, the Military 
Assistance Program nearly doubled in 1966.744 By the time of Turcios Lima’s death in 
October 1966, Guatemala’s counterinsurgency forces numbered 20,000 men, armed and 
trained through the United States.745 From this position of unprecedented strength, the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces launched its liquidation campaign against the fragmented 
revolutionary movement. 
 The counterinsurgency offensive required a ruthless and inventive commander in 
the field who could put all of the US training and armaments to proper use. Defense 
Minister Arriaga needed to look no further than his close friend, Colonel Carlos Arana 
Osorio. The two colonels belonged to the same military academy cohort, graduating from 
the Escuela Politecnica in 1939.746 Colonel Arana’s career advanced rapidly after the fall 
of Arbenz. He became director of Escuela Politecnica in 1954 before serving as the 
military attaché to the United States from 1958-1959. After developing contacts at his 
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post in Washington, Arana led the Guatemalan delegation within the Inter-American 
Defense Board in 1959. He received extensive training at several US military institutions 
and the Central Intelligence Agency praised him for being “one of the most competent 
and respected…politically minded officers in the army.”747 He returned to Washington to 
reprise his role as Guatemala’s military attaché from 1965-1966 until Defense Minister 
Arriaga summoned him back for a special assignment. With unparalleled 
counterinsurgency expertise and a close connection with US military personnel, Colonel 
Arana stood out as an obvious choice to command the main thrust of the campaign. In 
October 1966, the colonel arrived in the province of Zacapa prepared to eradicate the 
estimated three to five hundred guerrillas in the region. When he concluded his bloody 
work, Colonel Arana’s forces had killed as many as ten-thousand Guatemalans. 
 Colonel Arana introduced several practices that would become hallmarks of the 
Guatemalan counterinsurgency state’s merciless war against guerrillas and their potential 
support networks. Methodical in his preparations before launching the offensive, Arana 
deployed spies and made extensive use of the existing comisionado network, whose 
operatives infiltrated local communities to compile lists of potential subversives. The 
quite literal practice of “scorched-earth” tactics, utilized during the Maya Genocide of the 
1980s, originated from Colonel Arana’s strategies.  The Guatemalan Air Force had begun 
to run sorties against guerrilla positions by September 1966, but under Arana’s command, 
these aircraft began to use napalm to immolate entire villages and the surrounding 
countryside. Mirroring developments in Vietnam, carpet-bombing in zonas libres (free 
zones) depopulated the countryside with a rain of death. Moreover, an increasing number 
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of airstrikes originated from US Southern Command in Panama without making use of 
any of Guatemala’s own air assets.748 Aerial assaults from attack helicopters supported 
the thousands of ground troops deployed to eradicate the estimated three-hundred 
guerrillas in Zacapa Province. Already weakened by internal divisions, the guerrilla 
fronts reeled from the concerted attack, unable to effectively counter this new wave of 
aggression.  
 The technological advantage enjoyed by Arana significantly contributed to his 
ability to decimate Zacapa province, but it was the colonel’s use of political violence and 
social control that allowed him to annihilate the insurgency in the region. A variety of 
rightist paramilitary organization had already begun to form in the final months of 
Peralta’s rule, but Colonel Arana became the first military leader to intentionally 
incorporate them into his command structure and strategy. Initially, the MLN affiliated 
death-squad, Mano Blanca, led the extrajudicial bloodletting, but new organizations such 
as Consejo Anticomunista de Guatemala (CADEG) and Nueva Organizacion 
Anticommunista (NOA) formed and joined in the fray. The death-squads acted as a 
vanguard for the Army, eliminating anyone they pleased, regardless of their potential for 
subversion. Most of their members also held positions within the security forces.  
The death-squads used both targeted and indiscriminate killing in settlements that 
might offer support to local guerrilla groups. Unless they belonged to the MLN or PID 
parties, anyone in a position of authority, or even respected within their community, 
became a possible target for the death-squads. Fear so thoroughly permeated the towns 
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and villages of the Zacapa and Izabal departments that local leaders resigned from their 
posts and neighbors refused aid to victims of vigilantism. In Rio Hondo, for example, a 
man was killed in an “anti-guerrilla” operation while he was attempting to repair the roof 
of his family home. No one dared help the murdered man’s surviving family members, 
who had to endure Guatemala’s rainy season exposed to the elements.749 To do so would 
invite death-squad retribution.   
The most effective contribution made by the death-squads was their ability to 
eliminate any individual who might pose a threat without directly implicating the military 
or the government. When confronted with evidence of summary execution or forced 
disappearance, Guatemalan officials simply asserted they had no control over vigilante 
citizens. The MLN even ran advertisements announcing that “the government should not 
be surprised when…citizens organize themselves for self-defense, or take justice into 
their own hands.”750 The US embassy would conclude that many of these organizations 
were “fictional”: a cover for extrajudicial, clandestine units of the police and military. 
The Guatemalan government wanted “to appear to be operating within a legal framework 
as behooves a democracy and to be operating with the support of the people” and 
blaming assassination, mutilation, and other atrocities on shadowy, anonymous civilians 
who independently organized in “armed self-defense” provided security forces with 
plausible deniability.751  
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As the campaign in Zacapa wore on, death-squads deepened the terror by openly 
displaying the disfigured corpses of their victims. Additionally, publicly posted “kill list” 
circulated in urban areas that named individuals, often accompanied with a photograph, 
who were marked for execution. The psychological impact of these terror tactics played a 
crucial role in controlling the surviving population after the Army was satisfied the 
subversive threat had been eliminated in the area. If a name appeared on a kill list, many 
former friends and neighbors would shun, or even denounce the doomed victim lest they 
find their own names inscribed on a death warrant. 
Reaching a disturbing but unsurprising conclusion, Michael McClintock suggests 
that the incorporation of paramilitary death-squads within the military structure likely 
originated from the United States advisory program and was “in every way consistent 
with the ideal implementation of US counter-insurgency doctrine.”752 Reports from the 
Public Safety Program justified these extreme acts of violence as a part of the American 
Tradition: “The methods used to discourage guerrillesque activity are patterned after US 
far west frontier justice.”753 The head of the US military mission in Guatemala, Colonel 
John Webber, boasted in an interview with Time that he had introduced the use of 
clandestine paramilitary organizations to the Guatemalan colonels under his tutelage—
the most notable of them Colonel Carlos Arana. The reporter interviewing Webber 
suggested that arming civilians and giving them a license to “kill peasants whom they 
considered guerrillas or ‘potential’ guerrillas” was dangerous and that “there were those 
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who doubted the wisdom of encouraging such measures in violence-prone Guatemala.”754 
The gruff American colonel bluntly retorted, “That’s the way the country is. The 
Communists are using everything they have, including terror. And it must be met.”755 
Eventually, some US officials became concerned with rampant vigilantism, and a few 
expressed their misgivings, but only after the counterinsurgency campaign had 
effectively destroyed the rural guerrilla fronts and claimed the lives of thousands of 
innocent civilians. 
The collaboration between the United States and Colonel Arana went well beyond 
the tools and trade of direct violence. During the 1960’s counterinsurgency campaign, 
USAID allotted five-million dollars for the Guatemalan military’s Civic Action efforts.756 
Colonel Arana was a prolific proponent of Civic Action and utilized the Alliance for 
Progress program to a far greater degree than any of his predecessors. After a region had 
been sufficiently “pacified” the same units that razed villages to the ground rebuilt them 
and interred civilian survivors within their confines in a manner similar to the strategic 
hamlets used in Vietnam. The Guatemalan government and military highlighted the 
presence of medical units, school construction, and civilian cooperation, but the reality 
was much more sinister. The MLN and associated death-squads maintained a presence in 
the secured villages and enforced compliance with the military’s demands. For example, 
MLN partisans forced the captive population of Rio Hondo to perform popular 
demonstrations in support of the counterinsurgency. Newspapers reported nearly one 
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thousand peasants spontaneously gathered to denounce the FAR and Cuba while holding 
signs marked with “Viva el Ejército”(Long Live the Army).757 US officials were happy to 
accept the account, which originated from a Guatemalan Army press release, at face 
value. The best way to preserve one’s life in an occupied region was to be a card-carrying 
member of the MLN. Unsurprisingly, the party’s numbers grew as survivors of Arana’s 
campaign joined their ranks: a factor that would contribute to the colonel’s presidential 
bid in 1970.  
Colonel Arana boosted existing Civic Action initiatives that focused on domestic 
construction and social services, but his most innovative contribution to the program was 
introducing civil patrols. A mechanism for militarization, civil patrols conscripted 
survivors into local militias, typically dominated by the MLN, and used them as local 
defense against guerrillas. Despite the trauma many survivors had suffered at the hands of 
Arana’s forces, many joined civil patrols to secure access to basic resources provided 
through concurrent Civic Action programs. Furthermore, refusing to join a civil patrol 
would arouse suspicion of collaboration with guerrillas—an act that would likely result in 
appearing on a kill list. Several civil patrols would themselves evolve into full-fledged 
paramilitary units as the counterinsurgency campaign continued. Embassy officials 
monitoring the situation welcomed news that the captive population now denied 
guerrillas access to food, supplies, and information and “in some operations, the 
campesinos have even fought the guerrillas at the Army’s side.”758 Although the practice 
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would become more widespread and sophisticated during the Guatemalan government’s 
genocidal campaign of the 1980s, Arana’s militarization of the surviving population 
denied the insurgency its vital link with civilian support. 
 The Zacapa campaign delivered a rapid series of successes for the 
counterinsurgency state. The gruesome details of the indiscriminate, excessive violence 
meted out by security forces under Arana abound in scholarly accounts and survivor 
testimony.759 They will not be recounted in this study, but suffice to say Colonel Arana 
earned his sobriquet: “The Butcher of Zacapa.” Before the end of October, less than one 
month into the campaign, Arana’s forces had systematically destroyed the primary 
guerrilla fronts of the FGEI and MR-13. Many guerrilla leaders died in confrontations 
with the military or were assassinated by death-squads. Commander Yon Sosa himself 
narrowly escaped with his life after being wounded in a clash with the Army.760 The 
situation in the countryside became untenable by 1967, and the guerrillas still left alive 
went into hiding in Guatemala City or outside the country. Those who fled to the capital 
found little reprieve. While Arana purged the countryside, Defense Minister Arriaga 
continued to develop Guatemalan police agencies into an urban counterinsurgency force. 
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 Between 1966-1970, USAID, through the Office of Public Safety, provided at 
least $2.6 million for bolstering the Guatemalan police. According to the report from 
political scientist Howard Sharckman, in 1967 alone, the National Police added 1,500 
new members to their ranks and an additional 2,000 by 1968.761 Thousands of officers 
received specialized training from a variety of US advisers—many came from the CIA, 
the Green Berets, or fresh from similar assignments in Vietnam. As operations in the 
countryside wound down, death-squads began to collaborate with police agencies in 
eliminating urban suspects. The guerrillas had largely been crushed and scattered by 
Colonel Arana, so the MLN began to direct its paramilitary units against members of its 
political rival, the Partido Revolucionario. 
 The Secretary General of the MLN, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, did not mince 
words in declaring his ideological allegiance. “I am a fascist”, the party leader exclaimed, 
“and I have modeled my party on the Spanish Falange.”762 Expressing his deep 
satisfaction with Colonel Arana’s “plan of complete illegality” against the insurgency in 
Zacapa, Alarcon decided to improve the MLN’s political standing by killing off PR 
members. Prominent citizens who registered with the PR found their names on publicly 
distributed kill lists. Scores of local party leaders were disappeared or executed in areas 
where the MLN performed poorly in the elections. In the event an explanation was 
provided, the killers simply proclaimed their victims were agents of the guerrillas, 
communists, and traitors. President Méndez Montenegro stayed silent as members of his 
own party were murdered, but by August 1967, the remaining leadership of the PR 
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petitioned the government for protection against “the sowing of terror and death” by the 
MLN death-squads who falsely operated “under the pretext of fighting the guerrillas.”763 
Their request did little to stem death-squad violence that was spiraling out of control. 
 The MLN and associated paramilitary organizations undeniably aided the 
counterinsurgency campaign, but their excesses soon threatened to undermine their 
contribution to the Guatemalan Armed Forces. While many US officials excused or 
ignored extrajudicial killings at the onset of the offensive against the guerrillas, the daily, 
public displays of the horrifically mutilated bodies of death-squad victims could not be 
denied by mid-1967. In May, the State Department concluded “vigilantism…disturbed 
further the already strained internal security situation in Guatemala. The involvement of 
the army in this extra-legal activity poses a serious problem affecting the stability of the 
Méndez government.”764 By October, the US embassy speculated that the MLN was 
attempting to undermine President Méndez Montenegro’s popular support and create the 
conditions for another military coup. While the embassy report acknowledged the 
spectacular success of implementing paramilitary forces into the counterinsurgency 
effort, they believed that President Méndez Montenegro, and perhaps even Defense 
Minister Arriaga, could no longer control these extralegal elements.765 Even Colonel 
Arana apparently considered disarming some of the death-squad auxiliaries under his 
command, although he ultimately decided “that the group would not give up its guns 
willingly because it could not afford to do so. If they gave up their arms, they would be 
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‘defenseless against reprisals for past deeds.’”766 It took two outrageous attacks against 
public figures before authorities clamped down on MLN terrorism, which proved to be 
only a minor setback for the fascist political party. 
 The story of Rogelia Cruz Martinez appears in nearly every account of the 
Guatemalan Civil War. A renowned beauty, Cruz won Miss Guatemala in 1959 and 
competed for the Miss Universe title in the United States. Beloved by her nation and 
hailing from a good family, Cruz’s leftist sensibilities were public knowledge and the 
beauty queen became romantically involved with a FAR guerrilla. At the close of 1967, 
Yon Sosa and the remaining FAR leaders attempted to reconcile their differences in an 
effort to recover from their devastating losses. As a result, the FAR formally broke with 
the PGT, which had ceased its advocacy of armed struggle, and rejoined with Yon Sosa’s 
MR-13 remnants. The reforged FAR signed a declaration of war against the government 
in January, 1968.767 The day after the FAR announced their reformation, unknown 
assailants abducted Cruz. Her half-naked, ravaged body appeared days later under a 
bridge on the outskirts of Guatemala City. What was left of her remains showed clear 
signs of torture, mutilation, and rape.768 Such occurrences had become common in 
Guatemala, but her status grabbed the attention of the national and international press.  
 Retaliation for the vicious murder of Rogelia Cruz came on January 16, 1968. A 
FAR cell, allegedly led by Cruz’s boyfriend Nayito, attacked a car containing US military 
advisors. The targets were two of the highest-ranking US military personnel assigned to 
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Guatemala: Colonel John D. Webber, the head of the US military mission in Guatemala, 
and Commander Ernest A. Munro, the US Navy attaché. Both men were deeply involved 
in the counterinsurgency campaign. Colonel Arana had trained under Webber and 
counted him among his most valuable US allies. The FAR squad riddled the car with 
machine-gun fire, killing both of the American officers almost instantly.769 Several 
guerrillas, including Nayito, died in the ensuing firefight, and the FAR issued a statement 
claiming the attack was revenge against the United States for creating “genocidal forces” 
in Guatemala.770 The death of high-ranking American officers shocked the US 
government and public, and the State Department began to make concerted efforts into 
determining how to “put an end to counter-terror.”771 Unfortunately, the creature created 
from US counterinsurgency collaboration had grown far beyond the control of its 
erstwhile handlers. 
 Before US officials could grapple with their Guatemalan counterparts over the 
death of John Webber and Ernest Munro, the MLN lashed out with a public stunt 
designed to discredit the Méndez Montenegro administration and shift public outrage 
onto the political left. On March 16, the outspokenly conservative Archbishop of 
Guatemala, Mario Casariego, vanished. His supposed kidnappers had managed to seize 
Archbishop Casariego within one-hundred yards of the National Palace despite the 
abundance of security personnel in the vicinity.772 The minds behind the abduction 
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planned to blame the FAR and humiliate Méndez Montenegro in the process, but the 
implausibility of the battered insurgents carrying out such an operation caused many to 
believe that the Archbishop was party to his own kidnapping. The US embassy concluded 
that the “kidnapping of Archbishop seems to have been carried out by members of the 
armed forces to promote public demonstrations which would give Army motive for 
taking over government.”773 Drawing a logical conclusion, Ambassador Mein speculated 
that Colonel Arana and Defense Minister Arriaga “may be party to the plot.”774  
Within days, the plotters realized their false-flag operation had failed and the 
Archbishop was released unharmed. The chief culprits within the MLN and military 
remained concealed, but they supplied two expendable civilians who were involved with 
the plot as scapegoats. They were subsequently shot after their arrest. Unsatisfied with 
the obvious attempt to circumvent the consequences of the fake kidnapping, near-
universal public condemnation forced President Méndez Montenegro to take action 
against the colonels who were almost certainly behind the attempt to foment unrest. On 
March 28, Méndez Montenegro dismissed senior officers involved in counterinsurgency 
operations, including Colonel Arana and Defense Minister Arriaga.775 The move stunned 
the nation and “Guatemalans of all political shades…interpreted Méndez’ assertion of 
authority as the end of the armed forces’ constriction on civilian rule.”776 Even CIA 
analysts seemed impressed remarking: “President Méndez relieved three key military 
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men of their posts, and gave Guatemalans a president in fact as well as in name for the 
first time in five years.”777 Counterinsurgency efforts continued under a new Defense 
Minister, Colonel Rolando Chinchilla Aguilar, and his subordinates, but the six months 
that followed the botched false-flag kidnapping marked the nadir of death-squad 
activity.778 For that brief moment, it seemed that the forces of revolution and reaction 
might abate and some semblance of stability might come to Guatemala. 
By 1966, the Guatemalan military and its allies from the United States had 
constructed a deadly counterinsurgency apparatus and launched its campaign to eliminate 
the guerrilla threat. Implementing a strategy that incorporated death-squads, scorched 
earth napalm bombings, and public mutilation, Colonel Carlos Arana and other 
commanders succeeded in bringing the armed opposition to its knees. Although the 
excesses of the chief architects of the counterinsurgency campaign were briefly and 
lightly punished, the apparent effectiveness of their murderous tactics were difficult to 
deny. Massacres and political killings had a long and unfortunate history in Guatemala, 
but carefully orchestrated, government induced wholesale slaughter deployed in the 
counterinsurgency campaign of the 1960s was an altogether different phenomenon. The 
guerrilla movements, which had so recently seemed capable of ushering in a revolution, 
collapsed in the face of this unprecedented state violence. Guatemala’s transformation 
into a counterinsurgency state was now complete and its legacy would inspire the 
country’s future military leaders to build upon the perceived triumph and commit 
genocide when confronting a resurrected guerrilla movement in the 1980s. 
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Price of Progress: The End of the Alliance for Progress Era 
 
 With the apparent success of counterinsurgency operations and the dismissal of its 
most prominent leaders, it seemed possible that President Mendez Montenegro might 
return state power into civilian hands. The prospect of civilian rule, however, deteriorated 
almost immediately as anticommunist elites reaffirmed their dedication to the 
counterinsurgency state they had built with US assistance. Mendez Montenegro’s attempt 
to pass a tax reform met with impenetrable opposition. Although some US officials began 
to speak out against the abuses conducted by the Guatemalan military, they soon found 
themselves silenced by the assassination of Ambassador John Gordon Mein. Barely able 
to preserve his presidency, Mendez Montenegro retreated in the face of renewed US 
support for the Guatemalan officer corps. As the 1960s came to a close, the Alliance for 
Progress faded away, but the counterinsurgency state it had helped to create in Guatemala 
remained in place for over a decade. 
President Méndez Montenegro’s newfound political capital encouraged those US 
officials who had begun to acknowledge the problems of extrajudicial killing units, but 
the CIA surmised that “Méndez may believe that he can begin to make much-needed 
socioeconomic reforms, but he will have a difficult time. Much of the military 
establishment has been alienated, and the wealthy conservative elements will watch his 
moves carefully.”779 His most significant attempt at reform met with fierce resistance. 
Guatemala still possessed the most backward, insufficient taxation systems in Central 
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America. Since his inauguration, Méndez Montenegro’s administration had proposed 
several, moderate tax reforms to help combat the persistent fiscal crisis and contribute to 
Alliance for Progress developmental programs. Business interests from both Guatemala 
and the United States routinely blocked these attempts. When Finance Minister Alberto 
Fuentes Mohr, an internationally renowned economist described as “a perfect Alliance 
for Progress man,” introduced a progressive sales tax on luxury goods, conservatives in 
the business community labeled him a communist.780 In the same month that Méndez 
Montenegro flexed his presidential power by dismissing his top counterinsurgency 
colonels, conservative economic elites, who counted an increasing number of military 
officers among their number, forced the president to remove Fuentes Mohr from his 
cabinet. The firing of the Finance Minister confirmed that the Méndez Montenegro 
administration was still very much in the thrall of the military and its wealthy civilian 
supporters.        
 The failure of the minor tax reform and subsequent dismissal of Fuentes Mohr 
provoked a contentious debate between the emerging factions within the field of US 
policymakers involved in Guatemalan affairs. The excessive human rights abuses 
induced by US-sponsored counterinsurgency operations repulsed some officials within 
the State Department by 1967. Several within this “progressive” faction argued that 
Washington should reduce, or even eliminate, military and economic aid.781 The 
“pragmatists,” headed by Ambassador Mein, argued that reducing aid would be 
disastrous for Guatemala and the United States should avoid pressuring the government 
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over taxation in order to keep Méndez Montenegro in office. The ambassador likely 
recalled that the downfall of President Miguel Ydigoras, whose position was arguably 
more stable than Méndez Montenegro, began in earnest after the conservative general 
forced his tax bill through the legislature in order to meet Alliance for Progress 
obligations. The American ambassador’s unwillingness to advocate for tax reform, 
however, signaled that the United States lacked dedication to the principles and programs 
of the Alliance for Progress. Ambassador Mein and the “pragmatists” prevailed in the 
debate, but at the cost of alienating many of their “progressive” colleagues. The real 
winners, however, were Guatemala’s oligarchs, military officers, and their MLN-PID 
coalition. The political scientist Susanne Jonas, an authority on the Guatemalan Civil 
War, concluded: “For Guatemala, this debate and its resolution marked a turning point: 
this was the last time the United States flirted with the reformist alternative for 
Guatemala and with the use of aid as leverage for obtaining reforms.”782   
 All that the defeated progressive policymakers could achieve was the preservation 
of their dissent for posterity. Viron Vaky, the former Deputy Chief of Mission, had long 
expressed his concerns regarding the direction of the Guatemalan government and US 
policy. Shortly after joining the embassy staff in 1966, Vaky warned that US support for 
counterinsurgency operations had fully transformed Guatemala into a police state.783 
After more than a year of regularly reporting on the atrocities committed by death-squads 
backed by the Guatemalan Armed Forces, and by extension the United States, Vaky 
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could no longer reconcile his career with his moral compass and resigned. He returned to 
Washington in 1967 to join the State Department’s Policy Planning staff, where he 
continued to keep a close eye on Guatemalan affairs. When he learned that his former 
supervisor, Ambassador Mein, argued against pushing the Méndez Montenegro 
administration to act within the window of opportunity created by the dismissal of the 
counterinsurgency colonels, he decided to speak out against the direction of US policy in 
Guatemala. 
In his scathing report, Vaky unequivocally asserted that the State Department and US 
embassy that the United States must actively and openly condemn the terror tactics 
wantonly applied by the Guatemalan military. Vaky outlined, in considerable detail, the 
ethical and strategic bankruptcy of counterinsurgency efforts in Guatemala. The 
indiscriminate brutality employed by the Guatemalan security forces stirred up “righteous 
anger” that contributed to extreme political polarization.784 The people of Guatemala saw 
their government as an adversary, which undermined any effort at institution building and 
modernization.785 Moreover, Guatemalans associated the United States, which had 
funded and advised the successive military governments, with the use of state-terrorism. 
Vaky concluded:  
“Most disturbing of all--that we have not been honest with ourselves. We have 
condoned counter terror; we may even in effect have encouraged or blessed it. We 
have been so obsessed with the fear of insurgency that we have rationalized away our 
qualms and uneasiness. This is not only because we have concluded we cannot do 
anything about it, for we never really tried.  Rather we suspected that maybe it is a 
good tactic, and that as long as communist are being killed it is all right.”786 
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Vaky believed that the cumulative trajectory of the policy decision made by the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations corroded US credibility and 
presented an ethical crisis that needed immediate redress. Notably, Vaky believed that 
state-terror could no longer be stopped by any US actions; the system created in the 
fourteen years of US-backed military regimes was too deeply entrenched.787 The best 
course of action would be for the United States government to make it unambiguously 
clear to Guatemalans and the world that it opposed state-terrorism.  Otherwise, the United 
States would “stand before history unable to answer the accusations that we encouraged 
the Guatemalan army to do such things.”788 Vaky, a conscientious and intelligent 
diplomat, left his post feeling “like [William] Fulbright says he felt about the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution--my deepest regret is that I did not fight harder within the Embassy 
councils.”789 Vaky’s proclamation captured the tragedy of US-Guatemalan relations 
during the Alliance for Progress. In Guatemala, those that sought to fulfill even a hint of 
President Kennedy’s proclaimed intentions for Latin America could not loosen the grip of 
the reactionary militarists that his administration had empowered in the name of 
anticommunism. 
On March 31, two days after Viron Vaky lambasted US policy in Guatemala, 
President Lyndon Johnson announced he would not run for reelection. The Cold War had 
claimed another aspiring domestic reformer. Granted, President Johnson was culpable for 
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escalation in Vietnam, the invasion of the Dominican Republic, and Colonel Arana’s 
extermination campaign in Zacapa, among other global and national conflicts, but the 
beleaguered Texan’s real ambition had been his Great Society—a refashioned New Deal 
designed to aid Americans that the venerable social program had left behind. Instead, the 
Vietnam War engulfed the Johnson administration and devoured much of the revenue 
that could have been applied to the Great Society. Unable to end the war or fully deliver 
domestic reforms, Johnson faced unanticipated opposition from within the Democratic 
Party. Scholars continue to debate the precise nature of Johnson’s rationale for leaving 
office, but in broad terms, it is clear that he did not believe he could defeat Robert 
Kennedy in the Democratic primaries. Even after Senator Kennedy’s assassination in 
June, Johnson confirmed he would not run for reelection and helped secure the 
nomination of Vice President Hubert Humphrey. His health failing fast, the depressed, 
progressive President of the United States mirrored the decay and disillusionment that 
plagued what remained of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala. 
Guatemala never occupied much of President Johnson’s attention. His sympathizers 
blamed his administration’s foreign policy blunders on his advisers, many of them 
holdovers from the Kennedy administration. His detractors argued President Johnson’s 
diplomatic failures were of his own making. Regardless of the source of dysfunction, a 
broad consensus found Johnson inadequate in international relations. His hands-off 
approach in Guatemala is evident in the records his administration left behind. Unlike 
Kennedy, whose personal inquiries into the minutiae of Guatemalan affairs abound, 
President Johnson rarely engaged with matters pertaining to the largest country in Central 
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America. For his final trip as President of the United States, Johnson traveled to the 
region for the first time. 
On July 6, 1968, Johnson attended the Conference of Presidents of the Central 
American Republics held in El Salvador. Five years earlier, at the conference’s first 
meeting, the presidents of the United States and Guatemala—Kennedy and Ydigoras—
argued over allowing Juan Jose Arévalo participation in the upcoming presidential 
election. Ydigoras defended Arévalo’s right to run for office, albeit for self-interested 
reasons, and soon found himself ousted from office. The conference in 1968 marked the 
first time the Guatemalan and American presidents met in person since Kennedy’s fateful 
encounter with Ydigoras and it appeared much had changed in the interim. A left-leaning 
reformer who campaigned as the inheritor of the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution had come 
to power through a free and fair election. By 1968, the threat of communist infiltration in 
Guatemala had subsided and Cuban-inspired guerrilla movements diminished throughout 
Latin America as anticommunist regimes, in league with the United States, took extreme 
measures to eradicate the Red Menace. The United States and Guatemala cooperated on a 
number of projects aimed at economic diversification, social welfare, and infrastructure 
development. The US-supported a civilian president who had even managed to curb the 
excesses of his inordinately powerful military. At first glance, the Alliance for Progress 
had achieved its goals in Guatemala. 
Billed as an informal trip, Johnson’s stopover in Guatemala was purely ceremonial. 
Johnson arrived at the airport where he was greeted by dignitaries, observed a few 
cultural displays, and made a short speech. He affirmed that “The Alliance for Progress, 
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if we are faithful to its charter, can mean a new dawn of progress for all of us.”790 
President Johnson praised the ongoing regional economic integration through the Central 
American Common Market and projected that “Central America can be a workshop for 
opportunity and a workshop for achievement in this area of the world.”791 References to 
communist guerrillas and counterinsurgency terror were notably absent in the president’s 
brief remarks. Although Johnson admitted there remained much work to be done, the 
triumphant tone of the exiting American president gave the impression of a victory 
speech.   
Photographs from the event hint at the reality of the relationship between the two 
countries and their leaders. 792Amid the cheerful pageantry on display, Johnson and 
Méndez Montenegro both appear grim faced. The Guatemalan president obscured his 
reactions with sunglasses for most of the visit, but a few images revealed that he and 
Johnson showed the strain of being an enfeebled executive. Dark circles weltered under 
the eyes of the two progressive presidents who had been overwhelmed, in different ways, 
by the armed forces nominally under their command. Had they the occasion for a 
meaningful exchange, Méndez Montenegro and Johnson might have commiserated over 
the destruction of their domestic agendas. President Johnson, however, remained largely 
disinterested in the country’s affairs. He departed Guatemala after spending a single hour 
in the airport.     
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  A month after Johnson’s fleeting visit, an unprecedented event peeled back the 
thin veneer of progress: the assassination of Ambassador John Gordon Mein. In early 
August, the US embassy attributed a significant uptick in violence to the upcoming 
municipal elections. Most of the 281 offices up for grabs were local and rural, but “of 
perhaps more importance is the fact that the winners will control the electoral machinery 
for the 1970 election.”793 Paramilitary units of the MLN-PID coalition had established an 
intimidating presence in areas formerly held by guerrillas and their assassination 
campaign against PR members and other known leftists resumed. Embassy officials 
speculated that “some of the violence apparently has been the work of rightist armed 
vigilantes who are not responding to Government direction. Some of the violence may 
also be the work of the security forces themselves.”794 The threat of a grisly death 
sufficiently motivated many citizens to vote for the conservative coalition, and MLN-PID 
candidates took twenty-two municipalities, over half of the posts up for election.795 Yet 
resistance remained, both civilian and guerrilla, and faced with the prospect of a renewed 
cycle of violence and repression, even US officials hoped that Méndez Montenegro 
would “stiffen his resolve to press on toward the complete elimination of extra-legal 
operations.”796 Instead, the military high-command and its partners in the MLN 
reasserted their domination over the country. The capture of the FAR leader Camilo 
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Sanchez in late August acted as a catalyst for legitimizing the renewed presence of the 
counterinsurgency state. 
 On August 28, Ambassador Mein drove back to the American embassy after 
lunch with Guatemalan officials. Suddenly, a green Chevelle sped up alongside the 
ambassador’s limousine, pulled ahead, and swerved perpendicular to block traffic. As the 
ambassador’s limo screeched to a halt, a red Toyota appeared from behind, cutting off the 
exit. A group of men, at least three in number, spilled out of the cars and shouted for the 
Ambassador and his chauffer to exit their vehicle. The attackers fired shots into the air, as 
one of the men grabbed ahold of Ambassador Mein and attempted to drag him into the 
Toyota. Refusing to be taken as a hostage, Mein broke free from his captors and ran. The 
apparent leader of the raid shouted from the front car, “Shoot him.” A torrent of machine-
gun fire flooded the streets. Mein died almost instantly from any one of the six bullets 
that found their mark. He was the first American ambassador killed while serving in 
office.797 
 The FAR immediately claimed responsibility for the assassination. They made 
their rationale abundantly clear in their press release:  
“Today…the leading representative in our country of murderous and rapacious 
imperialism, Ambassador Gordon Mein, was executed. He resisted an attempt to 
                                                 
797 This account is derived from a number of primary sources housed in US archives, but the most crucial 
were: Central Intelligence Agency, “Assassination of US Ambassador to Guatemala.” August 29, 1968. 
National Security Files, Country Files: Guatemala, Volume 2, Box 54. LBJL;  
Peter F. Costello, “Killing of U.S. Ambassador, John Gordon Mein.” September 27, 1968. DNSA: 
Guatemala and the US. Record Group 286, Records of the Agency for International Development, Records 
of the Office of Public Safety. Box 72. National Archives.;  
Walt Rostow, “Assassination of Ambassador Mein.” August 29, 1968. National Security Files, Country 
Files: Guatemala, Volume 2. Box 54, LBJL.;  
Dean Rusk, “Confidential Telegram, State 229659.” August 29, 1968. National Security Files, Country 
Files: Guatemala, Volume 2, Box 54. LBJL. 
 402 
 
 
kidnap him that had been made for political reasons as a response to the capture 
of Comandante Camilo Sanchez, of the FAR…The capture of comrade Camilo so 
far has been kept from the public. The FAR demands the appearance of 
Comandante Camilo Sanchez, at present held…under the command of the sadist, 
Noeé Villegas Delgado, head of the Fascist groups in the army, Mano, Cadeg, 
etc., and ex-head of the Fourth Corps of the National Police, the den of reaction 
where most of the 6,000 victims of reactionary violence in Guatemala have been 
tortured and murdered. The execution of the Yankee ambassador is only the first 
in a series of measures that will be taken until Comandante Camilo is produced. 
By making known the capture and disappearance of the Comandante, the FAR 
repeats its irrevocable decision to fight until, together with the people, it defeats 
and drives out the greedy and parasitic bourgeoisie. We will fight on. Victory or 
Death for Guatemala.”798 
 
In response, the Guatemalan government immediately executed Camilo Sanchez. Death-
squads that had temporarily deactivated reemerged and returned to their murderous work. 
Security forces cordoned off the entirety of Guatemala City and began moving house-to-
house to root out the suspected assassins. The National Police learned that the cars used 
in the attack on the ambassador were rented under the name of Michele Firk, a French 
socialist. Seemingly confirming the FAR’s guilt, she shot herself before police could 
subject her to what would have undoubtedly been a brutal interrogation. Bounty posters 
appeared with the faces, names, and aliases of the three chief suspects offering ten-
thousand quetzals to “honorable citizens” who could either provide essential information, 
or neutralize the “leaders of chaos and anarchy” themselves.799 It is unclear if 
Guatemalan security forces actually apprehended the alleged culprits, but the wave of 
terror and bloodshed that followed the American ambassadors assassination claimed the 
lives of many leftist dissidents, guerrilla or not. For the scattered guerrillas that remained, 
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the death of Camilo Sanchez and the revivification of right-wing paramilitary activity 
effectively ended the revolutionary movement of the 1960s. The assassination of 
Ambassador Mein likewise sounded the death-knell of the Alliance for Progress. 
 John Gordon Mein did not overtly exhibit the rabid anticommunism of his 
predecessor, Ambassador Bell, but he cannot not be considered an exemplar for 
Kennedy’s vision of the Alliance for Progress. He supported President Méndez 
Montenegro and urged for greater civilian control of the military, economic development, 
and political reform. At the same time, he avidly supported counterinsurgency efforts by 
calling upon John Longan to recalibrate security forces, and shot down his colleagues 
support Méndez Montenegro’s attempts to push for tax reform. Historian Stephen Rabe 
points out that Mein had even advised his contacts in the security forces to bury their 
mutilated murder-victims to prevent bad press.800 His assassination provided the perfect 
opportunity for legitimizing the Guatemalan counterinsurgency state just as it appeared to 
be at its most vulnerable.  
 Mein’s death cemented the relationship between the United States and 
Guatemala’s military leadership. Shock and anger silenced many of the policymakers 
who had previously expressed their unease with the excesses of the counterinsurgency 
operations. The embassy still encouraged Méndez Montenegro’s efforts to disarm the 
estimated three-thousand civilians in clandestine paramilitary organizations, but 
suggestions for cutting economic or military aid to discourage state-terror evaporated.801 
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Through the remainder of 1968, the US embassy received numerous reports warning that 
the FAR had “decided to attack ‘the American presence in Guatemala’ as a matter of 
policy.”802 Specifically, the FAR apparently hoped to repeat their attack on Mein—the 
embassy learned that “an expert gunman of the FAR already has carried out a 
surveillance of the Ambassador’s residence in Guatemala City.”803 Crafting a new policy 
guide, the US embassy now resolved that “we believe it is misleading to hold that socio-
economic reforms in the rural areas can provide a direct solution for insurgency.”804 In 
the wake of Mein’s assassination, the United States redoubled its commitment to the 
Guatemalan security forces while simultaneously abandoning the core values of the 
Alliance for Progress.  
 The Guatemalan counterinsurgency state and its constituents were the greatest 
beneficiaries of the assassination of Ambassador Mein. The overwhelming majority of 
scholars report that the FAR was behind the plot, citing their press release, but Michael 
McClintock has suggested that the assassination might have been a false-flag operation 
carried out by top military officers and the MLN. McClintock cites interviews published 
by The New York Times and The Washington Post given by two close associates of 
Colonel Arana, a former bodyguard and the son of one of Arana’s business partners, who 
implicated several unnamed members of the Guatemalan military to US investigators.805 
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Moreover, McClintock points to a memo written by Mein in June 1966 in which the 
ambassador reported that he had learned that right-wing extremist plotted to assassinate 
him and the German ambassador, Count Karl Von Spretti.806 In 1970, two years after 
Mein’s death, kidnappers seized Ambassador Von Spretti and killed him when the 
Guatemalan government refused to negotiate. This was the third major kidnapping 
blamed on the FAR within a single month, a fact that McClintock finds suspect for the 
derelict organization. The military high-command used the death of Ambassador Mein to 
replace the Defense Minister with an MLN hardliner and forced Méndez Montenegro to 
reinstate the rank of general. For the first time since the 1944 revolution, five colonels 
were promoted to the military’s most preeminent position.807 Regardless of whether 
shadowy right-wing forces or desperate revolutionaries committed the assassination, the 
death of Ambassador Mein paved the way to victory for the MLN-PID coalition in the 
upcoming presidential elections. 
* * * 
If there was any life left in the original vision of the Alliance for Progress, the 
election of Richard Nixon in 1968 extinguished any hope that the ambitious program 
could be rejuvenated in Guatemala. As President Nixon entered the White House, 
Guatemalans began to look toward their own presidential contest that would inaugurate a 
new administration in July 1970. In preparation for the chaos that accompanied 
Guatemalan presidential elections, the State Department drafted extensive contingency 
plans in 1969. The Méndez Montenegro administration had expended what little 
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influence it had marshalled, and threats to the constitutional Guatemalan government 
came from all sides. Should a right-wing military junta seize control, the State 
Department again debated on whether or not to withhold economic assistance programs 
and reduce official personnel if the regime refused to eventually allow elections.808 
Returning to the perennial fear of Cuban infiltration, US officials also prepared for the 
resurgence of the battered “Castroist insurgency” and believed that Cuba’s support might 
resuscitate the guerrillas, who could take advantage of the transition of power. If guerilla 
and terrorist attacks threatened urban centers, the State Department believed that Méndez 
Montenegro would have no choice but to grant the military a free hand to establish order 
to ensure his personal safety.809 Additionally, in the unlikely event that the insurgency 
gained popular support and could not be controlled by Guatemalan security forces, the 
United States would supply whatever military assistance, short of conventional ground 
forces, that the Guatemalan military requested.810  
The most worrisome possibility the State Department faced was a nationalist 
clique of junior officers staging a coup; a recurring path followed by both liberal and 
conservative military leaders since the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944. The State 
Department feared that a reformist junta would be intensely nationalistic, potentially anti-
American, and would only exacerbate Guatemala’s existing problems. Worst of all, such 
a regime might follow “the Peruvian example” and inspire other Latin American 
countries to distance themselves from the Northern Colossus through regional solidarity 
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and increased economic self-sufficiency.811 Mired in the Vietnam War abroad and 
suffering from domestic unrest, the United States found it could do little but watch and 
wait for the outcome of the Guatemalan elections. By 1970, both Guatemala and the 
United States elected conservative presidents who had promised law and order, and 
whose ruthless determination in the pursuit of their goals earned them infamous 
reputations.  
President Julio César Méndez Montenegro survived, but at a terrible cost. Colonel 
Arana’s counterinsurgency campaign had earned him the title, “the Butcher of Zacapa,” 
and for his actions, he became a national hero among the military and landed elite.812 His 
popularity only increased during his diplomatic exile as Ambassador to Nicaragua, where 
he became the protégé of Anastasio Somoza.813 Three major contenders vied for the 
Guatemalan presidency, but Colonel Arana secured the nomination of the coalition of the 
two major conservative parties, the PID and the MLN. The Partido Revolucionario 
purged its left leaning members and selected Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, a moderate 
centrist, to inherit the Méndez Montenegro administration.814 Jorge Lucas Caballeros of 
                                                 
811 Ibid. 18. The Peruvian Example is a reference to the leftist, nationalist military regime that began with 
General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s coup against President Fernando Belaúnde. The political situations in 
Guatemala and Peru were broadly similar. Belaúnde, like Méndez Montenegro, was a moderate reform who 
proved largely ineffective in office thanks to domestic and foreign opposition. Both presidents faced rural 
insurgencies inspired by communism and had to rely increasingly on their militaries to maintain the 
semblance of order. General Velasco’s government, which deposed Belaúnde on October 3, 1968. This 
military dictatorship was a notable exception in that it was leftist in its political orientation and attempted 
numerous reform programs, nationalized a number of industries, and invested heavily in import-
substitution industrialization. Velasco aligned Peru more closely with Cuba and the Soviet bloc and was 
regularly at odds with the United States. 
812 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala. 60 
813 Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984) 163. 
814 Bureau of Intelligence and Research. “Guatemala: Campaign for National Elections Underway.” 
February 13, 1970. DNSA: Guatemalan and the US. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research. 3. 
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the Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG), a moderate leftist, had been an army 
officer, an economist, and a politician who advocated reform stood little chance against 
his more conservative opponents according to the State Department analysists815 The 
1970 election was superficially legitimate in that the military did not directly install their 
candidate in the presidency. They did not need to resort to a coup or widespread violence 
because they had already captured the mechanisms of state power and controlled enough 
voters through fear of death-squad reprisals. Norman Gall, an experienced reporter on 
Latin America, stated that Arana loyalist in the countryside “Threatened to burn down 
villages that did not vote overwhelmingly for MLN candidates.”816 A decade of civil war 
had eliminated an entire generation of moderate leaders and most leftist parties had been 
outlawed, making freedom of choice in Guatemalan elections merely an illusion. Nearly 
half of Guatemala’s registered voters abstained from casting their ballots, and Colonel 
Arana won the presidency with the support of aa mere 21% of the electorate.817 It was the 
first and only time a right-wing military leader came to power in Guatemala through 
purely democratic means.  
No one within the State Department was surprised by Colonel Arana’s victory in 
the 1970 presidential election. Arana opened his presidency with a promise; he would 
eliminate all guerillas even “if it is necessary to turn the country into a cemetery.”818 The 
United States would finance his attempt to do so. Immediately, the United States 
                                                 
815 Ibid., 4. 
816 Norman Gall, “Guatemalan Slaughter.” New York Review of Books, Volume XVII, No 9, 20 May 
1971; McCllintock, The American Connection. 99 
817 James Dunkerly, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America. (London: 
Verso, 1988) 459. 
818 Colonel Carlos Arana quoted in: LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions. 256. 
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government began to assist Arana in the creation of an elite police corps designed to help 
the new president cope with resurgent urban terrorism inspired by his election. Even 
those State Department officials who advocated the plan admitted that a “close watch” 
must be kept on Arana and the military because of the “serious risk” entailed in granting 
more military power to the colonel-president.819 The fleeting caution of the State 
Department was well placed; Arana soon declared a state of siege and unleashed death-
squads armed with kill lists written by the executive branch. Within the first twelve 
weeks of Arana’s presidency, the Guatemalan government assassinated scores of political 
dissidents, arrested 1,600 citizens, and murdered over one-thousand people.820 In the 
years that followed, Arana achieved a modicum of order through a heavy toll in blood 
and fear. 
As vigilantism and violence once again escalated in Guatemala, the United States 
found that it could do little to control the counterinsurgency state it had helped create. In 
fact, the murderous military-machine had managed to become relatively self-sufficient. 
The aid furnished by the Alliance for Progress had not improved stability, security, or 
quality of life in Guatemala, but it had built a structure for anticommunist operations. 
Military and economic assistance from the United States reached its highest levels during 
the 1960s, and though the Guatemalan military shattered the revolutionary forces before 
the end of the decade, literacy rates plummeted, malnutrition spiked, and the already wide 
gap between the wealthy few and the yearning masses expanded. Instead of a more 
egalitarian and prosperous society, the Alliance for Progress produced Aranismo—the 
                                                 
819 Maurice J. Williams. “[U.S. Assistance to Arana Government].” July 17, 1970. DNSA: Guatemala and 
the US., Agency for International Development, National Archives, 1. 
820 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions. 256. 
 410 
 
 
term used by Susanne Jonas to express the institutionalization of the counterinsurgency 
state under Colonel Arana.821 Throughout the 1960s, US aid aimed at economic 
development made its way into the hands of military through its unending pursuit of a 
communist counterinsurgency.  After the ascent of Carlos Arana to the presidency, 
military officers loyal to the president used their unchecked power to carve out massive 
tracts of land and pillage state coffers to add to their personal assets. Scholars have 
referred to the 1970s in Guatemala as “the decade of the generals.”822 Combining their 
unsurpassed military might with the financial assets of the state, the Guatemalan high-
command soon exceeded the wealth and power of the country’s traditional civilian 
oligarchs. Their rule in Guatemala, which continued uninterrupted until 1986, only added 
more corpses to the mound of dead that the counterinsurgency state had been built upon.  
 
Electing a reform-minded candidate to the presidency did not change the course 
Guatemalan military officers and US policymakers had already set in motion. This 
chapter has shown that Julio César Méndez Montenegro was president in name only, and 
that the leaders of the Guatemalan military retained the power they had seized as a result 
of the 1963 coup. Kennedy’s decision to accept a military overthrow as a means to 
prevent a leftist reformer, Juan Jose Arevalo, from becoming the president was meant to 
prevent an unfriendly and potentially subversive government from coming to power in 
Guatemala. A reaction to the military’s seizure of power, a full-fledged communist 
insurrection formed in resistance. Defense Minister Peralta used his time as head-of-state 
                                                 
821 Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala. 121. 
822 Black, Garrison Guatemala. Chapter 2.  
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to redefine the rules of Guatemalan politics to stymie any opposition to the coalition of 
far-right military officers and politicians. Faced with a civil war in Guatemala, the 
Johnson administration thought that the election of Méndez Montenegro would kick-start 
the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala. Instead, counterinsurgency campaigns consumed 
Guatemala and projects meant for economic and social development became another set 
of tools employed by the security forces. Collaboration between the United States and the 
Guatemalan military reached its peak as Guatemalan colonels, trained by the School of 
the Americas, orchestrated devastating operations against the revolutionary movement. 
By the time that some American officials became squeamish over the crimes against 
humanity perpetuated during the US-sponsored counterinsurgency campaign, the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces and its political allies had eliminated, controlled, or coopted 
other contenders for state power. By the end of the 1960s, the Alliance for Progress had 
failed to bring democracy and prosperity to Guatemala. Their country an inversion of 
those lofty ideals espoused by Kennedy in 1961, Guatemalans endured decades of harsh 
military rule, widespread violence, and civil war. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In 1975, reflecting on the program he had helped to build, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 
despaired at what had become of the Alliance for Progress. The Kennedy 
administration’s idealistic vision of the Western Hemisphere, united by the freedom and 
opportunity created by the Alliance, had been replaced by a “ghastly illusion”—a myopic 
focus on counterinsurgency doctrine.823 The history of US-Guatemalan relations during 
the Alliance for Progress era offers a cautionary tale of missed opportunity and tragic 
consequence. Instead of embracing popular leaders who supported the Alliance, the 
United States colluded with authoritarian commanders within the Guatemalan military 
and facilitated their ascent to power. At the same time, leading officers of the Guatemalan 
Armed Forces used the United States’ overriding fear of communism gaining additional 
footholds within its traditional sphere of influence to bring the state under their control, 
build a fearsome military-machine, and eventually acquire vast personal fortunes. The 
choices made by Guatemalan military officers and US officials converged to transform 
Guatemala into a nation where the distinctions between the command structure of the 
armed forces and the offices of the government were virtually nonexistent. Ultimately, 
the policy decisions made during the 1960s failed to completely counter communist 
opposition and enabled the Guatemalan military-government to go on to commit 
genocide as part of its US-sponsored counterinsurgency program. 
                                                 
823 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. “The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective.” in Latin America: The Search 
for a New International Role, ed. Ronald G. Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum, (New York, Halsted Press, 
1975) 83. 
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This study has reconstructed the course of US-Guatemalan relations during the 
Alliance for Progress era to show the crucial role the United States played in developing 
the country into a counterinsurgency state dominated by military officers. 
Simultaneously, this work has revealed that Guatemalan leaders, particularly those in the 
armed forces, successfully convinced Washington that they represented the most reliable 
partner for preventing a communist takeover. The resulting military government 
maintained its control over the nation through repression and violence. Successive ruling 
cabals of the high-ranking officers learned lessons during the 1960s that they applied 
vigorously during the following two decades of military-rule. The scorched-earth, 
exterminationist tactics employed during the 1960s counterinsurgency campaign laid the 
groundwork for the genocide the Guatemalan military-state committed during the 1980s. 
Although the notorious 1954 coup is rightly recognized as a watershed moment for the 
history of US-Guatemalan relations and the Cold War, the evidence presented here 
reveals that the military seizure of power in 1963 and its US-sponsored 
counterinsurgency campaign are critical for understanding how the Guatemalan state 
became capable of orchestrating the mass-murder if its own citizens.  
Guatemala’s importance to the United States shifted dramatically at the onset of 
the Cold War, as the banana republic transformed into one of the Western Hemisphere’s 
most contested battlegrounds. Consecutive presidential administrations, beginning with 
Truman, were deeply suspicious, and often hostile, toward revolutionary movements and 
looked upon the reforms implemented by left-leaning Guatemalan nationalists as 
communist infiltration, or, to paraphrase Ambassador Peurifoy—something near 
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enough.824 This antipathy toward revolution fostered a close relationship between the 
anticommunist officers of the Guatemalan military and likeminded American officials 
before the CIA-backed coup toppled Arbenz in 1954. When the Arbenz government 
began to encroach on US corporate possession in Guatemala and legalized the communist 
party, the United States had already hand-picked pliable, conservative military leaders 
who would do Washington’s bidding. Despite their elaborate designs, American planners 
learned they could not dictate events in Guatemala without the cooperation of key 
Guatemalan power brokers.  
The existing scholarship on US-Guatemalan relations is rooted in the 1954 coup.  
There can be no doubt that Operation: PBSUCCESS represented a seminal event in US-
Latin American relations. Although the United States was deeply involved in Guatemalan 
affairs since the late nineteenth century, the 1954 coup marked the beginning of a more 
direct, interventionist approach taken by the United States government. For those who 
have written about Guatemala’s Cold War experience, the overthrow of Arbenz marks 
the beginning of the country’s bloody descent into military rule, civil war, and genocide. 
In 1954, then vice-president Nixon boasted that the CIA-orchestrated coup against 
Arbenz represented  “the first instance in history where a Communist government has 
been replaced by a free one.”825 Nearly thirty years after President Jacobo Arbenz’s 
forced-resignation, a US official observing what was only beginning of the Guatemalan 
                                                 
824 This is in reference to a previously cited (Chapter 1) remark Ambassador Peurifoy made regarding 
Arbenz: “I am definitely convinced that if the President is not a Communist, he will certainly do until one 
comes along.” 
John Peurifoy, memorandum of conversation, December 17, 1953. FRUS 1952-1954 4: 1091-93. Quoted in 
Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 181 ; Rabe,  The Killing Zone. 46 
825 Richard Nixon, “What I Learned in Latin America” This Week. August 7, 1955 ;quoted in Susanne 
Jonas and David Tobis, eds. Guatemala. (New York: NACLA, 1974) 74-75 
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military-governments genocide against the Maya remarked, “What we’d give to have an 
Arbenz now.”826 While a wealth of scholarship exists on the 1954 coup and the Maya 
Genocide of the 1980s, English-language accounts that explain the foreign policy 
developments between the United States and Guatemala during the interim are rare and 
incomplete. Perhaps the most significant ambition of this study is to suggest that the 
events that occurred within the twenty-six year gulf between these cornerstones of the 
scholarship on US-Guatemalan relations of the Cold War are essential for understanding 
how the two are connected. In the process of reconstructing this overlooked period, the 
research presented here has provided evidence that what transpired during the Alliance 
for Progress era had a major impact on the development of the Guatemalan state and its 
relationship with the United States. Guatemala’s government certainly underwent a 
counterrevolutionary shift resulting from the 1954 coup, but this research shows that the 
state did not fully convert into a military regime until 1963. The high command of the 
Guatemalan Armed forces quickly followed their dissolution of the ostensibly 
constitutional democratic republic with a vicious counterinsurgency campaign where 
Alliance for Progress programs reinforced the training and armaments provided by the 
United States. Simply put, one cannot understand how the Guatemalan military-
government committed genocide without realizing the transformative steps taken by 
Guatemalan military officers and US officials during the Alliance for Progress era.       
  The United States had opportunities to change course even after the overthrow of 
Arbenz. The Kennedy administration represented the best chance for real change in US-
                                                 
826 Alan Riding, “Guatemala: State of Siege,” The New York Times Magazine.  August 24, 1980 pg 66-67; 
quoted in: Walter Lafeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. (New York: 
W.W. Norton  & Company, 1983) 9. 
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Guatemalan relations. Despite promises from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
that the Alliance for Progress would herald a new age of opportunity and freedom for 
Latin Americans, Guatemalans learned that the United States would not accept any 
challenge to its hemispheric hegemony. Washington’s willingness to compromise with 
reform-oriented nationalists in Guatemala completely disappeared after Fidel Castro’s 
revolution in Cuba offered an alternative vision for governance in Latin America. Under 
the direction of Kennedy’s ambassador to Guatemala, John Bell, the United States quietly 
cultivated its relationships with aspiring military officers who had steadily acquired more 
power in the crisis-ridden years that followed the1954 coup. When former president Juan 
José Arévalo announced that he would return from exile to run for another term, he 
presented himself as an admirer of Kennedy and a proponent for the Alliance for 
Progress. Nevertheless, President Kennedy chose to ignore the will of the Guatemalan 
people and some of his most knowledgeable advisors. Instead of defending the 
democratic process, Kennedy supported another military coup in Guatemala in order to 
ensure that the Central American country remained firmly within the United States’ 
sphere of influence. 
The United States intervention through the CIA’s Operation: PBSUCCESS in 
1954 is monumental event for the histories of the Cold War, US foreign policy, and 
modern Guatemala. Yet, for all of its importance, it was not an irreversible step in 
Guatemala’s tortured path to military dictatorship, civil war, and genocide. That moment 
arrived when the Guatemalan Armed Forces, with the approval of the Kennedy 
administration, took control of the government, canceled elections, and dissolved the 
constitution in March 1963. Once Defense Minister Enrique Peralta took the helm of 
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state, the military’s hold over the country could not be broken. His regime repressed 
political opponents, rewrote electoral laws to advantage the conservative-military 
coalition, and further extended the reach of security forces into Guatemalan society 
through Alliance for Progress sponsored programs. Under Peralta’s rule, the commanding 
officers of the Guatemalan Armed Forces fully changed from being the praetorian guard 
of the ruling elite, to the unchallenged masters of the Guatemalan state. 
The Kennedy administration’s willingness to partner with hardline anticommunist 
officers was an attempt to prevent the spread of communist-inspired revolution in 
Guatemala. The strategy almost immediately backfired. Colonel Peralta’s seizure of 
power inspired the disparate opposition groups and rebels to form a united front against 
the military regime and its US-backers. Faced with a popular revolutionary movement led 
by communists, the United States priorities in Guatemala shifted overwhelmingly to 
counterinsurgency efforts. Although their nationalist pride caused some Guatemalan 
officers, including Defense Minister Peralta, to hesitate in accepting the full measure of 
US assistance, this reluctance eroded as the guerrilla fronts’ attacks became more 
audacious and threatening. As such, Alliance for Progress programs became dominated 
by Guatemalan military officers who used the money and material initially intended for 
developmental projects to bolster their war against the guerrillas. The military’s authority 
over the state became unassailable as Washington poured millions in foreign aid into the 
coffers of counterinsurgency colonels.  
The Guatemalan Civil War provided a perpetual purpose for swollen military 
budgets and authoritarian rule that the Johnson administration, even if it had desired to do 
so, could not have reversed. This study has presented the presidency of Julio César 
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Méndez Montenegro as evidence for this claim. The leader of the Partido 
Revolucionario, who campaigned as the inheritor of Guatemala’s aborted 1944 
revolution, was president only in name. Peralta and the military high command 
reluctantly allowed Méndez Montenegro to assume the office that he had fairly won only 
after he agreed to a secret compact that effectively neutralized presidential power. 
Furthermore, under the façade of a civilian presidency and a return to constitutionality, 
the Guatemalan Armed Forces began to take extreme measures in their efforts to wipe out 
guerrillas and political dissidents. Making use of the armaments and training provided by 
the United States, the security forces employed clandestine death-squads who tortured, 
kidnapped, and massacred perceived enemies of the state on a whim. These reprehensible 
methods produced results. The estimated 500-strong guerrilla movement and its civilian 
supporters were nearly wiped out by the security forces’ coordinated assaults that claimed 
the lives of as many as ten-thousand Guatemalans. Despite the harsh repression and 
shocking violence employed by the military, the revolutionary movement was not 
completely destroyed, although it took nearly a decade to recover. The success of the 
1960s counterinsurgency campaign in Guatemala saw the normalization of forced-
disappearance, death-squad atrocities, and state-terror throughout Cold War Latin 
America and foreshadowed the genocide perpetuated by the Guatemalan government 
against the Maya in the 1980s. For Guatemala, the legacy of the Alliance for Progress era 
was the institutionalization of brutal military rule. 
Several scholars and commentators, especially those writing during the 1970s, 
regularly compared Guatemala and Vietnam as the United States’ laboratories of 
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counterinsurgency.827 This study too, has infrequently noted some of similarities between 
the two conflicts. Although if either country could be considered a laboratory, neither 
contained a controlled experiment. These two major Cold War counterinsurgency efforts, 
however, have major differences in scale, scope, and outcome. The protracted 
international quagmire that was the Vietnam War ended with the ignominious withdrawal 
of US forces and a communist victory. By contrast, Guatemala remained an 
anticommunist bastion and Cold War ally for Washington through its civil war that 
dragged on even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In pursuing Cold War victory in 
Guatemala, the United States encouraged one of the most murderous military regimes of 
the twentieth century to engage in flagrant crimes against humanity, culminating in 
genocide, in the name of anticommunism. If we are to make a comparison between these 
two tragic Cold War policy failures, then perhaps the results of the divergent results of 
these conflicts takes on greater importance. The Cold War history of Guatemala may 
offer a glimpse into a version of the Vietnam War that the United States won. 
                                                 
827 For example see: Blase Bonpane, “Our Latin Vietnam” February 4, 1968. The Washington Post.; and 
Howard Sharckman, “The Vietnamization of Guatemala: U.S. Counterinsurgency Programs.”; both 
reprinted in Susanne Jonas and David Tobis, eds. Guatemala. (Berkeley, CA: North American Congress on 
Latin America, 1974.) 
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